Protection of Freedoms Bill

Lord Scott of Foscote Excerpts

Thursday 15th December 2011 Grand Committee

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, this amendment was suggested to me and drafted by the Bar Council. Although it looks long and a bit daunting, I hope the Committee will understand that the point which it addresses concerns a simple point of principle, and the practice of that principle. The principle is the need to protect legal professional privilege. The Bar Council is seriously concerned that RIPA violates legal professional privilege by permitting authorities secretly to obtain information about privileged communications, in particular private meetings and other communications between a lawyer and a client. I was pleased to be asked to table this amendment as I feel very strongly that a lawyer and his client should be able to speak freely, and that the lawyer should be able to take instructions without fear of them being listened to.

The right of someone in custody to a private consultation with a lawyer is expressly protected by the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. The importance of an accused person being able to confer with his lawyer in private has also been emphasised in numerous cases under the ECHR. Indeed, it has been said that it is a fundamental condition on which the administration of justice rests.

The need for reform of RIPA was revealed by a case in 2009, In Re McE, when the House of Lords held that Part II of RIPA permits the covert surveillance of meetings between defendants and their lawyers. Noble Lords will be aware of recent high-profile cases involving CHIS—covert human intelligence sources— that have emphasised the need for privilege to be protected expressly; for example, the case of the undercover police officers, PC Mark Kennedy and DC Jim Boyling, infiltrating protest groups pursuant to RIPA authorisations. The Government’s partial response to In Re McE was to make two orders and two codes of practice under powers contained in the Act, one relating to directed surveillance and the other to covert human intelligence sources, which altered the authorisation procedures, but these do not address the fundamental problem.

We have already referred to the complexity of RIPA. The new clause has been carefully drafted—I am happy to say not by me—to ensure that covert powers of investigation cannot be used to target legally privileged information, while at the same time ensuring that privilege is not abused for a criminal purpose and that the regime caters for a position where it turns out that the privileged material has been acquired accidentally. The provisions would prevent the targeting of legally privileged material. The draft clause uses the code of conduct as a vehicle for guidance on minimising the risk of accidentally obtaining privileged material.

What I understand is called in the trade the “iniquity exception” has been reduced in scope. The Police Act 1997 takes matters out of privilege if the item or communication is,

“in the possession of a person who is not entitled to possession of them”

or is held or made,

“with the intention of furthering a criminal purpose”.

The Bar Council points out that the first of these exceptions would be counterproductive but it has reduced the scope rather than simply taking out the exception, which would perpetuate the problem that it is seeking to deal with. The wording in subsection (6) of the draft clause defining what cannot be targeted by a CHIS is borrowed directly from one of the 2010 orders made following the case to which I referred.

The provision about surveillance is based on evidence from solicitors that legal consultation involving protests or other multiple-defendant situations often take place in private premises—noble Lords will remember that one of the recent examples was of protesters at a power station whose group had been infiltrated by a police officer—and this amendment covers premises in so far as they are used for legal consultations. The other of the 2010 orders to which I have referred makes specific provision for targeting any place in use for legal consultations—in other words, it limits the premises and therefore limits the scope of the order. The definition of legal consultations that has been used is, however, very similar to that used in the order that is already in force.

It is a long amendment but, as I say, at the heart of it is a simple but very important proposition. I beg to move.

[Lord Scott of Foscote]

My Lords, I am in general sympathy with the objective behind this amendment but have some anxieties about the effect of subsections (9) and (12), which mirror one another in similar language. They seem to say that the question of whether a communication has been made with the intention of furthering a criminal purpose is to be determined in accordance with regulations or provisions made by the Secretary of State. Whether a particular communication is protected by privilege or that privilege is forfeited because the purpose of the communication was to further a criminal purpose is the sort of issue that could easily come up in legal proceedings before an ordinary court. On this notion that the Secretary of State could pre-empt that, I note the language,

“make provision for the determination (on an application for an”—

interception warrant, which I can understand—

“or otherwise)”.

That “or otherwise” seems to carry the power right through to legal proceedings where the question of privilege is an issue. I would like some elucidation on the intention behind these two subsections.

