Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill

Debate between Lord Purvis of Tweed and Lord Lilley

Tuesday 18th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

It is not my fault if the Liberal Democrats do not want to be consistent on this.

The point is that colleagues of the noble Lords to my left have argued in the other place for a referendum, but the Liberal Democrats in your Lordships’ House have done nothing. The noble Lord has tabled just two amendments, only one of which is consequential. When we debated ratification, the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, withdrew his amendments to the Motion without a Division. I think that speaks a thousand volumes. It seems that it falls to my noble friends on these Benches to stand up for the Chagossians and ask for the referendum that they rightly deserve. I beg to move.

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

I support my noble friend Lord Callanan’s amendment. My own amendment also calls for a referendum. The Government have given priority to the Mauritians—and, indeed, to some extent, the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice—maintaining what they think of as territorial integrity over the right to self-determination. That should not be the case. Under international law, the right of a group within a decolonised area to self-determination has priority over so-called territorial integrity. It is very regrettable that that has not yet been conceded.

When we come to vote on this subject on Report, as no doubt we will, I very much hope that this will be an area where there is widespread support across the House. I very much hope that the Liberal Democrats will support a vote requiring a referendum among the Chagossian people over the right to self-determination. We are told that they did so in the Commons. In fact, they were so moved by it and thought it such an important issue that they voted against the whole Bill at Third Reading.

So far, the amendments the Liberal Democrats have tabled cannot be said to be amendments that would require a referendum. Amendment 80, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, would require that

“a Minister of the Crown must engage with the Government of the Republic of Mauritius with a view to establishing a Joint Parliamentary Commission”.

We are getting “could”, “may” and “might” added together.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

Will the noble Lord give way?

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

I will speak to the noble Lord’s amendment first, because I am informing the House about it, and then he can tell me where I am wrong.

Amendment 80 would require that, having engaged with the Mauritian authorities to set up this joint commission, and having perhaps persuaded them to do so:

“The Minister of the Crown must further propose that the Commission’s responsibilities include … evaluating the recognition and protection of Chagossian rights, including … the right of return”


and

“the right to self-determination”.

We would therefore have to seek the Mauritians’ agreement on setting up a commission and then propose to that commission that it does something to evaluate the recognition and protection of Chagossian rights, which would include the right of return and to self-determination. However, this amendment, if we were to accept it, contains absolutely no requirement for the House to support a referendum. Indeed, it is extremely unlikely that this convoluted chain of events would lead to such a recommendation.

The final sentence of the amendment reads:

“If the Commission described in subsection (1) is established, within five years of the commencement of the Treaty”,


et cetera. The commission is not envisioned to even get going for several years, and the amendment is probably realistic to recognise this. I am looking forward to a serious Liberal amendment, or their support for serious amendments from me and my noble friend that would require a referendum. I give way to the noble Lord, now that he knows more about what his amendment says.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I first apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, for intervening when he was moving his amendment. I am flattered by being so courted by the noble Lords, Lord Callanan and Lord Lilley. Historians will be aware that the Rough Wooing was not entirely successful in my Border area. I have a question for the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, that I am sure he will be able to clarify. He is aware that the House of Commons voted on Amendment 9 for a referendum. Tabled by my colleagues, it would have required the Government to seek to

“undertake negotiations with Mauritius on a Chagossian right of return and on a referendum”

for Chagossians on self-determination. Parliament has voted on this already. The Division was 319 votes against and 83 in favour. The Conservatives did not support it. Why?

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

I am afraid I cannot tell the noble Lord that. I read the debate and it was not clear that there was much focus on the Liberal amendment. He has read out part of it; it covered lots of other things and they probably thought it was a bit wishy-washy.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I do not think that is quite acceptable. Amendment 9 was voted on, and it included everything that the noble Lord asked of me. Why did the Conservatives not support it?

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

I do not know. I am not an official representative of the Conservative Party. I am flattered that the noble Lord thinks I control the Conservative Party in the Commons and in this place. I do not do either. I have not had any ministerial role since about 2000. I may give the impression of having power and influence beyond that which I really do, and I am flattered that he should think so.

