(11 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Boswell of Aynho, for tabling this debate. He cannot be here this evening because he is exercising his responsibilities as chairman of the European Union Committee. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Rowlands, for moving the Motions of the committee and its reasoned opinion on the European Public Prosecutor’s Office proposal and for presenting the issues so clearly—as does the report that the committee produced.
It is laid out in the EU treaties that the Commission must consider the principle of subsidiarity when drafting all EU legislation. It must also include a detailed subsidiarity statement in the published text. It should be,
“substantiated by qualitative and, wherever possible, quantitative indicators”.
In effect, the Commission should not only say that the principle of subsidiarity has been met but also clearly demonstrate how it has been met and provide well researched and accurate evidence. To assess this, there is a two-limbed subsidiarity test. The Commission should clearly demonstrate in its rationale and impact assessments that the objectives of a proposal cannot be sufficiently achieved at member state level—the first limb of the test—and then that the objectives of a proposal can be better achieved at EU level by reason of their scale and effect, which is the second limb and the so-called EU added-value test.
The EU treaties give this House and Parliament the right to decide whether the proposal meets both limbs of the subsidiarity test. If noble Lords believe that the Commission has failed clearly to demonstrate that EU-level action is necessary and is of added value, it is their right to say so by issuing a reasoned opinion. This is therefore a matter for Parliament and not for the Government. In the case of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office proposal published in July this year, as we know, the European Union Committee considered the two-limbed test and found that the proposal does not comply with the principle of subsidiarity. The reasoned opinion clearly lays out the reasoning. The Government agree with the European Union Committee’s assessment.
In the Government’s Explanatory Memorandum on the proposal, we made it clear that we do not believe that the principle of subsidiarity has been met in this case. We share the view that the Commission has not presented a convincing case. The figures used by the Commission to justify the EPPO are flawed and inflated, while other evidence draws on inappropriate, partial and unsubstantiated information. There are many gaps and blanks, especially in the costs of change and future funding needs. While of course the issue of fraud must be tackled at all levels—including when it involves funds that form part of the EU budget—we do not agree that the establishment of an EPPO is the right approach. The relevant legal base in the treaties—Article 86 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union—says that a European Prosecutor’s Office “may” be established. The treaties do not say that it “shall” be created, yet the Commission presents that as the only solution.
The Commission has not allowed time for current reforms at national level to take effect and make a difference. For example, reforms to the European Anti-Fraud Office—OLAF—are currently being introduced to improve information exchange between OLAF and national authorities and to improve OLAF’s internal quality control. Indeed, a new regulation governing the work of OLAF entered into force only on 1 October. We hope that the improved quality of evidence provided by OLAF to national courts will address many of the conviction issues that the Commission raises in its assessment of the EU fraud problem. These changes need time to be implemented before any action is contemplated. The Commission has not considered adequately other options to strengthen the current system further. For example, it has not considered enhanced incentives or other options for reform at regional or national level in any detail or in a rigorous manner.
In the Government’s view, the best way to tackle EU fraud is through prevention. The UK has a zero-tolerance approach to all fraud, with robust management controls and payment systems in place that seek to prevent incidents of EU fraud. Additionally, we should continue efforts that are already being made to strengthen the current system. The House is also aware of our long-standing position in the coalition agreement not to participate in the establishment of any European Prosecutor’s Office. The details of the proposal serve only to reinforce that position. This proposal is unnecessary, unsubstantiated and unwelcome.
On the principle of subsidiarity, every reasoned opinion sends a political message to the Commission. If a quarter of the votes allocated to EU national parliaments were cast, the so-called yellow card would be triggered. The Commission would then be obliged to review the proposal. I am pleased to say that, as the noble Lord, Lord Rowlands, indicated, the 14-vote threshold has now been achieved in the case of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office. I firmly believe that this House should join that group and send a political signal to the Commission that its proposal does not meet the subsidiarity test.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Rowlands, for the way in which he has presented the report of the EU Committee, members of that committee and my noble friends Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts and Lord Dykes for their contributions to the debate. It has been a thorough report and a good debate. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Basildon, for her support on this issue. Time is of the essence. I understand that our votes have to be in by midnight tonight.
To conclude, this Motion is for Parliament. It is not for the Government to act. I can only encourage your Lordships to agree this reasoned opinion and exercise the right given to this House under EU treaties.
Our committee will take great comfort and satisfaction in the nature of this debate and in the unanimity that exists. I will not be tempted to rise to the bait of the noble Lord, Lord Dykes, and describe my Euro-tendencies at this time, except to say that this is one of the rarer moments when he and I agree on European issues. We have not agreed in the past. We certainly can agree on this issue.
I thank all those who have spoken. The noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, rightly emphasised the changes that are occurring within the existing institutions; the door should be left open to carry them through. My noble friend Lady Smith on the Front Bench rightly said that the primary responsibility will lie with national jurisdictions. That is where 80% of the funds are administered. Article 325 of the treaty says that responsibility for dealing with European fraud lies both with the Union and with member states. This proposal is therefore in this context wrong and I am delighted that all of us who have spoken in this debate share that view.
(13 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, government Amendments 113ZA to 113E would change the circumstance in which consent is required from the devolved Administrations for orders brought forward under Clauses 1 to 6. Clause 9 stipulates the circumstances in which the consent of the devolved Administrations should be sought. At present, consent is required from the Scottish or Welsh Ministers or the appropriate Northern Ireland department. The Constitution Committee’s report recommended that consent should more appropriately be obtained from the Scottish Parliament, the Welsh Assembly or the Northern Ireland Assembly.
