Localism Bill
Lord Taylor of Holbeach Excerpts(12 years, 10 months ago)
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Lord Taylor of Holbeach
I am pleased that we have been able to have this interesting debate. As the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, has said, both case law and the Standards Boards have moved on this issue, but there has been a considerable degree of anxiety about it in local government service areas, as my noble friend Lord Newton said. I think the Committee will agree that that has not been in the interests of local democracy. That is why Clause 14 forms such an important part of this Bill and why we are bringing it forward, so I welcome the opportunity provided by this debate. My noble friend Lord Greaves has produced, if I may say so, a typical set of House of Lords probes, and I accept totally what he is seeking to do. I think it is the wish of the Committee that I should go through the amendments that he has tabled and make it clear what the particular wording means and why we consider it important that these little nuances are brought in.
I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker, that nothing in this clause stops proper decision-making. Indeed, nothing in the provisions means that decisions are not going to be taken properly, having regard to all relevant considerations. On Gypsy and Traveller sites and the issues to which she referred specifically, I assure her that local authorities operate under fairly firm statutory guidance on provision for these matters. Any debate about this matter would have to be conducted in a proper fashion. In the end, councillors make decisions within that framework. We know that some people hold quite strong views on such issues. We accept that. In a democracy, we have to accept that people come with strong views. Whether they come with a closed mind is a different issue altogether.
I will come back to the comments made by the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, but it might help if I first go through the amendments. Amendment 88 removes “(to any extent)”. We believe that by putting in “to any extent” we bring clarity to the issue. We are seeking to give councillors clarity that they should be fully entitled to the freedom to campaign on issues that are important to their local communities. There should be no suggestion in the drafting of this provision that there are degrees of having a closed mind that need to be taken into account when deciding whether this provision applies. That is why that phrase is in the clause. It is to make it absolutely clear that there is no degree of a closed mind that might be the subject of predetermination. If this amendment were accepted, the position on predetermination would be less clear for elected members and the public, which would defeat the whole purpose of this clause, which is to provide clarification on the current position.
Amendment 89 is an unnecessary drafting change. The phrase we are using here is taken from previous case law and provides clarity that a councillor is not to appear to have had a closed mind if they had previously campaigned on an issue. The fact that they may have campaigned on an issue does not necessarily mean that they are providing evidence that they appear to have a closed mind. This drafting seeks to provide clarity for councillors—we want them to be sure that they are doing the right thing, and we would all agree that councillors want to do the right thing—as well as judges and the courts. Indeed, the reason this is in the Bill is to provide some statutory law where so much has been dependent on case law.
On Amendment 90, the word “just” in this sentence indicates more clearly the function the provision is performing, which is excluding certain conditions from the judgment to be made about whether someone had a closed mind. Read literally, without the word “just” the sentence could mean that any decision-maker doing something that indicates the view that they will take is automatically considered not to have a closed mind, so the inclusion of the word “just” avoids the potential for this misinterpretation, which would lead to a result that we do not want. The word “just” therefore defines the matter more clearly.
Amendment 91 would narrow the range of councillors’ activities that we are seeking to ensure cannot lead to accusations of a councillor having a closed mind. Our current drafting makes it clear that if a decision-maker had previously “done anything” that indicated what view they took on an issue, they would not as a result be considered to have a closed mind. I reassure my noble friend that we fully intend the phrase “done anything” to include anything that a member may have said, written, or perhaps even held aloft on a placard. The amendment is therefore unnecessary.
On Amendments 92, 95 and 96, the legislation has been written to apply to elected, co-opted and other members of councils. There is no need for the provisions to be extended to paid officers in local councils. I assure my noble friend that separate rules are in place for dealing with officer bias in decision-making. This clause is not designed to address officer bias. The definition referred to in Amendments 95 and 96 of the type of decisions covered by these provisions does, however, need to include this reference to functions of an officer of the authority, because certain officer decisions are exercised by elected or co-opted members of the council for technical reasons; some of the functions carried out by elected mayors, the chairman of an authority, and leader of an executive are regarded as functions of officers of the authority.
