Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Debate between Lord Rosser and Baroness Chakrabarti

Committee stage & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 24th November 2020 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I can be very brief, because others have put the point so well and also because of the next debate to follow. I would simply say that this degree of micro-precision becomes particularly important because the Bill goes further than the status quo and creates these advanced criminal and civil immunities. I will leave it at that, because I think we are all really quite keen to hear the Minister’s response.

[Lord Rosser (Lab) [V]]

As drafted, the Bill refers to criminal conduct as conduct

“in the course of, or otherwise in connection with”

the conduct of a covert human intelligence source, and as

“conduct by or in relation to the person”

who is specified as the covert human intelligence source. As has been said, the amendments would establish that criminal conduct is conduct by the covert human intelligence source in the absence of any explanation as to why the additional words to which I have referred are needed, and what the consequences would be, and for whom, if they were not in the Bill. A further amendment in this group also puts on the face of the Bill that a criminal conduct authorisation cannot retrospectively give clearance for behaviour that has already happened before the date the authorisation is given.

The Joint Committee on Human Rights also raised these issues in its report on the Bill when it said that the definition of what amounts to “criminal conduct” for the purpose of an authorisation is wider than simply criminal activity by a covert human intelligence source, and referred to the wording which the amendments in this group would delete. The only explanation for this which the Joint Committee on Human Rights could find was in the draft code of practice, which states that

“a criminal conduct authorisation may authorise conduct by someone else ‘in relation to’ a

covert human intelligence source,

“namely those within a public authority that are involved in or affected by the authorisation.”

No doubt the Government will wish to respond in some detail setting out why the words “in connection with” and “in relation to” are essential, what exactly they mean and, giving examples, explaining why it is considered necessary to enable a public authority to authorise criminal conduct by someone other than the covert human intelligence source, which some might feel is rather at odds with the title of the Bill.