Withdrawal Agreement: Attorney General’s legal opinion on the Joint Instrument and Unilateral Declaration

Debate between Lord Thomas of Gresford and Lord Goldsmith

Tuesday 12th March 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Goldsmith (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord for repeating the Statement made by the right honourable Attorney-General in another place. The purpose of the Statement was to provide the Attorney-General’s opinion on the implications of the three documents produced following the Prime Minister’s dash to Strasbourg yesterday. The purpose was, of course, what the Prime Minister had promised to negotiate, referring to,

“not a further exchange of letters, but a significant and legally binding change to the withdrawal agreement”.

According to the Mail on Sunday—not a newspaper that I necessarily follow in any respect—the Attorney-General is reported to have said:

“I will not change my opinion unless I’m sure there is no legal risk of us being indefinitely detained in the backstop. I am putting my hand on my heart. I will not change my opinion unless we have a text that shows the risk has been eliminated. I would not put my name to anything less”.


Before considering the merits of what the Prime Minister has obtained it is worth considering what has not been achieved. As I predicted in the debate yesterday—was it only yesterday?—there is no change to the withdrawal agreement. Its 597 pages remain unchanged. That is not entirely true, because they have been reduced to a smaller volume. The text, however, is completely unchanged. So too are the 26 pages—I think now 28 pages—of the political declaration.

The result is that the legal risk remains unchanged. As the Attorney-General states in paragraph 19 of his latest opinion:

“The legal risk remains unchanged that if through no such demonstrable failure of either party, but simply because of intractable differences, that situation does arise”—


that is, the situation in which no new agreement is reached—

“the United Kingdom would have, at least while the fundamental circumstances remained the same, no internationally lawful means of exiting the Protocol’s arrangements, save by agreement.”

I had the opportunity to hear the Attorney-General’s Statement in another place this morning, and I understood him to be reconfirming that position in his answers.

It is also worth restating that—despite rumours to the contrary—there are no changes to the arbitration provisions and no new system of arbitration: it will still be lawyers who make this decision. It also follows that the statement in paragraph 16 of the Attorney-General’s opinion of 13 November 2018 still stands. That statement was as follows:

“It is difficult to conclude otherwise than that the Protocol is intended to subsist even when negotiations have clearly broken down. The ordinary meaning of the provisions set out above and considered in their context allows no obvious room for the termination of the Protocol, save by the achievement of an agreement fulfilling the same objectives. Therefore, despite statements in the Protocol that it is not intended to be permanent, and the clear intention of the parties that it should be replaced by alternative, permanent arrangements, in international law the Protocol would endure indefinitely until a superseding agreement took its place, in whole or in part, as set out therein”.


I understand that still to be the position and invite the noble and learned Lord to confirm it.

In his Statement, the Attorney-General focused particularly on other available remedies in the event that the European Union can be proved guilty of bad faith in not reaching an agreement. He says—this is important, and the noble and learned Lord repeated these words earlier—that the new documents are,

“not about a situation where, despite the parties properly fulfilling the duties of good faith and their best endeavours, they cannot reach an agreement on a future relationship”.

Again, therefore, I ask the noble and learned Lord to confirm that the Government accept that if, while acting in good faith, both parties cannot reach an agreement, the backstop would endure with no predetermined end date. I underline the phrase “can be proved to be” acting in bad faith, because that would have to be demonstrated—would it not? —and it would be for the United Kingdom, if it was asserting that position, to prove it. Can the noble and learned Lord confirm that? The burden of proof, as we lawyers say, would be on us.

I also question the likelihood that that could be proved. I have made this point before in the House. It would be a very strong thing—a virtually impossible thing—for this arbitral panel to find on proof that senior statesmen and politicians were acting in bad faith, rather than simply being unable to agree on what are important matters for them—for their constituents, as for ours. As a practising lawyer —at least when he is not fulfilling governmental responsibilities—would the noble and learned Lord agree that the prospects of proving that, when the EU negotiators are saying, “No, we did not regard these proposals as being in the interests of the EU”, are vanishingly small? If he were advising a client, he would tell him so now.

In his previous advice, the Attorney-General referred to the difficulties of proof and the egregious nature of the conduct that would be required to establish a breach of those obligations by the EU. These are very strong things to have to prove. I respectfully suggest that, in reaching a view on how much comfort these arrangements give, that must be borne very much in mind.

The Attorney-General says that he believes the risks of an indefinite stay are reduced. He does not—it seems to me—explain in his advice why they are reduced. I understood that, in short, he sees a greater political will to reach an agreement. That is a political judgement. It is of course open to him and to others to take the same or a different view on the political will. I cannot, however, agree that anything in any of the three documents changes the legal reality.