On Amendment 94, we do not accept that this distinction should be made between the role of a co-opted member on a committee of the authority and the role of a co-opted member on a joint committee. Co-opted members of a committee of an authority would be free to express a view or campaign on an issue without being at risk of being unfairly accused of predetermination, but co-opted members of a joint committee would not. There are certainly instances in which co-opted members can sit on joint committees, and there is no reason to suppose that they will be any less capable of reaching a fair decision—something that lies at the heart of all of this—when sitting on a single-authority committee.
Amendment 96ZA makes a perfectly reasonable suggestion, but I refer noble Lords to our published impact assessment of these clauses. The impact assessment states that there will be a full policy-implementation review of the whole Localism Bill, including the policies on predetermination. That will provide all the information that I believe the noble Lord is looking for in this amendment, so I hope that when the time comes the noble Lord will not press his amendment.
The noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, asked whether, if as a matter of fact a councillor had a closed mind, the councillor could participate in a decision, what evidence would be used to determine that he had a closed mind and how this would be affected by the proposal in Clause 14. If a councillor is actually biased, he cannot participate in a decision; evidence of a closed mind could be that he has declared that he has a closed mind or that he refuses to listen to any new arguments. In reality, if a councillor says that he is not prepared to listen to any arguments and is self-evidently not prepared to do his duty by doing so, as we would all expect local government to do in a democracy, he would self-evidently be saying that he had a closed mind.
Lord McKenzie of Luton
My Lords, I understand and take that point. But if you had someone who declared that they had a closed mind, is not the import of subsection (2) that, if they declared that at any point up to the time when the decision was made, it would be ignored? That is what the provision says. If that is right, how do you adduce the fact that someone has a closed mind? That is what I am struggling with. We accept that, if you have got a closed mind, you should not be involved and that decisions could be unlawful. If people have room to review the facts, that is fine. But my concern is what evidence you would now get. Prior to this, if someone had said, “I have got a closed mind” and there was surrounding evidence to that effect, it would be clear where we are. But under this proposal, you have to ignore what someone has done. What someone has done is what they have said, what they have written and the banners that they may hold aloft. How does the Minister square that issue?
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
My Lords, the situation, as I understand it, is that statements made prior to a decision being made in the period in which a campaign or a discussion is being held should be evidence that a councillor may have a strong opinion, but that does not necessarily prejudice the decision that they are going to make. But if they say at the time that they are making a decision that they have a closed mind, they should not participate in that decision. The practicalities of this are to put pressure on all councillors, however passionate they are about an issue, to consider their position before they vote as to whether they have genuinely considered alternatives that are presented to them. In which case, as long as they have done that, this clause means that in no way can they be considered to have had a closed mind if they have done that in all conscience. This is designed to provide a framework of behaviour in local government, which I am sure that the noble Lord would seek to encourage.
Lord McKenzie of Luton
It is important that we get to the core of this. From what the noble Lord is saying, is it the case that if someone said every day of the week for two months leading up to the decision that they have a closed mind, that would be ignored under these provisions and that if they did not say, “I have a closed mind” on the day on which the decision is made, there is no difficulty?
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
It is fair to say that anyone who did not say that they were considering the matter with a fair consideration of the argument might well be in some difficulty. But what is disregarded by this clause is that evidence of the view that a person takes of a matter is not evidence of their state of mind when they are making that decision. It is important to understand that this is designed to enforce an openness of mind at the point of decision-making, which, after all, was always the purpose of predetermination.
The problem with predetermination was that it excluded people who had campaigned and, as my noble friend Lord Newton in his helpful contribution pointed out, the difficulty that a lot of local councillors had was knowing to what extent they could participate in the decision-making process if they had campaigned strongly on an issue. All this now does is say to a local councillor, “However hard you have campaigned on an issue, you should still make decisions without a closed mind or not participate in that decision”. But that is for the councillor himself to determine, rather than be determined by this clause.
Lord McKenzie of Luton
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister and I am sorry to have interrupted him on two or three occasions, but this is a very important issue. We accept the anxiety in local government about what councillors can and cannot do, and the importance, as the noble Lord, Lord Greaves, said, of the democratic component of this so that people are not precluded from campaigning on issues they feel strongly about. But that is the position at the moment, for as long as their minds are ajar.
