Lord Rosser
Main Page: Lord Rosser (Labour - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Rosser's debates with the Department for Transport
(12 years, 1 month ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, this is a probing amendment. The Bill provides that operators of dominant areas located at dominant airports require a licence to levy charges for airport operation services, and states that an airport area is dominant if the CAA makes a determination that the market power test is met in relation to the area. Subsection (8) of Clause 7 states that the Civil Aviation Authority may make separate market power determinations in respect of different areas at the same airport with the same relevant operator and may also make a market power determination in respect of an airport area that consists of two or more areas that are not adjacent if the areas are located at the same airport. Subsection (9) then states that a market power determination ceases to have effect if the Civil Aviation Authority publishes a notice of a further market power determination in relation to the airport area or in relation to an area that includes all of the airport area.
The effect of the amendment, which would add further words to the end of Clause 7(8), would be to require the Civil Aviation Authority, at such intervals as it considers appropriate, to,
“review market power determinations made on the basis of an earlier analysis”.
It is not clear whether other wording in the clause, or elsewhere in the Bill, is intended to require the Civil Aviation Authority to review decisions that it has made on market power determination. Circumstances can change over a period of time, and factors that were important in the original decision may cease to be so, or other factors may come into play.
Other subsections in Clause 7 say that the Civil Aviation Authority may make a determination that the market power test is or is not met in relation to an airport area, and that the Civil Aviation Authority must make a market power determination if asked to do so by the operator of the airport area or any other person whose interests are likely to be materially affected by the determination, subject to certain laid-down criteria being met.
There ought to be a requirement for the Civil Aviation Authority to review market power determinations it has made, irrespective of whether it is asked to do so. Subject to what the Minister has to say in reply, that does not appear to be a requirement laid down in the Bill. Even the reference in subsection (1) to the Civil Aviation Authority making a determination whenever it considers it appropriate to do so is not clear as to whether it also means reviewing a market power determination it has made that the test has been met or whether it applies only to making determinations where it has not previously been decided that the test has been met.
If the Minister does not intend to accept the amendment, I hope that he will say why the Government do not consider it appropriate, if that be their argument, or which provisions already in the Bill cover the issue raised in the amendment. Perhaps the Minister could also say how often the Government expect the Civil Aviation Authority to be making market power determinations. Are they likely to be regular occurrences and is it anticipated that such decisions will have to be revised or amended on a regular or frequent basis or only rarely? I beg to move.
I was surprised at the last sitting of the Committee when my noble friend made it clear that it is envisaged by the Government that there should be competition between two different terminals at the same airport. At an airport such as the JFK International in New York, where the terminals are situated widely apart and are approached in different ways, there may be some sense in that. Even in as large an airport as Heathrow, which now has five terminals, I find it difficult to conceive how there could be competition between the various terminals. It is built into this clause, on which the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, has moved his amendment, which seems to have some merit.
I would be grateful if, in responding, my noble friend could describe how he sees such competition arising. At the moment, taking Heathrow or Gatwick as an example, they are all under the same management. It may be separate between the airports; I find it difficult to conceive how it might happen between terminals. I would be grateful if my noble friend could explain how this might come about. It would obviously need to involve a change of ownership between the different terminals. Is there any prospect of that or is it somehow envisaged that there should be competition without a change of ownership? Perhaps my noble friend might explain that.
My Lords, the large airport test certainly applies in Clause 7(2), which refers to areas located in large airports. It goes on to define a large airport. I suspect that the CAA can make a determination on any other airport at a later stage if it becomes apparent that it might be in need of regulation and meets the tests in the Bill. Therefore, I invite the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, to withdraw his amendment.
Perhaps I might ask the noble Earl one last question before I withdraw my probing amendment. The thrust of his response seemed to be that what I sought to achieve with the amendment was covered by other parts of Clause 7. Do other parts of Clause 7 allow the CAA to initiate a review of an earlier decision that it has made off its own bat, or only if it is asked to by a person listed in subsection (3)?
My Lords, my understanding is that as soon as the CAA realises that it is appropriate to initiate a review because circumstances have changed, it can do so.