[Lord Rosser]

My Lords, I will be brief because the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, has gone over the thinking and reasoning behind this amendment, which, as she said, emanated from the Bar Council. She referred to the House of Lords judgment which appeared to hold that RIPA permitted the covert surveillance of meetings between defendants and their lawyers even though no express provision in the Act authorises it and such actions were regarded as contrary to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. The noble Baroness also referred to other developments, such as the undercover police officers who infiltrated protest groups and maintained their cover while fellow protestors were prosecuted and tried for offences. In one of those cases, I think I am right that significant non-disclosure of the officers’ role led to a number of overturned convictions and cases dropped against other campaigners. The Lord Chief Justice also expressed disquiet that an undercover police officer might have been party to legally privileged communications between the defendants and their lawyers. I suppose that the concerns of the Lord Chief Justice were confirmed in the case related to DC Boyling when it was revealed that he had indeed attended meetings with the defendant and his solicitor.

As the noble Baroness said, the Government made a partial response to the House of Lords judgment on the McE case by making two orders, one relating to direct surveillance and the other to covert human intelligence sources. Clearly, as the noble Baroness said, that has not addressed what the Bar Council regard as the fundamental problem. In making those comments, we want to hear the Government’s response to this amendment. Clearly, there are concerns—probably highly justifiable ones—about others having access to communications between a defendant and his lawyers. One suspects that it is perhaps a case of recent developments leading to RIPA being interpreted in a way that was probably not intended. We want to hear the Government’s response since they may well argue—we wish to hear the case—that the Bar Council amendment would not be appropriate. Equally, it might turn out that they will accept it.

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[Lord Scott of Foscote]

My Lords, I support wholeheartedly these amendments. My interest in powers of entry began about two years ago when I became a member of the Merits of Statutory Instruments Select Committee. Very soon it became apparent to me that statutory instruments kept coming in front of the committee providing for powers of entry for regulators in various different areas of activity.

One statutory instrument I particularly remember and which really prompted my interest more than any other was one arising under the Medicines Act, which gave power to regulators to enter the premises of pharmacists in order to ensure that the various provisions of the relevant statutes were being observed. The power to enter, which included entry into people’s dwellings, was a power to turn up and demand entry. If entry was refused, it was a criminal offence, and the official would have to come back with a warrant upon which he could gain entry; or, of course, if he knocked on the door and was admitted by consent, that was satisfactory.

When I saw the power to enter without consent and without a warrant, I began to worry. I went to visit the civil servants who had produced the particular statutory instrument and asked them about it. I was told, “Oh, this is common form, this has been here for years. Several previous statutory instruments under the old Medicines Act had similar provisions”, which was not really an answer to the question. I asked how often they had found it necessary to prosecute people for refusing entry, and they said, “Never”. Then I asked how often did they have to get a warrant. “Oh, we are always allowed entry”, they said. There was not a problem. They entered according to their customary practice, of which all of them had experience, by agreement. However, there on the statute book, in so far as a statutory instrument is part of the statutory law, was a power to enter without either agreement or a warrant. Other statutory instruments began appearing with the same features. Inquiries about those did not produce a significantly different response from that which had been given to me by the officials who had dealt with the Medicines Act statutory instrument.

I then met the noble Lord, Lord Selsdon, and conversations with him encouraged—and perhaps to some extent exaggerated—my worries about these powers of entry in statutory instruments. They do matter, I respectfully submit, particularly where the premises in question is somebody’s home. People are entitled, when they go through their front door and shut it behind them, to feel inviolate. Of course, the police have all sorts of powers of entry. They can enter under warrant, which is well known; they can also enter in hot pursuit of a criminal if the criminal dives in and seeks to take refuge; they can enter if they suspect criminal activity is going on within the premises and so forth. These powers of the police are well accepted and understood, but powers of entry for officials who are not the police but simply officials in some government department with a regulatory function—which is important and needs to be carried out—are an entirely different proposition.

There is absolutely no reason why powers of entry for all officials outside of the police should not require either agreement from the occupier of the premises or a warrant. The notion that you need a safeguard for very speedy entry in some cases is probably mistaken. A warrant can be applied for without any notice to the person whose premises are to be entered. The arrival of somebody with a warrant is just as much a surprise as the arrival of somebody without one. There is no need in an emergency to allow an entry. The warrant can be applied for and obtained very quickly from a magistrate, of whom there are many in all parts of the country. You ring them up and can go to the duty magistrate at any hour to get a warrant—if your facts are sufficient to justify the magistrate’s agreement to your application.

