Health and Care Bill

Lord Stevens of Birmingham Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 3 & Committee stage
Wednesday 26th January 2022 Lords Chamber

The constitutional character of this legislation is part of a larger story of Executive aggrandisement by a Government who, armed with a large majority in the elected Chamber, have scant respect for other sources of authority or for the conventions of parliamentary government. That the Government’s majority in the House of Commons is decreasingly biddable does not make its Executive arrogance any less objectionable. Clause 40, like Clauses 39 and 64, should not stand part of the Bill.

[Lord Stevens of Birmingham (CB)]

My Lords, it is a privilege to speak to this group of amendments. I recognise that a public service as important as the National Health Service has to be democratically accountable to the Secretary of State and Parliament. I also recognise that the broad provisions of the Bill have wide support outside this House from organisations ranging from the Academy of Medical Royal Colleges to the representative organisations spoken of today, the Patients Association, and many others which, at the inception of these proposals, came forward to advocate for them.

However, unfortunately, when we turn our attention to Clause 40 and Schedule 6 there is no such support for the measures therein. These provisions manage, perhaps uniquely, to combine being unnecessary, undesirable and unworkable—a legislative trifecta that has little to commend it.

The measures are unnecessary for the reasons set out by the noble Baroness, Lady Cumberlege. There is already a well-established mechanism for local consultation, under which democratic local authorities can, if concern arises, bat a proposal up to the Secretary of State for a national decision with the advice of an independent expert panel. There is also established public law in this area, which can be tested through judicial review. Just about nobody, nationally, or locally, thinks that the proposals in this part of the Bill are needed. They are, in effect, a solution in search of a problem.

As well as unnecessary, these proposals are undesirable. They would confuse and obscure accountability for the quality and safety of patient care. The Court of Appeal held in Nettleship v South Tyneside and Sunderland CCGs in 2020 that there is no duty to include in a public consultation options which local commissioners deem to be unviable, unrealistic or unsustainable. Yet Schedule 6 would allow the Secretary of State to impose service changes that local clinicians, local patient groups and, indeed, local authorities deem unsafe or unviable. This clearly cuts across the statutory responsibilities of local boards for the safety and quality of care.

Where the Secretary of State has imposed such a service change on the local NHS, is it the Secretary of State who will then be in receipt of Care Quality Commission findings and scrutiny? Is it the Secretary of the State who will be on the receiving end of medical negligence claims, or potentially criminal proceedings? This set of measures completely obscures the well-established accountability for the quality and safety of local care.

I believe that these measures are unnecessary and undesirable, but they are also unworkable. As worded, the definition of a reconfiguration is vague and overly broad. It could capture just about any change in service provision. On page 197, the Bill refers to changes that have

“an impact on … the manner in which a service is delivered to individuals.”

That could cover just about anything, and if hospitals are proposing such a change, they have a duty to notify the Secretary of State.

By contrast, the long-standing Local Authority (Public Health, Health and Wellbeing Boards and Health Scrutiny) Regulations 2013, with which your Lordships will be intimately familiar, set a higher hurdle, which is that the consultation requirement applies to

“a substantial development or variation”

in services. In its place, we would instead have, through the Bill, a set of processes that would lead to second-guessing, centralising and politicising, a furring-up of the NHS’s decision-making arteries, which, had these measures been in place during the pandemic, would have handicapped the response, at precisely the time when the NHS needs to be agile and adaptable, and will do nothing to advance the changes needed across front-line care delivery.

For all these reasons, I believe that if the Bill is passed in its current form, Clause 40 and Schedule 6 will become a running sore, not only for patients and local service but for Ministers. There are two possible ways forward. There is the proposal that Clause 40 do not stand part of the Bill, as suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, which would surgically excise the problem, or there is the group of amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Cumberlege, which would apply sutures, analgesics and disinfectant. Either approach could work, but one or the other is needed.

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[Lord Lansley (Con)]

My Lords, I intervene briefly to say that I support the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Crisp. We are grateful to him for tabling them, and indeed for presenting them so very well.

I also rather enjoyed the opportunity from the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, to think back to 2011, as I think it was, when I went to visit Watford General—I probably announced a new hospital then, but I cannot quite remember. She said the local connections were all funded by the local authority, and I seem to remember paying for the roundabout outside Watford General Hospital, because it was so instrumental to the process of the redevelopment. Anyway, that is by the way.

