Lord Taylor of Holbeach
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The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Taylor of Holbeach) (Con)
My Lords, this has been a welcome start to the Bill. Although we have strayed into some of the subsequent elements in discussing this, that is inevitable because the Bill knits elements together. It is proper that we see how the provisions of Clause 1 fit into the other aspects of the Bill.
I think that we can all agree that our current system for removal is too complex. It requires a number of decisions and notices to be made and served. Separate refusal and removal decisions can cause confusion to migrants as to when they need to leave the UK and lead to legal challenges being made later in the process
I start by considering the two amendments so ably moved by my noble friend Lady Hamwee. We know that she works assiduously on these Bills, whether or not she has taken home the guidance brochure this past weekend. Amendments 1 and 2 would ensure that a person must be given written notice of their removal. Amendment 1 also mandates setting out the date and approximate time of that removal. While I understand the broad intention behind Amendment 1, this would inadvertently reintroduce a layer of complexity, which the whole purpose of the clause is to reduce.
The intention behind Clause 1 is to move to a system where only one decision is made and served, giving, refusing or varying leave. Following that decision, those who require leave but do not have it will be removable.
I can confirm to my noble friend Lady Hamwee, and indeed to other noble Lords, that such people will all receive notice of the decision in writing, in accordance with Section 4 of the Immigration Act 1971, so it is unnecessary to place an additional notice requirement within this clause. This notice will inform them of the decision on leave, of their liability to be removed if they do not depart voluntarily, and the proposed destination for any enforced removal.
It would not be feasible to provide a date or approximate time of removal in this notice. Not all those who become liable to removal will be facing an enforced removal, as we—and, I think, all noble Lords—would always prefer that those who do not have valid leave to be in the country should return home voluntarily. This allows the migrant to depart on their own terms, is more cost-effective for the taxpayer, and, if the migrant leaves without the use of taxpayer resources, they can reduce the likelihood of, and possibly avoid, a re-entry ban.
I turn to the comments of my noble friend Lady Hamwee on the deemed service of the decision. She will be well aware that “deemed service” replicates the existing notice provisions, which have been shown to work effectively and are interpreted with a degree of flexibility, such that if the person can show that they received the notice at a later date, we will accept that as the date of service. There are established procedures on the delivery of notice and, indeed, they are set out in the regulations.
All migrants will be given the opportunity to raise with the Home Office any asylum, human rights or European free movement reasons why they believe they are entitled to stay in the UK. They will be informed that they are under a duty to do so at the earliest opportunity if their circumstances change, and will be advised to seek any legal advice as early as possible.
I hope I can reassure the most reverend Primate the Archbishop of York, who I am delighted is participating in our debates today, that the common law principles of access to justice mean that migrants will be given sufficient time—a minimum of 72 hours—to raise such grounds before any removal can be enforced. They will be reminded of the fact that they may be removed from the UK if they do not depart voluntarily during any contact management events. If the migrant’s removal is enforced but they are compliant with the process, they will be informed of when to check in to the port of departure. If the migrant is not compliant, they will first be detained, where they will be informed when removal is imminent.
The noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, mentioned our very productive meeting. Although I cannot share his view of the hard-working people we ask to handle this difficult task on our behalf, I note what he says about oversight. I should say that quality assurance checks are part and parcel of the process. However, we recognise that there is room for further improvement. As such, we have an ongoing programme of work to continue to monitor and progress our decision quality.
Amendments 4 to 7 seek to remove the discretion in the regulations as to whether we notify family members of removal. We have already stated our intention that family members will always be given notice where they are to be removed. I hope that it pleases the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, and my noble friends Lady Hamwee and Lord Avebury, that it is our intention to work out how to address the recommendations of the Joint Committee on Human Rights on Clause 1. We will amend the Bill on this subject. However, I remind noble Lords that it was only on 21 February that we received the report of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, making some similar recommendations. We are working out how to address both issues on Report. I hope I will return on Report. I reiterate that we will amend the Bill to meet the issues raised by these reports.
I now turn to Amendment 8. I appreciate the concerns raised by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, about the processes surrounding the removal of family members which have led to his tabling this amendment. At the risk of jumping ahead of ourselves, Clause 67 sets out the proposed parliamentary procedures in respect of various order and decision-making powers provided for in the Bill. It already specifies that any power to make an order or regulations is exercisable by statutory instrument and that, for this particular power, it is under the normal process of negative rather than affirmative procedure. The draft affirmative procedure is normally reserved for those orders or regulations that amend or repeal primary legislation, or develop policy in a way to require significant parliamentary debate, or where the intention behind the power to make them is not clearly set out in the Bill. This Bill is clear on the intent of the regulations. The scope for a Government to construct anything that would require significant debate in a statutory instrument deriving from it is limited.