That is a very clear answer. The Minister has said that the CAA can do it off its own bat. I will want to read the Minister’s response carefully but my initial reaction is that if the Minister is saying that my amendment is covered by other wording in Clause 7, the point that I seek to establish has been met. I will not go down the road of competition, which has been raised, since that will be dealt with by a subsequent amendment. I will wait for it to appear. I thank the Minister for his response and beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, in moving government Amendment 20, I shall speak also to government Amendments 21, 22, 23, 30, 32, 33, 35 to 45 and 61 to 63. These 20 amendments are being taken together because they all relate to appeals to the Competition Commission and the Competition Appeal Tribunal. Some 13 of the amendments give effect to our position that the Competition Commission and the Competition Appeal Tribunal should decide appeals on the same grounds. The other seven amendments ensure that both the Competition Commission and the Competition Appeal Tribunal have regard to the duties imposed on the CAA as set out in Clause 1 when deciding an appeal. For brevity, I will refer to the Competition Commission as the CC and to the Competition Appeal Tribunal as the CAT.
It has come to the Government’s attention that the current drafting in the Bill gives rise to inconsistency between the grounds on which the CC and the CAT may allow an appeal. In the present drafting, although the legal grounds on which an appeal may be allowed are the same, the CAT is specifically required to decide the appeal by reference to these grounds and “on the merits”. There is no equivalent provision for the CC to decide the appeal “on the merits”.
The Government are concerned that this inconsistency creates unnecessary and undesirable legal uncertainty. We wish to correct this to shut out any risk that under the current wording it could be interpreted that different powers are being conferred on the CC and the CAT. In summary, these amendments propose changes to the provisions about appeals to the CAT to align them with provisions about appeals to the CC.
Amendment 30 is to one of the grounds on which the CC may allow an appeal under Clauses 24 or 25 which relate to appeals against conditions of new licences and modifications to the licence conditions. The amendment would change the ground on which the CC may allow an appeal from,
“that the decision was based on the wrong exercise of a discretion”,
as it is currently in the Bill, to,
“that an error was made in the exercise of a discretion”,
as per the amendment. This amendment is being made to clarify the current drafting.
The remaining amendments are specific to appeals brought before the CAT. Amendments 35, 36, 37, 40, 43 and 61 delete the subsections that contain the current grounds on which the CAT may allow an appeal in Schedules 1, 3, 4, 5 and 13. Amendment 20 deletes a provision stating that an appeal may be brought on only one of the current grounds. Amendments 21, 38, 41, 44 and 62 replace these grounds with the same grounds as provided for in Clause 26 concerning appeals to the CC from,
“that the determination is based on the wrong exercise of a discretion”,
to,
“that an error was made in the exercise of a discretion”.
In particular, Amendments 21, 38, 41, 44 and 62 ensure that the CAT’s consideration of appeals is consistent with the CC’s by, first, removing the phrase “on the merits” from the grounds on which the CAT must decide an appeal, as just discussed; secondly, introducing an overall requirement that the decision appealed against was wrong on specified grounds—error of fact, wrong in law, and error in the exercise of discretion; thirdly, restricting the grounds for determining the appeal in the same way as for the CC; and, fourthly, reflecting Amendment 20 which, as I have just mentioned, clarifies the grounds of wrong exercise of discretion.
The overall result of these 13 amendments is that both the CC and the CAT may allow an appeal only to the extent that they are satisfied that the decision appealed against was wrong on one or more of the following grounds: that the decision or determination was based on an error of fact; that the decision or determination was wrong in law; and that an error was made in the exercise of a discretion.
These amendments are important to deliver the Government’s policy intention that the grounds on which the CC and the CAT decide appeals should be the same. They are also in keeping with our wish to deliver an efficient and effective appeals regime. These amendments allow the CC and the CAT to take a decision that offers something more than judicial review but does not extend to a potentially lengthy full rehearing of the case. The remaining seven amendments again ensure consistency between the two bodies. Amendments 32 and 33 to Clause 30 specify that when the Competition Commission is carrying out its functions as specified under subsection (4) of Clause 30, it must have regard to the matters,
“in respect of which duties are imposed on the CAA by section 1”.
Amendments 22, 39, 42 and 45 import an express duty on the CAT to have regard to the CAA’s duties as set out in Section 1 when deciding an appeal under Schedules 1, 3, 4 and 5. Amendment 63 imports an express duty on the CAT to have regard to the CAA’s duties as set out in Section 4 of the Civil Aviation Act 1982 when deciding an appeal under Schedule 13. My officials have engaged extensively with the CAT and the CC on this matter and they are content with the amendments. I commend them to your Lordships.
