2 Lord Ramsbotham debates involving the Northern Ireland Office

Queen’s Speech

Lord Ramsbotham Excerpts
Tuesday 27th June 2017

(7 years, 5 months ago)

Lords Chamber
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Lord Ramsbotham Portrait Lord Ramsbotham (CB)
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My Lords, like Peter Clarke, the Chief Inspector of Prisons, I was extremely disturbed to note that, despite all the evidence that the long-term and unresolved crisis in our prisons was deepening, there was no mention of any attempt to resolve it in the gracious Speech, as many noble Lords have already pointed out. The need to update the Prison Act 1952 was one reason David Cameron made the Prisons and Courts Bill, which had not completed its passage through the other place at Dissolution and from which prisons now appear to have been dropped, a major part of his 2015 manifesto.

The best evidence that our prisons are in crisis is that two-thirds of them are officially overcrowded, the accuracy of the previous chief inspector’s description of them as places of “violence, idleness and squalor” being acknowledged by Michael Gove when Secretary of State for Justice. Such a deep crisis can be resolved only by carefully thought-through, long-term plans, backed up by consistently sufficient resources. The last Secretary of State, Liz Truss, claimed that her White Paper Prison Safety and Reform, published last November, was a “blueprint” for a once-in-a-generation reform of our prisons, a claim I wish she had not made because it does not stand up to scrutiny.

The last major crisis in our prisons in 1990, the year of the riots in Strangeways and 23 others, was followed, in 1991, by the only previous White Paper on prisons, Custody, Care and Justice, whose centrepiece was 12 priorities which the then Home Secretary, now the noble Lord, Lord Baker of Dorking, described as the way ahead for the Prison Service. Unlike Prison Safety and Reform, which appears to have been written in a hurry by one person, its predecessor was painstakingly drawn up under the old Whitehall presumption that White Papers were statements of government policy which had to be implemented. Inexplicably, not one of the 10 following Secretaries of State responsible for prisons—two twice as Home and Justice Secretaries—has implemented it. Judging by his open letter published on 21 June, their number seems likely to be joined by David Lidington, who claimed:

“We know where the problems lie in our prisons, and we know what is needed to fix them”.


If that is so, why on earth have they not been fixed before now?

If only Liz Truss had ignored all the unco-ordinated initiatives of her predecessors and gone back to and updated the 1991 priorities, which were: to improve necessary security measures; to improve co-operation with other services and institutions, by working closely with the probation service and by membership of a national forum and area committees; to increase delegation of responsibility and accountability at all levels, with clear leadership and a published annual statement of objectives; to improve the quality of jobs for staff; to recognise the status and particular requirements of unconvicted prisoners; to provide active and relevant programmes for all prisoners, including unconvicted prisoners; to provide a code of standards for conditions and activities in prisons, which will be used to set improvement targets in the annual contracts made between prison governors and their area managers; to improve relationships with prisoners, including a statement of facilities for each prisoner, sentence plans, consultations, reasons for decisions, and access to an individual appeal body for grievances and disciplinary decisions; to provide access to sanitation at all times for all prisoners; to end overcrowding; to divide the larger wings in prisons into smaller, more manageable units wherever possible; and to develop community prisons, which will involve the gradual realignment of the prison estate into geographically coherent groups, serving most prisoners within that area.

Had these been implemented, we would not be facing today’s crisis. What is so worrying for the future is that, since 1991, there cannot be a single aspect of imprisonment that has not been studied, many times over, by experts, resulting in thousands of recommendations in hundreds of carefully researched reports, the only thing that all have in common being that they have been studiously ignored by the Prison Service and the Ministry of Justice. Having seen the fate of the 1991 The Way Ahead priorities and countless other sensible recommendations, I am sceptical about whether any of those currently in authority, who have resisted outside advice and orchestrated failure for so long, are the right people to implement reform.

If I have one cause for optimism that improvement is possible, it is the quality of so many of the people who work in our prisons. But their continued commitment cannot be taken for granted, and, if there is one thing that the lost years since 1991 have proved, it is that the prison system needs consistent direction and leadership. The stakes are too high for this crisis to remain unresolved any longer, and I beg the Prime Minister to think again.

Bloody Sunday Inquiry

Lord Ramsbotham Excerpts
Wednesday 13th October 2010

(14 years, 2 months ago)

Lords Chamber
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Lord Ramsbotham Portrait Lord Ramsbotham
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My Lords, I join others in thanking the noble Lord, Lord Shutt, for enabling this debate to take place. I declare an interest as when these events occurred I was the military assistant to the Chief of the General Staff, Field-Marshal Lord Carver, based in London, and as such I had to give evidence to the Saville inquiry for four and a half hours. Like my noble friend Lord Bew, I am bound to say that I thought that was perhaps a touch long to repeat the same question several times. The question was all about whether General Carver—as he then was—had been part of a conspiracy with the Prime Ministers here and in Northern Ireland to use the march as an excuse to go into the Bogside and take it over, which was totally removed from any possibility of achievement, let alone desire, because there were simply not enough soldiers available to take on that task.

