Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe

Lord Ricketts Excerpts

Tuesday 3rd December 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

I am very happy to confirm that on behalf of my honourable friend the Minister for Europe and I welcome the invitation to meet the delegation. We have 18 Members of this Parliament and 18 substitute Members. We have a very good delegation, as he says, representing both Houses and all parties.

[Lord Ricketts (CB)]

My Lords, while we are on the subject of UK delegations to European assemblies, does the Minister share my disappointment that we still do not have a UK delegation to the EU-UK Parliamentary Partnership Assembly? The European Parliament delegation is up and raring to go. Is it not a bit odd that it seems keener on a parliamentary reset than the Westminster Parliament?

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Ricketts, for his question. I do not know precisely why the nominations for this delegation have not yet been resolved. I believe that we on this side have resolved the issues; I do not know whether the noble Lord on the Front Bench opposite can shed some light. I understand that a change of Government, new roles and a change of leader will inevitably cause some delay, but I hope we can get this resolved very soon.

The Ukraine Effect (European Affairs Committee Report)

Lord Ricketts Excerpts

Thursday 21st November 2024 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Ricketts]

That this House takes note of the Report from the European Affairs Committee The Ukraine Effect: The impact of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on the UK-EU relationship (1st Report, Session 2023-24, HL Paper 48).

[Lord Ricketts (CB)]

My Lords, I apologise for being a little late. The previous item ran shorter than I expected.

It is a privilege to open this timely debate on an issue of the utmost importance. On 25 October, your Lordships held a wide-ranging debate on the situation in Ukraine. I was not able to participate, but I have read Hansard very carefully, and a lot of important points were made. The situation has of course moved on quite a lot even since then, with the election of Donald Trump, the massive further attacks by Russia on Ukraine’s energy system and the very welcome—although I think still unavowed—decisions in Washington and London to allow Ukraine to use longer-range missiles against legitimate targets in Russia. All that makes our debate today very topical.

Before coming to the business at hand, I want to pay tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Levene, who is due to make his valedictory speech today. I pay tribute to all that he has brought to this House, on the basis of his extraordinary career in the City, including his memorable year as Lord Mayor. I had the honour of working with him when he was Chief of Defence Procurement. I discovered more recently that we also shared an interest in finding the best way of getting to Normandy on a Friday evening. We will greatly miss the noble Lord.

Our focus today is the report published by the European Affairs Committee at the end of January, on the impact of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on UK-EU relations. The former Government responded to this on 27 March. Reading the report again nine months on, I think it has stood the test of time and has relevant things to say to those who are now making British policy.

I wish to thank, on behalf of the Committee, our clerk, Jarek Wisniewski, our policy analyst, Jack Sheldon, our committee assistant, Tabitha Brown, and our legal counsel, Tim Mitchell. We took evidence from 22 witnesses, including the then Foreign Secretary, the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, and the then Minister for Europe, Leo Docherty. We received a wide range of written submissions. I will set out briefly the main conclusions on the four aspects we considered: co-operation on sanctions, the UK-EU defence relationship, reconstruction of Ukraine, and the implications for longer-term co-operation with the EU in these areas.

The first area we looked at was sanctions policy. We commended the way the EU and the UK had worked together, but we were concerned even then about the growing evidence that Russia was circumventing sanctions through third states and through its use of uninsured shadow tankers. We also received evidence suggesting that the UK was not as effective as it should be at enforcing the sanctions that had been introduced.

We pressed the Government then to explore options for using sanctioned assets—or their proceeds—to support the reconstruction of Ukraine. In that context, we found it incomprehensible that the frozen assets arising from the sale of Chelsea Football Club, which Mr Abramovich had promised would be used for the support of Ukraine, had then not been disbursed. In their response, the Government assured us that UK sanctions were robustly enforced and that potential breaches were investigated and appropriate action taken.