In paragraph 4 of his opinion, the Attorney-General referred to a,

“systematic refusal to take into consideration adverse proposals or interests”.

A systematic, contumacious or deliberate refusal even to consider proposals would, I suppose, be evidence of bad faith—but that is as far as it goes. A sincere disagreement about the terms, however, is not bad faith.

As for the third document, the unilateral statement, it is that and nothing more. It is what the United Kingdom says that it thinks, but that does not make it so. I do not, therefore, share the view that there is anything in these legal documents that shifts the legal risk.

I am loath to go back to the codpiece that I referred to yesterday. However, I said then that I did not really understand how that soubriquet had come into being. From what I have read since, it is apparently code for figleaf. I regret to say that despite the energy and good faith of both the Prime Minister and the Attorney-General—which I respect—these are no more than a figleaf, and Members of the other place are left to make their political judgments on the basis of the Prime Minister’s deal.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)]

My Lords, I do not propose to repeat the speech I made yesterday, in which I suggested that it was inappropriate for lawyers to determine an issue as important as whether the backstop had run its course. I am very pleased that in the conclusion to his Statement today, the Attorney-General emphasised that matters of law affecting withdrawal can only inform what is essentially a political decision that each of us must make. As it is a political decision, it is really not right to ask lawyers to determine whether a state is acting in bad faith, as the noble and learned Lord said a moment ago. I commend the Attorney-General for sticking firmly to the opinion that he first gave and not being shifted, despite the enormous pressure I have no doubt he is under.

An aggrieved party under this instrument would have to persuade the arbitrators to prove—as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, said—that the other party had failed the best endeavours test with the objective of applying the backstop indefinitely. Further, he would have to prove that there had been a persistent failure or a systematic refusal to consider the other side’s proposals. Only if the arbitrators found in the aggrieved party’s favour would they be able to use temporary measures to suspend the backstop—and I emphasise the word “temporary”. The other party could cure the problem at will at any time by taking the necessary measures to comply with the ruling.

My first question to the Minister, therefore, is this: what does he envisage to be temporary measures? What does that mean? Clearly, it would not be a permanent unilateral withdrawal from the backstop. What would happen at the Northern Ireland border to the free passage of goods if temporary measures were taken? Would it be a smuggler’s free for all or a clamping down?

The Attorney-General originally advised that it would be highly unlikely that the United Kingdom could take advantage of the remedies available to it for a breach of good faith and best endeavours because of the difficulties of proof and the egregious nature of the conduct, which would have to be established. I remind your Lordships that according to the Oxford English Dictionary, the word “egregious”, which the Attorney-General in typical fashion rolled off his tongue, means “shocking”. Is it now then all about timetables? That is all that the instrument appears to lay down. I listened to the Attorney-General talking in the other place about time being of the essence. To every lawyer, that phrase means that if the timetable is not adhered to, the whole agreement is defunct. The United Kingdom negotiators have not shown themselves to be particularly conscious of time over the past two and a half years. Will a breach of the timetable on either side now amount to egregious, shocking conduct, sufficient to trigger the dispute settlement arbitration procedures?

Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill

Debate between Lord Thomas of Gresford and Lord Goldsmith

Thursday 16th June 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

I shall speak to the amendment in the names of my noble friend Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, who cannot be here this evening, and myself. From the position of practitioners with hands-on experience of the criminal courts throughout our legal careers, we believe that the existing system works perfectly adequately. I concur with the views that have already been expressed in that way. Few applications are made and, of those that are, most are rejected by the magistrate who is the highly experienced person. Why then is there a need to move away from the current position? We are told that it is because there are people who feel that if they come to this country they may be subject to a private prosecution and to arrest.

Those who feel that way in foreign countries simply do not understand the practice and procedure of our courts. It is strange to amend our law not because of a real problem but because there are people abroad who believe that a problem exists when it does not. We are moving from the position that if the Government want to introduce the question of the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions, it should be made equally clear at the same time that the tests to be applied are those which would be applied in an ordinary criminal case in this country. No special tests will be needed for those from abroad and who face allegations of offences of universal jurisdiction.

We feel that the tests that are to be applied are those of the existing discretions of the Director of Public Prosecutions. I have been approached today by my noble friend Lord Carlile in his usual genial and understated way to point out that the tests applied by the DPP are in fact subject to change. The guidance has changed in some ways. My noble friend tells me that we are now on the seventh version of guidance issued to public prosecutors. If that is the case, it is perfectly simple to redraft on Report the amendment that we have put forward so that we put in a broader way that the same tests which apply to citizens of this country will also apply in the case of people who come to this country.