So much for powers of entry. The need for powers that require neither agreement nor a warrant is simply absent. What is worse is that a number of the statutory instruments where these excessive powers of entry can be found are accompanied by a provision making it a criminal offence to refuse entry. I have done no research other than the questions I asked of the individuals I have already referred to, to discover how often it has been necessary to bring criminal proceedings against people who refuse entry. I do not know the answer to that but, again, if there is any anticipation on the part of officials of a likely refusal, then they should get a warrant, ex parte without notice to the occupier of the premises, and turn up with it. Then they would be allowed entry.

We are not only talking about entry, but also about the searching of premises. Who would be other than aggrieved and indignant if an official turned up at his or her premises, demanding the right to search and shuffling through the wardrobe, the drawers in the bedroom, the Chesterfield or whatever it may be? These are necessary powers but they should not be exercised without the authority of a judicial figure if agreement on the exercise of them is not forthcoming or is expected not to be forthcoming. This reform of the powers of entry is long overdue and is excellent.

In Clause 40 of the Protection of Freedoms Bill there is a welcome attempt on the part of the Government to introduce safeguards to be associated with powers of entry in order to reduce the problems to which I have referred. Those seem to be fine but, if I may respectfully say so, for one exception. They start in subsection (1) by saying that:

“The appropriate national authority may by order provide for safeguards”.

That is a discretionary power. “May” means “may”—it does not mean “shall”. Then one finds in subsection (2)(d),

“a requirement for a judicial or other authorisation before the power may be exercised”.

That is still a discretionary power. To my mind, the attraction of Amendment 133 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Marlesford, is that it makes the requirement for a warrant or consent compulsory. If paragraph (d) were taken out of Clause 40(2) and given a separate paragraph, making it a compulsory requirement for the exercise of a power of entry, the rest of Clause 40 would be entirely satisfactory and welcome. To leave it simply as a matter of discretion is simply not good enough, and the Government should think again about that. There is no reason why it should not be necessary to have either an agreement or a warrant. In any case, where there is a worry that notice to the occupant of the premises would give him or her opportunity to get rid of material that they do not want discovered, then go without notice but with a warrant. That solves the problem. This is an area of the law that needs reform. The amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Marlesford, provides the necessary reform, but it needs some adjustment to Clause 40. That is all I need to say at this stage about that.

If the occupier consents, of course there is no problem, but I have a little worry about consent. Consent, if it is to be a satisfactory alternative to a warrant, must be free and willing. When an official knocks on the door and says, “I am from the department of whatever and I need to search your property” for whatever he or she is searching for, the householder may very well be overawed by the authority and hence unwillingly give his consent. That should be looked at very carefully, and a code of conduct in that regard is probably desirable. If there is any doubt about it, the official should get a warrant before it can be done without notice to the occupier. That should solve the problem. For the reasons I have given, I strongly support the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Marlesford.

[The Earl of Erroll]

My Lords, I should like to say a few words on this important issue. Ultimately, it is the householder or the business owner who has to decide whether the official or whoever it might be is allowed in or not. Not all of them are necessarily government officials because there are powers of entry for certain people—for instance, RSPCA officials in certain circumstances as regards animals. But I may be wrong. I just think that there are, which is frightening. I do not know one way or the other.

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[Lord Scott of Foscote]

The noble Earl is quite right. There are powers for RSPCA officials. If they have reason to believe that an animal is not being well looked after or is being mistreated, they have a power of entry.

[The Earl of Erroll]

That is the point. The power of entry does not extend just to government officials. It can extend to other bodies. The danger is that the poor person at the door does not really know. As regards a business, perhaps officials have come along to seize equipment for some reason and think that an offence has been committed. That could be severely dangerous for a business, particularly if some of the equipment might be needed. A person needs to know instinctively whether the official can come in or not. The danger of any consent being involved is that it would be an excuse for bullying. We notice already that people who have regulatory functions, say, under health and safety, food safety or whatever, sometimes insist on things being done, which may not be strictly within their powers to insist on. Often expensively, people comply because they are terrified that they will get more inspections or more grief from the authority if they refuse. They also may have a feeling of, “If I don’t let this person in, it will seem as if I have something to hide. Then I will go in a black book and they will be around again and again”. I do not like anything that relies on a consent model.

