European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Skelmersdale Excerpts

Wednesday 14th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Goldsmith (Lab)]

My Lords, we strongly support these amendments, Amendment 153 having been co-signed by my noble friend Lady Hayter. It would remove Clause 9(2) from the Bill entirely, and the more limited Amendment 154 would remove what are probably the most damaging words from it but not the whole of it.

This is the widest of the Henry VIII powers that the Government want to take in this Bill. It would permit regulations to do anything that an Act of Parliament could do, including even amending this Bill, when an Act. Those are the words that Amendment 154, in particular, focuses on. Therefore, as has been said, we could find that, after lengthy debate and a vote in this House and in the other place, the resulting provisions so painfully and lengthily resolved could simply be removed by the decision of a Minister.

The noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, gave some examples and the noble Lord, Lord Beith, gave more dramatic examples, but the critical question is: why is this needed? First, as the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, rightly said, nobody should be misled by the words that are used. The word “modifying” might suggest at first blush that the provision is doing something less substantial, but in fact the definition of “modify” in Clause 14(1) makes it clear that it,

“includes amend, repeal or revoke”,

so the modification in question could take whole provisions away altogether.

The second point to underline—again, the noble Lords, Lord Lisvane and Lord Bilimoria, made this clear—is that what matters is not good intentions expressed at the moment by the Ministers in charge but what the Act actually provides. As parliamentarians, we would be failing in our job of scrutinising and controlling the Executive if we left Ministers with untrammelled powers simply on the basis that we would expect or hope that they would use them in a particular way or on the basis of them saying that they would not intend to use them in a particular way. That is not what we should do at all.

Therefore, it is no wonder that your Lordships’ Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, in paragraph 23 of its report, described this power as “wholly unacceptable”, and that the Constitution Committee, in paragraph 197 of its report, described it as one for which it “cannot see any justification”. I know that the Government’s argument will be that they do not know what will be in the withdrawal agreement and therefore they do not yet know what changes will need to be made, including to primary legislation—for example, to the Immigration Act. However, there is neither a need to take these powers, nor is it right to do so, for two reasons.

First, it is clear that our withdrawal must be subject to the prior enactment of a statute by Parliament approving the final terms of withdrawal—that is what Clause 9 will provide. So if the withdrawal agreement requires changes which cannot be effected by other powers—such as the power to deal with deficiencies under Clause 7—such changes can be incorporated into the statute approving the terms of withdrawal. Not only can such changes be included in that statute; they ought to be, because then they could be subject to a degree of parliamentary scrutiny. I agree with what the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, and the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, said about the significance of scrutiny in this context. They could be subject to the degree of parliamentary scrutiny and approval which important changes to primary legislation should require.

The Delegated Powers Committee noted:

“The Government propose to take very wide-ranging secondary and tertiary legislative powers in the Bill, which would appear to cover every possible need to deal with failures and deficiencies in retained EU law as we leave the EU. Given the sheer width of these powers, it is difficult to conceive of areas where the proposed powers are not sufficient. However if the final withdrawal agreement includes something that is not capable of being legislated for under the regulation-making powers of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act, then Parliament should legislate rather than Ministers. Parliament is capable—


we all have experience of this—

“of passing urgent Bills with extraordinary expedition”.

Paragraph 197 of the Constitution Committee’s report, to similar effect, said

“As the clause 9 power cannot be used until a further Act has been passed—likely to be the withdrawal and implementation bill”—


which is what the Minister told us in a previous debate—

“we cannot see any justification for the inclusion of the power in this Bill. Parliament will be better placed to scrutinise the appropriateness of such a power, and the restrictions and safeguards it might require, when the terms of the withdrawal agreement are known”.

The committee recommended removal of that clause.

That is the answer I give to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern. I hope he knows the high regard in which I and the House hold him, but in circumstances where there is to be an Act, where there are other powers to remove and make changes, this particular wide, untrammelled power is not necessary.

