Employment Tribunals Act 1996 (Tribunal Composition) Order 2012

Lord Scott of Foscote Excerpts

Monday 19th March 2012 Grand Committee

[Lord Monks]

My Lords, the UK has the third most flexible labour market among the OECD countries. I would like to explore what that means. Does it mean that we have the third best labour market in the OECD? I am afraid that it does not. Does it mean that we have the third most productive labour market in the OECD? It does not at all. Does it mean that we have the third best trained labour market in the OECD? It certainly does not. However, it does mean that we are in third place in terms of employers finding it easy to fire people unfairly and get away with it. It also means that we are in third place as regards employers being able to exploit the vulnerable and those most at risk, who often comprise young people, women and those who have the least hope of securing stable employment.

The changes that the Government are proposing in these two orders might just get us into second place in the OECD most flexible labour market league table. They will promote poor practice as opposed to good practice and encourage people to do things quickly and peremptorily rather than properly. There are a lot of myths about dismissal legislation. We should not forget that these measures are about unfair dismissal. Employers will win the cases that are taken against them if certain simple procedural rules are followed, particularly in the areas of competence and behaviour. Equality cases tend to be more complicated but if an employer warns a worker about a competence or behavioural matter, gives him a chance to improve and then takes the final decision, the employer wins. That is the reality of the case law that has developed since those provisions were introduced for the first time by Lord Carr, as the noble Lord, Lord Cope, has just reminded us. Irrespective of whether he has a small or a large firm, an employer should follow the basic procedures of giving people a warning and a chance to improve before taking a final decision. That seems to me eminently sensible good practice.

The effect of these measures will be to take thousands of workers out of scope—but for what? I simply cannot accept the argument that employers are sitting there thinking, “I am not taking on another worker because the qualifying period is too short”. I do not believe that it will lead to more recruitment and more jobs—although, as the noble Baroness, Lady Donaghy, rightly pointed out, if you are offering that to employers’ organisations they are bound to say, “Fine, it is a free gift, we will take it”.

I agree very much with what has been said on this side of the table about lay members, who have played a useful role in tempering the application of the law with some understanding of the realities of the workplace. I am glad that the employers’ organisations tend to agree with the trade unions on this. With due respect to judges, the realities of the workplace have not been their particular area of expertise, and they acknowledge that they have been helped. This order makes it a grace and favour provision for the legal chairman to choose whether he needs the lay representatives. That seems undignified and unfair, and it weakens the employment tribunal system in a way that will not be fatal but certainly will do it some harm in the eyes of many.

These measures are shabby, squalid and rather mean-spirited. They will not do anything for employment or for the British labour market, except to make it that much worse than it is at the moment.

[Lord Scott of Foscote]

I apologise to your Lordships, and to the Minister in particular, for not being here at the commencement at this debate. I intended to be, because I remember seeing this statutory instrument when it came in front of the Merits of Statutory Instruments Select Committee, of which I am a member. I made some remarks about it then and I had intended to make the same remarks here. I hope that what I am going to say has not already been said by somebody else.

The point I wanted to make does not relate to the reduction to one year for the bringing of an application for remedy for unfair dismissal. Unfair dismissal is a statutory remedy, and as the two-year period was fixed by statute it can be changed by statute—or, as here, by statutory instrument. However, I do not understand why it is thought necessary to put up to two years the right of a dismissed employee to obtain a written statement of the reasons for his dismissal.

Whoever has been unfortunate enough to be dismissed, whether or not he has a remedy to make a claim for unfair dismissal—and after this becomes law he will not have a remedy—he will want to know why he was dismissed. He is going to have to go back into the labour market and try to make himself a better employee, not so subject to dismissal as he was with his previous employer. Common courtesy ought to entitle the employee to be given the reasons for dismissal. Why has he been sacked? He needs to be given a reason. There may be other courses of action he may have against his employer for which it would be relevant for him to know why he had been dismissed. I cannot understand the policy behind requiring two years’ employment, rather than one year as previously, for the entitlement to be told why he has been dismissed.

I asked that question when the instrument was in front of the Merits Committee. Nobody knew the answer. My recollection is that the secretary of the committee went back to the department but did not get anything like a satisfactory answer. Perhaps the Minister could help with this. Why is it thought necessary to reduce the right of a sacked employee to be told why he has been sacked? Why must he be employed for two years before he is entitled to that very basic right, which ought to be a matter of common courtesy anyway?

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[Lord De Mauley]

Exactly, and that is what we are trying to do.

The noble Lord, Lord Young, referred to the Government’s focus for growth on small and medium-size enterprises, for which the impact of a tribunal case is often greatest. This measure is intended to deliver a decrease in the number of cases being lodged against small and medium businesses. A two-year period will also give them enough time fully to assess new members of staff and to benefit from skills retention in cases where they might otherwise have dismissed an employee in borderline cases because they do not have the access to sophisticated HR and legal resources.

The noble Lord, Lord Young, also suggested that this could lead to an increase in the number of discrimination cases. I do not buy that assertion. Already, discrimination actions are frequently brought simultaneously with unfair dismissal claims. That suggests to me that, if a discrimination claim has a reasonable chance of success, it is already being made. Indeed, because there is a time limit on making such a claim, it is already now important that, if a discrimination claim is to have a chance of succeeding, it is made simultaneously, so we cannot see that reducing the availability of unfair dismissal as a route will lead to a significant increase in discrimination claims.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Scott, asked about the changes to the written statement of reasons. The statement of reasons is linked to the qualifying period and the specified fair reasons for dismissal, which are set down in law. The objective of the qualifying period is to provide both parties with time to get the working relationship right. If it does not work out, this will not necessarily correspond to one of the specified fair reasons for dismissal. Of course, the employee can ask for a written explanation and I cannot see any reason why an employer would not provide it.