Despite all the good work, there is worrying evidence that Western sanctions are failing to constrain Russia’s capacity to wage the war or significantly weaken the Russian economy. Could the Minister give us the latest assessment of how effective sanctions enforcement is proving? Is it evidence of their effectiveness that Russia is having to rely increasingly on Iranian drones and North Korean missiles? Would the Minister comment specifically on the revelation in yesterday’s Financial Times that companies registered in the British Overseas Territories have exported $134 million of goods to Russia in 2024 alone? The article alleged:

“Russian documents suggest that a large volume of controlled exports”


is being exported by

“opaque entities in the British Virgin Islands, in particular”.

If true, that is surely totally unacceptable and undermines Britain’s capacity to lead internationally on sanctions enforcement.

On the shadow tanker fleet, it is good news that the Government secured agreement among 40 leaders at the Blenheim Palace summit on a call for action, and that the UK is taking national action to sanction 43 oil tankers, but is there any sign that this is reducing the flow of Russian oil and gas to markets such as India?

On the use of the proceeds from frozen Russian assets, the G7 have now given their welcome agreement to the extraordinary revenue acceleration mechanism, yielding $50 billion for Ukraine, of which the UK is providing around $3 billion. Speed of disbursement is now vital. Could the Minister tell us when the UK share of that will reach the Ukraine Government, and perhaps what proportion of the US contribution of $20 billion is going to get to Ukraine before—to pick a date at random—21 January 2025? Finally on sanctions, is there any end in prospect to the saga of the frozen funds from the sale of Chelsea Football Club?

Turning briefly to the implications of Russia’s aggression on EU-UK co-operation on defence, our report concluded that co-operation on military support had been more effective than previous experience would have suggested. We urged the Government to do what they could to overcome the delays in British participation in the PESCO military mobility project. We noted that the EU’s protectionist rules governing third country access to the European Defence Fund created a major obstacle to participation, even when our strategic interests clearly point to the closest co-operation. We recommended seeking an arrangement with the European Defence Agency similar to those which the US and Norway have.

I think it is fair to say that the former Government’s response was cautious. The current Government have announced an ambitious security pact with the EU, covering these issues and a wider set of economic security challenges. Of course, the return of Donald Trump makes it all the more urgent to pursue close co-operation with the EU across the range of defence issues.

Could the Minister confirm that the security pact will cover all the issues I have referred to? Will the Government also seek to persuade the EU to look again at the third country rules, which at present create such an obstacle at a time when it is more important than ever to have all of us in Europe working together on effective arrangements for the manufacture of, for example, missiles and ammunition?

On reconstruction, our report concluded that the horrific scale of the damage inflicted by Russia’s aggression on Ukraine means that a massive programme of international assistance is going to be necessary over a long period. With Donald Trump’s arrival, the likelihood is that a large proportion of that bill will fall to European countries. We welcomed the previous Government’s initiative to join the multi-donor co-operation platform and to host the first Ukraine recovery conference in the UK in 2023. We concluded that the UK should go on playing a major role in preparations for the reconstruction period—something we have great national experience of—including in the fight against corruption, and that we should support Ukraine in the reforms needed for it to join the EU, which would be a very significant stabilising factor in European security.

Clearly, reconstruction will be massively expensive. The $50 billion G7 loan is of course a helpful down payment, but the World Bank estimated in February this year that the total could be as high as $486 billion—and we have had another year of relentless destruction since then. Are the Government thinking about how it will be possible to raise sums of that order? Is the issue of the $300 billion of frozen Russian assets still off the table in that context?

Our fourth theme was the impact of the Russian invasion of Ukraine on longer-term co-operation between the UK and the EU on foreign policy. The committee recommended, as it has in the past, that there should be more structured arrangements for co-operation on security and foreign policy between the UK and the EU in the future. I am glad to see that the Prime Minister has clearly listened to the committee’s recommendation and has now proposed regular summits with the President of the Commission. The Foreign Secretary has begun a regular series of meetings with the EU Foreign Affairs Council, which is very welcome. However, there are also clear signs of impatience on the EU side because the Government have not said precisely what they want to achieve in the security pact. Can the Minister tell us what the Government’s timetable is for concluding the pact, which has become even more urgent with the election of Donald Trump?

