Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Debate between Lord Stevens of Birmingham and Lord Falconer of Thoroton

Committee stage
Friday 20th March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stevens of Birmingham (CB)]

The noble Baroness brings me neatly on to the second point I was going to make, which is that the lack of safeguards in Scotland precisely demonstrates the constitutional and practical difficulty of trying to legislate in Scotland while a number of those key safeguards are reserved matters to Westminster. Part of the reason the Royal College of Psychiatrists and the pharmacists came out decisively this week against the Scottish Bill was because it was not able to include enforceable conscience protections for health professionals that would, for example, have enabled them to refuse an instruction from their employer to participate in assisted dying. Instead, the mechanism that was forced, as it were, on the Scottish legislation was a Section 104 order, which would be subject to a future Westminster Government changing their mind.

The Scottish Parliament was being asked to legislate for assisted dying, absent any Scottish safeguards for conscience and dependent on the future decisions of a Westminster Parliament. The noble Baroness neatly illustrates the point that there is a fundamental problem when one part of the United Kingdom seeks to go its own way. It is incapable of getting the necessary protections and that is one of the reasons why the measure was defeated. Amendment 887 in this group, which would withdraw the reference to Scotland from some of the measures, clearly makes sense given that the Scottish Parliament has just decided that it will not go down this path.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

The three reasons why it extends to Scotland are so that people cannot advertise in Scotland to England and Wales, so that people in England and Wales get proper protections if they want to use the conscience clause, and so that substances are dealt with by the United Kingdom. That is why Scotland is included. Is the noble Lord saying that he wants those removed if the Bill goes through?

[Lord Stevens of Birmingham (CB)]

Can the noble and learned Lord elaborate on his second reason?

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

The second reason is that if, for example, you want the protection of employment law, that employment law which extends to the whole of the United Kingdom should protect you in Scotland as much as in England. You should never be prejudiced. That is why it is included.

[Lord Stevens of Birmingham (CB)]

Is the noble and learned Lord suggesting that Scottish health professionals will be travelling south to undertake assisted dying? Is it a sort of Berwick-upon-Tweed provision?

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[Lord Stevens of Birmingham (CB)]

It is not so much a matter of prejudice because, as I understand it, this provision was inserted in the House of Commons in the anticipation that the Scottish Parliament was going to have before it a Bill on assisted suicide, which it would at that point have passed. This was trying to do a belt and braces on a Section 104 order which everybody could see was likely to be deficient.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

No, that is not right. The reference to Scotland was included to provide protection for people in England and Wales who, under employment law, wanted to exercise the conscience clause. If I am right about that, I am sure the noble Lord would not wish it removed.

[Lord Stevens of Birmingham (CB)]

I would be interested to come back to that on Report when we have had a chance to investigate that point further.

Fundamentally, this shows that there is a great problem, a structural problem, in trying to do these types of big social changes through Private Members’ Bills, be they in Scotland or England. The reason for that is that it requires concurrent action by the Governments of both nations. We have seen time and again that when these sorts of questions have arisen and we have posed these questions, we have been told by the Front Bench, for reasons we all understand, that amendments to try to deal with these problems pose workability concerns. Then we ask, “How would you address those workability concerns?” and answer comes there none, because the Government are officially neutral on the question. Dealing with these sorts of questions cannot be left to Private Members’ Bills when you cannot get to the bottom of the workability concerns or deal with the fact that, in order for the narrowly drawn legislation to work, there are a whole set of other things that have to be in place that only the Government can provide.

I conclude on that point by noting that this past week we have seen a report from the House of Commons Public Accounts Committee, once again on hospice and palliative care. It says:

“There is an urgent need for reform to address the financial challenges that the independent adult hospice sector faces … The Department’s solution—the Modern Service Framework—is in the early stages of development, details are sketchy, and it is at least a year from being introduced. This is not good enough when so many hospices are announcing service cuts”.


The idea that we should legislate when that is the context right now seems to me utterly ridiculous.

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[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

The health service could determine who it is going to make it available to free, but it could not prevent other people—for example, private providers—having different provisions in relation to it.

The next category of amendments was in relation to removing Scotland. I gave an answer to the noble Lord, Lord Stevens, in relation to that in the course of the debate.

[Lord Stevens of Birmingham (CB)]

Perhaps the noble and learned Lord will clarify the answer he gave on Scotland. I think he is saying that even though the Scottish Parliament has decided that assisted dying should not be lawful in Scotland, a Scottish hospice could nevertheless not prevent its employees doing something that would be unlawful in Scotland if they travelled across the border to perform that act in England. Is that the consequence of what he is suggesting?