I would like to see the Liberal Democrats support us. We know that, if they do, we will win, but they seem unlikely to do so. It is clear that they have done a deal with the Government. They will never defeat the Government on issues of substance because, if they do, they will not get as many peerages as they want next time. Let us be quite clear about this. It is as shoddy as that underneath this, I suspect. I hope I am wrong—I may well be. I often am.

It would be a wonderful thing, and we may be able to achieve something for the Chagossians in the shape of getting an amendment on Report—not now, because we are in Committee—which has the support of a majority in this House. If we carry it out, the odds are that the Chagossian people will declare that they do not want to be incorporated in Mauritius and would prefer to remain citizens of the British Indian Ocean Territory and British subjects. In that case, we should honour and support their decision when it is taken. I look forward to a Damascene conversion by the Liberal party to this amendment.

Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill

Debate between Lord Purvis of Tweed and Lord Lilley

Committee stage
Tuesday 18th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, I have amendments to this Bill—I think they are in the last group—but I will not address them. I will keep to the amendments in this group, which has strayed into some wider areas. Since the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, is not seeking the guidance of the Companion, which discourages changing groupings that have already been agreed, we will no doubt discuss all the amendments in detail as we go. I tabled my principal amendment but no others because I chose to respect the work of the International Relations and Defence Committee, which may well have considerations in advance of Report for us to consider.

I will make some short remarks on the amendments from the noble Lords, Lord Lilley and Lord Callanan. I do not think the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, presented any different, additional arguments in introducing his amendments from those he presented at Second Reading. Therefore, we have heard them before. Other noble Lords agreed with his argument.

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

If the noble Lord regards the amendments clearly, he will see that the difference is that I am saying, “Suck it and see”. If you believe there is a possibility of a court coming up with these judgments—they say it will be within weeks—then let us see.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I understand that argument, which the noble Lord alluded to at Second Reading, but it is a curious one when a treaty has been agreed. If he had presented this argument under the previous Administration post 2022, during the negotiations, that may have held a degree of credibility, but I did not hear him at any stage ask the previous Government to abort those negotiations. This is important because he and others who agree with him are suggesting that the previous Government perhaps did not enter in good faith into negotiations based on ceding sovereignty to resolve legal considerations. That was the Statement that the Foreign Secretary made in November 2022. As I said at Second Reading, I assume—the noble Lord may be able to correct me—that the Government would not have made that policy choice in November 2022 without advice from the Attorney-General at the time.

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

Since the noble Lord is famous for his pernicketiness, I remind him that the Statement in November 2022 referred to the “exercise of sovereignty”, not the ceding of sovereignty.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I see. Presumably he is arguing that it would be joint sovereignty. How would you enter into negotiations with another sovereign state on the exercise of sovereignty if we were going to retain it? I do not understand. This is interesting. Is he now saying that the previous Government entered into those negotiations without the intent to cede sovereignty?

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

I promise the noble Lord and the Committee that this will be my last intervention. I had no insider knowledge and was not in any way involved, but the possibility, from reading the Statement, was that the negotiations would consider the possibility either of joint sovereignty, as has existed in certain parts of the world, or, as the noble Lord, Lord Bellingham, said—on a much better informed basis—of retaining sovereignty of Diego Garcia but ceding it elsewhere. There are all sorts of possibilities, and none of us knew at the time. That is why I certainly did not want those negotiations to take place, but I was not involved at all.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

Part of the noble Lord’s lack of involvement was in not raising his objections in Parliament at the time. If those negotiations were entered into to resolve the legal considerations then the Statement in 2022 undermines his quite novel argument now.

It is the case that the previous Government entered into those negotiations. I believe that they entered into them in good faith and they knew what the conclusions would be. The argument of the noble Lord, Lord Bellingham, is of course correct with regard to the 2017 declaration by the United Kingdom Government that they would be able to choose not to adhere to any rulings by the ICJ on the basis of a Commonwealth country, if that dispute started after 1987. It is a moot point whether this dispute started before then; there remain many arguments that it had. However, even if he is right, I am certain that the former Attorney-General—one of potentially three in 2022—would have advised the previous Administration that, regardless of that 2017 UK declaration, the ICJ would, as under its statute, refer to the General Assembly, because that is its purpose, and that there would be a resolution at the General Assembly. That was the entire point of the ICJ considering it, because it was referred to the ICJ by the General Assembly. I understand the noble Lord’s argument, but we would not be in a different place now even if his argument was very robust.

