The Economic Implications for the United Kingdom of Scottish Independence

Debate between Lord Steel of Aikwood and Lord MacGregor of Pulham Market

Wednesday 26th June 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord MacGregor of Pulham Market]

My Lords, we launched our inquiry in February 2012, when it seemed likely that there would be a referendum on independence in Scotland in autumn 2014. Since then this has, of course, been confirmed. We did so because we were concerned that, on what was widely recognised as an issue of momentous consequences not only for the people of Scotland but for the rest of the UK, it was vital that such a vote should be based not only on sentiment and patriotic fervour but on a full understanding of all the implications. At that time, these consequences had simply not been fully analysed, let alone widely exposed to public debate. We did not make the case for or against independence. We did not go into the constitutional or legal issues on the referendum process. We focused entirely on the economic implications, primarily for Scotland, but which are just as important for the rest of the UK as well.

The need for a properly informed debate before the referendum seemed to us to be all the greater as it became clear that if there were a yes vote for independence, it would probably take years to separate the Scottish economy from the rest of the UK and for it to negotiate entry into the EU as a new state. This would cause great economic uncertainty and possibly damage to Scottish businesses in the mean time. In our view, all the key issues and consequences needed to be fully explored beforehand, and not left to negotiations afterwards.

We heard from 44 witnesses in all, including British and Scottish Ministers, academics, trade unions and local authorities, with a wide range of opinions on business, finance and politics. We heard evidence in Glasgow and Edinburgh, a first for the committee. One disappointment was that some Scottish companies from which we would have liked to have taken evidence declined to do so. One witness described there being a possible “climate of fear”, with witnesses having fears about the impact on their business of speaking out. Another disappointment was the First Minister’s declining to give evidence himself before the Committee, much as we pressed him to do so.

I would like to stress yet again that our report is based on the evidence that we received. I thank all our witnesses, and on behalf of the committee express especially warm thanks to our specialist adviser, Dr Angus Armstrong of the National Institute of Economic and Social Research, for his most helpful contribution to our deliberations. As always I thank Bill Sinton, clerk to the committee, and his staff, for the huge amount of work they undertook. I am also most grateful to all my colleagues, who gave a great deal of their time to this inquiry and contributed greatly to the lengthy discussion that we had on the final report.

As our inquiry progressed, it helped to shine increasing light on the economic implications of a yes vote and what they might entail. As we reached the drafting stage of our report, the British and Scottish Governments have each started to publish their own analyses of the various economic implications, which we warmly welcome. Much more needs to be done, however, if the Scottish voters are to make a fully informed choice in October 2014, and the wider British public—and I do mean the wider British public—are to understand the implications for them. As the UK Government say in their response to our report:

“It is crucial that the referendum debate is properly informed”.

I turn to some of the main issues and, given the time available, can only highlight the key ones. Some are already much clearer than when we embarked on our report. For example, it became apparent during our inquiry, not least because of the exchanges that we had with the President of EU Commission, President Barroso, and then of the UK Government’s own analysis, that in the event of a yes vote Scotland would become an entirely new state and that the continuing UK would retain the rights and obligations of the UK as it currently stands. This is important particularly in the context of the EU, but, for Scotland, it would also apply to many other international bodies and treaties. Indeed, it was during our visit to Scotland that the Scottish Government’s claim to have legal advice to the contrary was blown apart.

Given the complexities in particular of negotiations with the EU and the need for unanimity of all member states in the EU in accepting a new member, it must be extremely unlikely that these negotiations would be completed by the spring of 2016, as some hope, and there is no certainty of outcome. Meanwhile, there would among other things be great uncertainty for Scottish companies operating internationally, for inward investment to Scotland and for other sectors of the Scottish economy.

One particular impact is on international trade. Most of our business witnesses spoke of the importance of being within the EU. One particular advantage was stressed by some chief executives of Scottish-based international companies, who spoke of the benefits of international trading deals done by the EU for their companies. The significance of this is underlined by the launch of the negotiations for an EU-US trade agreement at the recent G8 summit.

