Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Bill

Debate between Lord Thomas of Gresford and Lord Craig of Radley

Report stage
Tuesday 13th April 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I am relieved to hear the Minister’s statement concerning Clause12 and its removal. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, asked who the message was to be sent to. The proposal to give notice to a potential enemy that British forces would not be bound by the restraints of the European Convention on Human Rights was truly alarming. It would have exposed our troops in the field to reciprocal treatment.

I followed the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, in Committee in pointing out the utter uselessness of this clause anyway, in that it could not deal with those most pertinent and significant rights in the covenant from which no derogation is possible. It did not even try to mirror the circumstances of war or national emergency contained in Article 15, which permit derogation only in very strict circumstances. I do not propose to repeat that analysis.

The Government have thought again on the desirability of this clause. I urge them to think again on the desirability of the whole Bill. I urge them to pull the whole Bill and bring it back in the next Session after proper consultation. I do not say this from any party-political position but wearing the hat of the chair of the Association of Military Court Advocates. I cannot say that I am speaking for that association because no meetings have been possible during the pandemic, but you will appreciate that its members’ primary concern is with defending the ordinary service man or woman in courts martial, many of which relate to overseas operations.

For the reasons which I gave in relation to Amendments 1 and 6 and will not repeat at this stage, this Bill does not protect our service men and women. The only body protected by the Bill is the Ministry of Defence, probably for the ignoble reason given in Committee by the noble Lord, Lord Hendy: to save a bob or two. It is badly thought out, with many omissions and with repercussions that were not understood, not least in its failure to carry out the manifesto commitment of the Government to give statutory force to the military covenant—a matter which we shall shortly discuss. So, they should pull it now, and by all means bring it back in the next Session in a form which will be of use to and protect serving seamen, soldiers and airmen, without the ill thought-out provisions which expose them to danger. I say to the Government: pull the Bill.

[Lord Craig of Radley (CB)]

My Lords, I too welcome the Minister’s statement. As I have reminded the House, the Government’s justification for this clause to amend the Human Rights Act 1998 was to reflect the undertaking of a ministerial Statement by the then Defence Secretary, and repeated in this House by the noble Earl, Lord Howe, on 10 October 2016. If the Government still stand by it, it is worth recalling parts of that Statement. It explained that in overseas operations our personnel have had to face growing legal uncertainty and an unprecedented level of litigation. The Statement said that

“the resulting uncertainties have been distressing to many current personnel and veterans, and military advice is that there is a risk of seriously undermining the operational effectiveness of the armed forces”.—[Official Report, Commons, 10/10/16; col. 3WS]

I draw attention to the risk mentioned in that Statement—the risk of seriously undermining the operational effectiveness of the Armed Forces when engaged in conflict.

The Bill does not adequately address the growing concern that commanders of whatever rank may, for fear of later legal challenge or charge, be unsure or inhibited in the orders or directions they give to engage and defeat an enemy in the course of conflict. Statements about combat immunity in relation to human rights legislation lack the precision required for conflict. To state that a court should be

“very slow … to question operational decisions made on the ground by commanders, whatever their rank or level of seniority”

lacks precision for commanders at the time, on the spot. Even before a case reaches court, the accused will be subject to worries and uncertainty for weeks, months and even years while evidence is collected, witnesses identified and prosecuting authorities decide whether to take the case to court for trial. Some might even describe this as mental torture.

In Smith, the judgment was that there is a “middle ground” between close combat on the one hand and political direction on the other about the allocation of resources, where the actions or omissions of individual service personnel can be determined only on the evidence ex post facto—that is, a review far removed in time, place and emotion from the possible extreme dangers of the moment.

I am not questioning these well-argued legal judgments but drawing attention to a mismatch—and I think it is important to draw attention to it—between the disciplinary dictates of the Armed Forces Act and human rights legislation that may arise when service personnel are at or near to war. I drew attention to this in 1998, when debating what is now the Human Rights Act 1998. Regrettably, this Bill does not address this issue, in spite of the Defence Secretary’s Statement. One must hope that the human rights review now being undertaken by Sir Peter Gross—he has assured me that the issue of combat immunity will be considered—will provide a workable solution.

Meanwhile, Clause 12 provided for no more than was originally and clearly stated at the time the Human Rights Bill was being debated in 1998. As the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor, said, and these words are well rehearsed already:

“I also remind your Lordships and the noble and gallant Lord—


that is me—

that under Article 15 of the convention a state may, in time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation, take measures derogating from its obligations under the convention to the extent required by the exigencies of the situation.”—[Official Report, 5/2/1998; col. 768.]

The noble and learned Lord further asserted that the human rights convention was a flexible instrument. I fear that is now rather a dubious claim. Clause 12 added nothing to what was made clear in 1998, and I welcome the Government’s acceptance of the amendment from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope.