But there is a difference with private prosecutions. Let me say that no practising criminal lawyer has any time for private prosecutions. They generally fail, and generally they cause great harm and trouble to people. We feel that prosecution should be in the hands of people charged with those duties; namely, the Director of Public Prosecutions and the Crown Prosecution Service, which acts under the director. The distinction is that the arrest warrant in a private prosecution leads to trial. When the police arrest someone, there is an arrest, and then there is a consideration of evidence that is obtained between arrest and charge. The charge is brought on the advice of the CPS only where there is sufficient evidence for the case to go forward. At that intermediate stage, the charge does not exist in private prosecutions, and therefore the issuing of an arrest warrant leads, as I have said, straight to trial. We believe that safeguards are needed.

We start from the basis that there is no need to amend the existing position.

[Lord Goldsmith]

I wonder if the noble Lord could help me on one point. As an experienced criminal practitioner, as he rightly describes himself, he is well aware that there are two elements in the code for Crown prosecutors. One is the test as to the adequacy of the evidence and the second is the public interest. Both have to be satisfied before a prosecution takes place. I note that in the amendment tabled in his name and that of the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, there are two parts to this test. One part of the test, in proposed new subsection (4AA)(a), applies when there is enough evidence to be satisfied that there is a realistic prospect, so in that case there needs to be a consideration of the public interest. In the second test, in proposed new paragraph (b), which is where there is not enough evidence, there is no reference to the public interest at all. That is probably the most likely situation—that there is not enough evidence at that stage to know if there is a realistic prospect—so why does the public interest not come into his amendment at all, even though he has been addressing it on the basis that it is to replicate the current system, which requires the public interest to be considered?

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

The noble and learned Lord makes a very valid point and I accept that of course it is intended that the public interest test should apply in the second of the two instances as well, although it is not stated in the amendment. As the noble Lord said, we are seeking a solution that will ameliorate the decision of the Government to make it an essential prerequisite for the commencement of a private prosecution that the director consents. We simply seek to make it absolutely clear that the director will not apply a different test to people who come to this country. I hope that that answers the noble and learned Lord.

[Lord Goldsmith]

Does the noble Lord agree that in those circumstances it would be wrong for the House to accept the amendment as it is put forward?

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

I do not propose to ask the House to agree to this amendment tonight. This is the Committee stage. We shall consider the issue further. As I have already said, the criticisms so gently advanced to me by my noble friend have led me to believe that we might consider how to rephrase it in a way that would be more acceptable to the House.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Goldsmith]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness. I will make my second point, about what the existing system is. With respect, there is a misunderstanding among some of the Committee as to what the existing system is. In a moment, I will take the opportunity to say something about that on the basis of my experience, particularly from when I was Her Majesty’s Attorney-General.

First, in fundamental agreement with my noble friend Lord Campbell-Savours, the principle of universal jurisdiction is extremely important. I strongly support that principle. I was a Back-Bencher on the Labour Benches led by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Archer of Sandwell, who pushed the Government into passing an effective form of the International Criminal Court Act 2001, which meant that we could prosecute people who were not permanently established here. I was the Attorney-General who consented to the prosecution of Zardad the Afghan warlord; I actually led for the prosecution in that case. As the noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza, said, he was convicted, by a British jury, of hostage taking and torture. He was sentenced to 20 years, which he is still serving.

Just so that noble Lords do not think that my favouring of universal jurisdiction is limited to particular countries, I mention Israel. I publically indicated that I was going to call for the extradition of an Israeli solider when I was concerned that the Israeli authorities were not properly investigating and dealing with an allegation that a British citizen, James Miller, had been killed in Gaza by Israeli fire. I did not do that because I was being pushed by some group. I went and talked to the Israeli investigators, looked at their files, cross-examined them, and called for the Metropolitan Police to carry out its own investigations into evidence which the Israelis said demonstrated that it was not Israeli gunfire, but which demonstrated that it almost certainly was.

In the end the Israelis did not go quite as far as I would have liked, but they did more than they had done as they were threatened with a prosecution. Indeed, they thankfully paid significant compensation to the family of this poor young man. Therefore, I am very much in favour of universal jurisdiction. It is important that we have a robust and effective system. However—this is the second point—there is an anomaly in the existing system, which the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has rightly identified; namely, that the prosecution cannot take place without the consent of the Attorney-General. This is the debate that the noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury, and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, had.

I know that memories fade and that it is a number of years since I did this job, but my recollection is that every single one of the universal jurisdiction offences requires the consent of the Attorney-General to a prosecution. Of course, the Attorney-General can always issue a nolle prosequi, but that is different. In these cases, Parliament has taken the view that a prosecution of this sort has such a public element to it that it should not proceed without the consent of the Attorney-General. As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, pointed out, the consequence of that is that we have this anomaly. A private group or a private individual, no doubt for good reasons but sometimes perhaps not—I will come back to that—can have an individual arrested even though, when the matter goes to the Attorney-General, the prosecution will not take place.