In addition to the strong constitutional reasons why this extraordinary power should not be left to be used by one of the many Ministers who have the power to issue regulations is the reason that it is remarkably widely drawn. We have debated in previous amendments that the formula used here—such provision as the Minister considers appropriate—suffers from the defect that it is both subjective and open ended. As I ventured to advise your Lordships in a previous debate, speaking from my own experience as a former Minister, adviser to Ministers and a practising lawyer, the exercise of a power so broadly expressed would be difficult, if not impossible, to challenge. The noble Lord, Lord Wilson of Dinton, put it memorably in the debate last week as another example of Ministers being given plump pillows of legal protection. That is an additional reason to object to this provision.

However, the primary constitutional reason that I have tried to identify still remains. I hope therefore that, in addition to answering the questions that have been put—including the question put by the noble Lord, Lord Beith, and others as to why the power is needed, and the question raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, as to the application of the Sewel convention—the Minister, when he replies, will indicate why the Government, in these circumstances, consider the power necessary; and whether they can now see, in the light of the changes made to Clause 9 and the other powers that exist, that they do not need it.

[Lord Skelmersdale (Con)]

My Lords, this has turned into a clause stand part debate by any other name and I have been listening to it very carefully. The second amendment in this group would remove the words in Clause 9(2), “(including modifying this Act)”. This is rather curious because I know that many of your Lordships voted against Brexit in the referendum and in their heart of hearts still believe and hope that Brexit will never happen. That applies not only to noble Lords but also to Members of another place. But those words, of course, would include exactly what they want; namely, the repeal of the European Communities Act 1972.

[Baroness Goldie]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, for his contribution and other noble Lords for their comments. This has been a genuinely interesting debate on a very important issue. When I was asked to respond to this group of amendments, I suspected that I had drawn the short straw. I realise that there are various parts of this Bill which for your Lordships are indigestible, but I think that what tops the list of gastric turbulence is the deployment of Henry VIII powers. Let me start by saying that if, when I have finished speaking, it remains the view of this Committee that subsection (2) of Clause 9 is a constitutional abomination, I shall faithfully reflect that view to my colleagues in the other place who ultimately determine the Government’s position. Having given that undertaking, I hope that noble Lords will permit me the opportunity to attempt to persuade them that subsection (2) is in fact a proportionate approach to the position in which we find ourselves, a question which has been very legitimately posed by the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith. For the benefit of them both, here I go.

It all starts from the Government’s commitment, which I hope is welcomed by all noble Lords, to ensuring that the outcome of the negotiations under Article 50 can be implemented in time for day one of our exit from the European Union. This Bill is designed to provide the essential legislative mechanisms to ensure that the UK statute book can continue to function once we have left the European Union. It would be wrong to pre-empt the outcome of the negotiations, and it is crucial that we have sufficient flexibility to make changes to the Bill to ensure that its provisions do not ultimately contradict the agreement that we have reached as to the terms of our withdrawal.

It is not unprecedented to create powers that are able to amend the very Bill in which they are created. Of course, we would expect the exercise of such powers to be subject to parliamentary control, as is the case within this Bill. Your Lordships may ask with some justification whether there are any precedents for this. I can point noble Lords to the Enterprise Act 2002 and the Third Parties (Rights against Insurers) Act 2010, which also confer powers to amend their own Acts. Noble Lords will note that these Acts were passed when those opposite me were sitting on the Government Benches. Arguably, we are being transparent in that we have made it explicit that this particular power might need to be used to amend the Bill once it is enacted. By doing so, we are also making it clear that the other powers in the Bill cannot be used to do so, and of course, as with all the other uses of Clause 9, it could be used only to make provisions to implement a withdrawal agreement on which Parliament would already have voted.

In the present circumstances and given the inherent uncertainty of what the withdrawal agreement will contain at the detailed level, it is vital that we are prepared for scenarios where we need to modify any Act to give effect to the withdrawal agreement in domestic legislation. It is recognised by both the Opposition and the Government that in our preferred negotiated outcome, some amendments may have to be made to the EU withdrawal Act—for example, to facilitate an implementation period. This is an inevitable consequence of the uncertainty that arises from the ongoing negotiation.