I have looked at this issue randomly and I picked out hedgerows regulations, which I thought probably applies to private households. It includes a nice, simple phase which states that if someone does not let an official in or that it is difficult, they can get a warrant. It is terribly simple. I do not see why we do not classify things: basically, a warrant is needed to get entry, except, as everyone has said, in the case of an emergency. I will not try to suggest the wording because two efforts have been made. It is absolutely right. The idea that we modify every statute, Act of Parliament or regulation to bring them into line is completely the wrong way to go about it.

We had this problem with surveillance, investigatory powers and communications et cetera, which is why we introduced the Regulatory and Investigatory Powers Act—RIPA—which we talked about earlier. RIPA has been made incredibly complicated, which we would not want. But why do we not have an Act which regulates all powers of entry so that everyone can see the conditions quite simply and all other statutes or Acts refer to it if there is to be a power of entry? The power should be laid down in one place, but this time it should be kept simple.

At the end of the day we have to think back probably to Edmund Burke who, in the late 1700s, referred to the Englishman’s home being his castle. Yet here we are still struggling to keep a little bit of last defence there in some way. It seems that every single member of the public has access to it except the person who wants to protect it. If we cannot have any of this and it is too difficult to set it out simply in one place then I like the list of the noble Lord, Lord Selsdon, or a duty for someone to have that list somewhere easily available so that, if I am a business owner or householder, I can click on the Home Office website and it will tell me exactly what I have to do. How we do that is up to the powers that be. Personally, I think having it in one simple Act somewhere else that everyone refers to would be much simpler, certainly for me and the general public.

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, I am not unsympathetic to the sentiments underlying the amendments in this group and I am not unsympathetic to the points made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Scott of Foscote. Clauses 39 to 53 in Chapter 1 of Part 3 of the Bill go in the direction the noble and learned Lord would like to go. Obviously they do not go far enough as he would like to delete from Clause 39 “may” and replace it with “shall”.

I hope I will be able to explain this in response to my noble friend’s amendment but I think that might be going a bit too far. My noble friend would introduce a presumption that anyone seeking to exercise a power of entry may only do so either with the consent of the premises owner, which I think is Amendment 134, or under the authority of a warrant. That approach might be appropriate in many cases and that is why we want to look at all the powers we have and are asking all departments to do so. However, I am not persuaded that it would be right to adopt it as a blanket approach. One size does not fit all.

My previous job before the Home Office was in Defra. There, obviously animal disease was a matter of great concern to us. I also remember, as a farmer in the north of England not far from Longtown, the 2001 outbreak of foot and mouth. Obviously there is a need for the authorities, if we can put it like that, to be able to go into premises very rapidly, sometimes without a warrant—however rapidly the noble and learned Lord thinks that we can get a warrant. In the case of foot and mouth, speed was of the essence. It is possible that one of the reasons that the 2001 outbreak was not dealt with as effectively as it might have been was because there was initially a degree of inertia and a lack of speed.

The Committee will be aware that there are a very large number of powers of entry and we discussed that in the previous amendment. We want to make sure that we have appropriate lists of them to make life easier for individuals. However, when we carry out our review into all the powers as provided for by Clause 40(2) some will obviously prove necessary, some will require strengthening with further safeguards and some we will seek to abolish. That is why the word “may” might be more appropriate than the “shall” the noble and learned Lord is suggesting.

[Lord Scott of Foscote]

I was not suggesting that “shall” should apply to all the items. I was suggesting that it should apply to Clause 40(2)(d)—“may” could be kept for the rest.

[Lord Henley]

I take the noble and learned Lord’s point. He has not actually got an amendment down on this at the moment so we have not been thinking about that precisely but certainly we would consider having a look at that if the noble and learned Lord wants to come back to it on Report. I can see that Clause 40(2)(d) is where he wants the “shall” to come in.

The very simple point I am making is that not all powers of entry can be treated the same. Some powers of entry relate to the investigation of criminal offences or to a breach of regulation, but others do not. I would argue that it would be counter-productive in this instance, and indeed might prove unworkable in the case of powers of entry derived from European legislation, to seek to overlay a blanket requirement along the lines proposed in these amendments.