The existing removal powers that are in force allow the removal of family members. Unlike in deportation cases, there is currently no statutory definition of what constitutes a family member. That is a matter left to the Home Office. By defining this in regulations—noble Lords have referred to the draft regulations that have appeared in the memorandum that has been circulated—the Bill will give new clarity to families so that they will know exactly who may be liable to removal. It will also provide further parliamentary oversight that has until now been absent. Following scrutiny of this clause in the House of Commons, and at the request of the right honourable Member Mr David Hanson, my honourable friend Mark Harper, the former Immigration Minister, arranged for a draft of these regulations to be published and a copy is placed in the Libraries of both Houses.
Lord Rosser
Perhaps I might ask the Minister a question. The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee referred to the Government’s argument that these matters are best placed in regulations because the definition of “family member” or the time limits for removal may change within a limited extent. It commented that this purported justification is undermined by no such change having been needed over a period of very many years during which there have been numerous immigration Acts and a litany of immigration rules changes. Since the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, subject to what the Minister may say, appears to have shot the Government’s arguments to bits, why is the Minister still resisting ensuring that this is done by the affirmative process?
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
I think that I have made it clear that the affirmative process is used where there is an opportunity for the Government, in effect, to change policy through a statutory instrument, which then gives rise to a reasonable demand by Parliament for the opportunity to debate the measure. As I have said, we are going to bring forward more explicit changes to the Bill to reflect the concerns shown by the comments of the Joint Committee on Human Rights and the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. It would probably be best if we waited until then to see what they say before we rush to change the procedure by which these matters have been considered in the past. It would be helpful to the House to wait until these changes are produced.
The draft regulations are designed to reflect the immigration rules. If a person can come to UK and be granted leave on the basis of a family relationship with another migrant, it is only right that such a person could be removed along with the lead person who has no leave to be in the UK. The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee made recommendations about this clause that I am considering further. I will respond in detail on these recommendations before we consider the matter again on Report. That would be the right time, and I urge noble Lords to wait and see where these considerations lead us.
The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked a number of questions. If I do not cover them all now, I will certainly write to him. We will write to address his questions about the timescale of decision-making on removals and the carrying out of those decisions because I understand that this matter is of interest to a number of noble Lords. As to the impact on the number of removals, Clause 1 does not permit new categories of people to be removed; all those who can be removed under the clause can already be removed. It does not extend the powers to remove people but there is currently a more complicated set of procedures than will exist through the measures in the Bill. Clause 1 is about making removals more efficient.
Lord Rosser
Is the Minister saying that the provisions in Clause 1 about what the Government would regard as streamlining the procedure are not actually designed with the intention or hope that they will lead to more people who are not entitled to stay here and do not have leave to remain in the United Kingdom leaving the country than at present? Is that not the purpose of these changes?
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
No, the purpose of the changes is to make sure that people who are subject to removal leave voluntarily rather than through enforced removal. I am sure that the noble Lord and most noble Lords would agree with that proposal.
We will ensure that family members who have valid leave to remain in the UK in their own right will not be removed. We propose to remove only dependants of persons with no right to be in the UK. Where dependency is broken, such as when it involves a victim of domestic violence, the former dependant is expected to apply for leave to remain in their own right—and, if necessary, they will be removed if they were unsuccessful as a main applicant. We will also look at the best interests of the child in making any decision under our obligations—of which noble Lords are well aware—regarding victims of human trafficking.
This has been a helpful debate. I hope that I have been able to whet noble Lords’ appetite for a government response on this important clause before Report. I can reassure them that family members will always be notified if they are facing enforced removal. The draft regulations underscore this and make it clear how notice is to be given. In the light of those points, I hope that the noble Baroness will agree to withdraw the amendment.
The Archbishop of York
I still have not understood the Minister’s logic. I appreciate and want to commend the removal of the two-stage approach—the fast-forward immigration decision and then the removal decision. That has caused difficulty to a lot of people whom I have been representing and the Secretary of State knows that because we have had wonderful conversations. Therefore, I applaud that. But if there are 72 hours in which you can appeal the decision, what is the problem of giving notice in writing of the date and approximate time of the removal? People could still appeal within 72 hours. Why not state that? I cannot understand the logic. Can the Minister please help me?
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
The purpose of the notice is not to put people under notice as to the exact timing of when they will go. It is intended that they should be informed of where they will be removed to because that might have a bearing on human rights considerations. But the actual timing of their removal is an administrative matter. To my mind, it would be a complication that might reduce the effectiveness of these measures if the actual timing of their removal also had to be part and parcel of that notice.