[Lord Scott of Foscote]

Would not a reasonable solution be to say that the period of notice to which the dismissed employee was entitled would not begin to run until he had been provided with a statement of the reasons for his dismissal?

[Lord De Mauley]

Perhaps I may take that back to the department. I cannot give the noble and learned Lord an answer immediately, but I will write to him, if I may, on that. I am grateful to him for the suggestion.

The noble Lord, Lord Jones, spoke about SMEs taking on employees. He is absolutely right to focus on the benefits that this measure might bring. If every small business took on just one more person, there would be 4 million more people in employment.

The noble Baroness, Lady Gibson, and the noble Lord, Lord Young, pointed to BIS’s survey, which shows that 6 per cent of business view regulation as a barrier to recruitment. In fact, the SME Business Barometer asked small businesses what their main barrier to growth was. The survey does not show that businesses are not concerned about regulation, but business responses to consultation and employer representative surveys on the matters that we are discussing today clearly show that dismissal rules are a concern when recruiting staff.

On the draft Employment Tribunals Act 1996 (Tribunal Composition) Order 2012, calls for reform of the employment tribunal and the wider employment law landscape are not new. In so far as the role of lay members is concerned, Michael Gibbons recommended to the last Government in 2007 that they should review the circumstances in which employment judges can sit alone in order to ensure that, as my noble friend Lord Cope said, value is maximised. The British Chambers of Commerce recommended in 2010 that lay members should be abolished. Since then, survey evidence suggests further support for reform in relation to unfair dismissal hearings. For example, 87 per cent of clients responding to Pinsent Masons’s 2011 employment tribunal survey supported the Government’s then proposal to allow judges to sit alone in simple unfair dismissal proceedings. Academic research from Greenwich and Swansea includes some interesting data. For example, despite perceptions from judges—the noble Lord, Lord Monks, specifically referred to this—and members that members add value in unfair dismissal cases, the number of instances where panel decisions were anything other than unanimous was very small. Across a sample of 191 judges who all hear cases on multiple occasions, there were only 77 majority decisions, of which 60 had one or other of the lay members as the dissenting voice. Given the safeguards built in, with judges retaining the option to determine whether lay members are required in order to deal with the case justly and with judicial decisions made against statutory criteria, including an assessment of the wishes of the parties, the additional flexibility would allow the tribunals to obtain best value for money when deploying lay member resources.

Employment judges are already permitted to sit alone in a range of proceedings, including claims for breach of contract, unauthorised deduction of wages, certain redundancy and national minimum wage complaints, and “holiday pay” cases. While the range of such cases will increase under this order to include unfair dismissal cases, the use of lay members will continue. There is no plan to remove the role of lay members in employment tribunals entirely. The Government recognise and value the expertise which they bring to the system. This order is about replacing prescription with flexibility. It costs the taxpayer more than £80 million a year to fund the employment tribunal system. Lay members account for about £10 million of that sum. It is right to look at how the system deploys and utilises the expertise lay members bring so that they are deployed where they are most needed.

The noble Baronesses, Lady Turner and Lady Donaghy, referred to the fact that the Trades Union Congress believes that the proposal to remove lay members from unfair dismissal cases is a step too far. The TUC asserts that the Government want to remove lay members from unfair dismissal cases, but that is not the effect of the order being debated. As I have said, this order gives judges discretion. Lay members can and will be deployed if they add value, but judges will be able to sit alone wherever that would be better. Where lay members would not add value, it is not right that inflexible legislation should mandate their deployment anyway.

The noble Baronesses also referred to the fact that 63 per cent of those responding to the consultation opposed it, which I acknowledged in my opening remarks. Our consultation was not a referendum, nor should government consultations ever simply turn on weight of numbers alone. We set out proposals and looked to find evidence on the substance. Nothing that consultees said persuaded us that employment judges are not best placed to determine how an unfair dismissal case should be determined, particularly when it is the judge who has the circumstances of the individual case to hand, and not your Lordships when considering framework legislation. We acknowledge that there are some unfair dismissal cases, such as those where there is a significant dispute around the facts of the case, which might be more appropriate for a full panel to hear. Indeed, this was accepted in the consultation paper and our response document. But there will equally be claims which an employment judge sitting alone will be perfectly well qualified and able to determine.

The noble Baroness, Lady Prosser, suggested that there was a risk that employment judges are insufficiently in touch or in tune with industrial good practice. Employment judges come from a wide variety of backgrounds and many have practical experience of managing staff. The fact that a judge might not be in tune with industrial good practice does not necessarily make them less likely to be able to assess evidence. What is critical, irrespective of the nature of the proceedings, is that the person making the determination is able to assess the evidence presented to him or her. Employment judges are trained specifically for this purpose and they carry out their functions to the highest of standards. In fact, the academic research from Greenwich and Swansea suggests that lay members may not always have relevant and recent experience in industry themselves. Indeed, it reported that there was a broad perception that they had less direct workplace experience than previously may have been the case.

My noble friend Lord Hodgson asked whether it was the Government’s view that judges sitting alone will speed the process up. We certainly intend that it will. We will be monitoring that closely. The noble Baroness, Lady Gibson of Market Rasen, asked how one person can be better than three.