Financial Services Bill

Lord Sassoon Excerpts

Monday 18th June 2012 Lords Chamber

Tabled By

[Lord Sassoon]

That (a) the following provisions of the Financial Services Bill be committed to a Committee of the Whole House—

(i) Clauses 1 to 4 (the Bank of England);

(ii) Clause 5 (the new regulators);

(iii) Schedules 1 to 3 (Schedules relating to the Bank of England and the new regulators); and

(b) the remainder of the bill be committed to a Grand Committee.

[The Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (Lord Strathclyde)]

My Lords, on behalf of my noble friend I rise, unusually, to move this Motion. Perhaps I may give the House some explanation of the Motion.

As the House will know, last Monday night my noble friend Lord Sassoon invited the House to commit the Financial Services Bill to Grand Committee for its Committee stage. A group of Peers, some of whom had played no part in Second Reading, that night raised objections. In the face of those concerns my noble friend Lord Sassoon rightly withdrew his Motion even though it had the support of both the Government and the Opposition. In discussions in the usual channels preceding the Second Reading debate the Government had suggested that it would be appropriate to send the Financial Services Bill to Grand Committee for its Committee stage, building on the success of the Grand Committee that considered the Budget Responsibility and National Audit Bill in Committee last Session. Unlike that Bill, the Financial Services Bill has received pre-legislative scrutiny. It has also been through all its Commons stages, including a Committee stage off the Floor of the House.

The proposal to commit the Bill to Grand Committee was put to the Opposition and secured their full support. In the usual way, dates had been fixed for each day of Committee in the Moses Room, with the agreement of the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, the opposition shadow Treasury Minister. On Tuesday we resumed discussions in the usual channels to see if we could reach an agreement, and the Motion today reflects a compromise which was put forward.

We propose to commit the clauses in the Bill relating to the Bank of England and the new regulators to a Committee of the whole House for three days and the remainder of the Bill to the Grand Committee for perhaps a further seven sessions, as previously agreed. The Motion for split commitment is a compromise that seeks to dispel the unease which was expressed last Monday by taking the most high-profile parts of the Bill on the Floor of the House. However, it also reflects representations from other Peers around the House who over the course of last week expressed their wish to see the whole Bill continue to be committed to Grand Committee.

It was the Opposition who suggested that we explore split commitment, and on that basis we put this proposal to them last Tuesday. Last Wednesday morning I myself put it to the noble Baroness the Leader of the Opposition. Late on Wednesday, however, we learnt not only that our original usual-channels agreement had been revoked but that the Opposition had also chosen to reject the compromise without explanation. This morning the Opposition found an explanation—that a report from the Treasury Select Committee of the House of Commons had changed its view. It is unfortunate that they did not choose to reveal that view either in the course of the Second Reading debate last week or in the course of the usual-channels discussions that followed. In any event, it is a curious argument given that the Treasury Select Committee’s core recommendations concern Bank of England governance and the objectives and powers of the new regulators—both of which are covered by the very clauses that we propose in the Motion before the House today to commit to the Floor of the House.

In these unfortunate circumstances, and where usual-channels agreement has not been forthcoming, I believe that it is right for the House itself to decide the fate of the Motion before us today. However, we need to take the decision with some perspective. Three Parliaments ago, on the initiative of my great predecessor from the Benches opposite, the late Lord Williams of Mostyn, we agreed to make more use of Grand Committee in return for introducing rising times at 10 pm, with the aim of reducing the need to scrutinise legislation long into the night. If the House does not support the Motion we will have more Bills competing for time on the Floor and there will inevitably be repercussions. We would need to sit later into the night to conduct our scrutiny after 10 o’clock and we may need to return even earlier from our Summer Recess.

Schools (Specification and Disposal of Articles) Regulations 2012

Lord Sassoon Excerpts

Tuesday 6th March 2012 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Sassoon]

That the Bill be read a second time.

Bill read a second time. Committee negatived. Standing Order 46 having been dispensed with, the Bill was read a third time and passed.

Office for Budget Responsibility

Lord Sassoon Excerpts

Tuesday 6th July 2010 Lords Chamber

[Lord Barnett]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government how the independence of the Office for Budget Responsibility is guaranteed.

[The Commercial Secretary to the Treasury (Lord Sassoon)]

My Lords, the Office for Budget Responsibility was established to make independent assessments of the economy and public finances. The terms of reference for the interim OBR describe its independence. They make it clear that the OBR’s assessments are produced with no ministerial involvement and that the OBR has the freedom to publish information at its discretion. Sir Alan Budd will be advising the Chancellor on the arrangements for the permanent OBR, including on issues relating to independence.