Sometimes very cautious advice is given and therefore people tend to be more restricted than the law may otherwise allow, but notwithstanding all that—I think we have common cause in what we see as a proper outcome in this, so that if you have a closed mind or you are going to be involved in a decision, you should be able to judge the facts objectively and not predetermine the matter—I still see a difficulty in this provision. That is because I cannot see how you would ever get evidence of someone having a closed mind on the basis of this provision. It seems that you would have to ignore what they had said and done and campaigned around right up to the point when they make the decision. That seems to me to be an anomaly and I am still not sure where it leaves us.
Lord Beecham
I recall at Second Reading the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, speaking very passionately about how one needs to respond to constituents. The assumption is that a councillor will always be on the side of his constituents, but that may not be the case. A councillor may decide that a particular project—let us say, an application for a bail hostel or something of that kind—is one that he, having heard the evidence, would want to support. It might be an incinerator or an abattoir, which may not play terribly well with his constituents. How would those constituents feel, as opposed to the commercial developer who might be the applicant—which is assumed normally to be the case—if they believed that their councillor had made up his mind in favour of something that they did not want without being open to persuasion and hearing their arguments and representations at the decision-making meeting? If one takes that point of view into account, one has the grave concerns which both my noble friends have advanced and which require detailed consideration by the time we get to Report. This is not a one-way street. We have to be very careful about how we might seek to change the balance within what is, as I implied in my earlier intervention, a quasi-judicial function. It is about only those that I think we are concerned.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
The noble Lord has degrouped amendments which address that issue; perhaps we will come on to that matter later. The failure of an elected politician to fulfil the wishes of their constituents or to fail to respond properly to their wishes cannot be legislated for; the solution lies in the electoral process, at a subsequent general election. The illustration that the noble Lord used could not be covered by legislation in any way that he would have wished.
I believe that we have satisfactorily demonstrated that the purpose of this clause is to clarify the position of elected councillors to make it possible for them to campaign and engage fully with their local communities on issues which concern them without inadvertently—as has been the case in the past—excluding themselves from the decision-making process by doing so. That is why this is a great step forward and why it is in the Bill.
Lord McKenzie of Luton
My Lords, I will be brief. I am not unsympathetic to the noble Lord’s amendment but I am not sure that I agree with the basis on which he proposes it. I think that he is distinguishing some circumstances where predetermination can be dispensed with from others where it should not. Without reopening the arguments that we have just been through, I do not believe that that is the import of Clause 14. In a sense, we are still awaiting the definitive government view on that. The issues around predetermination ought to run throughout the decision-making process. It is not quasi-judicial planning issues; there are lots of other decisions that councillors may make. As I understand it, if they have discretion on decisions, it must be real discretion. If they have pre-empted it by predetermination, there is the prospect that that decision will be unlawful, whatever area of decision-making is involved. However, I would not particularly disagree with taking those licensing operations outside the provisions of Clause 14.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie of Luton, for temporarily forgetting that he is on the opposition Benches and not the government Benches and, in effect, making the case that the Government will be making to my noble friend Lord Greaves. On this issue, I am afraid that I beg to differ with my noble friend.
I apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Beecham; I imputed this set of amendments to him and not to my noble friend when we were discussing the previous grouping. It probably rather shook him to discover that he was the author of a set of amendments that he had not actually been involved with.
On Amendment 93, it might help to clarify just how radical the change is. I hope to provide some reassurance with what I am going to say. The Government’s view is that an elected member is equally able to listen to arguments and evidence and come to a fair decision on what my noble friend has referred to as a personal licensing matter as he is on any other licensing matter. That means that there is no justification for leaving unclear the circumstances that mean that a councillor has to withdraw from participating in any licensing decision process. That lack of clarity arises from the fact that we as a Government do not accept the distinction being drawn here between what a councillor can say about a decision relating to a personal licence and what they can say about a decision on any other licensing matter. We strongly believe—this is at the heart of our policy on predetermination—that councillors should no longer be restricted in which of their opinions they are free to express to the communities that they are elected to represent. Councillors, like any other individuals, will have regard to laws on libel and data protection when discussing individual circumstances or information which they may hold. However, it would be wrong to restrict them in this way from commenting on what may be a matter of great interest to their constituents.