I first came across the practical problem to which this matter gives rise in the case of Major General Almog, which has been referred to. The first that I knew of an application to arrest Major General Almog was when we received a call from the relevant court to ask me whether I wanted to say anything about it. I could not say anything about it as I had no role at that stage; my role would come later. I could not do anything. I make this point also because one of the briefings that I have seen on this issue suggests that there is no evidence that in that case there was no prior notice given to the Attorney-General of the intended application. I know that there was not in that case because it took place on my watch. From that moment I have considered how you deal with the anomaly that you can have somebody arrested but ultimately there will be no prosecution. That gives rise to a number of problems. First, it gives rise obviously to the problem that someone may be detained, deprived of their liberty and certainly restricted in their movements for a period before the papers reach the Attorney-General and a decision can be made. That is not good for the individual. Secondly, it is not good for the people who have, as it were, promoted the prosecution in the first place. They will be disappointed that, having got somebody arrested, the matter does not proceed.

There is a question of the public funds involved—perhaps it is for your Lordships to decide how important this is—but there is also the consideration that such action will in certain circumstances exacerbate relations with what may be a friendly state if, for good reason—I will come back to what that may be—an Attorney-General says no to a prosecution but somebody has been locked up for a period of time, or at least prevented from going about their business. That will do nothing for good relations and there may be circumstances—the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, referred to such a circumstance, hypothetically, at least—where that could be very damaging to a wider interest.

For a long time I believed that it was necessary to deal with the anomaly. One comes back to the difference between noble Lords’ amendments and the Government’s amendment. Fundamentally, the difference comes down to this: other noble Lords’ amendments say that you should notify the DPP and he should have an advisory role. The Government say that this process cannot happen without his consent. What is the difference between those stances? It is not the difference of timing because if you are going to notify the DPP and ask him to give an advisory view, you need to give the man or woman time to consider it. I agree with what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said about the ability of the CPS to move swiftly. I have also heard it said that one of the problems is that there may not be enough time. In the cases that I have seen, the groups that have wanted a prosecution have known for some time that they would like to see that particular individual prosecuted. They may not have known that he or she was travelling on a particular day but they have been assembling their evidence. I see no reason at all—I understand that the DPP has offered this—why there cannot be a system under which they present their material to the DPP so that he and his staff have a reasonable opportunity to consider it and can form a view as to whether or not they will give their consent.

I see real dangers in the present system. It is an anomaly. It leads to dangers to the individual and risk to the people who promote this. It risks relations. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said that he knows of cases—indeed, he has advised on cases—of people who are frightened to come to this country. I have heard this as well. The Government will know better, and if that is the case, it is a bad thing. It is a bad thing if in fact they are being deterred from coming where ultimately there have been no prosecutions.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

Does the noble and learned Lord agree that it would be quite wrong for the DPP to give in advance immunity to someone coming to this country?

[Lord Goldsmith]

I am really not sure that I agree with the noble Lord. It is not an immunity, but if the question arose and the DPP had seen the material that was going to be produced, had examined it and, having regard to the evidential test and the public interest test, he was of the view that he would not consent to a prosecution, I do not see why he should not say that. That would not be done in a broadcast, but if there were a legitimate reason to know the answer, so that someone can, for example, come to attend an important meeting with Her Majesty's Government, why not? In that respect, what the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, said about the DPP having an opportunity to consult a policy statement about this was very wise. That is exactly what I would expect this particular DPP to do; and he would look to what all the interests were. That would, no doubt, be one of the questions that he would consider—to what extent is it right? He would want to make sure that he is not bounced into making wrong decisions and that he has an adequate opportunity to decide. That is important.

That takes me to where I was going when the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, intervened—the amendment in his name and that of the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven. There are two points about that. The first is the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile. Neither this DDP nor, I hope, any DPP needs the straightjacket of being told by Parliament how to do his or her job. They can be trusted to do that without that sort of straightjacket.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

My Lords—

[Lord Goldsmith]

Let me just make this point and of course I will give way to the noble Lord. I made the point about that amendment not just because it is surprising that he is putting it forward on the basis that it is intended to restate the law as it stands, because it patently does not do that, but because, as the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, said, it demonstrates the dangers of trying to be prescriptive as to exactly what the tests should be.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

I think that the noble and learned Lord misunderstands the purpose behind our amendment, which is not to put a straightjacket around the director, but to give assurance to people who want to come to this country that they will be treated in exactly the same way as a resident or a British citizen would be treated. I should have thought that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, would welcome that assurance for the purposes of advising his clients.