[Lord Barnett]

I thank the Minister for his Answer. Can he tell us whether it was the sheer incompetence of the Government in not letting the OBR have independence that led Sir Alan Budd to resign, or was it my Question? Is not the real problem the reliability of the OBR’s forecasts? Is the Minister aware that the OBR has itself expressed great uncertainty about its forecasts? In the circumstances, and given the possibility that it could be wrong, as many leading economists have said, is it set in stone that the OBR should continue with its actions even if the economy has actually gone into a downturn even faster than the OBR had forecast?

[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, in answer to the first question, I am sorry to pour cold water on a newspaper story, but Sir Alan always planned to leave in the summer. He was appointed to provide forecasts for the emergency Budget and to advise on the establishment of a permanent OBR, which is exactly what he has done and will continue to do. The noble Lord, Lord Barnett, asked, secondly, about what he described as “uncertainty” around the forecast. The whole point about the way in which the OBR has presented its forecast is that it has given a transparent probability distribution. The Treasury has never done that before in its forecasts; it has simply given a line and not explained the variability around it. Forecasts are of course subject to probability distributions and the OBR has followed the best practice for forecasts that the Bank of England and others have used for many years. As to what will happen if the forecasts change, the Chancellor has set a fiscal mandate and it is the responsibility of the OBR following each Budget or other fiscal event to report on whether his latest announcement still sets a course that has a 50 per cent or greater probability of meeting the mandate.

[Lord Newby]

My Lords, does the Minister agree that it is vital for the OBR not just that it is independent but that it is seen to be independent? As the Government bring forward their detailed proposals for the OBR, will they ensure that, for example, it is housed outside the Treasury building and that all appointments to it are publicly advertised?

[Lord Sassoon]

I thank my noble friend for reminding us that independence is at the core of what the OBR is about and key to its permanent design. The Chancellor will shortly receive the advice of Sir Alan Budd on the setting-up of the OBR and I am sure that Sir Alan will consider the various factors that my noble friend mentioned.

[Lord Peston]

My Lords, did I hear the Minister right when he said, I think, that the fan charts that are to be found in the Budd committee’s report are best practice? In fact, as a matter of technical economics, they are not. Best practice is to publish confidence limits with appropriate probability distributions, which all the independent forecasters do—the Treasury is perfectly aware of that because it publishes their forecasts on the website. Given that the Government wish to save public expenditure, is not the best thing that can possibly happen the abolition of this body before it starts wasting even more money?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sassoon]

I defer to the noble Lord on what is best practice in economics. All I can say is that, as between Treasury forecasts that were produced in the past, completely untransparently and without distributions or fan charts, and Bank of England and other forecasts that had a degree of variability—I see the noble Lord nodding—I think that we have moved to a vastly better place.

[Lord Myners]

My Lords, the heart of the Question relates to the independence of the OBR. The House should be reminded that the OBR is based in the Treasury; it is staffed by people seconded from the Treasury; press inquiries are handled by the Treasury; Sir Alan Budd’s appointment letter is signed by Mr Dave Ramsden, the head of economic forecasting at the Treasury; and Sir Alan reports to Mr Ramsden, whose work he is meant to be reviewing. Will Sir Alan, when he leaves, be subject to any restrictions on his future employment—in particular, taking the knowledge that he has gained in this post back to his occupation in the hedge fund community?

[Lord Sassoon]

On an interim basis, the OBR has been housed within the Treasury to save costs and to give it early and easy access to Treasury models. Part of the advice that Sir Alan Budd gives will be about the location and other governance arrangements for the OBR on a full-time basis.

[Lord Eatwell]

My Lords, if the Treasury was always aware that Sir Alan was going to leave in the summer, why has his replacement not been announced right away? Will the Minister give us the essence of the disagreement that has led to this resignation? Is it not substantially to do with the issue of independence, which my noble friend raised in his Question?

[Lord Sassoon]

I thank the noble Lord for his questions, but I thought that I had addressed the main point already. There has been no disagreement. Nothing has happened. It has always been the case that Sir Alan Budd planned to leave in the summer and that is exactly what he is going to do. My right honourable friend the Chancellor is enormously grateful for the important work that he has done to get the office up and running. As for appointments, it would have been strange to appoint somebody before Sir Alan Budd had even announced his departure. The appointment process for his successor will take full account of the need for continuity.

[Lord Ryder of Wensum]

My Lords—

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sassoon]

I thank my noble friend, who points out that Treasury forecasts have been as fallible as anybody else’s. That underlines the importance of our now having an independent office up and running to make the forecasts for us.