I ask my noble friend to withdraw the amendment. I am afraid that the Government are not prepared to see these as exceptional circumstances from the general principle of predetermination and the freedom of councillors to express their view prior to making a decision.
Lord Shipley
My Lords, perhaps I may comment briefly on the standards issue, not least because I tabled an amendment yesterday about standards committees that unfortunately has been printed as part of the amendments to the Education Bill. Members of your Lordships’ House will, therefore, not have seen it. I fully understand the predicament that that puts us all in. However, this relates directly to what the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, said. Perhaps I may express some views on the Standards Board and standards committee issue.
For a number of years, I have been deeply concerned about the performance of the Standards Board and that whole standards structure. After a lot of thought about how you might actually make it work better, my amendment proposes a prescriptive way forward that might avoid some of the problems that we have experienced in recent years. We have had problems because the structures of the Standards Board for England and the standards committee under it have worked badly. There have been too many spurious references to it, often followed by detailed press interest in the accusation that has been made. There have been some very poor decisions, many of them reported in the media, and a number have been successfully challenged in the courts. There should not be a structure that ends up with successful challenges in the courts, in a quasi-judicial system, being pursued by local authority standards committees. People’s reputations are at stake here, and we have to do it a bit better.
However, the time is not right for a wholesale change in the standards system, because the general public have a right to expect that a council has a code of conduct, and, in my view, that should not be voluntary. It should be statutory and there has to be a standards committee that can look into any allegations or complaints that the code has not been followed. However, this is quite different from the register of interests and, for example, a failure to declare an interest. Indeed, a potential example was discussed a moment ago.
My solution is simply to propose that we might consider, between now and Report, a provision that a relevant authority should have a standards committee, but that such committees might be established jointly between relevant authorities, which is particularly important for parish councils. That is because the structure of a standards board for an individual parish council is hard to deliver. It would cost a great deal, for one thing. The role of the standards committee is to assess cases brought before it against the code of conduct of that relevant authority, but the membership must have a majority of independent members. They would be appointed against known principles, and have an independent chair. Those councillors who currently serve on such a committee, coming from their own local authority, would no longer do so, because otherwise there would be a real doubt in the mind of the general public as to whether there is any real or perceived bias in a judgment that is reached. I would have other members in a minority who have been elected members of a local authority, I propose for at least four years, but they should not currently be members of a local authority and would not have been a member of the relevant authority to which the committee relates. In other words, you put a barrier between those who make the decision of a standards committee and those whom it is investigating. You would have to have an appeals system. My amendment suggests that the Secretary of State should establish by regulation an appeals system at a national level, and I propose that members would be former chairs of standards committees, all of whom at present are independent.
Maybe we will come back to that issue on the third day but I hope that there may be a way for us to preserve some form of standards committee. Even in this structure, most councils are going to want to do so; otherwise, they do not have a means of investigating a complaint on the voluntary code of conduct. It is a very serious matter because the public perception has to be that everything is being done properly and is above board. So I do not support a voluntary code of conduct and I do think that there is a very strong case for a standards committee for each relevant authority—but possibly combined across several—to be considered.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
My Lords, the coalition has considered the whole issue of standards boards and standards committees. We must recognise that there are different arguments in this case between the Benches opposite and ourselves. Amendment 96A seeks to remove the amendments that the Government are proposing to the Local Government Act 2000, which are needed to remove the requirement for local authorities in England to have standards committees. Of course, this applies only to England.
Rejecting the coalition’s changes to the standards board regime will remove local choice and retain a key aspect of a costly conduct regime which, as my noble friend Lord Shipley has said, has led to vexatious and politically motivated complaints against councillors. However, my noble friend would admit that if we are going to instil a full sense of responsibility in local government, we need to vest in those local authorities the responsibility for the standards of their members. Local authorities may well wish to adopt a voluntary code of conduct for members and co-opted members and determine for themselves what should be in that code; or they may choose to ensure high standards in another way, for example, through a statement of clear principles against which members can be judged by the electorate. The key element is that the choice about how to promote good conduct should be for local authorities to make, rather than for Government to impose on them the requirement for a code of a conduct or standards committees if they do not wish to go down that route.