On the argument of the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, and our little to and fro on the treaty, we have been told on many occasions by the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, and his colleagues in the previous Administration that treaty-making is a prerogative power. We do not have that short a memory in this House; we recall the Rwanda Bill and the Rwanda treaty. I recall the noble Lord, Lord Murray of Blidworth, telling us that it was not our role to interfere in the prerogative power of Governments making, implementing or changing treaties. I quote:

“My Lords, we are not aware of any precedent for Parliament mandating the Government in international negotiations conducted under the royal prerogative. The Government were not prepared to accept such a significant … shift”.—[Official Report, 24/7/18; col. 1598.]


That is ultimately what the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, puts forward. That quote from Hansard is from the noble Lord, Lord Callanan. He was insistent that it was not Parliament’s role to interfere or mandate a Government in the negotiation of treaties under the royal prerogative. He was either wrong then and right now, or he was right then and wrong now. I am sure he will be able to say which when he sums up the debate.

Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill

Debate between Lord Purvis of Tweed and Lord Lilley

2nd reading
Tuesday 4th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

My Lords, it is a great privilege to follow the powerful speech by my noble friend Lady Foster of Aghadrumsee. I am tempted just to say “ditto” and sit down, but that is not the practice in this place, so I will focus on some aspects that differ from the focus that she gave. The importance she attached to the Chagossians enables me to be a bit briefer than I would otherwise have been.

I want to return to a powerful assertion that was made the first time this House considered a Statement on this subject, which was diluted a bit today in the defence put forward by the noble Minister. The original Statement by the Defence Secretary said

“without this deal—within weeks we could face losing legal rulings, and within just a few years the base would become inoperable”.—[Official Report, Commons, 22/5/25; col. 1284.]

What is the likelihood of us facing a legally binding ruling? If so, I ask the Minister, from which court is it likely to come?

First, as even the Foreign Office recognises, the opinion of the International Court of Justice was purely advisory, not binding. Secondly, it was based on UN General Assembly resolutions. Such resolutions are not legally binding, especially as they have not been endorsed by the Security Council. Thirdly, when the UK signed up to the International Court of Justice, our declaration specifically said that the Government of the UK excluded the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice on

“any dispute with the government of any other country which is or has been a Member of the Commonwealth”,

as is Mauritius. Hence, the opinion of the ICJ was triply non-binding, and no future ruling of the ICJ on this dispute could be binding on us.

Ministers never mention these facts; either they are unaware of them, or they do not want us to know. Instead, they segue on to discussing the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, as the noble Baroness did today, since that also has a tribunal. However, Article 298 of that treaty provides that states may “at any time” exclude “disputes concerning military activities”. Therefore, it is hard to see how the UNCLOS tribunal could reach a binding ruling which would impede our use of the base, still less do so in ways that the Defence Minister originally spelled out when he said:

“Rulings against us would mean we could not prevent hostile nations from setting up installations … on the outer islands … we could not guarantee the safe berth of our subs, patrol the waters around the base, control the airspace directly above or protect the integrity of our communications systems”.—[Official Report, Commons, 22/5/25; col. 1284.]


All that seems impossible to come from a tribunal which excludes, or where we can exclude, military matters.

These are not the only issues which the Government refuse to address. They never mention—even the Explanatory Memorandum on the agreement ignores it—the Pelindaba treaty, to which Mauritius is a signatory. It is signed by all countries counted as in the African region—and Mauritius is one—making Africa a nuclear-free zone. The treaty allows no reservations, at the time or subsequently, so it will apply to Diego Garcia, and it cannot be overridden by our treaty unless Mauritius resiles from the Pelindaba treaty. Do the Americans accept that that will mean that no nuclear weapons-carrying vessels or planes can use the base?

The agreement with Mauritius purportedly relates to completing the decolonisation of Mauritius. There are two relevant principles that have a bearing on the process of decolonisation. The first is the right to self-determination, and the second is the principle of territorial integrity. This agreement elevates the principle of territorial integrity above that of the right to self-determination.