My Lords, perhaps I may take one of the amendments in the group to make my point. Government Amendment 30 deletes paragraph (c) in Clause 26, which says that the Competition Commission may allow an appeal under Section 24 or 25 only to the extent that it is satisfied that the decision appealed against was wrong on one or more of the following grounds, one of which is that the decision was based on the wrong exercise of a discretion. That wording has now been replaced in government Amendment 30 with the wording,
“that an error was made in the exercise of a discretion”.
I endeavoured to listen carefully to what the Minister had to say about this group of amendments and, if he did cover my point, I would be grateful if he could repeat his explanation. He seemed to say that this was all about clarifying the current drafting as opposed to explaining what the difference was between the wording in the Bill and what is being proposed, bearing in mind that it is not the same wording and therefore presumably does not mean exactly the same.
It would be helpful if the Minister could explain what this change in wording means. I refer to government Amendment 30 to paragraph (c) in Clause 26. Does the change from “wrong exercise” mean that although a decision was made incorrectly, the process was fine and the options to choose from were correct, the proposed wording,
“an error was made in the exercise of a discretion”,
is meant to imply that the exercise itself was flawed, had the wrong information to hand, was conducted incorrectly and options were considered that should not have been? It is important that we do not just get told, “We are seeking to clarify the current drafting”, but that we have a full explanation as to what the current wording in Clause 26 means—this relates to,
“that the decision was based on the wrong exercise of a discretion”,
and how that differs in meaning from the wording with which Amendment 21 replaces it,
“that an error was made in the exercise of a discretion”.
I hope that the Minister can clarify the position.
Before the Minister replies, I was looking at this with some interest. I cannot help feeling that the issue might be one of parliamentary drafting. I would like to know whether the CAA, the airlines or the Competition Commission asked for the wording to be changed. My noble friend Lord Rosser has already pointed out that there is a change of wording, with “the wrong exercise”, but it is also odd that the original wording from Schedule 1 is in the present tense, whereas the wording in the amendment is in the past tense. I cannot help feeling that the parliamentary draftsman who did it first was found to have got something slightly wrong; I am not sure what. It is puzzling why that wording has changed from the present to the past tense, unless it is just for a legal reason. If there is another reason, I would like to see where the amendment came from and why.
Perhaps I may ask the Minister to clarify what the wording means. When I made my contribution a few moments ago, I asked whether the current wording,
“wrong exercise of a discretion”,
meant that if a decision was made incorrectly, the process was fine and the options to choose from were still correct. I then asked if the new wording,
“error … made in the exercise of a discretion”,
was intended to imply that that the exercise itself was flawed, that it had the wrong information to hand or was conducted incorrectly, and that options had been considered that should not have been. Does the wording we now have mean one of those two options—and, if so, which one?
My Lords, it is probably best if I write to noble Lords; this is a very technical point.
My Lords, as we have just been discussing, Clauses 24 and 25 deal with appeals to the Competition Commission in respect of, first, the conditions of new licences and, secondly, modification of licence conditions. Under the Bill, persons who operate a dominant area at a dominant airport require a licence to levy charges. An appeal lies to the Competition Commission against a decision by the Civil Aviation Authority to include, or not to include, a condition in a licence when it is granted, and an appeal also lies to the Competition Commission against a decision by the Civil Aviation Authority to modify a licence condition.
An appeal can be brought only with the permission of the Competition Commission and the Bill states that the Competition Commission may refuse permission to appeal only on one of the following grounds: that the appeal is brought for reasons that are trivial or vexatious, or that the appeal does not have a reasonable prospect of success. Clearly, from the wording in the Bill there is a concern that trivial or vexatious appeals should be stopped. I am sure we would all agree with that objective, and my amendment seeks to add in a further ground on which permission to appeal can be refused—namely, that the appeal does not demonstrably show that it is in the interests of users of air transport services, in order to further minimise the potential for frivolous or vexatious appeals.
