Policing and Crime Bill

Debate between Lord Rosser and Lord Faulks

Committee: 5th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 16th November 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks (Con)]

My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Grender, for mentioning my small part in the acceptance of revenge porn as part of the list of criminal offences that the Government accepted ought to enter the calendar of criminal offences. The Government looked carefully at this and, in many ways, some of the conduct that was embraced within so-called revenge porn was probably covered by existing criminal offences. However, it was accepted that such was the need to identify specifically this sort of behaviour that it was appropriate to include it as part of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015.

While I entirely accept what lies behind these amendments and the evil that they are directed against, I think that one has to bear in mind that we have had only a very short time for this legislation to bed down. I am glad that there have been prosecutions; it appears that there was a need and the prosecuting authorities have acted accordingly. But I am not sure that I am, at the moment, satisfied that there is a need to go further in terms of definition. For example, Amendment 217 talks about threats to disclose. The Minister will no doubt correct me, but all these areas are probably covered by existing criminal law—for example, blackmail, threatening behaviour, theft or other offences. A threat may be something substantial but it may be something very trivial and we do not want to have relatively trivial matters embraced in what is often a very serious offence.

As to Amendment 218, of course, on the face of it, it seems attractive that there should be some compensation. I am a little concerned, however, about a judge in a criminal case having to assess anxiety and the degree of anxiety in terms of the appropriate quantum of damages. How is he or she going to do that? Will there be evidence from somebody expressing how affected they were, and the degree of the affection—whether, for example, it caused them to go to a doctor? There is a slight danger that we could lose sight of what is really important—a criminal offence, rather than whether there should be compensation.

Quite apart from the questions of appeal raised by my noble friend Lord Hailsham, there is some work to be done on this. On the question of appeal, surely there would be an appeal from the magistrates’ court to the Crown Court as of right, and to the court of criminal appeal in appropriate, and possibly restrictive, circumstances. It may be that in due course there would be some informal tariff, perhaps involving the Sentencing Council—but I would not like it to be thought that the criminal prosecution of matters should be used as some proxy for obtaining compensation.

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

My Lords, I will be brief. These amendments cover a serious and disturbing issue that has received considerable publicity in recent months. The purpose of the amendments, as I understand it, is to tighten and extend the reach and scope of the law in respect of disclosure of private sexual photographs and films without consent and with malicious intent. They include new clauses on compensation and anonymity for victims. At this stage we will listen with interest to the Government’s response, including the extent to which they consider that the law as it stands is sufficient—or, alternatively, needed—to deal with any or all of the issues addressed in the amendments.

Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill

Debate between Lord Rosser and Lord Faulks

Monday 2nd December 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks (Con)]

I endorse what my noble friend said about the need to protect those who are the victims of anti-social behaviour. Very often they are just the sort of people who are held up as being vulnerable to the effects of the provisions in the Bill. From my experience of a barrister practising for public authorities, I add the observation that it has become quite a regular feature of litigation that public authorities are sued for failing to take sufficient steps to protect those who are the victims of anti-social behaviour. The Bill will at least provide some form of additional power to give an answer to those sorts of claims.

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

My Lords, the amendments with which we are associated relate to Clauses 86 and 89 and whether they should remain in the Bill in their present form. We also wait with considerable interest to hear the Government’s response to the different points that have already been made in the debate on this group of amendments.

As the government documentation on the Bill indicates, the existing grounds for possession for anti-social behaviour are discretionary and require the county court, on application from the landlord for possession on an anti-social behaviour ground, to decide that the ground is made out and that it is reasonable to grant possession. The Government say that it takes on average seven months to get an outcome from the courts in anti-social behaviour possession cases, and that the existing discretionary grounds apply only to anti-social behaviour and criminality in, or in the locality of, the property. Indeed, in the light of the riots two and a half years ago, the Government are also proposing later in the Bill to extend the scope of the discretionary ground so that landlords can seek to evict a tenant who adversely affects the lives of those in neighbouring communities through rioting and looting, or who attacks or threatens landlords’ staff away from their homes.

The purpose of the new absolute ground for possession, say the Government, is to speed up the possession process in cases where anti-social behaviour or criminality has already been proven by another court. The Government’s draft guidance states that the court must grant possession subject to any available human rights defence, provided that set procedures have been followed. In addition, the court’s discretion to suspend possession will be limited to no later than 14 days, or six weeks in exceptional circumstances.

It is worth reflecting on the conditions that have to be met for a grant of possession; at least one of them has to be met. The first is that a tenant, a member of the tenant’s household or a person visiting the property, has been convicted of a serious offence. The second is that the tenant, a member of the tenant’s household or a person visiting the property has been found by a court to have breached an injunction to prevent nuisance and annoyance—in other words, an IPNA. The third is that the tenant, a member of the tenant’s household or a person visiting the property has been convicted of breaching a criminal behaviour order. The fourth is that a tenant’s property has been closed for more than 48 hours under a closure order for anti-social behaviour. The last is that a tenant, a member of the tenant’s household or a person visiting the property has been convicted of breaching a noise abatement notice order.

