Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill

Lord Rosser Excerpts

Wednesday 5th October 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser]

My Lords, I associate myself with the words of welcome already expressed to the noble Lord, Lord Henley, and with the words of appreciation and the expression of good wishes already expressed to the noble Baroness, Lady Browning.

This has been a passionate debate at times, with strongly held and widely differing views being expressed about the Bill. The reason why the Bill is before us is the statement in the coalition agreement that there would be a review of control orders. There is an objection in some parts of the coalition to the current control orders, and the Bill is an attempt to pretend that the coalition is making a significant change to the current arrangements. In reality, with regard to the continuation of control orders, the Government are tinkering at the edges and it fools no one. The difficulty is that the tinkering being undertaken through the Bill is potentially damaging and dangerous, as well as potentially costly.

The tinkering with the current arrangements includes the renaming of control orders to terrorism prevention and investigation measures notices; a change in the threshold from reasonable suspicion of involvement in terrorism-related activity to reasonable belief; a lengthy list of prescribed powers removing the ability of the Secretary of State also to impose any further obligations needed to prevent or restrict an individual’s involvement in terrorism-related activity; an overnight residence measure instead of curfew orders, which averaged just under 12 hours in 2010; and the TPIM regime being reviewed every five years instead of the annual renewal in Parliament required for control orders.

Unlike control orders, the Bill does not include a power of relocation to another part of the country without consent. Despite the interventions earlier by the noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury, I do not think that this was done on the basis that there were other provisions in the Bill that could achieve the same objectives.

The Government have clearly had second thoughts about the wisdom of that last matter; shortly before the Third Reading of the Bill in the other place they published the Draft Enhanced Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill, which provides powers for the Home Secretary to impose enhanced TPIM notices. The powers available under such enhanced notices would include relocation without consent, which the Bill before us omits, and a ban on using communication devices, which the Bill before us restricts.

In reality the Government are revising the Bill before it has even been passed but, presumably because of the political embarrassment involved in having to put back provisions of the current control order arrangements in the interests of national security, they are seeking to do so not by putting the change in this Bill but by producing another draft Bill that can be debated and voted on by Parliament when needed at a later date. Clearly, the Government now accept that there is a requirement for a continuation of these additional powers in the interests of national security, otherwise they would not be trying to retain them in the somewhat back-door fashion they are proposing. In other words, the Government recognise that the coalition politicking involved in the Bill before us has put national security at risk.

However, the Government's proposed way of rectifying their error of judgment gives rise to further concerns. If for their own political reasons the Government are not going to include those powers in the Bill before us, that means that they could not be activated quickly when needed, since if Parliament was in recess at the time it would require the recall of Parliament and thus a period of some days at least before the Bill could be debated and passed and receive Royal Assent. Neither is it clear, as has been said, exactly how meaningful any parliamentary debate could be. Presumably, the Government would not be disclosing the intelligence information that had led to the Bill being brought forward.

The Government now recognise that the powers provided for in the draft Bill are needed, but because they will not include them in this Bill they are going to create a situation, particularly when Parliament is in recess, where the powers may be needed urgently in the interests of national security but cannot be exercised immediately when the need for them has become pressing. Quite a thought with the Olympic and Paralympic Games just around the corner. That would also mean that if the draft Bill were passed it would run alongside the current Bill, creating two separate control order regimes, expiring at different times, with different levels of power and possible court challenges.

There is a further concern. When Parliament is dissolved, or in the period between the appointment of a new Parliament and the first Queens's Speech, the Secretary of State would be able to apply the provisions of the draft Bill effectively by decree, if Parliament had not debated and passed the legislation and the legislation were still effective. Is that the way we want to go on this issue, either now or in the future? All because the Government will not put the provisions of the draft Bill into this Bill. There is certainly a real price to pay for the coalition Government’s political fudge.

We then come to the issue of resources. Perhaps the Minister will tell us what the additional cost of the extra surveillance for the TPIMs will be, and from where the additional funding will be met. As has been mentioned in this debate, Deputy Assistant Commissioner Stuart Osborne gave evidence to the Bill Committee in June on the readiness of those involved to implement the new system and said:

“To get the resources that we anticipate we need will take more than a year, in terms of being able to get people trained and to get the right equipment. Until we have got that, we will not be able to start to bed things in and see how it works and how it transpires”.—[Official Report, Commons, Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill Committee, 21/6/11; col. 9.]

So we have a situation where to date there appears to be silence on what the additional costs of the extra surveillance will be and where the money will come from, and a statement from a knowledgeable source that it will take more than a year to get the resources required in terms of people trained and the appropriate equipment. Where is the additional appropriately trained manpower going to come from at a time when numbers of police officers are being significantly reduced and police forces severely stretched?

Control orders are not ideal nor indeed desirable, but they are needed to deal with the situation that has arisen where a small number of people seek to pursue their own aims and objectives through acts of terrorism, and it is imperative that, when needed, we have the powers to stop them after the time their suspected intentions begin to emerge but before they can carry out their ghastly actions. Control orders have the support of the police, including the power to relocate; they have had the support of the courts, including the power to relocate; and they have been used by the current Home Secretary, including the power to relocate. I understand that some three-quarters of current controlees have relocation as part of their control order.

One of the prime responsibilities of a Government is the security of the nation and of our people. The Bill weakens counterterrorism protection by removing the power to relocate dangerous terror suspects, if needed, to prevent terrorist activity, and puts that provision in a draft Bill that it might not be possible to activate in time to deal with a security situation requiring the immediate use of the powers in the draft Bill. This Bill also weakens accountability since, unlike control orders, TPIMs will not require annual parliamentary votes to continue, and I am by no means the first to have drawn attention to this point. The Bill also fails to address the issue of the additional resources that the police and security services will need for the increased surveillance needed as a result of the changes that it introduces.

This Bill has nothing to do with improving national security; indeed it weakens it. It has nothing to do with human rights, since it is simply a classic example of a piece of legislation that has everything to do with internal coalition politics in which the protection of the people of this country from further acts of terrorism comes second behind the need to produce a political fudge on the question of control orders, which this Bill and the draft Bill retain, albeit under another name. This is not a change to “control order light”; it is a change to “control order risky”—and highly risky, at that. The Government should think again about some of the provisions of this Bill.

[Lord Reid of Cardowan]

Before my noble friend sits down, will he allow me to declare my interests as registered? I meant to do this during my contribution but did not because of the brief time allotment.