The primary duty of the Civil Aviation Authority, as set out in Clause 1, is that it must carry out its functions in a manner which it considers will further the interests of users of air transport services regarding the range, availability, continuity, cost and quality of airport operation services. Surely, then, there must be an argument for saying that in any appeal to the Competition Commission against a decision by the Civil Aviation Authority to include, or not to include, a condition in a licence, or in any appeal against a decision by the CAA to modify a licence condition—both instances relating to persons who operate a dominant area at a dominant airport—it should also have to be shown quite clearly that the appeal is in the interests of users of air transport services, bearing in mind that that is the primary duty and responsibility placed on the Civil Aviation Authority, whose decision is being appealed.
Clause 30, on the procedure on appeals, states that subsections (1), (2) and (5) of Clause 1 apply to the carrying out by the Competition Commission of its function of deciding an application for permission to appeal under Clauses 24 and 25. Clause 30 refers to subsections (1) (2) and (5) of Clause 1, and subsection (1) refers to the Civil Aviation Authority having, where appropriate, to carry out its functions in a manner which it considers will promote competition in the provision of airport operation services. In a debate on an amendment when we were previously discussing the Bill in Committee, the Minister said that subsection (1) of Clause 1 would take priority over subsection (2) as far as the Civil Aviation Authority was concerned if promoting competition in the provision of airport operation services conflicted with its duty under subsection (1) to carry out its functions in a manner which the Civil Aviation Authority considers will further the interests of users of air transport services regarding the range, availability, continuity, cost and quality of airport operation services.
However, it is not clear whether the giving of priority to subsection (1) over subsection (2) in Clause 1 where there is any sort of conflict applies also to the Competition Commission under Clause 30. Without it apparently being clear that it does, the Competition Commission, bearing in mind its name, might well give greater weight to promoting competition when deciding whether or not to refuse permission to appeal, rather than wanting to satisfy itself that the appeal is in the interests of users of air transport services, which is clearly stated in this amendment and is in accordance with the primary, overriding duty of the Civil Aviation Authority as laid down in Clause 1(1).
I hope that the Minister will either accept the amendment or be able to provide an assurance that giving priority to subsection (1) over subsection (2) in Clause 1 applies equally to the Competition Commission in Clause 30 as to the Civil Aviation Authority. I beg to move.
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for explaining the concerns that his amendments seek to address. However, I believe that the Bill already takes those concerns into account. The proposed appeals process has been carefully designed to ensure that where an appeal is brought, ordinarily for it to succeed, the appeal body should consider whether it is in passengers’ interests in the provision of airport operation services. It is our aim to have in place an appeals process that facilitates transparency and a timely manner of resolution of appeals, and that permission to appeal should be granted only where appropriate. However, we do not wish to stop those whose interests are materially affected from appealing. In meetings with airlines and airport bodies, my officials have sought to assure parties of this.
Clauses 24(5)(b) and 25(5)(b) as currently drafted already ensure that permission to appeal a licence condition or licence modification would be refused if the appeal did not have a reasonable prospect of success. Where an appeal had a reasonable prospect of success, it would be unjust and wrong in principle to refuse permission. In answer to the important question put by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, I refer the Committee to Clause 30, which contains provisions stating that the Competition Commission “must have regard” to the same duties as the CAA in the discharge of stated functions. Included in these is the determination for permission to appeal under Clauses 24 and 25.
The Bill as drafted empowers the Competition Commission to refuse to grant permission to appeal so as to avoid parties bringing an appeal as a “spoiling” tactic. Nor can appeals be used as a delaying tactic. The default position is that the CAA’s licence condition or modification comes into effect while the appeal is being heard. Therefore, I do not believe that the inclusion of a further subsection in Clauses 24 and 25, as suggested by the noble Lord, would add anything of further substance to the Bill.
In the light of those assurances, I hope that the noble Lord will be willing to withdraw his amendment.
Before I do so, while I think that the noble Earl has probably given me the assurances that I seek, perhaps I may ask him again directly whether he is saying clearly that, under the terms of Clause 30 where it states—as I indicated and the noble Earl has repeated—that subsections (1), (2) and (5) of Clause 1 apply to the carrying out by the Competition Commission of its functions, which include determining appeals brought under the two clauses that we are talking about, in carrying out those functions the Competition Commission is bound in the same way under Clause 1(1) and (2) as the Civil Aviation Authority is itself. Will it have the same general duty in respect of determining whether those appeals should be heard? In other words, it is to give priority—and see as its primary duty as the Competition Commission—to making the decision to furthering,
“the interests of the users of air transport services regarding the range, availability, continuity, cost and quality of airport operation services”,
thus ensuring that that duty overrides the duty to promote competition in the provision of airport operation services. I think that that is what the Minister said to me, but I should be grateful if he could confirm that that is the case.