I will step outside the immediate issues in the committee’s report to comment on the issues that lie directly ahead for Ukraine. As I have said, I strongly welcome the fact that the Ukrainians are now able to use the UK Storm Shadow missiles alongside the ATACMS supplied by the US. I realise that the Government are not avowing that decision, but, as President Zelensky said, the “missiles speak for themselves”. This gives a powerful signal of support to Kyiv and complicates Russia’s military planning. It will not change the course of the war, but it is an important move. It undermines the narrative that Putin had been trying to establish—that it was fine for Russia to rain down Iranian drones and North Korean missiles on Ukraine, but it was a reckless escalation for Ukraine to use western-supplied weapons against legitimate targets in Russia.

However much we in this House all want the Ukrainians to come out with a clear victory from this terrible war, the hard fact is that, even with continued, wholehearted western support, they do not have the combat power necessary to drive the Russians off every metre of Ukrainian territory. The advent of Trump is likely to mean that 2025 will see a ceasefire negotiation. President Zelensky himself accepted that when he said last week that Ukraine

“must do everything so that this war ends next year, through diplomatic means”.

It would therefore be prudent for western capitals, alongside continuing to give staunch support to Ukraine, to begin to do contingency planning on the key principles that should guide western policy if there is to be a negotiation. They should start a discussion on those issues as soon as possible with those around Trump, to convince him that, if he is to come out of a negotiation looking strong, which is what he normally wants to do, he must ensure that Ukraine’s vital interests are safeguarded.

I suggest three principles as a start to that discussion. First, Ukraine must be a full party to any negotiations about its future. Trying to impose a deal agreed between Washington and Moscow would be calamitous for Ukraine and for European security. Secondly, Ukraine must not be obliged to cede sovereignty over territories that are currently occupied by Russia, assuming that there will be a ceasefire with in-place forces. The long-term status of those territories must be left open, as was the case in Korea and Germany. Thirdly, Ukraine must be left free to decide its own security policy. It should not be left in some neutral zone, suspended between East and West. The West should be free to give Ukraine security guarantees as a prelude to it joining NATO and the EU in the longer term.

Noble Lords may well ask what Putin’s incentive would be to agree to such a deal. Here I suggest that Trump’s famous unpredictability might come to our aid. If he were to set out a deal on the lines I outlined, and Putin rejected it, that would be the end of a beautiful friendship. In those circumstances, Trump might well decide that, to look strong, he would have to back Ukraine to the hilt. Putin would have to factor in that possibility anyway, even if it did not eventually happen.

If a ceasefire deal respecting those three principles could be achieved, it would at least offer the prospect of building a strong and free Ukraine closely tied to western institutions. It would leave Putin with no long-term gain from his murderous gamble. I much look forward to the debate and the Minister’s reply.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Ricketts (CB)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all the speakers who have taken part in this debate, including a number of distinguished former members as well as current members of the European Affairs Committee, and also to the Minister for a very comprehensive response to all the many points that were raised. It was a privilege to listen to the valedictory speech of the noble Lord, Lord Levene, which was characteristically reflective and substantive; we will miss him a lot in this House.

This has been a thoughtful, wide-ranging and constructive debate under the shadow of the impending Trump presidency, with all the implications that has for Ukraine and for European security. Once again, this House has sent out a strong, powerful and unanimous message of continuing support for the courageous people of Ukraine.

We have heard widespread concern about the need for rigorous enforcement of the quite elaborate sanctions regime now in place. I take away a strong message from many speakers that European countries are going to have to take greater responsibility for their own defence and for the support of Ukraine in the years ahead. For many, that underlines the need for closer EU-UK co-operation on all the issues we have been talking about.

