European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 (Relevant Court) (Retained EU Case Law) Regulations 2020

Lord Stewart of Dirleton Excerpts

Wednesday 25th November 2020 Grand Committee

Moved by

[Lord Stewart of Dirleton]

That the Grand Committee do consider the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 (Relevant Court) (Retained EU Case Law) Regulations 2020.

Relevant document: 32nd Report from the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Stewart of Dirleton) (Con)]

My Lords, the instrument before the Grand Committee today relates to the question of which courts should be able to depart from retained EU case law. From January, UK courts, rather than the Court of Justice of the European Union, or CJEU, will be the final arbiter of laws that govern our lives. In order to promote legal clarity and certainty in our law following our departure from the EU, Parliament has provided that EU law that we have chosen to retain is to be interpreted in line with EU case law which we have also chosen to retain.

The way in which our law is interpreted by courts and tribunals does not remain static over time. Our departure from the EU has, naturally, brought with it a change to the context in which the law is considered, and we want our courts to be able to reflect that in their decisions where appropriate. Without the ability to depart from EU case law, there is a risk that UK law will remain tied to an interpretation from the CJEU that is no longer appropriate in the UK.

For that reason, the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 vested in the UK Supreme Court and, in Scotland, the High Court of Justiciary, in specified cases, the power to depart from retained EU case law, applying their own tests for deciding whether to depart from their own case law when doing so.

This instrument will extend the number of UK courts with the power to depart from retained EU case law to include courts at Court of Appeal level across the UK. In making such decisions, the test to be applied by these courts is to be the same as that used by the UK Supreme Court in deciding whether to depart from its own case law—namely, whether it is right to do so.

The instrument will achieve our aim of enabling retained EU case law to evolve in a more timely way than otherwise might have been achieved through the status quo. It will also help to mitigate the operational impacts on the UK Supreme Court and the High Court of Justiciary that would have arisen if the power to depart from retained EU case law were reserved solely to those courts. It will further assist those courts by providing prior judicial dialogue on these complex issues from the Court of Appeal level.

I am sure that your Lordships are familiar with the terminology but, first, I shall briefly explain what I mean by retained EU case law. Retained EU case law is defined in the 2018 Act as, broadly, any principles and decisions of the CJEU as they have effect in EU law prior to the end of the transition period. This includes cases which were referred to the CJEU by the UK, as well as those referred by other member states. This is a vast and complex body of case law that spans many different areas of law.

In amending the 2018 Act through the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020, Parliament provided the power to make regulations to extend the list of courts which may depart from retained EU case law, to set the test to be applied by those courts and to specify any considerations that courts should take into account in coming to such decisions. This instrument extends the list of courts that can depart from retained EU case law to: the Court of Appeal of England and Wales, the Court Martial Appeal Court, the Court of Appeal of Northern Ireland, the High Court of Justiciary, when sitting as a court of Appeal in relation to a compatibility issue or a devolution issue, and the Inner House of the Court of Session, the Lands Valuation Appeal Court and the Registration Appeal Court in Scotland.

The instrument also sets out that the test to be applied by these additional courts when deciding whether to depart from retained EU case law will be the same test used by the UK Supreme Court in deciding whether to depart from its own case law. This test is well established and is capable of being easily understood and applied without any further guidance. It is anticipated that applying the same test to that used by the UK Supreme Court will foster a consistent approach across the jurisdictions and, in turn, on appeal to the UK Supreme Court. There is a wealth of case law underpinning the UK Supreme Court’s test which has evolved over time to ensure that courts consider changing circumstances and modern public policy.

The Government have decided against specifying a list of factors to be considered by the courts with the power to depart from retained EU case law, as the UK Supreme Court’s test is underpinned by a significant amount of case law, which provides considerable guidance. The instrument does not change the operation of the doctrine of precedent, which, practically speaking, means that when a court reaches a decision on whether to depart from retained EU case law, that judgment has the same precedent status as other judgments from that court.

As required in statute, the Government have consulted senior judiciary across the UK, a consultation process that was also extended to the devolved Administrations, as well as to representatives across the legal services sector, businesses and other organisations, and was open to the public. The consultation ran from 2 July to 13 August, with a response published on 15 October. That consultation sought views on whether to extend the power to depart from retained EU case law to the Court of Appeal and its equivalents across the UK, or to the High Court and its UK equivalents.