I turn next to currency choices. Our analysis is very similar to that of the UK Government. After some toing and froing, the Scottish Government seem to have settled for continuing to use sterling in a sterling currency union. The UK Government state in their Scotland Analysis document:

“A formal … currency union is very different to the current arrangements and would be a profound economic change for both states … the economic rationale for the UK to agree to enter a formal sterling union with a separate state is not clear”.

We in our report are even more specific, as we state:

“A monetary union as advocated by the Scottish Government would require robust and credible limits on borrowing and indebtedness by both member states. So far the Eurozone has found this problem intractable”—

a point acknowledged also by the UK Government in their document. We continue:

“We believe that it would be difficult for any such agreements to be made binding in all circumstances”.

On Bank of England and monetary policy, again our report and the Government’s analysis are similar. The Government’s conclusion is that,

“the economic rationale for the UK to agree to enter a formal sterling union with a separate state is not clear”,

and that it is likely that economic and fiscal plans of a separate Scottish state would be subject to rigorous oversight by continuing UK authorities. We agree with that but are rather more direct. We do not see how the UK Government could extend central banking services to an independent Scotland, since the UK Government would lack control over its tax and spending policies. Crucially, we argued that this, along with the continued use of sterling by an independent Scotland in monetary union with the rest of the UK, could only come about, if at all, on terms agreed by the UK Government and that—a point to which I will return—arrangements should be clear before the referendum. We add that,

“the proposal for the Scottish Government to exert some influence over the Bank of England, let alone the rest of the UK exchequer, is devoid of precedent and entirely fanciful”.

I note that in his letter to me, the Chief Secretary to the Treasury quotes the Chancellor of the Exchequer as saying that,

“it is highly unlikely that the rest of the UK would agree to enter into a formal sterling currency union with an independent Scotland”.

We entirely agree with that and believe that it should be confirmed before the referendum.

I turn now to the other paper that the UK Government have so far produced, published last month, on financial services and banking. Time prevents me from going into detail—others may wish to do so—but, again, we are in broad agreement. We agree on the significance of Scotland’s financial sector to its economy and the fact that 90% of its customers are located in the rest of the UK; on the need for a separate Scottish financial regulator for an independent Scotland, adding to compliance costs and complexity for Scottish financial institutions; and on the fact that the assets of the whole UK banking sector, including Scotland’s banks, are around 492% of total UK GDP whereas, by contrast, Scottish banks would have assets totalling around 1,254% of an independent Scotland’s GDP, with all the implications for financial shocks such as we have experienced in recent years.

All of these are key considerations for the Scottish electorate. As the Chief Secretary points out, that proportion of GDP is massively greater than was the case with Iceland, Ireland and Cyprus. The problems that would face Scottish banks, savers and depositors in the event of a financial crisis in an independent Scotland could be immense and need to be thought through in advance. We await government papers on assets and liabilities in defence, all of which are substantially covered in our report.

On North Sea oil and gas, there is a broad equivalence between Scotland’s gain on North Sea oil revenues and what it would lose from abolition of the Barnett formula. I notice that the noble Lord, Lord Barnett, is in his place, and this is interesting for many of us in your Lordships’ House who have been arguing, one way or another, that the Barnett formula needs to be resolved in the near future. An independent Scotland, curiously, would resolve the question, although we would still have to worry about it if the independence vote did not say yes. However, that is not an answer to the Scottish issues. One of our witnesses, Professor McCrone, said that, on the expected geographical division, which we in our committee accept, about 90% of revenues would accrue to an independent Scotland. On the other hand, there is substantial volatility in oil prices, uncertainty over future oil revenues and the need to deal with substantial North Sea oil decommissioning costs. It is no long-term panacea.

Division of assets and liabilities will be complex, including for PFI and public sector pensions. Indeed, the subject of pensions as a whole needs detailed consideration, including the need for a Scottish pension regulator for private sector pensions, a pension protection fund and a separate financial services compensation scheme for Scottish financial institutions. An independent Scotland will need to handle the difficult questions of the ensuing public sector debate as a consequence of looking at the division of assets and liabilities, with volatile tax revenue, the loss of risk-sharing with the rest of the UK and no record of issuing debt to global lenders. Those are all issues that the Scottish Government will need to spell out for the comfort of the Scottish electorate before the referendum.

