Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Debate between Lord Thomas of Gresford and Lord Carlile of Berriew

Report stage & Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords & Report: 1st sitting & Report: 1st sitting: House of Lords
Monday 11th January 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB) [V]]

My Lords, on the narrow point just made very clearly by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, I would question the way in which she diminishes the importance of codes of practice, which have the force of law. One example of a code of practice that has had the most incredible effect on the fairness of trials is Code C under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, which in many ways has been the formidable weapon in the hands of the defence advocate, and sometimes in the hands of the prosecution advocate too, to ensure that justice is done.

That said, I have no objection whatever to what is intended by Amendments 6 and 36. I suspect that the Minister would want to refer to the code, at least generally, which is peppered with words such as “reasonable”, “proportionate”, et cetera, and would say that reasonableness is imported in any event. However, I agree with the view that in a Bill of this kind, adding the word “reasonable” into the statute as suggested may be comforting and safe, and will make it a better statute.

I disagree with Amendment 18, which is in this group, and a time limit of four months. Running a CHIS is often very arduous and complicated, and many CHIS are run for much, much longer than four months. The noble Lord, Lord McCrea, in an earlier part of this evening’s debate, referred to the information that was obtained concerning the Real IRA, as it was called, which led to the conviction of a number of its operatives. I do not know anything about the facts of that case, but I suspect that in an operation of that kind, many CHIS were run for long periods, and for very good reasons. As the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, said very eloquently, those who are running the CHIS are, in any event, these days, doing an extremely good job in great difficulty, and we do not want to add to their bureaucratic burden; they and their CHIS have great difficulties to face. They do not want to be faced with the necessity of reapplying every four months; it is just far too short a period.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I have little to add to what has gone before. I often wonder whether the Government are concerned about judicial review when they resist placing the test of a decision on a reasonable basis in any legislation. If the test in any case is simply the subjective belief of the official—the government agent involved—it might be hoped that a trip to the divisional court and an application for judicial review would be avoided. The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, did indeed refer to public law tests. The Wednesbury test of reasonableness is now more than 70 years old and it is sometimes forgotten that it was the local picture house that took the town’s corporation to court because the licence it gave prevented children under 15 attending the cinema on a Sunday, whether accompanied by an adult or not—one’s mind flips back to the dim and distant past. That was the factual basis of a very important principle of law.

When considering reasonableness in this context, there are two limbs. In the context the House is discussing, the question would be whether the authoriser had taken into account all the wider implications of the authorisation, including its effect on prospective victims of the crime being committed. He would obviously have to follow the code, which, as the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, has just said, is peppered with instructions, having the force of law, to act reasonably. If the authorisers get beyond the first limb of the test, the second limb is whether the decision they have taken is so outrageous and irrational that, as Lord Diplock put it in a later case, it is

“so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it.”

Needless to say, cases challenging a decision tend to succeed on the first limb, but I do not see why we have to go to that position. I have been trying to check Hansard, but I think that the Minister referred, in reply to the first group of amendments today, to the decision being reasonable. I cannot see any reason why it would not be reasonable to put “reasonable” on the face of the Bill. I support these amendments.

Queen’s Speech

Debate between Lord Thomas of Gresford and Lord Carlile of Berriew

Wednesday 8th January 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

Hear, hear.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

We have one over there. Another fought Lord Roberts of Conwy for Plaid Cymru and there was even a Conservative contender, for a valleys seat in south Wales. I welcome the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, and particularly welcome his support for the A55—a north Wales road, I note—which runs into the Irish Sea, and the new Irish border, somewhere to the west of South Stack, Holyhead.

The well-worn track, however, between the Temple and Westminster was becoming rocky. For a young barrister, political involvement risked a black mark. None of the current Supreme Court justices appears to have had a juvenile fling at politics, although I note that one of them once owned a racehorse called, provocatively, “Young Radical”—something we all thought we were. Now there are these vague proposals, in the Conservative manifesto and in the Queen’s Speech, to establish a constitution, democracy and rights commission. Protecting the Constitution, the paper published by the right-wing think tank Policy Exchange on 28 December, expresses alarm at the entry of the Supreme Court into the political arena. The authors appear to see the Supreme Court justices, hitherto political virgins, coming together as a collective body with a determination to seize political control and promulgate new laws. We heard an echo of that in the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde, who referred to “imaginative” new laws.

It is a highly regressive document, even calling for the removal of the title of “Supreme Court” and reverting to the wording of the Victorian Act of 1876 when Lords of Appeal in Ordinary were created to man the Judicial Committee. The authors of the paper write:

“If appeals against judgments were reviewed, in the words of section 4 of the Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1876, before Her Majesty the Queen in her Court of Parliament, it might be much less likely that the UK’s apex appellate court would mistake its position in relation to the Houses of Parliament.”


Accordingly, this paper—the basis of Tory policy—calls for the renaming of the Supreme Court as the “Upper Appeals Court” to emphasise its inferiority to the political sovereignty of Parliament and the Executive. That may not be quite compatible with the concept of independence of the judiciary as the third pillar of our democracy. Are we on the way to Philadelphia?