(8 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I put my name to a couple of these amendments and I would like to speak to them. Under our constitutional arrangements, the Human Rights Act is the next best thing that we have to a constitutional guarantee of fundamental rights and freedoms. The Minister has rightly put his name on the front of the Bill, stating that in his opinion it is compatible with the convention rights. I have put my name to these amendments to seek to make sure that what the Minister has put on the face of the Bill becomes transparently clear in the statute when it is enacted.
Article 8 of the convention, which guarantees the right to personal privacy, indicates that any exception must be provided by law—that is to say, satisfy legal certainty—and by the principle of proportionality, and that any interference must be necessary and no more than necessary to safeguard other compelling public interests. The problem with the Bill as drafted is that it does not go quite far enough to ensure full compliance with the Human Rights Act and with Article 8 of the convention. That is why the amendments in the name of my noble friend Lady Hamwee are needed, in my view. First, it is important not merely to have regard to but to make sure that there is full compliance with the principle of proportionality. That is what these amendments seek. Secondly, without repeating what has already been said, it is very important that the obligations on public authorities—for example, not to use the powers listed in Clause (2)(1)—are no more than what,
“could reasonably be achieved by other less intrusive means”.
That is classic principle-of-proportionality language.
I very much hope that in one way or another the Government will come to accept these amendments or something very similar to them so that we can make sure that lawyers like me are not able to go to court to challenge all of this under the Human Rights Act, but that Parliament gets the statute clear to put beyond doubt the application of the principles of legal certainty and proportionality, which is what these amendments are designed to do.
I will say just a word about Amendment 14, not because I want to make an elaborate statement about it but because, as I said at Second Reading, it is very important that we have a board or commission with the requisite powers. I will come to that in later debates on the Bill.
My Lords, I will speak briefly to Amendment 14. We have already heard at length that, in its report on the Bill, the ISC called for a “backbone” of privacy to be inserted into it. The Home Office’s initial response was to add one word to the next version of the Bill: it inserted “privacy” into the title of Part 1 so that “General protections” became “General privacy protections”—nothing else changed. Later, under some pressure in the Commons, Clause 2 came into being, which goes some way, but not all the way, to inserting the privacy protections that we on this side of the Committee feel are needed.
This episode suggests to me that no one in the Government has a brief to speak up for privacy and civil liberties when legislation is being formulated. Presumably, that is why the Home Secretary included Section 46 in the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, giving her the power to establish the Privacy and Civil Liberties Board. The only problem is that she has not commenced this power and the vacuum in privacy protection advocacy in government is still there.
Amendment 14 would force the Home Secretary’s hand so that she must get on with it—actually, to be more precise, her successor must get on with it because she probably has bigger fish to fry as of Wednesday. For now, this is simply a probing amendment. If it were brought back on Report, it would probably need some improvement in terms of the board’s scope and powers. The American version of this, the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, has been very successful with a much wider brief. For now, I will be content to hear the Government’s response to the amendment as it stands.
Before I sit down, I will say a couple of words regarding the friendly fire that has been coming from behind me during this debate—rather ungraciously, I might say—from the noble Lord, Lord Carlile. He queried whether I had read Nineteen Eighty-Four and knew about its description of CCTV in every bedroom. I have, actually, but I suspect that he has not been doing his reading on security matters because, if he had, he would know about Project Optic Nerve, in which GCHQ intercepted 1 million Yahoo! users’ webcams, which effectively put state cameras into 1 million bedrooms.
(12 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am in a small but growing minority in this debate in that I am neither a distinguished lawyer nor a member, not even a former member, of the ISC.
When compared with many other countries, it is remarkable how much the British people hold the courts in high regard and respect their decisions. This is partly because our judges are seen as incorruptible, independent and wise, but the main reason is that court decisions are the result of a process that is fair and transparent. By “fair” I mean that the court will give no privileges to either side, even when one side is the state. This principle is known in European jurisprudence as “equality of arms” and is a very British concept. An important aspect of equality of arms is that each side has an opportunity to see the other side’s evidence, to challenge it and test it, and to call evidence of their own to rebut it. The decision that is made after that process has been respected as one that we have good reason to respect.
What does transparency mean in this context? The principle of transparency entails that proceedings should be open to the public unless there is a very good reason why not. The court should make plain the reason for its decision. No matter how high our regard for the judge, it is very hard to trust his or her decision if you do not know how and why it has been reached.
Closed material proceedings are a big departure from the principles of transparency and fairness. The Government are proposing that, in civil cases where they are the defendant and are being accused of wrongdoing, they should be able to stack the proceedings in their favour on what is probably the deciding issue in the case. CMP is not just a secret hearing with the press excluded; the litigants and their lawyer are also locked out. The Government’s lawyer would have a private meeting with the judge who will decide the case and give him or her so-called evidence that their opponent cannot see. I say “so-called evidence” because it will simply be assertions that have not been tested or challenged. It may be mistaken or could even be complete fiction. Even so, the Bill requires the judge to take this highly dubious information into account when reaching a verdict—a very one-sided arrangement that cannot in any way be described as fair.
