Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill

Debate between Lord Purvis of Tweed and Lord Morrow

Report stage
Monday 5th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, I gave very careful consideration to the points raised in these amendments by both noble and gallant Lords. They raise significant issues, which I am very sympathetic to. I am also very keen to hear the Minister’s response, given her commitment in Committee, especially in relation to the consequences of Article 1 of the treaty, as the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig of Radley, has indicated.

There are, however, elements of the amendments which I am perhaps not entirely persuaded by. They are the conditions within the bailiwick of the Mauritian Government that could give rise to the circumstances where we would seek to stop payments. They are not covered by this amendment, per se. They would, however, be covered in subsection (4) of the proposed new clause in my Amendment 50, which will be discussed much later during our considerations today and which would create the conditions where, if the Mauritian Government by their actions were putting at risk the consequences of our payments, Parliament would be able to pause the payments.

If there are reasons unspecified by Amendment 1 which are non-defence related, there is the potential for UK funding for resettlement support, the trust fund operations or Chagossian community-specific support to be put at risk, so it is worth while to separate out the defence interests from the other elements of the treaties. As the mechanisms in Amendment 50 are preferable in our view, we would find it difficult to support these amendments.

[Lord Morrow (DUP)]

My Lords, Amendment 26 standing in my name states that:

“Sections 2 to 4 come into force only when the Secretary of State has assessed … the impact of the termination of all rights granted by the Treaty to the United Kingdom with respect to the entire Chagos Archipelago through Article 15 of the Treaty”


and

“the impact of the arrangements in Article 15 on the leverage opportunities at the Secretary of State’s disposal in negotiating with Mauritius after ratification”.

Article 15(1)(a) of the Mauritius treaty states that Mauritius can terminate the Mauritius Treaty in the event of

“a failure by the United Kingdom to make payment as required by Article 11”.

This means that if a payment is more than 22 days late, the entire Mauritius treaty is terminated, subject of course to the fact that sovereignty over the Chagos Islands will be in the hands of Mauritius. In that event, we would lose absolutely everything, and if the United States wanted to keep its Diego Garcia base, it would probably have to do so by force. While the United Kingdom could no doubt seek to achieve this, China, Russia and other countries could protest very loudly and have international law on their side. It would provide an excuse for any other power to try to take Diego Garcia and could lead to a major war.

Of course, the Government can respond by saying that this will not happen if we pay on time—and, no doubt, they will assure that we will pay. While we are protected from this eventuality by dutifully paying up completely and always on time, Article 15(1)(a) places the United Kingdom, and by extension the United States, in a formally intolerable, weak position.

To understand the problems arising from the very weak footing on which the treaty places us when negotiating with Mauritius, we must appreciate the huge concerns about what happens in relation to the Chagos Islands beyond Diego Garcia. Mauritius has a clear incentive, arising from the income stream we have promised, to seek additional income streams for leasing other islands or parts of islands. The Government have sought to make much of the fact that we have a veto on the deployment of security and defence forces beyond Diego Garcia, but the problem is that the real threats do not announce themselves as deployment of security and defence forces and are much more subtle. Something that begins as a non-security and defence deployment, in relation to which we have no veto, can evolve into something very different—an emergent risk, over which the treaty affords us no right of veto but only a right to object. The right to object can be resolved only on a consensual basis within the joint committee between the UK and Mauritius proposed by the Mauritius treaty and could no doubt take a long time if Mauritius wanted it to. It is here that our complete lack of leverage provided by paragraph 1(a) of Article 15 is a particular cause for concern.

Mauritius could generally adopt a very unco-operative approach on the joint committee, knowing that, if it resists one of our concerns and we counter by threatening to withhold payment, subject to satisfactory resolution, that will serve simply to renounce all our remaining rights in relation to the Chagos Islands, giving them completely to Mauritius. Of course, if ever a deployment of non-security and defence personnel from another country becomes an emergent risk, and one wherein those concerned in effect become security and defence personnel, the UK would have a right of veto. However, the difficulty is that, by that stage, they will be established in place, and if they did not want to leave, they could be removed only by force, threatening war and international instability.