These powers have potentially significant effects. Will the Minister say—this question has already been asked—whether the number of evictions is expected to increase as a result of these provisions, particularly in the light of the Government’s implied comments about the deterrent effect of the current length of eviction proceedings on landlords taking action? These would seem to imply that an increase in evictions is likely if the length of time to complete court proceedings is reduced.

Will the Minister confirm what will happen to those families who are evicted, including any children or elderly or disabled people? Who, or which body if any, will have responsibility for finding accommodation for such families who become homeless as a result? Alternatively, will such families simply be left to their own devices, even if that means being on the streets, on the basis that they will be deemed to have made themselves—including any women, children, elderly or disabled people—intentionally homeless?

As I understand it, the power to evict under Part 5 relates to those in social housing and to those in assured tenancies in the private sector. Will the Minister confirm that that is the case? The power to evict does not appear to apply to owner occupiers, including those living in a mortgaged house who might well have secured their mortgage under a state-backed scheme that is ultimately supported by all taxpayers, including by those in rented accommodation. To that extent, it does not appear that there is equality of treatment for victims irrespective of tenure. It would appear that under the Government’s Bill, which is intended to put victims first, a victim who lives in social housing and has had their life made a misery by a person or persons in a nearby owner-occupied property does not have eviction available as a possible solution—unlike a victim who lives in their own home and has had their life made a misery by a person or persons living in social housing or an assured tenancy.

If the Government’s intention is to put the victim first, why are there apparently two classes of victim, one for whom eviction of the perpetrator and their family is a possible solution, and another for whom it is not a possible solution and for whom there is no alternative additional sanction available? Will the Minister address this point? If I am right, will he confirm that the Government nevertheless regard this as totally fair and just, when there do appear to be two classes of victim?

Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill

Debate between Lord Rosser and Lord Faulks

Monday 25th November 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser]

My comments will be much in line with those already expressed. It is worth recalling the very considerable powers given to a local authority with a public spaces protection order. It has the power to impose such an order for a period of up to three years without, apparently, any requirement to secure the approval or agreement of any other individual groups, bodies or organisations, including the courts.

There are just two conditions that a local authority must satisfy. First is that,

“activities carried on in a public place … have had a detrimental effect on the quality of life of those in the locality”,

or that,

“it is likely that activities will be carried on in a public place … that … will have such an effect … The second condition is that the effect, or likely effect, of the activities … is, or is likely to be, of a persistent or continuing nature … is, or is likely to be, such as to make the activities unreasonable, and … justifies the restrictions imposed by the”,

public spaces protection order.

The only check on that local authority power is that:

“An interested person may apply to the High Court to question the validity of … a public spaces protection order”,

on the grounds,

“that the local authority did not have the power to make the order … or to include in particular provisions or requirements imposed by the order”,

or,

“that a requirement under this chapter was not complied with in relation to the order or variation”.

Bearing in mind the potentially significant but apparently unchallenged powers that a local authority will have to make a public spaces protection order, it is important that the Minister places clearly on record how weak or strong are the proposed provisions to challenge the validity of such orders and how, in practice, they are expected to operate.

What do the Government believe that Clause 62(2) means in practice? That is the clause referring to the grounds on which an application can be made to the High Court, to which I referred a few moments ago. In an early debate this evening, the Minister said that the fact that activities carried on in a public place had to be,

“of a persistent or continuing nature”,

and “unreasonable” was adequate protection, but each local authority will interpret those words as it sees fit. How regularly does an activity have to be carried out to be persistent or continuing? Can that issue be taken to the High Court in challenging the validity of an order? On what basis might it be deemed that a local authority did not have the power to make a public spaces protection order or to include particular prohibitions or requirements imposed by the order? Would that include a challenge that the two conditions referred to in Clause 55(1) and (2) had not been met? If so, why does the Bill not set that out clearly in Clause 62(2), or does a local authority not having the power simply mean that the challenge can be only on the basis that the area to which the order relates is not a public place?

Perhaps the Minister could give some examples of what might be deemed a prohibition or requirement that the local authority had imposed on the order which it would not have the power to impose under the Bill. Clause 62(2) also refers to a challenge on the basis that a requirement under this chapter was not complied with in relation to the order. Does that ground relate purely to process, or would it include other issues? If so, can the Minister give some examples?

How quickly do the Government think that an application under subsection (2) would be heard in the High Court? If a local authority has made a public spaces protection order preventing use of, let us say, a public footpath in the light of objections from landowners and nearby residents—or, alternatively, a local authority has made a public spaces protection order preventing the use of a large public square in a major city which is regularly used for the purpose of rallies or public protest meetings, in the light of opposition from local residents or businesses—the question of how quickly access to the High Court can be made is not unimportant.

As an individual can apply to the High Court, how much is it likely to cost to make such an application and will the use of professional lawyers be mandatory or optional? Will legal aid be available? If so, to which categories of interested people will it be available? Does the reference to an interested person making an application to the High Court mean that a business or other organisation cannot make an application to question the validity of a public spaces protection order? If that is the case, what is the Government’s argument for taking that stance?

Clause 62(5) states that,

“the Court may quash the order … or any of the prohibitions or requirements imposed by the order”.