What led to the creation of CMPs in the first place? They were introduced for Special Immigration Appeals Commission hearings involving foreigners for whom a national security deportation was being considered. Previously such appeals were held in total secrecy and, by comparison, CMPs were a bit less bad. We are now being invited to extend CMPs from this highly specialised application to civil cases, where the Government are the defendant and are being accused of wrongdoing.
However, that is not the end of this mission creep. Buried in the Bill, in Clause 11(2), is the power for the Secretary of State to amend the definition of “relevant civil proceedings” by statutory order, into who knows what areas of our justice system.
Of course, we have a good idea of how far the Government would really like to go in extending the scope of CMPs. The Green Paper sought to apply CMPs to all civil proceedings involving the Executive. Secret and unfair hearings, therefore, could have been invoked by a hospital trust fighting a medical negligence claim, or a local authority defending itself against a claim for maladministration. For now, the Lord Chancellor has rowed back on that ambition in the face of a mountain of protest, but he has shown us the ominous and dangerous road that he wants to take us down.
What of the safeguards that the Government have trumpeted? We are told that the case judge will decide whether CMPs will be invoked, not the Minister. However, there is a disconnect between what the Government are saying on this and what is actually on the Bill. According to the Bill at present, judges will have their hands tied, with no discretion to consider the competing interests of disclosure in the interests of justice and national security. This, therefore, will effectively be a ministerial decision, with no effective judicial oversight.
What, then, is the problem that this Bill seeks to solve? The current system of PII certificates works well. It allows a balance to be struck between the requirements of justice and national security. If a Minister believes that disclosure could harm the public interest, he or she signs a certificate to that effect. The court then considers the issue, and the judge has a number of ways to handle the information in question. He can withhold it, release it, redact it before he releases it, protect the identity of the witness, and he has a number of other nuanced solutions. The PII system works well, and the Government have failed to bring forward a single example of where the PII system has led to a disclosure that has been damaging to our national security.
In fact, the Bill requires a Minister to “consider” the PII route before applying for a CMP, but the wording of this provision is so weak and easy to evade that, in effect, Ministers can and will demand CMPs without giving any serious consideration to the much fairer PII route. If this Bill is to proceed, before the Minister can ask for a CMP he should have to demonstrate to the court that for some reason a PII certificate will not do the job.
What do others think of this Bill? The House could do worse than listen to the views of the special advocates, specially vetted lawyers who are appointed to serve the court in CMPs. If anyone knows about the grimy details of this part of the justice system, they do. In a memorandum signed by 50 special advisers—which is basically all of them—they say that,
“CMPs are inherently unfair and contrary to the common law tradition … the Government would have to show the most compelling reasons to justify their introduction … no such reasons have been advanced … in our view, none exist”.
There you have it from the horse’s mouth. No reason has been advanced and none exists for making part of our civil justice system inherently unfair. That is the opinion of the specialist lawyers with deep knowledge of this type of proceedings and with no axe to grind at all.
What, then, is behind this solution without a problem? Over the past few months we have been offered a series of spurious justifications for this draconian Bill, all of them without any evidence to support them that stands up to scrutiny. I put it to the House that this Bill has nothing to do with protecting national security or preventing the CIA from withholding intelligence from our agencies because they do not trust our courts, or with saving the Government from having to settle civil cases for large sums because they cannot use sensitive data to defend themselves. All these reasons and others have been advanced at various times with little or no evidence to support them.
I put it to noble Lords that the real problem that this Bill is designed to solve is the justified embarrassment that the security agencies suffered when a recent civil case exposed their involvement in rendition and torture. In that case, the previous Government sought to conceal from the courts seven paragraphs that admitted what the Americans did to the litigant while he was in their custody.
The judge’s view was that:
“Of itself, the treatment to which”,
the litigant,
“was subjected could never properly be described in a democracy as ‘a secret’ or an ‘intelligence secret’ or a ‘summary of classified intelligence’”.
This Bill might have prevented the exposure of this wrongdoing and it may do so in the future if we pass it without major amendments.
I am sorry to interrupt my noble friend but that is not quite right. The previous Government attempted to provide that information to the United States Military Commissions, but were thwarted from doing so by the American intelligence authorities. What the British Government sought to do was entirely honourable and they did not seek to conceal it from our own court. I thought I should just place that on the record.
I thank my noble friend for that. The Lord Chancellor has indulged in plenty of comforting rhetoric in an attempt to assuage the serious concerns that many people wiser than I have about this Bill. The problem is that there is a yawning chasm between his words and those in the Bill. For example, he assures us that the judge will decide whether CMP will be used but the Bill as currently worded makes clear that the judge’s hands will be tied and will have little option but to grant the Minister’s request for CMP, even if he or she believes that the case could best be tried using PII rules. The judge will not be able to adjudicate between the competing arguments of justice and national security.
As it currently stands, this Bill is a toolkit for cover-ups. As such it is a threat to our democracy and we have a lot of work to do to fix its serious shortcomings. I hope that my noble and learned friend the Minister will listen to the strong misgivings about this Bill around the House, among civil liberties campaigners and, particularly, the special advocates who have a much more balanced and independent view of these matters than the politicians and the security agencies.
I will listen carefully to the Minister’s response today and in Committee. I hope that he is able to give me comfort to support a much-improved version of the Bill in the future but there is a long way to go.