If experience shows that it is possible to be more precise in working this new arrangement, I have little doubt that we will come back to the House to seek ways in which that can be done. But for the time being, it is expecting too much to be able to be precise about the actual time and date of a person’s removal when serving this notice.
The Archbishop of York
Is the Minister quite sure about that in the light of what the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, said about the way that this thing will work—that it will not be very efficient and that people will not be very good at it? Now the Minister is saying that there will be an administrative decision by the Secretary of State. How can we be certain that the kind of problems that the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, drew our attention to, which are real experiences that everyone knows about, will not affect the changes we are looking for?
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
I can be certain that when people get a decision about the refusal of their right to remain they will be removed if they do not make arrangements to go voluntarily. That is a step forward. I hope noble Lords will appreciate that much of what the Government are trying to do, including bringing Border Agency activities into the Home Office, is designed to make sure that as we develop better oversight of decision-making within the Home Office and within UKVI we will have a more efficient process in the detail that the most reverend Primate suggested.
Lord Rosser
How long will those who have been told that they no longer have leave to remain be given to make arrangements to leave voluntarily and how long will it be before a decision is made that they are not going to leave voluntarily and that enforced removal is required?
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
It will be for them to make arrangements with UKVI on the basis of the notice that they have been given. We are not looking for enforcement as being the primary objective of the policy. I think the noble Lord would agree that voluntary departures are what we would prefer to see happen.
Lord Ramsbotham
Following what the most reverend Primate said, perhaps I may say how pleased I was to hear the use of the word “better” just now in terms of oversight. I ask the Minister to accept that, hard- working though they may be, case workers have not been very good at their task and neither has there been oversight. If they had been and there had been oversight there would not have been this endless history of problems and complaints for years and years, which have been ignored. The time has come for that ignoring to stop. Therefore, I am relieved to hear mention of better oversight.
Lord Ramsbotham
My Lords, I support the amendment so ably moved by the noble Lord, Lord Avebury. When I took over as Chief Inspector of Prisons and was given the responsibility for immigration detention centres, I was horrified to find that all of them were geared only for the short term and had no long-term arrangements for people who were there for a long time. When I went into it, I discovered that the reason for this was the lack of direction from the Home Office. There was at that stage the Immigration and Nationality Directorate, which was meant to be running the centres, and they were all let out on contract, but there was no overall drive, no direction.
The fact that we have now been waiting for longer than World War II for this matter to be resolved suggests that that lack of direction and drive obtains across the whole immigration detention centre system anyway. I am still told by members of immigration monitoring boards that, in fact, the centres where people are held—sometimes for years, let alone months—are not geared to look after their needs in any more than the short term, about which I asked last October and which has been so ably described by the noble Lord, Lord Avebury. It is important not just that the Government do this in six months, but that they appoint someone responsible and accountable for overseeing these centres, and seeing that things actually happen.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
My Lords, I appreciate the concerns of my noble friend Lord Avebury, the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, and the concerns of the most reverend Primate the Archbishop of York. They have caused my noble friend to table the amendment, and caused us to debate not just the rules but the provision of facilities.
I start by reassuring the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, that in the past year the Home Office has been in acute dialogue with Heathrow Airport Ltd about the Heathrow Airport facility to progress accommodation units. That is now bearing fruit. My noble friend Lord Avebury asked me if I could place information on the design of these facilities in the Library. I understand that HAL, the Border Force and, for that matter, the Home Office are in final discussions on the detailed design stage and, indeed, are going out to contractors for quotes in March of this year—that is, now. If that is the situation, I am sure that I will be in a position to satisfy my noble friend’s request to place a copy of the design in the House Library, and I will seek to do that for him.