It is bizarre that boundaries laid, and former administrative arrangements imposed on an area, by the colonial power should be treated as so sacrosanct, whereas the rights of the people who were displaced—many of whom would like to return or have the right to return—are to be ignored. It is even more bizarre given, as my noble friend Lord Callanan pointed out, the promise in the Labour Party manifesto that it would support the sovereignty, integrity and right to self-determination of peoples in the British Overseas Territories. I wait in the summing up to hear how the Government reconcile their promise made to the British people, and to the peoples of those territories, with what they are doing today.

Why are the Government ploughing ahead? Of course, they refer to the fact that negotiations began under the previous Government, although they were paused by the noble Lord, Lord Cameron. At the time they were paused, I found myself discussing this with a Foreign Office official, who I heard mention the agreement. I said, “Isn’t it good that these negotiations have been paused?” He obviously did not approve of the negotiations. He said, “Oh, it’ll make no difference; they’ll continue. It is the settled policy of the Foreign Office, whichever Government are in power, that we shall continue with this process to give away the sovereignty of them”.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

All the legal considerations that the noble Lord has outlined to the House, including those in the latter part of his remarks, pre-date November 2022, when the previous Government started negotiations to cede sovereignty. They took all his remarks into consideration, so why did they start negotiations to cede sovereignty?

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

The noble Lord is making a party-political point, as the Lib Dems always do. I am accepting that both parties are allowing themselves to be driven by the settled policy of the Foreign Office. We have to recognise that.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

It started in 2022.

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

Whenever it started, the settled policy of the Foreign Office will probably continue for another 22 years. Anyone who has been a Minister knows that every department has a settled policy that continues unless Ministers come along and determine to overthrow it.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

Earlier in 2022, the then Government’s view was that there would be no change to the sovereignty of Chagos. That was a Statement given to Parliament in early 2022. The policy changed under Liz Truss as Prime Minister and James Cleverly as Foreign Secretary to start negotiations to cede sovereignty. If there had been a settled will, it had been the one before the Government changed policy. It was the noble Lord’s Government who changed the policy.

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

Of course it was, but they allowed it to be changed from pressure from the Foreign Office. We can go into the archaeology of when this surfaced in the form of government policy and when it was internal, but I have no doubt that it was. Whenever I have spoken to Foreign Office officials, they have acknowledged that we are not bound by rulings of the court, nor are we likely to be, and nor are we bound by the obligations of any treaty, but they argue that Britain must none the less abide by even non-binding advisory opinions, since if we do not, how can we tell other countries that they must abide by international law? That is precisely the argument that was forwarded just now by the noble Lord, Lord Hannay.

It is touching that our diplomats believe that countries that might otherwise flout international obligations and rulings will change their ways and become law-abiding if they see us obeying rulings that we do not have to abide by and being purer than pure. I believe that the policy of the Foreign Office, and, above all, the policy of elected officials in charge of the Foreign Office, should be to pursue British interests and not to set about setting examples to other countries and virtue signalling. That is what this is doing, and it is weak for that reason. I hope that the House will in the weeks to come persuade the Government to abandon it.

Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Debate between Lord Purvis of Tweed and Lord Lilley

Committee stage
Monday 19th February 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendment 76A, in my name and in the name of my noble friend Lady Hamwee. This is a probing amendment to allow the Minister to expand on some of his helpful comments in an earlier group with regard to how the monitoring committee and the joint committee will operate.

When we started the Bill and I first read the treaty, I was not at that stage quite appreciative of how significant the monitoring committee and the joint committee would be when it comes to making decisions about the preparedness of when Rwanda would be a safe country. I was not aware at that stage, when I read the treaty, because at that stage, I was not aware that I was a decision-maker as to whether or not Rwanda would be safe. According to the Advocate-General, however, I am a decision-maker because I am a Member of Parliament and it is now a decision of the court of Parliament: this creature that has now come up from the grave to sit in judgment of a third country’s record on safety.

It is also relevant because the monitoring committee and the joint committee will be the supervising bodies, to some extent, with regard to the overall operation of the start to the end of the relocation processes. The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, is absolutely right: we do need more information about it, because we are gradually learning about what some of the estimates may be for the numbers to be relocated.