There was also the thought that, however this conflict ends, we are going to be sharing the same continent with a hostile Russia for the foreseeable future. That has far-reaching implications for our foreign policy, defence spending and much else. But those are issues for another day. With renewed thanks to all the participants in this debate, I beg to move.

Motion agreed.

Foreign Affairs

Lord Ricketts Excerpts

Tuesday 5th March 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ricketts (CB)]

My Lords, I welcome the debate and the great energy and purpose that the Foreign Secretary has brought to his role, ably supported of course by the noble Lord, Lord Ahmad, and the talents of the Foreign Office staff. They have increased the impact and influence of British foreign policy.

Five months after the awful Hamas attack, we must not lose our sense of horror at the incessant images from Gaza that we see every day. The suffering of the Israeli hostages is unimaginable. It is extraordinary that, despite all UK and US efforts, Gazans on the verge of starvation are reduced to mobbing a food convoy, with the stampede killing many people after Israeli forces opened fire. It is equally extraordinary that the US is reduced to air-dropping some pallets of aid into northern Gaza because it cannot persuade the Israelis to let in enough by land. I have never known as wide a gulf as exists now between a US President and an Israeli Prime Minister. It seems that the talks in Egypt about cessation of hostilities and hostage exchange have now broken down. Faults are no doubt on both sides, but it is hard to avoid the conclusion that Netanyahu’s determination to prolong the war is linked in some way to his own political survival.

Stopping this fighting is desperately urgent, to get hostages out and humanitarian aid in, but also to create an opportunity to move towards a better post-conflict future for Israel and Gaza. I welcome the Foreign Secretary’s championing of the two-state solution. For all the difficulties, it is the only viable alternative to a forever war between Israel and the Palestinians. I also think he was right to open up some negotiating space around the point at which a Palestinian state could be recognised. Of course there are huge obstacles; a new Israeli and Palestinian leadership would be needed, in my view, as would a credible answer to who will provide security in Gaza and who will foot the massive reconstruction costs there.

From that point of view, it is encouraging to see that the Gulf Arab states are now much more engaged in thinking about the future of the Palestinian people than was the case in the past. They will have to have a central role in the running of Gaza in the future, alongside a new Palestinian leadership. Part of that package should be a peace deal between Israel and Saudi Arabia, which would enable Israel at last to integrate into the dynamic region of which it is a part. A lasting ceasefire would also do a great deal to stop Iran destabilising the region. It should de-escalate tensions across the border with Lebanon, and remove the Houthis’ pretext for taking international shipping hostage in the Red Sea.

Could the Foreign Secretary tell us where things stand on the comprehensive US draft UN Security Council resolution, which the Americans circulated in mid-February and which set out a lot of the points I have just gone over, and a very different vision from that on offer from Prime Minister Netanyahu?

I turn briefly to Ukraine. Of course, I draw attention to the European Affairs Committee’s report on the impact of Ukraine on UK-EU relations, which has been largely positive. I single out the issue of using frozen Russian assets to fund reconstruction; when he came to the committee, the Foreign Secretary kindly told us that

“there is a legal route to doing this”.

The Commission plan at the moment seems to be only to use future windfall profits from the euro clearing balance. Frankly, that will not change the dial on reconstruction. Can the Foreign Secretary update the House on where we are on the idea of using frozen Russian assets, at least as collateral?

More broadly, I am afraid that there is no prospect of either side achieving an outright victory, much as I would like to see Ukraine doing so. The risk is a long, grinding war in which the Russians gradually gain the upper hand, especially if we have a new President Trump in the White House. If President Zelensky decided the time had come for an armistice, freezing something like the current front lines, we should see that as an opportunity, not a disaster. It would enable us to bring the 80% of Ukraine which is free into NATO and the EU. Korea is not an exact precedent, but it gives an idea of what could be achieved by a long-term armistice. In that case, rather than being a bridgehead for further Russian aggression in Europe, an armistice would be more likely to leave Putin and his successors scrambling to prevent people stuck in the benighted, sad, Russian-controlled rump escaping west to a prosperous and free Ukraine.