I am aware that there has also been a lack of legislative framework governing the operation of the short-term holding facilities. As has been pointed out by noble Lords, this has been a matter of concern for years to a number of interested parties, including Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Prisons, who has responsibility for inspecting the UK’s detention facilities. The delay in introducing these rules is regretted, but it has been a case of unavoidable delay being caused by a number of different reasons, including, most recently, the discussions surrounding the legislative framework that should apply to Cedars, which we have just discussed, which initially had been classified as a short-term holding facility and, as such, would have been covered by these rules. We have just debated those amendments. Accordingly, today, I give my noble friend a commitment that separate sets of rules governing the management and operation of short-term holding facilities and the Cedars pre-departure accommodation will be introduced before the Summer Recess. With that, I hope that my noble friend will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Avebury
It remains only for me to thank the most reverend Primate the Archbishop of York and the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, for their powerful support for this amendment. I also thank the Minister not only for the very welcome reply that he has given to this debate but for the close attention that he has paid to the correspondence that we have had over the past few months, particularly on the facilities at Heathrow. I am delighted to hear him give the assurance that we will have separate sets of rules for the short-term holding facilities and the pre-departure accommodation within a shorter space of time than I asked for in the amendment. It is rather an unusual experience to have a Minister grant something better than that for which the amendment asks—I think it is probably unique in my 52 years in one House or the other. I can only say how grateful I am to my noble friend and how much we look forward to the implementation of his kind undertakings. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)
My Lords, it may be proper now to raise a point of detail on Amendment 12 in case the matter is taken any further. Noble Lords will know that the Bill applies to Scotland and Northern Ireland as well as to England and Wales. We see that in Clause 69, which applies to Schedule 1 as it does to most other provisions in the Bill. The problem with the amendment is that it refers to two people who have oversight of matters in England and Wales, but does not include their equivalents in Scotland and Northern Ireland. Certainly, so far as Scotland is concerned, there is a separate police complaints commissioner and there is a Scottish inspector of prisons. I am not sure of the details in Northern Ireland but they could no doubt be checked as well. My point is that if the oversight provisions are to be carried across all the jurisdictions, we should be careful to include and mention them in this particular clause.
There was a related point, which the Minister might like to confirm. I take it that the codes that have been referred to apply to Scotland and Northern Ireland as well as to England and Wales. It is very important that there should be uniform standards throughout the entire country in these important matters.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
My Lords, this has been a useful debate because it has enabled me to address a number of issues, some of which are the subject of the Bill's provisions and some of which go a little broader to address the role of contractors. The Bill itself and the amendments address only the powers vested in immigration officers. I would like to reassure the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, that effective regulatory oversight of the way in which the new enforcement powers in Schedule 1—and indeed other immigration powers—will be exercised, is already in place.
In England and Wales, the Independent Police Complaints Commission, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, pointed out, provides oversight of serious complaints, matters of conduct, and incidents involving immigration officers and officials of the Secretary of State exercising immigration and asylum enforcement powers. The IPCC’s remit also includes those officials exercising relevant customs and customs revenue functions within the UK Border Force. We should remember that this is UK-wide—there is no devolved power here. This is a reserved power for UK borders.
In relation to Scotland, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, is quite right to point out that the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service has the remit to investigate deaths and allegations of criminality in respect of immigration and customs matters. In addition, all complaints about immigration officers and officials of the Secretary of State who are exercising immigration and asylum enforcement powers in Scotland may be investigated by the Police Investigations and Review Commissioner. That does not change under these provisions.
To ensure that this scrutiny is truly nationwide, we have included a provision in Clause 59, following agreement with the Northern Ireland Executive, to enable the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland to provide oversight of serious incidents, complaints and conduct matters in Northern Ireland where immigration and customs enforcement powers are exercised. Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Prisons has a statutory responsibility to report on the conditions and treatment in all places of immigration detention in the United Kingdom. Furthermore, the UK’s border and immigration functions as a whole, including the use of enforcement powers such as those in Schedule 1, are subject to the independent scrutiny of the Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration, Mr John Vine.
My noble friend Lord Mawhinney asked what was meant by “reasonably required” because that seemed to exercise a number of noble Lords. It means to the extent of finding the object of the search and no further. Indeed, noble Lords might be surprised to know that immigration officers have powers to search people who are being examined in ports for passports and other relevant documents, but they are not permitted to search those in detention for weapons or other dangerous articles that might cause harm to themselves or others. A protective search power is currently only available in respect of people who have actually been arrested. Immigration officers have a number of powers to enter and search premises for the purposes of finding material that would facilitate the investigation of current immigration offences. But the powers do not apply to illegal immigrants in immigration detention who have been arrested by immigration criminal investigators rather than the police.
A further example is that officers can search for relevant documents in the home of an arrested person or the premises at which they were arrested. They are not permitted to search the premises of a third party—for example, those of a relative or partner. The Government, quite rightly, are seeking to ensure that immigration officers have the powers that are currently available to contractors but not to immigration officers themselves.
Lord Mawhinney
I hope that my noble friend will excuse me because I readily acknowledge that he knows much more about this subject in detail than I do, but is he telling us that the words “reasonably required” relate only to the object of the search rather than to the way in which the search is carried out?
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
The use of force has to be reasonably exercised. In the case of search, that has to be reasonable too. The answer is that it is not an either/or. Reasonableness is at the heart of the process. I hope that that satisfies my noble friend.