Does that include the length of time of up to three years for which the order has been imposed by the local authority?

The Government say that the Bill is about victims, but people on the wrong end of an unjustified local authority public spaces protection order will also be victims, so what provisions in the Bill will enable support to be provided to such individuals, including support in taking a challenge to the High Court? On the face of it, one might conclude that the proposals for public spaces protection orders are fair and reasonable. If they are applied by reasonable people acting in a reasonable manner, they almost certainly will be. However, the question is: what are the safeguards in the Bill to prevent abuse of this power? What or who is there to stop a local authority from acting unreasonably in making an order in the first place? Is there in reality nothing?

[Lord Faulks]

Is the answer to the noble Lord’s question not that if an authority acts unlawfully its acts are amenable to judicial review, just as any other administrative acts are?

[Lord Rosser]

I am waiting to see what answer the Minister gives me. The noble Lord himself raised a particular reference to Clause 62, so perhaps he is also waiting for an answer to his point.

I ask the question again. Is there in reality nothing, with the only redress being an application to the High Court by an interested party? If the answer is that you go to the court on some other issue of judicial review, it comes back to the point about what this clause is doing in the Bill. If that is the case on the question I have raised about the specific grounds on which the validity of the order can be challenged in the High Court and how restrictive or otherwise those grounds are, I suggest that that is very relevant—as is the speed with which an individual can get a hearing at the High Court, along with the cost of doing so and the support that will be given to them.

There is obviously some confusion about what Clause 62 means; that is clear from the contributions made by a number of noble Lords. I hope that the Minister will be able to provide detailed answers to these questions and thus resolve any confusion there may be about what this clause is meant to mean, and in what circumstances and on what basis it will be applied.

Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill

Debate between Lord Rosser and Lord Faulks

Wednesday 20th November 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser]

In Clause 40(3)(a) there is,

“a requirement to stop doing specified things”.

In Clause 40(3)(b) there is,

“a requirement to do specified things.”

In Clause 40(3)(c) there is,

“a requirement to take reasonable steps to achieve specified results”.

I should have thought that what the Minister has just described is a requirement to do specified things and is covered by Clause 40(3)(b). What kind of things does Clause 40(3)(c) cover? Why is it, in relation to Clause 40(3)(c), a requirement to take reasonable steps to achieve specified results, whereas in Clause 40(3)(b), which is a requirement to do specified things, there is no reference to taking reasonable steps?

It is clear that, in the eyes of the Government, there is some significance in putting the requirement to take reasonable steps in Clause 40(3)(c), but not in Clause 40(3)(a) or Clause 40(3)(b). I should be grateful if the Minister could explain what that is and what the distinction is between a requirement to do specified things and a requirement to achieve specified results. I asked whether it was intended that the person or body issued with a community protection notice will be told, by the person issuing it, what will be deemed to constitute,

“reasonable steps to achieve specified results”.

[Lord Faulks (Con)]

Before the noble Lord answers, I wonder if I might add to his burden and suggest that the difference between paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) is really pretty obvious. In paragraphs (a) and (b), somebody has direct control over specified things that can or cannot be done, whereas in paragraph (c) we are talking about third parties, over whom the best that can be ordered is that reasonable steps are taken to achieve specified results. It is a classic example, frequently found in legislation.

[Lord Rosser]

I hope the noble Lord will accept that the definitions the Minister was giving seemed to come under the requirement to do specified things, not achieve specified results, which is what I had asked about.

Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill

Debate between Lord Rosser and Lord Faulks

Tuesday 15th November 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, I have enormous respect for the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, for his experience and the consistency of his approach to this issue. I also acknowledge how delicate the situation is, how important the liberty of the individual is and that any powers of this nature ought to be hedged by a great many safeguards. However, a decision of this nature is one that falls to the Home Secretary to take. So far, the judges who have these powers have exercised the right to scrutinise thoroughly in a way that we cannot feel is short of what might be desired. I respectfully submit that it is a power that should belong to the Home Secretary, who makes these decisions, no doubt with great anxiety and the consciousness that any decision that she makes will be looked at very carefully.

A judge will have an opportunity to look at a particular case on an ad hoc basis. However, we should not underestimate the strategic role of the Home Secretary to see an act or potential act of terrorism, or a terrorist, in the wider scope. Notwithstanding all the powerful speeches that have been made, I respectfully submit that this is a question that belongs to the Home Secretary and her alone.

[Lord Rosser]

My Lords, we do not feel moved to change our stance on the procedure that is associated with control orders. Therefore, we have a fundamental difference of view with those who have tabled the amendments that we are discussing and, indeed, with all noble Lords bar one who have so far spoken in this debate. The security of our citizens—protecting them from the risk of terrorism of the exceptional kind that we have seen and been under threat from in recent years—is the responsibility of an elected Government through the Home Secretary. It should be a matter for the Home Secretary, who is accountable to Parliament and the electorate, and not the courts, to make an executive decision on whether a TPIM and its associated conditions are needed if she or he reasonably believes, based on the intelligence available, that an individual is involved in terrorist activity that places the security of our citizens at risk. For that reason, we are not able to support these amendments.