If we look at other categories of emergent risk, in relation to which we have powers only to lodge objections on the joint committee, we are further confronted by the way in which the terms of the Mauritius treaty—especially paragraph 1(a) of Article 15—rob us of leverage. These risks would all be avoided if the UK did the right thing and corrected the historic wrong of the forced removal of the Chagossians from their islands and afforded them self-determination. While it is plain that not all would vote to be a separate jurisdiction from Mauritius—in the same way that not everyone on the Ellice Islands voted to become a separate jurisdiction from the Gilbert Islands—polling suggests that a majority would vote to become a resettled, largely self-governing British Overseas Territory, legitimately under British sovereignty. In that event, none of the above difficulties would arise.

Northern Ireland Protocol Bill

Debate between Lord Purvis of Tweed and Lord Morrow

Committee stage
Tuesday 25th October 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Morrow (DUP)]

I thank the noble Lord for his comments. I did listen very carefully to what the noble Lord, Lord Hain, said and I want to read Hansard tomorrow to get better into my head exactly what he was saying, but I was struck by some of the things he said. Like the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, I voted against the protocol, as did every unionist in Northern Ireland—so it has no support among one section of the community.

We have long moved away from majoritism. As a matter of fact, I do not remember majoritism in Northern Ireland. That age has long gone and we were told that it would never return. Politics in Northern Ireland would be by consensus; that is what we were told. We were not only told it—they put it down in law. But I have yet to hear from many who berate this Bill that they are concerned about how the Belfast agreement has been kicked right, left and centre. I ask the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, to suppose for a second that this border was where it should be and not in the Irish Sea. Does anybody—but anybody—feel for a moment that that would not have caused the complete collapse of the Northern Ireland Assembly?

We have not collapsed the Northern Ireland Assembly as such. The Ministers are still in place, doing their tasks and getting on with it, because we did it in such a way. When Sinn Féin did it, they wrapped everything up. I have never heard one Member from either the Lib Dems or Labour—which surprises me—say that Sinn Féin has done wrong here. I did not hear it. Maybe it was said when I was not here, but I have never heard that said. I find that there is pick and choose. If unionists do something, they are a nasty lot, they are nasty people, but with Sinn Féin it is, “Oh no, they have a reason; they have a cause.” Well, we have a cause and we want to defend that cause.

In 1960 the UN went further and passed its decolonisation declaration, basically shifting its position to one of actively encouraging imperial powers to decolonise. Today, the UN still has a committee dedicated to the decolonisation of the small remaining colonies. If you examine its work, the UN is very clear that an NSGT is not a jurisdiction that is governed entirely by another country. Most NSGTs are largely self-governing. They remain classified as NSGTs because they are not entirely self-governing. Now, of course, I recognise that, in order to be formally classified as an NSGT by the UN, you not only have to meet the definition of an NSGT; you also have to persuade the Assembly to vote an agreement that a jurisdiction should be so defined.

I am not about to start a campaign for the UN to vote to classify Northern Ireland as an EU NSGT. However, it is clear, on the basis of the UN definition of an NSGT and the level of self-government enjoyed by existing NSGTs, that Northern Ireland not only meets the UN definition of an NSGT, but one in relation to which the colonial power—in our case the EU—controls more of the governance of Northern Ireland than do many officially recognised colonial powers in relation to their NSGTs.

The story of colonisation since 1960 has been the story of decolonisation. The actions of the EU arguably amount to the first example of new colonisation, as opposed to annexation by military force, since 1960. I find it quite extraordinary that the EU should have even dreamt of seeking this agreement. It does not reflect well on the EU at all that it should have requested this, and the fact that the UK Government had to fight it for even the most ridiculous four years, after the fact, is quite extraordinary. Of course, its justification was allegedly defending the Good Friday agreement—or Belfast agreement, whichever you choose—but this is utterly absurd.