What I am really looking for from my noble friend on the Front Bench is to understand the mischief to which the Government’s proposals in Clause 54 are the remedy. Certainly, when I was Secretary of State—which is a long way back; we were not in deficit but we did not have a lot of money—the issue every year with the capital expenditure of FTs was that they always told us that they were going to spend a lot and then did not spend anything like as much. To account for that in the public accounting system, we had to make some heroic assumptions about how much less they would spend than they said they were going to spend.

It may be that the department is saying that the way we get round all this is to set very tight limits in the first place—to say where we think they are going and what we think they can spend. This, frankly, is a recipe for disaster for many trusts, because the reason they underspend is that there are so many difficulties in planning and executing capital expenditure projects.

I am trying to find out the purpose behind the Government taking such strong powers in relation to capital expenditure. I rather hope that they might see merit in the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Crisp.

[Lord Stevens of Birmingham (CB)]

My Lords, I will be brief. In response to the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, in fairness, there is logic to the broad direction being set out by the Government here. As the financial health of foundation trusts improves, their ability to seek self-generated capital investment will, in all likelihood, be much higher, looking over the next four or five years, than it has been during the more constrained financial circumstances of prior years. So it is not unreasonable to have a set of measures in the Bill that would enable Ministers to ensure that the NHS sticks with the capital expenditure, voted for by Parliament, for the NHS in any given year; nor is it unreasonable on the part of the Government to seek to ensure that there is a mechanism by which that capital can be allocated fairly across the country according to need, rather than purely according to an individual institution’s ability to finance it.

All that being said, rather than this being a fundamental matter of principle in the way that our last two discussions have been, these amendments have a lot to commend them. They are entirely pragmatic and put the right safeguards around what should be only an emergency power. As the noble Lord, Lord Crisp, laid out, that was the basis on which a consensus was achieved back in 2019. It provides good incentives at trust level for sound financial management and, frankly, it provides a bit of a pressure release or a safety valve against an overly artificially constrained capital settlement in certain years or parts of the country.

I very much hope that, in the constructive spirit with which I think these amendments are being advanced, this is something that the Government might consider favourably.

[Baroness Neuberger (CB)]

My Lords, I declare an interest as chair of University College London foundation trust. I want to echo everything that has been said. I do not really understand why what was a carefully negotiated agreement seems to have been reneged on. I think it would be great to have some kind of explanation from the Minister as to why that should be the case.

I rather agree with the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, that some of those freedoms for foundation trusts are essential, and that fettering foundation trusts too much will not do much good. I really want to agree with everybody and not waste any more time, but please can we have an explanation?

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[Lord Stevens of Birmingham (CB)]

I shall briefly make two points. First, having looked at this quite carefully, it is good to see that there is nothing in the proposals for the payment scheme that would intrinsically give rise to the concerns just articulated. Secondly, in response to the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, there are very good answers that can be provided, even if not now, to the questions that he poses. One starting point would be to look at the judgment that the Court of Appeal handed down at the end of 2018, which essentially confirmed that what he said is correct. It is just about possible to torture the 2012 tariff system to make it fit for purpose, but an incredibly elaborate set of workarounds is required to do so, with an enormous amount of bureaucracy and that covers only about 60% of the fund flows in the National Health Service. Hence the desire for something more flexible, which this set of clauses enables the NHS to take forward.

[Baroness Thornton (Lab)]

My Lords, it is very gratifying that so many noble Lords have decided to come in to take part in a debate about NHS finances tonight; I am very grateful for that.

I shall speak briefly to Amendments 199, 200 and 202A in my name. Amendment 199 provides that the Secretary of State must set out rules for determining the price to be paid for NHS services. Amendment 200 ensures that the key policy documents covering NHS services are approved by the Secretary of State. Amendment 202A provides that the rules must be subject to parliamentary scrutiny.

I am very pleased that the complexity of NHS funding was not mentioned in great detail tonight, but there has been speculation about how funding may work and how the various financial responsibilities in and across ICSs may develop. What we think we know is that complex funding approaches, such as payment by results, will become less important. In Clause 70 and the associated Schedule 10, however, the Bill is wonderfully uninformative. It just says, “Out with the old”—the national tariff—“and in with the new”, the NHS payment scheme. I am again with the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, in saying that these questions need to be answered, because they will affect the regulations, procurement rules and so on.

The payment scheme—actually, I am not going to talk about the history of the NHS payment scheme at this time of night, but, unless the Minister can justify it and answer the questions posed by the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, this part of the Bill should be quietly dropped. We seem to have something that works, so why replace it with something that we do not know very much about?