That is not to say that these types of safeguard do not have a place, and that is why we support the wider use of warrants whenever powers of entry are exercised. We also support the principle of consent in most cases—although obviously there are cases where consent would not be appropriate—and the removal of a power to enter people’s homes unless it is fully justified and accompanied by a magistrate’s warrant. I am trying to indicate that we need to consider the most appropriate approach on a case by case basis, and I think that Clause 40 allows us to do just that. The list of possible safeguards set out in subsection (2) includes a large number set out in paragraphs (a) to (k). These include a requirement for judicial authorisation and a requirement to give notice of the exercise of a power of entry and so on. I could read through the entire list. We consider that a targeted approach appears to be the preferable course of action on this occasion. The safeguards that apply best in most cases are specific to the type of investigation or inspection required and to the legislation conferring particular powers of entry.

I do not know if my noble friend Lord Selsdon wants me to go on to deal with his amendment or whether he is going to speak to it.

Protection of Freedoms Bill

Lord Scott of Foscote Excerpts

Tuesday 13th December 2011 Grand Committee

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, the Minister referred to compliance by relevant authorities and others who might look at how it is working. That takes us straight back to Clause 33(5)(k) and whether the person referred to there is to be construed in the normal meaning of that language. I have been trying to catch the eye of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Scott, to tempt him to enter into this, but he has resisted, which is probably quite right. I see now that he is not going to resist.

[Lord Scott of Foscote]

Everyone who is mentioned in subsection (5) is either an individual or a corporate body and would fall within the meaning of the word “person”.

[Baroness Hamwee]

I think that might assist us. We are concerned that private corporations, if that is a concept that one can have, should be caught within the term “person”. The example that I used was the operator of a shopping mall. However, perhaps it is not fair to continue this debate in public. My noble friend Lord Phillips and I have made our concern very clear, and this debate is a little circular, so at this point the best thing I can do is to beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Terrorism Act 2000 (Proscribed Organisations) (Amendment) Order 2011

Lord Scott of Foscote Excerpts

Thursday 20th January 2011 Lords Chamber

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Neville-Jones)]

My Lords, the terrorist threat to the UK and its interests abroad remains severe and sustained. The Government are determined to do all that they can to minimise that threat. Proscription of terrorist organisations is an important part of the Government’s strategy to tackle terrorist activities. We would therefore like to add the organisation Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, the TTP, to the list of 46 international terrorist organisations that are listed under Schedule 2 to the Terrorism Act 2000. Having carefully considered all the evidence, the Home Secretary firmly believes that the TTP meets the statutory and discretionary tests for proscription. This is the ninth proscription order amending Schedule 2 to that Act.

Section 3 of the Terrorism Act 2000 provides a power for the Home Secretary to proscribe an organisation if she believes that it is concerned in terrorism. The Act specifies that an organisation is concerned in terrorism if it commits or participates in acts of terrorism; prepares for terrorism; promotes or encourages terrorism, including the unlawful glorification of terrorism; or is otherwise concerned in terrorism.

The Home Secretary may proscribe an organisation only if she believes that it is concerned in terrorism. If the test is met, she may then exercise her discretion to proscribe the organisation. In considering whether to exercise that discretion, she takes into account a number of factors, which were announced to Parliament during the passage of the Terrorism Act in 2000. The factors considered are the nature and scale of an organisation’s activities; the specific threat that it poses to the United Kingdom; the specific threat that it poses to British nationals overseas; the organisation’s presence in the United Kingdom; and the need to support other members of the international community in tackling terrorism.

Proscription is a tough but necessary power. Its effect is that the proscribed organisation is outlawed and is unable to operate in the UK. Proscription means that it is a criminal offence for a person to belong to, or invite support for, a proscribed organisation. It is also a criminal offence to arrange a meeting in support of a proscribed organisation or to wear clothing or to carry articles in public which arouse reasonable suspicion that an individual is a member or supporter of a proscribed organisation.

Given the wide-ranging impact of proscription, the Home Secretary exercises her power to proscribe an organisation only after thoroughly reviewing all the available relevant information on the organisation. This includes open-source material as well as intelligence material, legal advice and advice reflecting consultation across government, including with the intelligence and law enforcement agencies. Decisions on proscription are taken with great care by the Home Secretary, and it is also right that both Houses must approve the order proscribing a new organisation.