Ukraine

Lord Ricketts Excerpts

Thursday 29th February 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ricketts (CB)]

My Lords, I welcome the Statement and the leadership role the Government have played in supporting Ukraine from the very beginning. I also welcomed this week the fact that the final obstacles to Sweden joining NATO have been cleared, which is another powerful strengthening of the alliance as a result of Putin’s invasion.

The House of Lords European Affairs Committee, which I have the privilege to chair, published a report a couple of weeks ago on the impact of the invasion of Ukraine on EU-UK relations. We took a lot of evidence about sanctions policy and the seizure of assets, which is, frankly, the next big opportunity to help support the financing of the reconstruction of Ukraine. The Foreign Secretary, when he gave evidence, said that there is a legal route to the seizure of assets. As has been mentioned, the EU is looking at the seizure of windfall profits of assets—although the real game-changer would be to get at the underlying assets themselves. It is important that we work in co-operation. I wonder whether I could press the Minister a bit further. Can he assure us that we are working closely with the EU and the US, with the aim of getting to a place where we can start doing this quickly, because the needs in Ukraine are obviously very pressing?

AUKUS Security Partnership

Lord Ricketts Excerpts

Tuesday 13th February 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Cameron of Chipping Norton (Con)]

This is a deeply strategic approach. First, it fits into a tilt to the Indo-Pacific. Noble Lords can see we have signed the Hiroshima accord with Japan; we have a new status at ASEAN; we have very strong partnerships with India; and now we have AUKUS, which is a defence stature that puts us in with Australia and America in a very strategic way. In terms of the partners for pillar 2, we would welcome others to come but on each occasion we will have to ask, “What will they bring, is it the right thing, is it the right country and is it the right fit?” The strategic move of AUKUS is incredibly powerful.

[Lord Ricketts (CB)]

My Lords, speaking as another member of the club of those on Mr Putin’s blacklist, I welcome the AUKUS agreement but ask whether the Minister will accept that the handling of the French was pretty catastrophic? Does he accept that France is a major Indo-Pacific power and that now, when those bruises have perhaps healed somewhat, there is time to work with the French as well in the Indo-Pacific area, where they have a great deal to contribute?

[Lord Cameron of Chipping Norton (Con)]

The noble Lord makes a good point, which is that, ultimately, Britain and France should co-operate as closely as we can, because we are similar-sized powers with similar-sized militaries and global ambitions. That is what the Lancaster House agreement that he did so much to bring about was all about. What I would say to French partners now looking at this is that what AUKUS does for UK capacity is make sure that we replace the Astute submarines, which are incredibly high-tech and successful, with a new-generation AUKUS submarine—so the funding and the capacity are in place for that. We are assuring our future, and that is good for France because we can then talk with it about how it will secure the future of its submarine programme.

Occupied Palestinian Territories: Humanitarian Situation

Lord Ricketts Excerpts

Thursday 9th November 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ricketts (CB)]

My Lords, I commend the Minister for the huge effort he is putting into efforts to reduce the tension, as have other Ministers. I also support the Government on humanitarian pauses, which I believe is the best and only practical first step. The Minister will be aware that Mr Netanyahu has spoken about Israel retaining overall security responsibility for Gaza when the fighting stops. Does he understand that also to mean that Israel will therefore be responsible for humanitarian efforts and for restoring basic services to Gaza, such as health, education and welfare, and for reconstruction? These are massive tasks. If not Israel, who will administer Gaza in the interests of the people of Gaza when the fighting is over?

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

I recognise and reflect on some of the comments the noble Lord has made from his insight and experience on this issue. I agree with him. You can have the noble intent of a ceasefire. Ultimately, in any conflict that is where we should be aiming. We are having a structured response to ensure that we deliver what we can. I am sure noble Lords have followed the progress being made even as I speak on this issue.