My Lords, the Competition Commission must have regard to the CAA’s general duty under Clause 30, as per the set of amendments accepted earlier today. We do not believe that it would be sustainable for the Competition Commission to promote competition where to do so would be inimical to the interests of users of air transport services, as described in Clause 1(1).
I do not seek to play with words; I am just anxious to be clear. The Minister said that the Competition Commission must “have regard”. Does that mean that its general duty in hearing these appeals is the same as the CAA’s general duty under Clause 1, which states that its primary and overriding responsibility in determining whether those appeals should be heard is to,
“further the interests of users of air transport services”,
rather than, where there is a conflict, to promote competition? I do not know whether we are playing with words over “have regard to”. In the Minister’s view, does that mean that the Competition Commission is bound in the same way as the CAA is in its general duty under Clause 1(1) and (2)?
My Lords, the short answer to the noble Lord’s question is yes.
In that case, since the Minister’s very specific answer makes it clear that the Competition Commission has the duty in the same way as the CAA has the duty under Clause 1(1) and (2), I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
The amendment relates to Clause 29, which deals with appeals determined by the Competition Commission under Clauses 24 and 25, which we have just discussed. Clause 29 states:
“A determination made by the Competition Commission … must be contained in an order”.
Later, it states that the Civil Aviation Authority,
“must take such steps as it considers requisite for it to comply with the order”.
It then goes on to say:
“The steps must be taken … if a time is specified in the order or is to be determined in accordance with the order, within that time, and … otherwise, within a reasonable time”.
The effect of the amendment would be to remove “within a reasonable time” and insert,
“within the period of 24 weeks beginning with the day on which the Competition Commission published the relevant order”.
This is a probing amendment, which seeks to find out what the Government mean by “within a reasonable time” and how they believe those words should be interpreted. Do they mean more or less than 24 weeks and, if it could be more than 24 weeks, will the Minister give some examples of where it might be reasonable for the Civil Aviation Authority to take longer than 24 weeks to comply with an order made by the Competition Commission when no specific timescale is laid down by it? It would also be helpful if the Minister could say who will be responsible for deciding whether the Civil Aviation Authority has taken steps to comply with an order within a reasonable time. Will it be the Civil Aviation Authority itself, the Competition Commission, the Secretary of State, the courts or some other individual or body?
As I say, this is a probing amendment. I hope I have explained the motive for tabling it and the issue that we hope the noble Earl will address. I beg to move.
My Lords, the amendment seeks to amend subsection (7)(b) of Clause 29. The clause contains provisions relating to the publication of, and other matters connected to, the determination of appeals.
The current drafting provides that the CAA must take steps to comply with the appeal determination within any time period specified in the order. When none is specified, it must do so within a reasonable time. I am unable to support the amendment for two reasons. First, we do not think that it is necessary. Under subsection (7)(a) of the clause, the Competition Commission may specify a time limit in the order. We would expect it to do so if and whenever appropriate. Why would it not do so? Secondly, in circumstances where it is not appropriate to specify a period, it will be necessary to afford the CAA a reasonable time within which to comply with the order. What will comprise a reasonable time depends upon the context. There may be cases where action should be taken in fewer than 24 weeks and others where it is not reasonable to expect the CAA to take action within that period.
The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked me to give examples. I do not have any to hand but there may, I suggest, be a requirement to provide IT facilities or some capability that might require the CAA to procure something. It simply would not have time to take the necessary procurement action, although it might have every intention of doing so and perhaps give assurances that it would do so.
Against this background, to set an arbitrary time limit of 24 weeks is not appropriate and may cause injustice. Therefore, it is prudent to retain the flexibility that subsection (7)(b) provides the CAA. This flexibility is consistent with our wish for the CAA to be an efficient regulator but to allow it appropriate periods of time to comply with orders. I hope that in the light of my explanation the noble Lord will be willing to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I am not a lawyer but I do not have any difficulty in understanding the provisions. I do not understand why the Competition Commission or the Competition Appeal Tribunal would not set a time limit if it were appropriate to do so. If it were inappropriate—the CAA might have said that it was already complying and had no intention of stopping complying—it would be totally unnecessary to impose a time limit. However, I would expect the Competition Commission to impose a time limit if it were desirable.