Following that report, and in consultation with the devolved Administrations, the Government have tabled amendments to change the current reference to Ministers to reference to the legislatures, in order to reflect the views of the Constitution Committee and the devolved Administrations, which are content with these proposals and have agreed to legislative consent Motions based on this provision.
The remaining government amendments are in response to further consultation with the devolved Administrations. They widen the circumstances in which consent from the Scottish Parliament and the Northern Ireland Assembly would be required in order properly to reflect the relevant devolution settlements, and have been reached in agreement with those Administrations and, again, the devolved Administrations have agreed to legislative consent Motions based on this provision.
Amendment 113AA extends the need for consent from the Scottish Parliament to take into account situations that may arise where functions of Scottish Ministers are altered by changes made by the Bill, but where those changes are not already covered by Clause 9(1) as it stands. The amendment excludes the need for consent to some changes under Clauses 1 and 2, because it would not be appropriate to require consent from devolved Ministers where a body’s functions are in a reserved area and the body is being abolished, or abolished by way of merger. Without this exception, consent of devolved Ministers would be required in areas that are primarily reserved under the Scotland Act 1998.
The drafting reflects agreement reached with the Scottish Government, and we believe that it is a sensible and pragmatic solution that will allow us to implement orders under this Bill effectively. The amendments also ensure that the Bill is consistent with the legislative consent motion currently lodged in the Scottish Parliament, following discussions between my department and the Scottish Government. I beg to move.
I warmly welcome the amendments introduced by the Minister, because the Constitution Committee made a sensible proposal. It was obviously clear that it should apply to not only Welsh Ministers but the Welsh Assembly.
(13 years, 12 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Henig, for moving her amendment, which also stands in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Whitty. It and the amendments grouped with it raise interesting aspects of the Bill and I am grateful for the debate that has taken place. They concern the definition of an eligible person in Clause 1, and the ability of Ministers to transfer functions to persons so defined. Perhaps I can best help by saying that when we come to the debates about the different bodies, I will debate in some detail their functions and where they are going, as well as the nature of the changes that will be involved. I am sure that we will have every opportunity to do this.
Amendment 7A would remove Clause 1(2) and replace it with a new subsection that allowed for the transfer of functions to a Minister in the UK Government or the devolved Administrations, or to an eligible person. Amendment 9 would remove subsection (3)(a), thereby removing Ministers from the list of eligible persons under subsection (3). However, Ministers would still be covered by the proposed amended definition in subsection 3(b) of,
“any other person exercising public functions”.
So, taken together, these amendments would have no real substantive effect on the Bill.
Amendment 11 would remove unincorporated bodies, other than bodies of trustees, from the list of eligible persons under subsection (3). This amendment would prevent the transfer of functions to a variety of organisations, such as unincorporated partnerships. Perhaps I may illustrate this in a way that might particularly interest the noble Lord, Lord Liddle. I refer to the transfer of the regional development agencies to the local enterprise partnership structure, and the way in which that might function. The impact of Amendment 7A would be far wider because it would remove the option for Ministers to transfer any public function to an unincorporated body regardless of the nature and scope of the policy intent. I do not believe that this is a desirable outcome because it would risk ruling out a range of innovative approaches to the delivery of public functions. Our specific intention for the transfer of functions from RDAs is that local enterprise partnerships should be free to adopt the arrangements that suit them best as part of our move towards more locally driven, targeted approaches to growth.
I know that we will have an opportunity to talk about this in detail as a policy when we come to the debates on those bodies, but the amendment would remove the option to form an unincorporated partnership, and would go further by limiting options for public bodies reform in general. So, from that point of view, we resist the amendment because it goes to the heart of some of the changes that we are proposing.
Finally, Amendment 16A seeks to require that when a Minister lays an order under the powers in the Bill, the order names the eligible person to which any transferred functions are to be transferred. We do not believe that it is necessary to include such a provision in the Bill as the orders and the accompanying explanatory material, which has already been the subject of various amendments in Committee, would give this information as a matter of course. Indeed, the provision of such information would be covered by the proposed requirement to provide, as part of the explanatory material, the reasoning for the order.
I apologise for interrupting the Minister. I wonder whether it might help the Committee if the Government could publish very soon some of these orders in draft form. There are precedents for doing such a thing, and at least we would know and understand a bit more the nature of the orders themselves.
The noble Lord, Lord Rowlands, has made an interesting suggestion. I think that by the time we have gone through a number of debates on individual bodies, noble Lords may well have quite a substantial idea of the pattern that the orders may well form. I hope to be able to provide noble Lords with the background to a lot of the changes that are anticipated by this legislation.
Perhaps I may respond to some specific points. The noble Lord, Lord Hunt—it might have been the noble Lord, Lord Pannick—asked about audit. Where public bodies are retained as a result of the 2010 review process, and in particular where functions have been transferred to them from other bodies, I assure the Committee that they will continue to be subject to the existing requirements for accounting, reporting, and data confidentiality issues. NDPBs are required to have in place robust governance and accountability arrangements, and both the Cabinet Office and the Treasury provide detailed guidance on the matter. Published annual reports and accounts are the main vehicle by which departments and public bodies regularly inform Parliament and the public about their activities and expenditure.
On freedom of information, I further reassure the House that where bodies already subject to the Freedom of Information Act are merged to form new arm’s-length bodies that are established by and at least partly constituted by appointments made to government, steps will be taken to ensure that they fall within its scope. Where a body’s functions are transferred to another body that is already subject to the Act, they will naturally be subject to that Act.