Armed Forces Bill

Debate between Lord Thomas of Gresford and Lord Craig of Radley

Tuesday 1st March 2016 Grand Committee

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

My Lords, I would like to say something about attitudes towards mental health. I remember in the 1970s appearing on behalf of a person who had been blown up rescuing a pilot from a plane in the Western Desert during the war some 30 years before. It was extremely difficult in those days to persuade the ministry—the War Department, I think it was—that he was entitled to a war pension. We succeeded in the Divisional Court, but in the next election when I was a candidate he stood up and told the people there that if they voted for anyone, it should not be that Liberal candidate as he had problems.

[Lord Craig of Radley (CB)]

My Lords, I support the thrust of this probing amendment. Clearly there are enormous differences between trying to deal with people who are still in the services and may be suffering from mental illness and those who have become veterans and, maybe many years later, develop or show symptoms of mental illness. How does that get related to their time in service? There are a number of other practical points that I think have been very well made. I would like to put on the record that I am for this in principle but I can see that there are many difficulties. No doubt the Minister will have a chance to tell us about them.

Armed Forces (Service Complaints and Financial Assistance) Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Thomas of Gresford and Lord Craig of Radley

Monday 16th March 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)]

My Lords, I speak as chairman of the Association of Military Court Advocates—I declare an interest; I am not expressing the view of that association.

I very much welcome the extension of the role of the ombudsman to considering the merits of a particular issue. I approach it from the point of view of the complainant and the complainant’s family, and the importance of the confidence of the public in the system of justice in the Armed Forces. From the point of view of recruitment and retention of service personnel, it is very necessary that those who undertake the burdens of service life should feel that they have a fair and just system of complaint. As I expressed when the Bill went through this House, the weakness of simply looking at process was that a decision on process would not be satisfactory to the complainant and their family. They would want an ombudsman to act like an ombudsman and to look at the merits of a particular case. I am grateful that the Government have moved in that direction.

[Lord Craig of Radley (CB)]

My Lords, following the Government’s defeats on this Bill in the other place, their initial reaction was to consider how best to reverse them when the Commons amendments were considered in your Lordships’ House. I shared that reaction. Not to reverse the defeats would be a further withdrawal from the position adopted by the Government and reaffirmed in correspondence that I had with the Minister of State, Anna Soubry, following the Bill’s consideration in this House. She wrote to me:

“The bill as it currently stands”—

that was before the defeats in the Commons—

“gets the balance right between having a strong and independent Ombudsman and preserving the PRIMACY of the chain of command. It is that balance that I wish to maintain”.

We now have this run of government amendments reflecting their new position. No doubt this change of heart within government has been brought about in part by the imminence of Dissolution, in part by the weakness of their position in this House on this matter, and in part by the acceptance by the Chiefs of Staff, albeit on the basis of shotgun pressure upon them, that the Bill as amended is the least bad of the possibilities likely to be available. However, is not that latter acceptance itself due in part to the character of Nicola Williams, the nominee for the new post of ombudsman, and the position that she has adopted of recognising the ethos and value of the chain of command? Whether she accepts, as Anna Soubry stated, the primacy of preserving the chain of command remains to be judged.

However, in due time, will her replacement be as savvy? We are legislating about principles, not personalities. I am also concerned to learn that the ombudsman’s office may be 20-plus strong, not all of them lawyers, as will be the ombudsman, and so probably less qualified to undertake systemic examinations of complaints handlings, let alone of actual complaint topics.

Moreover, there seems to be no presumption of improvement in the working of the chain of command over time in dealing with complaints—in fact, the opposite. The default presumption is that complaints will continue to be subject to systemic and irreversible maladministration, as bad as or even worse than it is today. Once again, it is the unspoken but damaging inference that civil authority does not believe that the military chain of command is ever really competent or trustworthy, or is ever really worthy of being upheld or supported. Such an attitude would concern me very greatly.

The Human Rights Act 1998 flew in the face of and upturned long-standing Armed Forces legislation. It removed the majority of the Armed Forces’ legal processes from the chain of command and was damaging to the sense of trust. For example, the convening and review of courts martial are no longer exercised by the chain of command.

The Human Rights Act and other, more recent, statutes affecting the position of the chain of command have served to chip away at and undermine the essential and irreplaceable value of trust and support up and down the chain of command. Although each individual change may seem not to be too damaging or serious, it is the cumulative impact of a number of statutes on the values of the chain of command that worries me and that must be considered. Such values are vital to the use of armed forces in peace or war and to success in operations.

Will the Minister give an undertaking that, as and when there are significant improvements in dealing with complaints by the chain of command, the size and scope of the ombudsman’s team will be reviewed? Otherwise, and given those improvements, there will surely be a temptation to avoid idle hands and deploy the efforts of the 20-plus in systemic work which might, on balance, prove to be inimical to and derogatory of the standing and desired primacy of the chain of command. I look to the Minister for that assurance.