On who governs Gaza, that is an active discussion in which we are involved. It has been very clear, as has Antony Blinken, that this is not Gaza first. A complete settlement for the Palestinian people needs to happen. It means that reoccupation is not an option. While this operation persists, we are talking directly. It is not just us; the US, in particular, and other key partners are delivering those messages. We are seized of this and are working with key partners on the immediate priorities of ensuring that aid goes through, that people get out and that we create spaces for humanitarian aid to be delivered. The second priority is the interim period. That is why we are working on boosting and supporting the Palestinian Authority to ensure that n there is Palestinian Authority oversight supported by all key partners, including many Arab states. The noble Lord will know how complex this is, but I assure him that we are treating this as a priority.

Situation in Russia and Ukraine Recovery Conference

Lord Ricketts Excerpts

Monday 26th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ricketts (CB)]

My Lords, I too congratulate the Government on the success of the reconstruction conference last week. The timing of that conference looks even more prescient this week than it did last week. The spectacle we saw last weekend must surely have shown the whole world that Putin is a weak, indecisive leader at the head of a corrupt and chaotic country. I completely agree with the Government that the leadership of Russia is something for the Russian people, but our business is to ensure that Ukraine grows in confidence and strength in the months ahead. In that context, will the Minister reassure us that the ambassadors in all those non-aligned states that sat on the fence at the time of the invasion of Ukraine can now be persuaded that this would be a very good time to come off that fence and give their support to Ukraine, with the aim of shortening Putin’s war?

I have one final point. With the Vilnius summit of NATO coming up very shortly, will the Government be working to open up more the prospect of Ukraine joining NATO one day?

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

My Lords, the noble Lord speaks with an extremely valuable insight into world events, and I thank him for his constant insights and advice, which are always welcome. I can give him the reassurances he seeks. We have been working diplomatically through the United Nations, and directly and bilaterally with key countries, particularly across south Asia, the Middle East and north Africa. Are we seeing results? Yes, of course. To give just one example, the UAE is an important partner of the United Kingdom for various reasons; most notably, we have seen the UAE’s strong support at the UN Security Council. More recently, we have seen countries such as Morocco also change their position. I am not saying that there is not more work to be done, but clearly the diplomatic effort, along with all the other areas that we are working on, is seeing results.

NATO expansion is a matter for all NATO countries, but it is very clear from the applications we saw from Finland and Sweden that, even before the weekend’s events, all countries now recognise that Russia is a real challenge to their security. However, it is very clear, and we have said it time and again in debates, that the Russian Government and military are themselves fragmented. Indeed, as it said in the Statement I repeated, we have seen through Yevgeny Prigozhin’s own statements that he, as someone who has contributed to and directly supported the Russian war on Ukraine, is saying that they are fragmented. I think the next few hours, days and weeks will be an important determinant of what happens, but I make very clear, and I am sure all noble Lords agree, that our intent right from the start was Ukraine’s security. As my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary made clear, the implosion of Russia and its instability is to no one’s benefit.

Execution of Alireza Akbari

Lord Ricketts Excerpts

Wednesday 18th January 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend for his kind remarks but, on the actions we have taken, even in the last three months an additional 40 individuals or organisations have been directly sanctioned by the United Kingdom Government. As I alluded to earlier, in reply to the noble Lords, Lord Collins and Lord Purvis, we do this in conjunction with our key partners and allies, including the European Union, the United States, Canada and others.

My noble friend also raised the issue of what more can be done. While we have been acting decisively—about 300 individuals and organisations have now been sanctioned—we have also acted at the United Nations. I thank my noble friend Lord Polak for his comments on the UN Commission on the Status of Women; talk about a total and utter contradiction of representation to have Iran sitting on the CSW. We acted with our American partners and this demonstrated to me—here I commend your Lordships’ House—that, although it is sometimes not recognised—that issues raised here have a direct consequence on British policy and, more importantly, on the actions we take. That is one such example of recent action we have taken to send a very strong message to Iran that its actions will not be tolerated and, equally and importantly, working in conjunction with the international community.