Lord Mawhinney
I assume from what my noble friend said that he will go on to define, as other noble Lords have asked, who sets the standard of reasonableness and who monitors it in this context.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
I set out earlier detail on those people who are responsible for oversight in this matter. Indeed, the training procedures and codes that apply in this area are designed especially to ensure that the people exercising these functions are properly aware of what is considered to be proportionate. I do not think that it is an unusual situation for anyone carrying out activity on behalf of a government agency. Reasonableness is perfectly well understood, which I think most noble Lords will know. I hope that I am being reasonable in the way in which I am answering my noble friend's question.
A number of noble Lords questioned the role of private contractors in this area. As I have explained, the amendments do not address private contractors. But detention staff are subject to a number of oversight and monitoring bodies. All complaints concerning the use of control and restraint are referred to the UKBA Professional Standards Unit, which passes all such allegations to the appropriate bodies such as the police or other oversight bodies where appropriate, and I have explained who they are.
In addition, independent monitoring boards, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Prisons and the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman can conduct unannounced inspections of detention premises. Independent observers from Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Prisons and from independent monitoring boards also monitor a number of removal flights from the UK and I am intending to go on one such flight in a few weeks’ time.
Baroness Williams of Crosby
Before the Minister concludes his extremely reasonable remarks, may I press him on one point? Those companies to whom the conduct of these issues is outsourced need more than simple reference on to the Chief Inspector of Prisons or the IPCC. Could I therefore press him, before he concludes, about whether we can build in serious incentives to the companies to which these activities are outsourced so that they recognise that their contracts will be at risk if they fail to carry out the expectations of the conduct and behaviour that we are laying upon them in this very sensitive area?
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
My noble friend Lady Williams of Crosby and the most reverend Primate the Archbishop of York joined the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, in raising the question of the effectiveness of quality control in terms of outcomes, how we enforce contracts, and whether we hold contractors responsible. We do exactly that. We have contract monitoring teams at each detention facility and individual detention and escort contractors are certified by the Secretary of State, and this certification can be withdrawn. As the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, will know, a new training programme is being undertaken by the Home Office in this area. I have invited him to come along and look at the programme and perhaps contribute to its development because we feel it is very important that at the heart of good practice in this area lies oversight on the one hand, good management on the other and, at the bottom of all of that, good training for the operatives. I think it would be the wish of the House and, indeed, the Home Office that that is provided for. My noble friend Lady Benjamin asked if there was particular training given to officers on medical conditions. I am not in a position to give that answer on the spot but I am happy to write to her.
I turn to Amendment 13. We should make it clear that the provision to extend the use of force affects only immigration officers and does not make any change to the powers of contractors, those detainee custody officers and escorts, who have separate statutory powers to use reasonable force in their functions. We believe that immigration officers should be able to use their powers to the fullest extent, where it is necessary. If paragraph 5 were to be removed, it would not affect the majority of immigration powers of examination, arrest, entry, search, detention and fingerprinting, where officers are able to use reasonable force if necessary, as most of these are contained within the Immigration Act 1971 and the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, as my noble friend Lord Avebury pointed out.
However, there are a small number of coercive powers, which sit in later legislation, where there is no specific reference to the use of reasonable force. Although the use of force is currently implied, we intend that this should be set out explicitly in statute to ensure greater transparency. The use of force in these situations may be necessary for immigration officers to carry out their role effectively and safely, and I have given illustrations of that earlier in my response. I am sure noble Lords will agree that it would be hard to see, for example, how immigration officers could safely arrest a person for the offence of assaulting an immigration officer if they were unable to use reasonable force to restrain that person. It should be noted that the new enforcement powers proposed in the Bill make amendments to either the Immigration Act 1971 or the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, so will already be covered by the existing provision for immigration officers to use reasonable force where necessary.
I can assure noble Lords that only immigration officers who are fully trained and accredited may use force. Arrest training is currently provided by the College of Policing, and training on the use of force, including control and restraint techniques, is in line with ACPO standards. Published guidance explains that the use of force must be proportionate, lawful, necessary, and age appropriate. It also sets out that force should be used for the shortest possible period, should be the minimum needed, should be used only when all other avenues of securing co-operation have been exhausted, and should be de-escalated as soon as possible.
Every instance where force is used is recorded in a comprehensive incident report. Out of 14,598 enforcement visits in the financial year 2012-13, force against the person was used in a little over 2% of cases. The issue of whether that use of force was reasonable must be justified on a case-by-case basis, as I have been explaining to my noble friend Lord Mawhinney. The extension of the power to use reasonable force will ensure that existing powers are able to be operated effectively, that they are in step with other law enforcement bodies’ powers, and that current enforcement practices are not at any risk of legal challenge on the grounds that the ability to use force is not explicitly set out in statute. Now I hope that I have been able to explain the context in which these provisions of the Bill are being proposed. In the light of these points, I hope that noble Lords will be reassured and feel able not to press their amendments.