For me, Bloody Sunday began with another event which I shall never forget. On that morning, a very gallant close friend and colleague, Major Robin Alers-Hankey, died in hospital in London. Robin had been shot in Londonderry in September while commanding his company. He was putting down a march not very far from the area described in the report when the crowd opened, a sniper fired through the gap and the crowd then came together so that it was impossible for the soldiers to follow up and capture the sniper. Those were the sort of events that soldiers were up against almost daily in Londonderry. Like my noble and gallant friend Lord Bramall, I had the great honour and privilege of commanding that battalion when it came back from Londonderry, having been its second-in-command and involved in its training to go there.

There has been a great deal of criticism of the Widgery report during today’s debate. However, two aspects of that report and the Saville inquiry are exactly the same: first, that no deaths would have happened unless the ban on marches had been defied, which inevitably led to a clash with the security forces—that was the circumstance—and, secondly, that some soldiers acted with restraint and some without fire discipline. All that has happened in the intervening time is that a great deal more details are available in the Saville inquiry. It has gone into much more than Widgery did. Sadly, as a result of all this, 1st Battalion, The Parachute Regiment and Bloody Sunday join Brigadier-General Dyer and Amritsar as examples of stains on what the British Army stands for and does.

Perhaps I may make one or two comments about the circumstances of operating in Northern Ireland which echo what the noble Lord, Lord Mawhinney, said, and very firmly contradict the noble Lord, Lord Smith of Clifton. It was always a great problem for us going into Northern Ireland in those early days after we were put there in 1969, not as the Army to do an army job, but as people to take over from the RUC when it became exhausted. Unlike many other situations around the world in what were called peacekeeping operations or keeping the peace, the Army went in when the police handed over to it. You acted as the Army and you gave the situation back to the police as quickly as you could. Unfortunately, from 1969 onwards, there was a long period when the Army was acting as police, for which it is not trained or equipped, in areas where law and order did not run under the hands of the RUC. It was always problematic and difficult for soldiers who were trained to act as soldiers to have to be pseudo-policemen.

I had the great privilege of commanding my battalion in Belfast for four months, and then I commanded the brigade there for two years. During those two years, every Sunday, for month after month, there were marches which we had to put down. I was very fortunate in having an extremely good policeman in Belfast with whom I worked very closely and we always agreed at what moment we the military would take over responsibility, and we handed it back to him as soon as we could,. It always remains for me one of the great tragedies of Bloody Sunday that Brigadier MacLellan, who was in a similar position to mine in Belfast, was denied the presence of his policeman, Chief Superintendant Lagan, who chose that day not to be there. Lagan had recommended that the march be allowed in the first place and, therefore, he was, in a way, opposed to what happened. However, the absence of a policeman made life doubly difficult for Brigadier MacLellan, particularly in the difficult position of deciding on the moment when arrests squads could go in.

That is, of course, a matter for Saville and the past. As Lord Acton once said, hindsight is the privilege of the historians. I have been interested that the theme of this debate appears to have been the words, “It is time to move on”. It is certainly time to move on as far as the Army is concerned and, like many other noble Lords, I listened with admiration to the very clear, unambiguous and brave words of the Prime Minister on 15 June which were read out in this House. It was instantly followed by a message to the Army from the Chief of the General Staff. I should like to read out from it, because it seems to have been made exactly in that same spirit. Referring to the whole of Operation Banner, the message states:

“The overwhelming majority of those deployed conducted themselves with utter professionalism, restraint and humanity and played an important role in protecting the people of Northern Ireland, providing much needed stability and thereby helping to set the conditions for the peace Northern Ireland enjoys today. The cost was high: we will always remember the 651 service personnel killed, and the 6,307 wounded during the course of the operation, not to mention the grievous police and civilian casualties … We ask a lot of our young soldiers, given the incredibly complex environment in which they have to operate and the magnitude of the decisions they have to take, often on a daily basis. I want to stress that rightly we are held to account for our conduct and must always operate within the law. But I would like commanders to assure those under their command that they will, like me, support all soldiers who have acted in good faith and in keeping with the Army’s values and standards, if and when their actions come under scrutiny ... It is a sign of a healthy organisation that we can look back on our past actions, admit our mistakes, and learn from them, so we are stronger and better for the future”.

Having heard the wise words of the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Eames, and others, it is clear to me that Northern Ireland wants to move on. I believe you can take a view—many noble Lords have mentioned aspects of this—that Northern Ireland could be better and stronger in the future having been through what it has. It is of course important that aspects of the past are cleared up and healed, and I absolutely accept the need for something other than inquiries. My noble friend Lady O’Loan mentioned one organisation and, in terms of simplicity, I would always welcome that. However, in achieving that and looking forward, I hope that there will be inquiries into all aspects of what went on and not just those involving the security forces. In view of what they have done and what they still do, it would be wrong for them to feel that it is they who are always going to be singled out, as opposed to those who have perpetrated the problems that they have been brought in to solve.