[Lord Ricketts (CB)]

My Lords, on the issue of what practically can be done, is there no way of having further sanctions on Iran to constrain its capacity to build these kamikaze drones, which have been supplied to Russia and which Russia has been using to kill thousands of civilians? Might the British Government take the initiative in that area and bring the international community together to constrain this traffic in terror?

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

My Lords, the noble Lord has great insight on these matters and I agree with him. We are looking at how we can further constrain Iran’s ability to provide such ammunition to countries such as Russia, including through stopping of some of the supply chains. But the noble Lord will know from his own experience that the destabilising effect of Iran—particularly on situations of conflict such as Yemen, where the supply of weapons continues—continues to this day, although through direct co-operation we have had many interventions.

Queen’s Speech

Lord Ricketts Excerpts

Wednesday 18th May 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ricketts (CB)]

My Lords, wars simplify and clarify. They oblige every country involved to make choices about what its essential interests are and how to protect them. Speaking of clarity, it must be increasingly clear, even to President Putin, that he has made a massive strategic error in launching the largest armed conflict in Europe since World War II. The myth of Russian military prowess has exploded. Putin’s only hope now is to avoid total humiliation and find some outcome that his propaganda machine can present as justifying his gamble. The President and people of the other combatant, Ukraine, have been magnificent. However this ends, renewed, pro-western Ukrainian nationalism will be a big factor in European politics from this time on.

I want to concentrate on the choices that western countries face as they step up to this Russian barbarism. President Biden has made an important policy shift by putting America back into leadership in deterring Russia and supporting democracy in Europe. Finland and Sweden formally applied today to join NATO. I have known that organisation since joining the UK delegation to NATO in 1978 and it has never felt more united or more purposeful. When I was the permanent representative to NATO in the early 2000s, Sweden and Finland were by far the most effective partner nations—serious defence nations but proud of their neutrality and non-alignment. However, faced with Putin’s war, each has made a profound decision based on an impressive national debate and decided to join.

Germany too has made an amazing shift in its security policy, greater than anything I can remember in the last 40 years. It will take that country time to change its pacifist culture and to re-equip the Bundeswehr, but its recognition of the need to shoulder hard-power responsibilities shows a real capacity to adapt and is a major change in the European security landscape.

Germany and other EU countries are also facing up to the disastrous policy of dependence on Russian oil and gas. Weaning themselves off that will be a long and expensive operation, but it will remove Russia’s biggest leverage over its western neighbours. The EU too has moved a long way in the last three months in stepping up to the security responsibilities to go with its economic power.

How do I think Britain is performing in reassessing our vital national interests in the new circumstances? The answer, frankly, is mixed. I give full credit to the national security response. The clear warnings from the intelligence community and our leading role in NATO and in arming Ukraine’s military—all this has been surefooted. In other areas, though, our response has been much less impressive. The Government insist on treating women and children fleeing Ukraine as potential security threats requiring the full panoply of visa controls, rather than welcoming them as refugees as Poland and Hungary have.

Putin’s war should be the perfect opportunity to put behind us the rows with the EU in the interests of a truly united western response to this massive European security threat. I gather that the discussions between the EU and the UK on sanctions against Russia have been positive and constructive; the Government have not said much about them but it is good to know that they are going on. We should push out that bridgehead to wider aspects of the crisis, including energy policy and a joint campaign to bring other countries beyond Europe to accept that their interests are at stake as well and that they too should be supporting western sanctions.

In my view, though, Ministers still seem to wear ideological blinkers that make it impossible for them ever to acknowledge that the EU does anything positive or constructive. The EU does not even seem to figure in the Foreign Secretary’s “network of liberty”, from reading her Guildhall speech; nor does it figure as a partner in our new international development strategy. I think we are in the process of missing the key opportunity to build closer working relations with the EU on international policy.