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

This was picked up by the noble Baroness, Lady Merron. She focused, rightly, on what would happen in the case of a doctor who lived in Scotland but worked in England. The question was: could they be prejudiced? The answer is no—employment law would apply, and employment law is right across the country. On what is not being done in relation to the Bill, it does not refer to Scotland, because in Scotland they are awaiting the Scottish Bill. It is entirely focused on the protection of people working in England. That is why it is there. It is also focused on advertising coming from Scotland into England. So it is not in any way dependent upon what might happen in Scotland.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Debate between Lord Stevens of Birmingham and Lord Falconer of Thoroton

Committee stage
Friday 13th March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

May I just finish? The noble Lord, Lord Stevens, refers to proposed new paragraph (m) in the scheme. Under the scheme proposal, the panel of up to seven persons has to be satisfied, or the “assessment must ascertain”, that the person

“has experienced the involvement of a specialist palliative care team and, if not, whether this was because of availability, unsatisfactory care or patient choice”.

I am very supportive of the idea—and I think this was in the noble Lord’s mind—that as much information is available as possible. As I understood the noble Lord, the more we know about the shortcomings of palliative care, the better.

However, I wonder whether the best way to deal with that is not to make a requirement in proposed new paragraph (m) for what a seven-person panel must investigate but to make that the sort of issue that the voluntary assisted dying commissioner should be looking at in his monitoring, which is required specifically by the statute. That is just the sort of thing that might help him.

We all support the point that the noble Lord, Lord Stevens, made that the more we know about palliative care—its funding, where it is good and where it is bad—the better. But is the assisted dying Bill the right place to try to lever in a whole range of informational requirements, of the sort that he referred to from the Mental Health Act, which we would all support?

[Lord Stevens of Birmingham (CB)]

Even if the noble and learned Lord does not adopt the scheme put forward by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, would he nevertheless accept that, for the co-ordinating doctors, it would be valuable to ascertain the information contained in proposed new paragraph (m) in this amendment? We would therefore be accumulating real-world evidence from every case and not looking at just the aggregate national position that the voluntary assisted dying commissioner might be able to adduce.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

Yes, and I cannot imagine a situation, in particular because it is specifically required under the Bill, in which the co-ordinating doctor does not raise the question of what palliative care the patient has had and what is available. Indeed, the Bill requires him or her to do that. Whether the co-ordinating doctor should then provide that information to the voluntary assisted dying commissioner is a matter for the commissioner, as it is up to him or her to decide what information to collect. In principle, it seems a good thing, but the noble Lord has referred to vastly bigger issues that we might need to consider, not in the context of the assisted dying Bill but in relation to how proper information is available about the availability of palliative care. We are all supportive of that.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Debate between Lord Stevens of Birmingham and Lord Falconer of Thoroton

Committee stage
Friday 23rd January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stevens of Birmingham (CB)]

On that very point, the noble and learned Lord’s Bill, at Clause 41(4), does indeed propose that an interpretation will be imposed on Section 1(1) of the 2006 Act, suggesting that he thinks there is some ambiguity on that point. As to the question about withdrawing care from an MND patient, surely the distinction between an act and an omission—the ability for somebody to choose to decline treatment—is a well-understood principle that has no bearing on the question of an assisted death.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

They are fundamentally different, but the idea that removing the respiratory equipment does not involve some acts is not realistic. But I completely accept the proposition that they are different. On the legal point, there is some ambiguity about what the section means and whether it needs to be changed, but I am making it absolutely clear that, from my point of view and that of the promoters of the Bill, it is most certainly not outside the broader founding principles of the NHS.

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[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

My answer to that—because the answer I gave in my long and tedious speech was obviously inadequate—was that to be properly informed, you would have to say what the effect of the drugs and what the complications would be. That comes from the word “informed”. If there could be any doubt about that, the fact that you have to discuss how, physiologically, it brings about the death and you need to discuss what happens in relation to the complications puts that beyond doubt.

I will just go back to the question from the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge. It is Clause 33, not Clause 32, which is the civil liability for providing assistance. That provides that if it is done in accordance with the Act then there is no civil liability, but it needs to be done in accordance with the Act, which means it has to be the informed wish.

[Lord Stevens of Birmingham (CB)]

Could I pursue that point and connect it with the question from the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay? It is very important that we clarify this for the benefit of the medical profession. Clause 33(2)(b), which covers civil liability, says that the civil liability exemptions are not available to a doctor

“in tort arising from a breach of a duty of care owed to a person”.

In the scenario described by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, what is the duty of care that the doctor owes the patient who has just not died?

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

I am not sure whether the noble Lord is asking that in the context of giving information or of doing it negligently. The effect of Clause 33(2) is that nothing prevents the obligation on the doctor to act with reasonable care towards the patient. If, carelessly, the doctor failed to set out all the risks or maladministered the assistance, either the patient or the estate of the patient would have a claim against that doctor for negligence. There might be a dependency claim as well.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

In response to the question from the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, regarding the complications, that has to be agreed in advance. I did not think that that was the question from the noble Lord, Lord Stevens.

[Lord Stevens of Birmingham (CB)]

That was indeed my question.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

The doctor has to take reasonable care at that point. They cannot do anything to kill the patient, so they have to provide reasonable treatment to save the patient’s life at that point.