Having carefully considered all the advice, the Home Secretary firmly believes that the TTP is currently concerned in terrorism. Although, as noble Lords will appreciate, I am unable to go into much detail on the evidence, I am able to summarise. The TTP’s stated objectives are: the enforcement of Sharia, resistance to the Pakistani army and the removal of NATO forces from Afghanistan. The group is a prolific terrorist organisation which has frequently perpetrated attacks in Pakistan. For example, an attack in July last year on a meeting of tribal elders in a marketplace in the Mohmand Agency killed 104 people and injured 120. Two recent suicide attacks on army vehicles in Lahore killed 57 people in March last year. Although the majority of attacks have been against military and governmental targets, the TTP is known also to target crowded areas and places of worship; for example, an attack on the two Ahmadi mosques in May 2010 which killed more than 80 civilians.

The group is also known to target and claim responsibility for attacks on western targets; for example, in June 2010, an attack on a NATO convoy just outside Islamabad killed seven people and destroyed 50 vehicles and, in April 2010, an attack on the US consulate in Peshawar killed at least six. The TTP has also threatened attacks in the West and was implicated in the failed Times Square car bomb in New York last May.

The proscription of the TTP will contribute to making the UK a hostile environment for terrorists and their supporters, and will signal our condemnation of the terrorist attacks that the group continues to carry out in Pakistan. Proscription will also support the emerging international consensus against the organisation. The TTP is already designated by the United States and Pakistan, and I understand that proscription is being considered by a number of other countries.

Proscribing the TTP will enable the police to carry out disruptive action against any supporters in the UK. It will also send a strong message that the UK is not willing to tolerate terrorism either here or anywhere else. Proscription is not targeted at any particular faith or social grouping, but it is based on evidence that the organisation is concerned in terrorism. It is clear that the TTP is not representative of Pakistani or Muslim communities in the UK. The organisation has carried out a large number of attacks in Pakistan resulting in mass casualties. I know that the vast majority of British Muslims joined us all in condemning those abhorrent acts of violence.

Finally, I have already said that the Government recognise that proscription is a tough power that can have a wide-ranging impact. Because of that, there is an appeal mechanism in the legislation, and any organisation that is proscribed or any that is affected by the proscription of an organisation can apply to the Home Secretary for the organisation to be de-proscribed. If the application is refused, the applicant also has a right to appeal through the Proscribed Organisations Appeal Commission, which is a special tribunal that is able to consider the sensitive material that often underpins proscription decisions. A special advocate can also be appointed to represent the interests of the applicant in closed sessions of the commission. This is a fair process.

There is ample evidence to suggest that the TTP is concerned in terrorism, and I believe it is right that we add it to the list of proscribed organisations under Schedule 2 to the Terrorism Act 2000. I commend the order to the House.

[Lord Scott of Foscote]

My Lords, I have no doubt whatever that the House should support this order, and I rise simply to ask why it has taken so long for the order to be sought. It appears from the contents of the letter that the Minister sent to the noble Lord, Lord Goodlad, the chairman of the Merits Committee, in anticipation of the meeting that the committee had to peruse this document, that information has been in the hands of the authorities indicating that since 2007 the TTP has carried out mass-casualty attacks in Pakistan and Afghanistan, that it was implicated in an attempted Times Square car bomb attack in May 2010, and that there were other atrocities in the first half of 2010, as referred to by the noble Baroness. Although I thoroughly support the making of the order, I wonder why it has taken so long for it to be made.

[Lord Reid of Cardowan]

My Lords, first, I apologise to the Minister as I was slightly late in coming into the Chamber for her opening speech. However, I welcome the order and I also welcome the fact that time has been taken over it. Noble Lords may be aware that when the now Prime Minister was asking us to ban Hizb ut-Tahrir, I said that it is absolutely essential that, when we take action to proscribe or ban, we have sufficient evidence to make sure that, however great our revulsion at what these people are doing, that action is taken under the letter of the UK law and that we have sufficient evidence of that law being breached; otherwise, when these people appealed, it would be a propaganda coup for them if we were to take action that failed. Therefore, I thank the Minister for her Statement today. I understand how difficult it often is to get concrete evidence to carry such measures forward, but I am sure that, even at this stage, we will all be relieved that the action has been taken, because these are very dangerous people.