Lord Rosser
Is the Minister still looking at what I understand is a code of practice—which the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, has discussed with him—or are we to take it that the answer he has just given means that he does not see the need for a code of practice?
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
I think I can reassure the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, by the actions I took following the meeting that I had with the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham. He gave me a copy of the code of practice that he had produced following his review and I was pleased to take it back to the Home Office and feed it into the department. I would like to believe that the points that the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, has made are being reflected in the approach that the Home Office is taking at the moment. There is naturally great interest in what he is suggesting. As I said, we are looking forward to the opportunity to allow him engagement with us on the development of the training programme.
Lord Rosser
I am not entirely sure whether that means the code of practice will see the light of day in any schedule to the Bill or whether it simply—I do not use the word “simply” in a derogatory way—means that the Minister intends that the Home Office may take account of what is in that code of practice in the practices that the Home Office seeks to ensure are adopted. I think the answer I have had is the latter rather than the former. That is what the Minister’s response indicates. As I understand it, the Minister said in his reply that the oversight powers throughout the United Kingdom are already there through the relevant postholder or commission. I think he has said that the extension of powers under Schedule 1 apply only to immigration officers and not to private contractors, and that appropriate training is or will be given in relation to the extension of the powers on reasonable force. That is what I have understood from the replies the Minister has given.
I shall obviously want to read in Hansard the words the Minister has actually used since it is easy to gain an impression when it is not the correct one. However, I thank him for his detailed response and, if noble Lords will forgive me for not naming them all, I thank them for taking part in the debate on these amendments. I was particularly impressed by the noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Crosby, who indicated that my amendment should have gone further than it did. I am not often told that, but there we are. I have to say that the points she made were extremely relevant. In the light of what the Minister has said, and on the basis that I intend to read his words carefully in Hansard to make sure that I have understood them fully, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Roberts of Llandudno
Before my noble friend the Minister sits down, can he tell me how many employees of these companies have been dismissed for this sort of heavy-handed behaviour?
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
I did feel rather comfortable until the noble Lord suggested that I had not yet sat down. I cannot give him the answer to that question, but if it is possible to do so, I will write to him.
“Restrictions on detention of unaccompanied children
(1) Schedule 2 to the Immigration Act 1971 (administrative provisions as to control on entry etc) is amended as follows.
(2) In paragraph 16, after paragraph (2) insert—
“(2A) But the detention of an unaccompanied child under sub-paragraph (2) is subject to paragraph 18B.”
(3) In paragraph 18, after sub-paragraph (1) insert—
“(1A) But the detention of an unaccompanied child under paragraph 16(2) is subject to paragraph 18B.”
(4) After paragraph 18A (as inserted by paragraph 2 of Schedule 1) insert—
“18B (1) Where a person detained under paragraph 16(2) is an unaccompanied child, the only place where the child may be detained is a short-term holding facility, except where—
(a) the child is being transferred to or from a short-term holding facility, or(b) sub-paragraph (3) of paragraph 18 applies.(2) An unaccompanied child may be detained under paragraph 16(2) in a short-term holding facility for a maximum period of 24 hours, and only for so long as the following two conditions are met.
(3) The first condition is that—
(a) directions are in force that require the child to be removed from the short-term holding facility within the relevant 24 hour period, or(b) a decision on whether or not to give directions is likely to result in such directions.(4) The second condition is that the immigration officer under whose authority the child is being detained reasonably believes that the child will be removed from the short-term holding facility within the relevant 24 hour period in accordance with those directions.
(5) An unaccompanied child detained under paragraph 16(2) who has been removed from a short-term holding facility and detained elsewhere may be detained again in a short-term holding facility but only if, and for as long as, the relevant 24 hour period has not ended.
(6) An unaccompanied child who has been released following detention under paragraph 16(2) may be detained again in a short-term holding facility in accordance with this paragraph.
“(7) In this paragraph—
“relevant 24 hour period”, in relation to the detention of a child in a short-term holding facility, means the period of 24 hours starting when the child was detained (or, in a case falling within sub-paragraph (5), first detained) in a short-term holding facility;“short-term holding facility” has the same meaning as in Part 8 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999;“unaccompanied child” means a person—(a) who is under the age of 18, and(b) who is not accompanied (whilst in detention) by his or her parent or another individual who has care of him or her.”.”
Baroness Williams of Crosby
My Lords, I very much agree with what has just been said by the noble Lord, Lord Judd, and what was said by the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Harries of Pentregarth.