I turn next to defence, which is an absolutely key issue, particularly for the rest of the UK. We were disappointed that Defence Ministers refused to give evidence to us and we had to rely on others. We are particularly grateful to the noble Lord, Lord West, who gave some very compelling evidence to our committee. The UK Government’s position is that it is for the Scottish Government to set out for the Scottish people how the defence of an independent Scotland would be arranged and, for the rest of the UK, the UK Government cannot prenegotiate the deals of independence ahead of the referendum. We certainly recognise the security aspects and are clear that any post-referendum negotiation would be huge, lengthy and complex on defence issues. We are also clear that the defence implications, not least cost, are immense for the rest of the UK, and we hope that substantial contingency planning is already under way in the Ministry of Defence. Others may wish to comment on defence in greater detail today. I certainly welcome the fact that the Government are planning a detailed paper on shared defence and security services, and I hope that it will cover the issues that we have raised, on which we have so far not had a proper government response.

This leads me to my final point. There is general agreement that this will be a momentous decision for the people of Scotland, but it is not so well recognised that this will also be a momentous decision for the rest of the UK. There are huge implications for the rest of the UK—over 90% of those affected.

[Lord Steel of Aikwood]

This excellent report is full of questions, some of which are directed to the UK Government—but mainly they are directed to the Scottish Government. As they have known for two years that they will have a referendum, does not the noble Lord find it extraordinary that these questions have not yet been approached?

[Lord MacGregor of Pulham Market]

I cannot speak for my committee as a whole—although I suspect I am doing so—but that exact point occurred to us as we went through all the evidence. Many of the responses that we were getting, or not getting, did not deal with the points that I am raising now. I put my emphasis on the UK Government’s position today because we are in the UK Government’s Parliament, but I hope that many of the issues that we have raised—and, incidentally, that have been raised by Scottish business and some Scottish local authorities, such as the Glasgow City Council—will get a better answer than we have had so far.

As I was saying, we have spelt out many of the consequences of Scottish independence in our report. On defence in particular, there are potentially huge cost implications. Also included are such major issues as the division of assets and liabilities, negotiations on sterling and monetary policy, and so on. That is all very well. On the other hand, so much hinges on the subsequent negotiations. It is not enough, it seems to us, to leave it to those advocating independence to make the case, as the Chief Secretary to the Treasury has argued. He argued the case on our questions on the need to have the negotiations clarified as follows:

“The UK Government believes that people in Scotland will vote to remain part of the United Kingdom and therefore is not making plans for Scottish separation from the UK. This is not complacency but rather based on a strong belief that the UK works, and works well. Scotland contributes to, and benefits from being part of the UK”.

He goes on to say:

“It is for those advocating independence to set out a clear and well evidenced case to people in Scotland about what the implications of leaving the UK would mean for them—including some of the unavoidable choices that will have to be made”.

We do not think that that is a sufficient response because, in fact, the implications for the rest of the UK are very substantial as well. That is why we have argued the particular point that I stress now. We have argued in our report that:

“Scotland needs and deserves a fully informed debate, based on fact and free from rancour, well before the referendum vote”.

It continues with the following key point:

“To help bring it about the Scottish and British Governments should be more open about how they see the outcome of negotiations after a ‘Yes’ vote; each should indicate the ‘red lines’ of its negotiating stance on such crucial issues as currency, defence, division of assets and debts and negotiations with the EU before the referendum so that voters can make an informed choice”.

I regard this as a critical point. The debate is becoming much clearer and better informed, particularly since we took evidence and completed our report. The UK Government have produced very helpful and detailed analyses of some key issues and we look forward to more. However, there is still this issue about not discussing the negotiations in advance of the referendum. One argument has been that that should wait until after the negotiations, but one problem is that could make it very easy for many of the people intending to vote in the referendum to vote “yes”, on the assumption that all the negotiations would take place afterwards and that there would then be a second vote afterwards, once they were completed. That is not satisfactory and it is not the way it should operate. That is why we have urged—