I know that the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, will disagree with this because he disagrees with the purpose of this amendment but I have to state the position of the coalition, which is quite clear, that this is a matter for local authorities themselves.
Lord Tope
My Lords, I hesitate to intervene at this stage. This is almost the first time in a very long local government career that I actually think that central government should be imposing something. I share the views that have been expressed that it must be a statutory requirement that each local authority must—not may—have a code of conduct. There is a separate issue concerning how that code of conduct is drawn up but I think that it would be nonsense for each local authority to have a different one. There should be a uniform code. I believe that the Association of Council Secretaries and Solicitors—we used to call them legal officers—is drawing up a code of conduct that could be adopted. That is good and right, and I do not suggest for a moment that central government should draw up the code and impose it; I am saying, and I believe quite strongly, that Parliament—central government, if you like—should say that a code of conduct is mandatory, not voluntary. Good local authorities—the vast majority—will adopt a code of conduct, but the ones that most need, and should have, a code are probably those least likely to have one. That is why it should be a mandatory requirement.
The code does not have to be drawn up by central government; it could be drawn up by the association that I mentioned or by the Local Government Association. However, I believe that it needs to be a uniform code so that we do not have different standards wherever they happen to suit particular local interests, usually because it is those local interests that are most in question.
My other question relates to the standards committee. Again, I feel that in the general, although not universal, rejoicing at the departure of the Standards Board for England we are in danger of throwing out a baby with the bath water. We are in danger of moving to a situation that is worse than the one we had before the Standards Board was put in place. Therefore, I believe that it should be mandatory for each local authority to have a standards committee. I say that as one who will constantly argue against prescription, but this is one area where it is particularly important. My noble friend Lord Shipley has proposed a way in which standards committees might be constituted. There are lots of discussions to be had around that, and they could well be had within local government and not necessarily involve central government. However, again, the mandatory requirement to have a standards committee is fundamental.
Those are two issues where, unusually for me, I argue that there should be at least a minimum requirement of a mandatory code of conduct and a standards committee, the composition and nature of which could be subject to further consultation and discussion. Those two requirements should be in the Bill.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
My Lords, I can perhaps offer a slightly more friendly response to my noble friend Lord Tope’s more recent speech than I did to his previous suggestions. The proposal in Amendment 96B and the consequential Amendment 98G—that the new standards function set out in Chapter 5 of Part 1 of the Bill should be a joint duty of the Mayor of London and the London Assembly, as it now is—is one that we are open to considering and seems to have common sense behind it. I can see the benefit of ensuring that the mayor and the Assembly are given equal roles and responsibility for promoting and maintaining high standards.
On Amendments 98A, 98B, 98C and 98D, we see that there is a specific issue here for the GLA in terms of the delegation of decision-making by the Assembly to employees of the authority and we are happy to consider it further. I am not convinced that the same issues apply to other local authorities that have the benefit of Section 101 of the Local Government Act 1972, so perhaps it is not necessary for the amendments to be drafted in quite such wide terms. I am therefore happy to undertake to further consider all these amendments with my fellow Ministers and we can return to our discussion on Report.
Lord Tope
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for what I hope was a favourable reply. I am certain that the GLA and my noble friend Lady Doocey, who is still a member of the London Assembly, will wish to join me in saying that we seek a common-sense and rational solution to a particular issue that applies to one particular authority, the Greater London Authority. On that constructive note, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord McKenzie of Luton
My Lords, we agree with the noble Lord, Lord Greaves, that we cannot have a free-for-all and that it should be mandatory for every local authority to have a code of conduct. There should be a universal code and an appeals procedure. If that means that we would support each of these amendments, that is where we are.
Lord Beecham
I hear what the noble Lord says but the Bill distinguishes, does it not, between matters which will be made criminal offences. Failure to register or to declare an interest are offences at the serious end of misconduct. But is that not a national provision? What is the difference in principle between obligations of that kind and obligations of other sorts of conduct that can affect a community that a council is representing?