I will be very quick because the debate is going on. It is worth remembering that in 2008 the European Commission produced a directive which said that the maximum period for detention was normally six months and that in exceptional cases 12 months could be added to that, with an absolute limit of 18 months in every single case. It is not to the great credit of our dear country that the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland both decided to opt out of that directive. Consequently, we, as one of the world’s oldest and most stable democracies, have to our discredit the shame of having people detained in prison conditions month after month, as the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Harries, pointed out. We should say that the time is well over when we can continue to try to justify this kind of thing.
We could have a limited period; for example, the Federal Republic of Germany has a maximum period of two months as normal practice. We have already heard that France has 45 days. Spain has a serious terrorism problem—as serious as ours, possibly more so—yet retains two months as its normal limit. It is beyond my understanding and belief how this country has continued to leave this issue without seriously addressing it and saying that the time has come for us to opt back in to the directive and ensure that we never exceed 18 months for any case at all.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
My Lords, the contribution of my noble friend Lady Williams of Crosby is probably a good place to start. The deprivation of liberty is a very serious matter so I will first set out the safeguards that are currently in place to ensure that detention powers are used appropriately. Although there is a power to detain, the Home Office has a policy presumption in favour of temporary admission or release. Wherever possible, alternatives to detention are used. Detention must be used sparingly and for the shortest period necessary. I hope that that reassures the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, and my noble friends Lady Hamwee and Lady Williams.
The noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Harries, asked why we do not have a time limit on detention. That was echoed by a number of subsequent speakers. The current system is derived from case law, specifically a case called Hardial Singh. The system works well, is understood by the tribunal and other judges, and has been authoritatively restated by the Supreme Court in a case called Lumba. The system affords appropriate protections to individuals and flexibility to the Government. It is not indefinite detention: every case is carefully and regularly considered to see whether detention continues to remain appropriate. Regular reviews of detention are required to be undertaken to ensure that detention remains lawful and proportionate, and individuals can apply for bail and challenge the legality of detention by judicial review, as has been stated.
I reassure noble Lords that these safeguards are also built into the provision already included in the Bill. Clause 3 will not prevent an individual from applying for bail immediately after being placed in immigration detention. Likewise, an individual can challenge the legality of their detention at any point by way of judicial review, and legal aid will remain in place for this. The existing internal formal reviews of detention will also remain. I reassure noble Lords that detainees will have full access to legal advice.
My noble friend Lady Hamwee wanted to know more about the requirement to decide on the papers. She asked what qualified as a “material change in circumstances”. It will vary on a case-to-case basis and the tribunal will decide whether that test is met. An example could be a significant deterioration in someone’s health over a short period. The provision will not apply where there are genuine reasons to seek a further hearing because there are materially different grounds to consider. If the tribunal concludes on the papers that there are material changes that need to be considered, it will proceed to a hearing and can grant bail if it thinks it right to do so.
Noble Lords should also be aware that the Tribunal Procedure Committee has consulted on placing a time limit on repeat bail applications. The committee may have proposed implementing the requirement through the Tribunal Rules rather than in primary legislation, as here, but it is clear that repeat applications on the same facts are a concern to the Tribunal Procedure Committee.
I want to highlight to noble Lords the context of the requirement for the Secretary of State to consent to the grant of bail where removal is 14 days or fewer away. Rather than introducing a new power, the Government are clarifying existing legislation to block immigration bail granted by the tribunal, defining an existing power. Under paragraph 30 of Schedule 2 to the Immigration Act 1971, the Secretary of State can prevent bail being granted while someone is pursuing their appeal at any stage,
“if directions for the removal of the appellant from the UK are for the time being in force or the power to give such directions is for the time being exercisable”.
The Government consider that the proposal in the Bill requiring the Secretary of State’s consent to release on bail 14 days prior to removal is a proportionate approach. As I have explained, this proposal actually represents a reduction in the powers available to prevent the grant of bail. In that context, I hope that noble Lords will not feel unduly concerned about this condition.
My noble friend Lady Hamwee asked whether exercising this veto would not just cause people to seek judicial review, thereby delaying removal and creating an expense. A judicial review would not have to be pursued in-country. Removal would therefore not need to be postponed. There are obvious savings from proceeding with removal and not allowing anyone to remain in the country either in detention or on bail with conditions.
We should try to get some of these figures in proportion. Admittedly some individuals have been detained for considerable periods of time but 62% have been in detention for fewer than 29 days, and the total number of people who have been in detention for more than a year is 199. In terms of proportion, this system is therefore dealing effectively with the vast majority of detainees.
