Immigration and Social Security Co-ordination (EU Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Lord Rosser and Lord Oates

Consideration of Commons amendments & Ping Pong (Hansard) & Ping Pong (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 21st October 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Oates (LD)]

My Lords, I shall speak only briefly because my noble friends Lady Hamwee and Lady Ludford have comprehensively set out the injustices that will be visited on thousands of British citizens and their families if the Government’s policy stands. I shall make just two points.

First, the argument that to retain the existing rights of UK citizens with EEA spouses or families is somehow discriminatory or unfair as against UK citizens with non-EEA spouses has no merit. I speak as a UK citizen with a non-EEA spouse. When we made decisions about our lives, we did so in the knowledge and understanding of the rules at the time, just as UK citizens with EEA spouses made decisions about their lives on the basis of the rules at the time, which they could have had no reasonable expectation would change. The only way in which one could say that discrimination would occur would be if this amendment suggested that UK citizens forming relationships with EEA citizens going forward should be afforded different rights, but that is not what it says.

Secondly, yesterday, your Lordships’ House passed two amendments in lieu on agri-food standards. They were important and I was pleased to support them, but this amendment, I venture, is much more important, because it is about people’s lives. If it is not passed, huge misery will be inflicted on a large number of people. I do not think that we have really understood the level of suffering that will be inflicted. Frankly, it is wrong and heartless, and we should not allow it to stand.

[Lord Rosser (Lab) [V]]

We do not minimise the importance of this issue any more than we minimise the importance of any of the amendments and the issues they covered which this House sent to the Commons and which the Commons rejected. As has been said, British citizens who moved to other EU countries will lose the right they had to return to this country of birth with a non-British partner or child, perhaps to look after an ageing parent, unless they can meet financial conditions that will be beyond the reach of many. While British citizens who have moved to the EU or EEA before the end of 2020 will face these restrictions, EU citizens who have moved to the UK before the end of 2020 will not.

However, while this issue of the right for UK citizens to return with their family was referred to by some speakers during the Commons proceedings on Monday, it was not taken to a Division. This rather indicates that we have now taken this matter as far as we can at present, having sent it to the Commons once. For that reason we will abstain if Amendment 2B in lieu is taken to a vote. In the Commons on Monday, the Government said they would

“continue to keep this area under review”.—[Official Report, Commons, 19/10/20; col. 804.]

We call on it to continue to look further at this issue, in which I declare a personal family interest, outside the Bill and well before the deadline date of 29 March 2022 for bringing existing close family members to the UK on current EU law terms.

Immigration and Social Security Co-ordination (EU Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Lord Rosser and Lord Oates

Committee stage & Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 14th September 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Oates (LD)]

My Lords, I want to address my remarks to Amendments 43 and 74 in the names of my noble friends. As my noble friend Lady Ludford has so eloquently outlined, the exemption from data protection for migrants is unjustifiable. Indeed, as she said, the suggestion that we might even withdraw from the European Convention on Human Rights only adds to the alarm that we should feel about that.

This issue goes back some way, as my noble friend Lady Ludford said. During the passage of the Data Protection Bill through Parliament, my noble friend Lady Hamwee raised this issue and sought to amend the Bill, sadly unsuccessfully at that time. She asked the Government to justify the exemption, but from my reading of Hansard, they either could not or would not. She also asked for reassurance from the Minister —and I believe it was the same Minister, the noble Baroness—but, sadly, she did not seem to get much. In fact, the Minister told the House that a decision on whether to apply the exemption could be exercised not only by the Home Office but by contractors who worked for the Home Office. She said that it would apply not only to migrants but to British citizens who supported the applications of migrants. The one piece of assurance that the Minister gave was that the exemption would be used in only a very small number of cases. She was quite explicit about that, so I hope that in her reply, the Minister will tell us how many times the exemption has been applied and, if not, whether she will undertake to write to us.

The truth is that the exemption gives huge discretion to the Home Office and its contractors to determine when access to data can be denied. The Government say that it would not be abused. That might be fine if we had not had the events of Windrush, which my noble friend Lord Dholakia referred to, and if we really felt that we could trust the Home Office and its contractors in this era of the hostile environment. However, in these circumstances it is very hard to do so. We have no way of knowing how the exemption is being applied, unless the Minister is able to tell us a bit more about that. Therefore, this is a matter of significant concern to us. As my noble friends have noted, we are seeking to remove the exemption from EEA nationals. I hope that we will not hear from the Minister that that is in some way discriminatory, as we want it removed from everybody.

Finally, and briefly, on Amendment 74, as my noble friend Lady Ludford said, we really want to hear an assurance from the Minister on this matter that will appear in Hansard.

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

As we know, the Data Protection Act 2018 provides for an exemption from some general data protection provisions where personal data is processed for the maintenance of effective immigration control. Of course, that allows an entity that processes data for immigration control purposes, such as the Home Office, to set aside a person’s data protection rights in a range of circumstances. It can also prevent people involved in immigration cases being able to request access to the data that the Home Office holds on them, and that could affect EEA or Swiss nationals applying for a new immigration status in the UK after Brexit.