Perhaps the Minister will surprise me and tell the House that indeed we are planning to work more closely with the EU on these issues in future—but what would make that impossible would be for the Government to pursue their plan to have powers to disable part of the Northern Ireland protocol. Seen from the perspective of a major war in Europe, both the substance and timing of that are massively ill judged. If pursued, it will confirm the view in European capitals that Britain is not to be trusted. It will therefore ensure that this country has no influence in shaping the EU’s political, economic and security priorities.

I make this appeal to the Government: like Germany, Finland and Sweden, let us be bold and recognise that Putin’s war has clarified where our vital interests lie. Let us back down from the brink of a major breach with the EU and work together with EU countries for peace and stability in Europe.

Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy

Lord Ricketts Excerpts

Thursday 22nd April 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ricketts (CB) [V]]

My Lords, I declare my interest as a strategic adviser to Lockheed Martin UK. I know how hard it is to conduct a review such as this, having co-ordinated the equivalent document in 2010. I pay tribute to Professor John Bew and to all the officials who produced it. I agree with the Minister that it is the most comprehensive survey yet of the UK’s national security challenges. It also gives a convincing analysis of a world that is fracturing into blocs and heading towards systemic competition. I welcome the confirmation that European security, NATO and Britain’s partnership with the US will, as the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, said, be at the heart of our foreign policy.

The Indo-Pacific passage turned out to be more measured than the advance hype suggested. Some increase in diplomatic activity, economic engagement and military presence makes sense, but we have to be realistic: Britain will only ever be a secondary player in Asian security. The passage on China recognises that we must treat the country both as a strategic competitor and a necessary partner on trade and climate change. I agree that that is the difficult balancing act we need to perform.

I want to underline three areas that I see as main weaknesses in the review. First, it is an impressively wide-ranging document, but it is not a strategy. The US historian John Lewis Gaddis defines strategy as

“the alignment of potentially unlimited aspirations with necessarily limited capabilities.”

This review suggests British leadership in a whole series of areas but, as the noble Baroness, Lady Anelay, observed, it makes no effort to set priorities. In the 2010 and 2015 reviews, we published a prioritised list of the risks facing Britain, which at least offered some guide to resource allocation. This review is, in effect, a long laundry list of worthy goals, leaving the real choices to be made by Ministers later.

Secondly, it is not truly integrated. There is a large gap between the words of the review and the Government’s actions. This is clearest in the ambition for the UK to be a “soft power superpower”. That is a noble aim, but the problem is that the Government’s actions are undercutting it. Take development policy: DfID was a great soft power ambassador for Britain; it showed that we were practising the values we preached. Reducing the aid programme to 0.5% of a smaller GDP means making more than £4 billion of cuts from one financial year to the next. It is the speed as well as the scale of those cuts that is going to have such a disruptive impact. Since the UK already has some long-term commitments to multilateral organisations such as the World Bank, the burden will fall heaviest on the bilateral programmes in countries in desperate need, such as Yemen, Sudan, Somalia and Syria. I felt that the Foreign Secretary’s Statement yesterday disguised the extent of those cuts, but they are inevitable. They will mean stopping projects for humanitarian support, clean water, education and nutrition. Once staff are sacked it will be very difficult to get them restarted.

At the same time, the British Army is to create new Ranger battalions to train and mentor the armed forces of less advanced partners. I fear we risk cutting development spending and increasing military presence in the same regions, if not the same countries. The Minister might wish to explain how that is an integrated approach.

Thirdly and finally, in two sentences, we are proposing to work with European partners but not the EU. How can we credibly aspire to be a superpower in soft power, science and technology, reshaping the world order, if we do not have a functional relationship with the EU? We will not have a real national strategy until we can overcome this taboo.