Having considered the responses fully, the Government have concluded that extending the power to Court of Appeal level courts strikes the appropriate balance between enabling retained EU case law to evolve more quickly, where appropriate, and providing legal clarity and certainty. It also assists in managing the operational impacts by ensuring cases are considered in a timely way. Furthermore, extending the power at this level will mitigate the impacts of potentially large volumes of divergent decisions, both within and across the UK jurisdictions, as decisions of these courts are binding on themselves and courts below as well as being persuasive across the UK’s three legal systems. Where such divergence occurs, this can be resolved more quickly by the UK Supreme Court if it is not required to consider all questions of whether to depart from retained EU case law.

I know that there was significant interest from your Lordships when the power to make this statutory instrument was introduced during the passage of the 2020 Act. I hope that your Lordships will be reassured by the consultation that has taken place and the careful approach that is being taken in extending the power to Court of Appeal level courts only.

An impact assessment has been published alongside the consultation response. Any impact is heavily dependent on both litigant behaviour in bringing proceedings seeking a departure from retained EU case law and, of course, the outcome of that litigation. However, based on a qualitative assessment, we assess that any impact on an increase in case volume as a result of this instrument is manageable at Court of Appeal level, helps to maintain legal certainty and mitigates pressure on the UK Supreme Court.

This instrument enables our courts to be better able to consider whether to depart from retained EU case law than the status quo provided in the 2018 Act. Providing these seven courts with the ability to depart from retained EU case law will allow timely evolution of our case law. It will relieve pressure on the UK Supreme Court and avoid our case law becoming fossilised. We are taking an approach that balances the importance of legal clarity and certainty with the need for the law to evolve with changing circumstances.

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[Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful for the contributions to this debate and I would like to respond to the points made.

First, I acknowledge the contribution of the noble Lord, Lord Beith, who pointed out that consultation has taken place. I emphasise that the terms of the legislation seek to strike a balance which is intended to prevent an overwhelming rush of work to the court at the highest level. We also intend to maintain judicial independence.

My noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern raised the matter of the approach which he had urged at an earlier stage whereby there should be a means of referral from the lower courts to the higher—to those courts which are capable of taking a decision in these matters. There is no provision for any courts to refer below the Court of Appeal, including the magistrates’ court. Matters will find their way into the appellate level of courts capable of hearing these matters in the normal way by decisions being taken and themselves appealed against. It seems very likely that appeals in these contexts would be more or less inevitable given the novelty of the situation but also acknowledging the likely temporary nature of the situation as the law recovers full independence.

The noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, spoke about there being an allergy on the part of the Government and the Conservative Party against mention of the CJEU. Having gone over my notes and counted four occasions when I mentioned that court in the first two pages of my notes, I am driven to conclude that the noble Lord was speaking figuratively, although at the end of his speech he said that I had perhaps not yet developed the allergy.

On the matter of the response of the consultees, the noble Lord said that I might perhaps be exercising something of a sense of humour when I spoke positively of it, given the overall terms in which the consultation had been responded to. However, I take from the consultation that there was support for the cautious approach taken in terms of the SI, balancing competing needs between access to the courts, the need to avoid a particular higher level of court being overwhelmed with applications and the need for legal clarity. In the circumstances, it seems inevitable that there will be some increase in the burden of work on the higher courts resulting from the unprecedented decision of this country to leave the European Union. That degree of disruption is, as I say, inevitable. However, I submit that the terms of this SI admit a useful and productive method by which that new burden of work can most readily be assimilated over time.

On the noble Lord’s point about the range of courts capable of taking on this function with regard to the statutory instrument, he made reference to the Lands Valuation Appeal Court in Scotland. The seven courts were chosen specifically for their appellate status, the availability of appeals to them and the absence of availability of appeals from them.

The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, indicated the Labour Party’s position and sought reassurance with regard to the concerns that were raised by trade unions and the legal profession. Nothing in this statutory instrument seeks to impose at all on any of the courts any view which the Government may hold. Indeed, the statutory instrument may be read as emphasising the importance that the Government place on the independence of the courts and of judicial discretion. Other than through reiteration of the 1966 test laid down by the House of Lords, there is no prescriptive list of factors to be taken into account by the courts taking on this function.

The Government see this instrument as an important part of the United Kingdom’s future standing to ensure that more courts are able to depart from retained European Union case law but in a timely and appropriate manner. We consider this to be a proportionate and sensible approach to this unprecedented and novel situation as the United Kingdom becomes the first country to leave the EU. We consider that extending the power to courts at the Court of Appeal level, to the Court of Appeal and to its equivalents, strikes the right balance between the provision of legal clarity and certainty and enabling the law to appeal more flexibly.

I am grateful for your Lordships’ learned contributions to the debate. I hope that your Lordships agree that the statutory instrument is a necessary one, therefore I commend this draft instrument to the Committee.

Motion agreed.