As has been said, Amendment 43 would preclude the exemption from applying where the person in question is an EEA or Swiss national. EEA and Swiss nationals will become subject to this exemption as a result of our departure from the EU.

Amendment 72 would ensure that personal data belonging to an EEA or Swiss national resident in the UK before the Act that has been gathered through their use of public services cannot then be shared and used for the purposes of immigration enforcement. The relevant public services include primary and secondary education, and primary and secondary healthcare services, as well as where a person has contacted law enforcement to report a crime.

Amendment 74 would provide that a third party—for example, a landlord—given access to check a person’s settled status for specific purposes may not be allowed to use that access or information for any other purposes.

The issue is that there have been reports and evidence of data sharing as part of the Government’s rebranded hostile environment controls when people have, for example, access to education or report a crime to the police. In that latter regard, there appear to be examples of migrant women in particular suffering domestic abuse and being deterred from reporting a crime for fear of getting pulled into the immigration system. The comment has already been made about the independent Windrush Lessons Learned Review identifying a number of people from the Windrush generation who have been wrongly subject to proactive compliant environment sanctions, where the Home Office has shared data with other departments. Therefore, there is a lot of evidence that this data sharing goes on and that it has a detrimental effect on some individuals.

The Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration has found a 10% error rate in immigration status checks. Therefore, being unable to find out what immigration data the Home Office holds that led to an error—for the purposes of an appeal, for example—is of significance. The figure that I have been given—I am sure the Minister will correct me if I am wrong—is that, since the beginning of 2019, 60% of requests for disclosure have been denied. I hope that in their response the Government will, at the very least, say how they intend to address the concerns raised by this group of amendments.

Investigatory Powers Bill

Debate between Lord Rosser and Lord Oates

Report: 2nd sitting (Hansard - part one): House of Lords
Monday 17th October 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Oates (LD)]

My Lords, I support Amendments 100C, 100D and 100E. I am not at all naive about the threats that are faced by this country and the need to provide the tools to the security forces to deal with them. However, as the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation has made clear, the fact that powers might be useful is not in itself a justification for granting such powers; they must be proportionate, properly scrutinised and properly constrained. I agree with my noble friend Lord Paddick that the phrase “request filter” has a benign ring to it that is perhaps lulling some of us into a false understanding of what it is really about.

As my noble friend recalled, when we discussed this matter previously, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, disputed the idea that the request filter would create a virtual database. He seemed to suggest that it cannot be described as a database simply on the grounds that the data will not be held by the Government. The data accessed by the request filter will be held by commercial entities, not by the Government, that is true, but it will be held on the instruction of the Government in the form that the Government determine, and it will be accessible by agencies of the Government by a means that the Government will determine. I make no claim to be an etymologist, but that seems to me pretty much the definition of a virtual database.

The House may wonder why the Government are going to such an effort to make this distinction between a database and a request filter, when it seems self-evident that they are effectively one and the same. The reason is simple: because they do not want people to realise that they are in the process of legislating into existence the power to create a vast virtual database of information on every person in this country.

As my noble friend mentioned, the Joint Committee on the draft Communications Data Bill stated at paragraph 113 of its report, which dealt with the request filter:

“The difference is that instead of one database there are many and they are privately owned. Although they are privately owned the Government can stipulate what should be held on them, for how long, and in what format it should be supplied. The differences therefore are not as great as the Home Office suggests”.

As my noble friend said, it concluded that,

“the Request Filter can be equated to a federated database”—

a database which will be accessible not only to the security services in the tireless work that they do on our behalf to keep us safe from terrorism, law enforcement authorities in their vital work tackling serious crime, or the police in dealing with crime in general. As my noble friends have said and the Government have confirmed, this vast, federated database will be available to all public authorities to assist in obtaining the communications data that they are permitted to use, subject to individual authorisation.

I do not think that the public have any idea of the sweeping powers that we are contemplating granting to the Secretary of State to establish this vast virtual database. I imagine that they will be horrified when they do, just as they were by proposals of previous Governments to create national databases, before this Government cleverly came up with a new name for it that sounds so eminently and hypnotically reasonable, but is as far from describing what it actually is as it is possible to conceive.

I hope that this House will not allow itself to be misled by the Government’s creative use of the English language, but, rather, aware of the practical reality of what is being proposed, will support the amendments in the names of my noble friends.

[Lord Rosser]

My Lords, we do not share the major concerns expressed in support of the amendment, in view of the Bill’s provisions. As I understand it, neither did the committees which considered the Bill, including the Joint Scrutiny Committee on the draft Bill. There are also downsides which would arise from the amendment, to which reference has already been made.

In Committee, we asked the Government to clarify that the general provisions in relation to privacy in Clause 2 affected every power in the Bill, in the light of the letter written by the noble Earl, Lord Howe, to me on 14 July stating that the new overarching privacy clause set out the privacy obligations which constrain the use of the powers in the Bill—which therefore must include necessity, proportionality and the protection of privacy. In their response, the Government confirmed that that was the case. For those reasons, we will oppose the amendment.