Project Tempora

Lord Strasburger Excerpts

Wednesday 20th November 2013 Lords Chamber

Asked by

[Lord Strasburger]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government which Minister first authorised GCHQ’s Project Tempora; when that happened; and why they did not disclose the existence of Project Tempora to the Joint Committee on the Draft Communications Data Bill.

[The Senior Minister of State, Department for Communities and Local Government & Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Baroness Warsi) (Con)]

My Lords, I hope that your Lordships will understand that it would not be appropriate to discuss the specifics here. However, I can say that GCHQ and all other security and law enforcement agencies operate within a strict legal and policy framework, as set out by my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary in the other place on 10 June.

[Lord Strasburger (LD)]

I thank my noble friend for the Answer that she was required to give. In a democracy, wholesale untargeted state intrusion into the private lives of all the people, such as Project Tempora, is unacceptable unless it has the informed consent of the people via their Parliament. However, Parliament has not been informed and has not given its consent to Tempora; nor has the Cabinet, the National Security Council or even, it seems, the ISC. Will the Government acknowledge that the much vaunted oversight of the security services has failed spectacularly, as underlined last week by the feeble public performance of the ISC? When will the Government at last join the global debate about limiting state surveillance of its innocent citizens?

[Baroness Warsi]

The noble Lord makes an important point but I assure him that secret does not mean unaccountable. We have a system where any intrusion of the sort to which he refers has to be necessary, proportionate and carefully targeted. We have a number of oversight mechanisms, including political and judicial, the commissioners and of course Parliament through the Intelligence and Security Committee.

Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000: External Communications

Lord Strasburger Excerpts

Tuesday 30th July 2013 Lords Chamber

Asked by

[Lord Strasburger]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government what guidelines Secretaries of State adopt in deciding whether electronic communications sent from the United Kingdom to a United Kingdom addressee but routed outside the United Kingdom fall within the definition of “external communications” in Section 20 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000.

[The Senior Minister of State, Department for Communities and Local Government & Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Baroness Warsi)]

My Lords, I am sure that your Lordships’ House will understand why I cannot go into detail on operational matters. The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 sets out that authorisations for all interceptions of communications, internal or external, must consider necessity and proportionality. My right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary has stated that privacy is at the forefront of the minds of Secretaries of State. Great care is taken to balance individual privacy with duty to the UK’s national security. The Interception of Communications Commissioner provides thorough and independent oversight of all of these considerations.

[Lord Strasburger]

I thank my noble friend the Minister for her reply. We now know that GCHQ is routinely hoovering up and storing prodigious quantities of the internet communications of millions of innocent people, turning us all from citizens into suspects. As far as I am aware, Parliament has not sanctioned this industrial-scale seizure of our private data by the state. Can the Minister please tell the House whether this blanket snooping on all of us is authorised by a Minister, and if so, which Minister sanctioned it, and under which section of which Act of Parliament?

[Baroness Warsi]

I do not accept the noble Lord’s question, or indeed the points he made in it. I can assure the House that we take the interception of communications incredibly seriously. For these actions to go ahead we need a warrant from one of the most senior members of the Government as well as detailed legal advice to support it. That decision will be reviewed by independent commissioners and implemented by agencies, which are bound by legal and ethical frameworks, alongside parliamentary scrutiny through the Intelligence and Security Committee. This provides one of the strongest systems of checks and balances and democratic accountability for secret intelligence agencies and their work anywhere in the world.