The citizens of Northern Ireland deserve the full rigour of protection under international law in respect of their democratic right to political participation as our counterparts have in each of the other constituent parts of the United Kingdom or indeed any other country. However, that protection has been patently undermined by the protocol.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord for giving way. I am concerned about his argument when it comes to the position of the new—again—Home Secretary. She said in July:

“The Northern Ireland Protocol Bill needs to be changed so that it actually solves the problem. … The bill’s ‘dual regulatory regime’ lets EU law flow into Northern Ireland in perpetuity … I’ve been fighting for while in government. Without them, the bill treats people living in Northern Ireland as second-class citizens.”


Does the noble Lord agree with Suella Braverman? If he does, will he be bringing an amendment to Bill to make sure it does not have a dual regulatory regime that allows EU law to flow into Northern Ireland?

[Lord Morrow (DUP)]

If the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, is asking me if I agree that Northern Ireland citizens are now treated as second-class citizens, yes, I do. Some people in Northern Ireland seem to be content to be treated as second-class citizens, because, like the noble Lord, they want to pull this Bill apart and the protocol to remain. I hear, in the debate today, some noble Lords saying that there are problems with the protocol, but in time that will be sorted out. Where will our economy and industry be? My noble friend Lord Browne will be making some reference to that a little later.

Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, among other provisions, states:

“Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives. … Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his country.”


This has plainly been violated by the protocol, which has partly removed our right to take part in the Government of our country as it relates to 300 areas of law, both in terms of engaging in public service as a candidate and in terms of voting.

Of greatest importance, however, is that the plundering of aspects of our right to vote violates the Good Friday agreement. I hear many champions in this House of the Belfast agreement, and I have to admit that I would not be the best advocate of the Belfast agreement, and I am prepared to say that. But let those who are stand up, and then they will run into problems with their debate and where they are going. Specifically, the Good Friday agreement affords the people of Northern Ireland the right

“to pursue democratically national and political aspirations.”

Moreover, in the case of the Good Friday agreement, there is the additional international constraint arising from a foundational provision of the protocol, in Article 2, which specifically obliges the UK Government to ensure that there is no diminishment of any of the Good Friday agreement rights following Brexit. Article 2(1) states:

“The United Kingdom shall ensure that no diminution of rights, safeguards or equality of opportunity, as set out in that part of the 1998 Agreement entitled Rights, Safeguards and Equality of Opportunity results from its withdrawal from the Union”.


So now we confront the central absurdity: the EU pretended that an obligation that did not exist in the protocol existed, and that an obligation in the protocol that did exist in fact did not. There is nothing anywhere in the text of the Good Friday agreement saying that there cannot be a customs border, and there is something that plainly states you cannot erode the political democratic rights of the people of Northern Ireland, which was the plain consequence of placing a border down the Irish Sea.

Of course, I am not saying for a minute that the UK and the Republic of Ireland could not agree to avoid a hard land border, only that it is not required in the Good Friday agreement. In a context, however, where the Good Friday agreement prohibits—

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, if the argument of the noble Lord, Lord Bew, is so powerful, why has he failed to persuade the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, who started his remarks by saying that he has no faith in any of these talks resulting in any agreement for two or three years at least? If the noble Lord, Lord Bew, cannot even persuade the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, he may struggle to persuade others who may be a bit more sympathetic to his arguments.

The noble Lord, Lord Bew, knows that I like and respect him, but let me scotch this point about Article 16. The Government insisted that they were working in the joint committee when others on the Conservative Benches were saying they should dump that work and trigger Article 16. We on these Benches said, “Let the joint committee process do its work, because that is what the Government negotiated in the agreement.” Now we have heard in Committee in the Commons that talks have been exhausted—no more on the joint committee; instead, we are bringing unilateral legislation. So the noble Lord will forgive me for being a bit cynical about the Government’s position. On the one hand, they are saying that they are using the joint committee and therefore will not trigger Article 16, and on the other that they are no longer in the joint committee and need unilateral legislation. I am afraid it does not match. That is perhaps at the heart of why there is still uncertainty over the Government’s proposals.

At the outset, I say that I am a borderer and live in Scotland—I was going to say that therefore I sympathise, but that sounds deeply patronising. I understand many of the arguments, as I said earlier to the noble Lord, Lord Dodds, because I raised them in the debates. We opposed the Government because we could see the situation was not only going to be detrimental but would effectively remove rights. But that is not something that our Benches or this Bill can resolve.