Baroness Smith of Basildon
I am grateful to the Minister for addressing the amendment, but he will know that that was not the substance of the questions that I asked. It was used as an example to raise two issues, the first being the criteria that the Home Secretary would use and the second, significantly, whether an individual who had had bail denied would be told whether the Secretary of State had overruled the tribunal judge. The amendment was just probing. If the Minister could address the questions that I asked, I would be grateful.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
I was about to go on to develop the theme based on the noble Baroness’s example. I cannot give an exhaustive list of the circumstances where the Secretary of State might consider it right to intervene, but examples which we have already given in the statement of intent are good ones. Mental health and family bereavement are examples of such circumstances which I hope the noble Baroness will understand. We expect the power to be exercised in a relatively small number of cases.
Baroness Smith of Basildon
I think the Minister has missed the point that I made. I was probing not what the exact examples would be but the criteria that the Secretary of State would use given that she will have the ability to overturn a decision by a tribunal judge. In the other place, Norman Baker said that there were no other grounds that she would look at, yet that begs the question about it being a political decision. What grounds will the Secretary of State use if she decides to overturn the decision of a tribunal judge?
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
I hope that the examples I have given show that these are not trifling matters. Deterioration in a person’s mental health or a family bereavement are changes in the circumstances of the applicant which would mean that the Secretary of State was able to make an immediate decision without it having to go back to the tribunal for a bail hearing. This is the Secretary of State using her executive power to ensure that in circumstances where people are significantly disadvantaged by a change in their conditions the matter can be resolved. If the noble Baroness wishes me to elaborate further, I shall do my best to explain it to her in writing so that she has something more positive than just a few scattered notes from which I am addressing her.
Amendment 19 would have the effect of creating many unnecessary bail hearings in the tribunal, increasing the inefficiency and complexity of the system. An individual can still apply for immigration bail at any time or challenge the legality of their detention by way of judicial review. A significant number of individuals are released on bail by the Home Office without the need for a bail hearing—we have just heard examples of why that is so—and so to mandate a requirement in primary legislation to require bail hearings to take place will unnecessarily increase the number of hearings and will slow the system and add complexity.
Amendments 20 and 21 would make two changes. First, they would limit judicial discretion to maintain detention of those who are suffering from mental health concerns or of those who are under 17 where the judge considers immigration detention remains appropriate for their own or, in the case of those with mental health concerns, others’ protection. Secondly, the amendments would remove the requirement for repeat applications made within 28 days of a previous application where there has not been a material change in circumstances, made under the bail provisions in Schedule 2 to the Immigration Act 1971, to be decided without a hearing.
Published guidance provides that certain categories of people are considered unsuitable for detention in the first place unless there are very exceptional circumstances in play. Unaccompanied young people under the age of 18 and those suffering from serious mental illness which cannot be satisfactorily managed within detention are specifically listed as case types that should be detained only in very exceptional circumstances. However, there will always be cases with very exceptional circumstances which mean that detention is appropriate. An example may be when it is necessary for detention to continue while an individual is being or waiting to be assessed or awaiting transfer under the Mental Health Act. We may also need to hold unaccompanied children where, for example, it is in the public interest because of a risk of reoffending or a risk to national security. They may also be held for a very short period either on arrival pending collection by social services or when we are trying to remove them. In any decision to hold an unaccompanied child, we will consider our duty to safeguard and protect the welfare of children.
The noble Lords’ amendment would prevent a judge in a bail hearing from considering if very exceptional circumstances are in play and would require judges to release individuals even where there is the real possibility that this will put them into a more vulnerable situation or where they clearly pose a threat to themselves or others. Amendment 21 seeks to remove the requirement for the Tribunal Procedure Committee to change the rules to require repeat applications to be disposed of without a hearing, thus undermining the Government’s proposals. It would also allow the current inefficient bail processes to remain in place.
However, I have listened to the points made by noble Lords in this debate. It has been a good debate about a very important aspect of the provisions of the Bill. I will consider those points before we return on Report. In the mean time, I ask noble Lords not to press their amendments.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, other noble Lords have spoken very effectively about the impact of detention. I will just mention again the first of the amendments in this group, which is on the presumption of liberty. As we heard, a presumption of liberty is already something that judges would consider almost automatically as a matter of instinct. Of course, the drafting of the amendment could be tweaked but we are only at Committee stage. However, subject to reading Hansard and the Minister’s confirmation that the Government will consider the points before the next stage—I know he made no commitment and I would expect no less of him than that he would consider what has been said—I think that a presumption of liberty is so important that is should be in statute. Guidance can be changed. I would like to see the matter put absolutely beyond doubt. I appreciate that the amendment might have elephant traps in it—amateur amendments sometimes do. Of course, at this moment, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.