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
I do not think the noble Lord is suggesting that to offend the code of conduct in any way should be made a criminal offence. What is clear is that some aspects of conduct in public office are indeed criminal matters and therefore subject to prosecution under the existing law. We will come on to the declaration of interests at a later point.
This has been a worthwhile debate, but I hope that noble Lords understand exactly where the coalition is coming from and why it is seeking to introduce a regime that puts the responsibility on local authorities themselves to ensure the proper conduct of their members and their business. We will have useful opportunities between now and the Report stage to discuss these matters further. In the mean time, I hope that my noble friend will withdraw his amendment.
Lord Tope
I am sorry to have to say that as a loyal member of the coalition, but it is my view.
Amendment 98J would simply leave out “and other”. The other amendment in my name in this grouping is identical. My purpose is not so much to press the amendment as to find out what the Government have in mind with “and other”. What does it refer to?
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
My Lords, we do not see the case for these amendments, which would limit the registering and declaring of interests to financial interests. That would take us back to the days before the Widdicombe committee in 1988, when there was widespread concern about the treatment of non-pecuniary interests, which led to the strengthening of the requirements relating to pecuniary interests. There are clearly situations where non-financial interests are relevant to decision-making by councillors, and it is right that the public are aware of such interests so that they can see that decisions are being made fairly and transparently. I hope that my noble friend will see the merit of the argument and withdraw his amendment.
Lord Greaves
My Lords, I apologise. I should have jumped up before the Minister. I will speak to Amendments 98K and 98M in this group.
On the two other amendments in the group, Amendments 98J and 98L, which would remove “and other” and “or other” respectively, an important, if not fundamental, point to be made is that the Government are proposing to use in this Bill language which in local government is rather out of date. Local government used to talk about financial interests and non-financial interests. If you had a financial interest, you had to declare it. You then had to do whatever the council instructed you to do, such as leave the room or sit there and not speak. If you had a non-financial interest, you had to declare it, but you were not usually subject to those sanctions.
My experience is that local government nowadays talks about personal and prejudicial interests, which are similar. However, prejudicial interests, while they include financial interests, are wider ranging and may include interests which are not directly financial but are nevertheless thought to be prejudicial to somebody taking part in discussion and debate. Personal interests, which have to be declared, are those which people should know about but are not thought to be prejudicial to people taking part in a debate. It seems to be common practice in local government nowadays for those words to be used. I was fairly sure that they had been used in the previous legislation, although I have not looked it up. Perhaps along with my noble friend, I would ask the Government to check the nomenclature, because there is no point putting in legislation words which are not now used on the ground and, in any case, are narrower perhaps, and less clear certainly, than the words and categories now used in local government.
My amendments in this group follow on from the amendments in the previous group. They are part of a package of the way we suggest the new standards regime needs to be changed. First, if there is to be a local system of councillors being sanctioned by local committees and no National Standards Board procedure, there needs to be an appeals procedure written into the system. There has to be a way in which someone who feels aggrieved by a local decision is able to appeal to a wider group against the sanction made against them. As I understand it, this is normal human rights and administrative tribunal procedure. In many ways these bodies will be operating as administrative tribunals and we hope that the Government will look at this issue. We suggest that it should not be a national quango such as the Standards Board for England and that it should not be run by central government; it should be operated within local government by representatives of local government and it should be set up in co-operation with the LGA. As my noble friend Lord Shipley said, we have set out ways in which this can be done.
My second point concerns parish councils. The Government have not bottomed the issue of parish councils on this new standards regime. I have a long briefing about the problems that it will cause to parish councils but I shall not read it all out. If parish councils have to operate their own procedures, there will clearly be resource implications. Big town councils might be able to do it—although it might be wasteful of their funding—but small parish councils will not possibly be able to do it. If there are many individual local codes so that parish councils operate different systems and some do not have any, how will members of parish councils be trained to understand the code? How will parish clerks, who play an absolutely crucial role, be trained in the new system?