I respect both noble Lords who spoke with passion about this, but I put it to them that they and Suella Braverman cannot both be right. The new Home Secretary is on the record saying that this Bill will make citizens in Northern Ireland “second-class citizens” —this Bill, not the protocol. She is arguing for this Bill to be amended. She said in her article in the Times that she had argued that while in government. She is now back in government, so I do not know what will happen with the Government’s position in this Bill on a dual regulatory system, but maybe the noble Lords can inform me later on.

If the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, is arguing so strongly that this Bill will not have Northern Ireland operating under two systems, it is incumbent on him to bring amendments to it to remove the dual regulatory system and Clause 11 when we get to it. I look forward to debating those amendments, because he surely cannot support measures in this Bill which would allow Ministers to enforce EU rules on traders within Northern Ireland.

[Lord Morrow (DUP)]

I thank the noble Lord for giving way. All I wanted to say is that I am encouraged that I can get his support if we do that. Is that what he is saying?

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I will match his “Get rid of Clause 11” with “Get rid of them all”, because that is our position.

The Advocate-General said at Second Reading:

“the peril … was not inherent in the protocol’s provision.” —[Official Report, 11/10/22; col. 764.]

But he then said today that the “problem lies in the protocol”, which the Government themselves negotiated. So, we are back to the situation regarding the Government’s proposals, and it seems that the Government are going to rest on an assertion of necessity, with an assumption that it is not going to be tested. It surely is not welcome for us, in passing legislation, that the Government are effectively asking people to challenge it in the international courts—I can only imagine that it would be the ICJ.

The ICJ has stated in clear terms that invoking necessity on wrongfulness and not adhering to a treaty commitment cannot be a permanent solution. So I ask the Advocate-General, if he responds to any of the points that I am going to make, whether the Government agree with that. The ICJ has stated on a number of occasions that, even if invoking necessity was upheld, it is only temporary in order to remove the grave and imminent peril; it is not permanent, because it still means that that party is in breach of the treaty.

So if long-term, permanent changes are required to be made, that will require protocol changes and treaty changes, and the Government have not said that. They cannot invoke necessity if they believe that this is a permanent solution. The reason why I say that with confidence is—the Advocate-General, in schooling the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman, and me as non-lawyers, said we were “less wrong” on this—that, customarily in international law, we have to look at the record of the ICJ. I asked the Library of the House to provide me with information on when the ICJ has upheld parties who have invoked necessity. It has never been upheld, for the very good reason that it has to be limited, and “grave and immanent peril” on a cumulative basis is considered an exceptionally high bar. The Advocate-General must know that.

Of the two cases that the Advocate-General cited, the one involving Hungary and Slovakia—which was referred to by my noble friend—I found fascinating, as I mentioned before, when I read the judgment. The Advocate-General said that necessity

“was recognised by the International Court of Justice in 1997 in a case between Slovakia and Hungary regarding a dam on the Danube.”—[Official Report, 11/10/22; col. 765]

As I referred to before, the Government seem to be relying on one case regarding communist Hungary in 1989 which the ICJ threw out.

The second case mentioned, involving Canada and fisheries, could refer to two cases. In one, the ICJ was asked by Spain to adjudicate because Canada had seized a vessel, invoking necessity, but the ICJ said that it could not look into it because Canada had passed legislation at that time to have a reservation from the ICJ, so the case could not even be heard. The other case relating to the Grand Banks should worry the Minister, as it was about imposing licence fees. Canada invoked necessity; the US responded saying that it would pay the fees of the fishermen and then claim reimbursement from Canada; then Canada amended its laws, which brought in all other aspects, and it was resolved by Canada removing the licence fees. Now, if that is a precedent, it is a worrying one, because I can see that there will be consequences with the EU as a result of this legislation. There will be reciprocal action and the UK will pay for it.

So can the Minister confirm what the Library told me, that there has never been a successful invocation of necessity? Can he tell me if there has ever been a case where any party has invoked necessity for framework legislation? I could not find it, so presumably the Minister will be able to help me.