Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Debate between Lord Stevens of Birmingham and Lord Falconer of Thoroton

Committee stage
Friday 23rd January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stevens of Birmingham (CB)]

On that very point, the noble and learned Lord’s Bill, at Clause 41(4), does indeed propose that an interpretation will be imposed on Section 1(1) of the 2006 Act, suggesting that he thinks there is some ambiguity on that point. As to the question about withdrawing care from an MND patient, surely the distinction between an act and an omission—the ability for somebody to choose to decline treatment—is a well-understood principle that has no bearing on the question of an assisted death.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

They are fundamentally different, but the idea that removing the respiratory equipment does not involve some acts is not realistic. But I completely accept the proposition that they are different. On the legal point, there is some ambiguity about what the section means and whether it needs to be changed, but I am making it absolutely clear that, from my point of view and that of the promoters of the Bill, it is most certainly not outside the broader founding principles of the NHS.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

My answer to that—because the answer I gave in my long and tedious speech was obviously inadequate—was that to be properly informed, you would have to say what the effect of the drugs and what the complications would be. That comes from the word “informed”. If there could be any doubt about that, the fact that you have to discuss how, physiologically, it brings about the death and you need to discuss what happens in relation to the complications puts that beyond doubt.

I will just go back to the question from the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge. It is Clause 33, not Clause 32, which is the civil liability for providing assistance. That provides that if it is done in accordance with the Act then there is no civil liability, but it needs to be done in accordance with the Act, which means it has to be the informed wish.

[Lord Stevens of Birmingham (CB)]

Could I pursue that point and connect it with the question from the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay? It is very important that we clarify this for the benefit of the medical profession. Clause 33(2)(b), which covers civil liability, says that the civil liability exemptions are not available to a doctor

“in tort arising from a breach of a duty of care owed to a person”.

In the scenario described by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, what is the duty of care that the doctor owes the patient who has just not died?

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

I am not sure whether the noble Lord is asking that in the context of giving information or of doing it negligently. The effect of Clause 33(2) is that nothing prevents the obligation on the doctor to act with reasonable care towards the patient. If, carelessly, the doctor failed to set out all the risks or maladministered the assistance, either the patient or the estate of the patient would have a claim against that doctor for negligence. There might be a dependency claim as well.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

In response to the question from the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, regarding the complications, that has to be agreed in advance. I did not think that that was the question from the noble Lord, Lord Stevens.

[Lord Stevens of Birmingham (CB)]

That was indeed my question.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

The doctor has to take reasonable care at that point. They cannot do anything to kill the patient, so they have to provide reasonable treatment to save the patient’s life at that point.