My experience from talking to people involved in standards committee throughout the country is that where there are lots of parish councils they seem to occupy quite a high proportion of the time of standards committees. The reason for this is obvious: parish councillors are not getting the expert advice on standards matters—on declarations of interest and so on—which they ought to be getting; and parish clerks are perhaps not being trained or not passing on that advice. I am a huge fan of parish councils but there may be something about parish-level politics and government that leads to individual rivalries and encourages people to make complaints against each other. Whatever it is, there is no doubt that parishes form quite a large part of the workload of standards committees in many different places. To leave them adrift, as this Bill seems to do, does not seem the right way to go.
In our view, the parishes probably need their own system. That system ought to be operated via the established means of communication and training that parish councils have with the National Association of Local Councils and other bodies such as the county organisations, and there ought to be county-level standards committees for parish councils. Whatever the system is, doing it within the parish council community is a sensible idea—particularly if the parish council finds itself cast adrift with a district that does not have a system. In any case, if districts have different codes of conduct and different systems for standards committees, the parish councils will have to join in those willy-nilly whether or not they agree with the systems and the codes. A separate parish system seems to be the way to look at things.
My final point relates to criminal offences. Again, we think the Government have not thought this issue through properly. On failures to declare interests, a major failure is a very serious matter indeed, whether it be a failure to register or a failure to declare during a meeting. A minor failure would require a sanction—but not a draconian sanction such as being hauled up before a magistrates' court. Yet the government system seems to mean that if the offence of not declaring or not registering an interest is not sufficiently serious for the DPP to agree to prosecute, there will be no sanctions at all. That does not seem to be the right way forward.
As for the criminal investigations and vexatious complaints, that needs thinking through; there are enough vexatious complaints on standards already that end up with people being found not guilty and having no sanctions against them—or, in my case, the complaint was proved and the sanction was nothing. People can imagine what happened. There are enough cases of people using the standards procedure for political or personal vexatious purposes. Think of the prospects of this being used when criminal sanctions are possible. You would get massive headlines in the local papers that the complaints had been made, it would all come to nothing but the damage would all have been done. It has to be thought through a bit more carefully.
I join my noble friend Lord Tope in hoping that we can have discussions with the Government in the mean time and that at the very least we can get the thing thought through again. If no change occurs at the end of the day, so be it—but we are convinced that the Government have not yet got it quite right.
Lord McKenzie of Luton
I am not sure that we would agree with everything that the noble Lord has said, but we would appreciate the opportunity to join in the discussions with government together with the coalition parties.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
I thank noble Lords. I am sort of having a second bite of the cherry within the group, because I can talk specifically about the proposals of my noble friend. I hope that I can really reassure him. He talked about appeal structures and the like and the need to maintain them—and of course human rights legislation provides for this. But in actual fact the sanctions that the Secretary of State intends to provide for in regulations under Clause 18(2) will be relatively low-level sanctions based on powers of discipline that councils already possess. It is not our intention to confer any new disciplinary powers of the sort that would give rise to a need or expectation for a bureaucratic appeal process.
I cannot support Amendment 98M, which would insert a new clause relating to parish standards, although I understand the interest in it. The legislation as currently drafted gives parishes the power to have a code or a standards committee if they would like. Parish councils are free to make arrangements to work jointly with other authorities. My noble friend is mistaken if he believes that advice is not available to parish councils. The last Government published the Quality Parish and Town Council Scheme; it was published by the department in 2003, and it gives information about model charters whereby principal and local councils in England can work in partnership. That document can be viewed on the DCLG website. We intend here also that the regulations to be issued by the Secretary of State under Clause 18(1) will specify that the registration of parish members' interests will be carried out by the monitoring officer of the district within which the relevant parish falls.
There was some talk about the criminal sanctions for failing to register, and I note noble Lords’ concerns on that. The noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, asked, too, that he might be a party to discussions that we might have before Report on those issues. I assure noble Lords that we would be happy to discuss that aspect of Clause 19 relating to breaching regulations under Clause 18. With that, I ask my noble friend Lord Tope to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
My Lords, the issue of Clause 19 was the question of the way in which the regime would operate and the criminalisation of a failure to declare interests. I have given reassurances to the House in that regard, and with that in mind I wish to see Clause 19 stand part of the Bill.