I thank the Minister for his reply. I also thank my noble friend Lord Clinton-Davis for the points he made. Obviously it is my intention to withdraw the amendment since it is probing in nature, but will the Minister respond to the other point I made about who will determine whether it has been done within a reasonable time? The clause provides that it should be done “within a reasonable time” if no time limit is set. Who makes the decision as to whether it has been done within a reasonable time?
My Lords, I do not know the answer to that question, but I imagine that if it was not done within a reasonable time, there would be a mechanism for the appellant to go back to the Competition Commission or the Competition Appeal Tribunal. However, if I have got that wrong, obviously I will write to the noble Lord.
My Lords, the terms “a reasonable time” and “a reasonable person” are frequently found in legislation. The noble Lord is absolutely right.
I am happy to leave this in the context that if the Minister finds that the response he has given to me on who will determine whether it has been done within a reasonable time is not the position, he will write to say that. As I say, it is a probing amendment to try to find out more about the Government’s intentions so far as the definition of “within a reasonable time” is concerned, and what kind of cases might come within that category rather than in subsection (7)(a), which provides that,
“if a time is specified in the order”.
I thank the noble Earl for his response and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, the amendment addresses a recommendation from the Delegated Powers Committee. Paragraph 2 of Schedule 8 enables the Secretary of State to increase by negative order the £1 million threshold specified in sub-paragraph (4)(a) of Schedule 8 as the amount of annual turnover above which an airport operator is eligible for certification by the Civil Aviation Authority as a relevant airport operator.
When the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee looked at the Bill, it apparently had in front of it a memorandum from the Department for Transport, which the department had prepared for the committee, explaining the delegated powers in the Bill. The report on the Bill that we now have from the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee states that paragraph 64 of the memorandum—which must be the memorandum from the Department for Transport—explains that the purpose of the power in Schedule 8 to increase the £1 million threshold,
“is to enable the amount to be increased, for example to take account of any inflation”.
The Delegated Powers Committee said:
“If it is the Government’s intention that the purpose of the power … is to enable the Secretary of State by order to increase the threshold in line with inflation, this should be specified on the face of the Bill, in which case the negative procedure is appropriate. But if the threshold is to be increased for other reasons, the affirmative procedure should apply”.
My amendment seeks to specify that the Secretary of State can increase the threshold figure only by the affirmative resolution procedure unless the increase is made to keep in line with inflation, in which case the negative resolution procedure will be used.
I hope that the Minister will accept the amendment, which, unless we have misunderstood it, seeks to put into the Bill the views that the Delegated Powers Committee expressed in its report. Although the memorandum from the Department for Transport indicated that it would enable the amount to be increased to take account of any inflation, in which case the negative procedure would be appropriate, clearly if the Government were going to do rather more than simply seek to increase the figure in line with inflation, I would share the view of the Delegated Powers Committee that the affirmative procedure should apply. The purpose of the amendment is to seek to achieve that objective. I beg to move.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, for tabling the amendment. An amendment of this kind would address a recommendation of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee in its helpful report on the Bill, which was published four days before the start of Grand Committee. I have no complaint, but we will need a little more time to determine which way to go. However, I agree with the general aim of the amendment and have much sympathy with it.
The current drafting of the amendment is not technically correct. It would need alternative drafting to make a consequential amendment to the Airports Act 1986, where the provisions are to be inserted. I therefore wish to consider the matter further, with the intention of bringing forward a government amendment on Report. However, I do not anticipate having any difficulty with accepting the advice of the DPRRC. I hope that this reassures your Lordships that my intention is for a government amendment to be brought forward on this, in order to respond effectively to the DPRRC recommendation that if the purpose of the order provided for in sub-paragraph (11) of paragraph 2 of Schedule 8 is to ensure that the threshold can be increased for reasons other than inflation, the current negative procedure should be amended to an affirmative procedure to give Parliament greater scrutiny. With this assurance, I hope that the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.
I thank the Minister for that very helpful reply. I fully accept that the amendment might not be worded in the appropriate manner. It appears from what he said that he intends to take the matter away with a view to producing an amendment that is in the right place in the Bill and says the right things to achieve the recommendation of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.