The Hope hostel in Kigali can accommodate 200 people, with an average processing time of a fortnight. On the previous day of Committee, we did the maths, as the Americans say. Well, we can do some more maths now, as the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, has helped us. If we believe the Daily Telegraph, which occasionally is a reliable journal of Conservative thinking in this country, if there are 30,000 people, on the figures given by the noble Lord, Lord Murray’s, impact assessment of the Illegal Migration Act, which, of course, we will take as read, that is £5.6 billion plus the £400 million down payment, so a neat £6 billion.

The Minister, in an earlier group, outlined the very high cost of accommodating existing asylum seekers in hotel accommodation. We know, through the Independent Commission for Aid Impact, that the Home Office decided on the most expensive and least efficient means by which to accommodate asylum seekers. Nevertheless, that is £2.9 billion a year—so, on any reckoning, the number of those who will be relocated to Rwanda will take at least a decade at a cost of at least £6 billion. There is no means by which the Government can have a more effective way for the British taxpayer than efficient accommodation and processing here in this country. There is no way the Government can square any of it to make the Rwanda scheme cheaper for the British taxpayer.

Ultimately, we are looking not just for value for money but for whether we can make the decision that Rwanda is safe and the mechanisms are in place.

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

Before the noble Lord moves on to the other bits, can he give us some estimate of how much it will cost the British taxpayer if he and his friends succeed in perforating this Bill like a sieve so that it has no deterrent effect and we have an ever-growing number of people coming here having to be put up in hotels at immense cost to the UK?

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord, who has been here during the various days in Committee. He will have heard last Wednesday what the Government’s own estimate is regarding the deterrent effect of the Illegal Migration Act. That ranges towards the top element of deterrence of 50%. That is not ours or the Opposition’s but the Government’s estimate of the likely impact of the Illegal Migration Act, and that is the mechanism by which this is brought about. A 50% deterrence would be roughly 16,000 people.

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

If it does not rise.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

Well, that is the deterrent effect. Assuming that of those who are coming, 50% on a regular basis are deterred, then over the long term there would still be 50% coming by boats. That is not my estimate, it is the Government’s estimate.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

I asked the noble Lord for his estimate of what will happen if we have no deterrent effect and there is an ever-growing number of people crossing the channel. Is it possible even to reach a figure? It must be enormous.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

The Permanent Secretary at the Home Office was unable to do so. That is why he sought ministerial direction. Home Office civil servants sought ministerial direction because the Permanent Secretary said that the Government’s policy was not proven value for money.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I will address the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, and then happily give way to the noble Lord.

The valid question is, “If this Bill will not work, what would work?” We know that this Bill will not work, so the better deterrent effects are those policies such as relocation and resettlement agreements, which comply with international law and have policing mechanisms attached to them. That is called the Albania deal. I am sure that the noble Lord will agree that this has been a success.

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

A deterrent effect of 90%.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

From a sedentary position. I agree with the noble Lord. I think Hansard picked it up: a successful 90% deterrent. The noble Lord heard me at Second Reading saying that we welcomed the Albania deal. An internationally legal, efficient, effective resettlement and relocation agreement is what works. This is not any of those. I happily give way to the noble Lord, Lord Murray.

Northern Ireland Protocol Bill

Debate between Lord Purvis of Tweed and Lord Lilley

Committee stage
Monday 7th November 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I am grateful to the Minister.

When the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, says that he is miles away from the situation, I have known him long enough to suspect that there is a wee bit of code there. He is probably actually pretty close to knowing what is going on, and I suspect that he is right. I worry, because the Government are not engaging widely, as the noble Lord, Lord Empey, said, or consulting. We have not had sight of what is on the table; we know what the EU has put on the table but not what the UK Government have put on the table. My fear is that, if the Government told us what was on the table, many people would be disappointed that they are only technical talks. Some people want them to be negotiations.

That comes on to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Lilley. I respect and understand his disagreement with the Government’s position—the Government want to mend it, not end it, and, as I understand it, the noble Lord thinks there is a more substantial issue with that. Ministers have said they want to fix it, not nix it. If you want to mend it, not end it, there are mechanisms, but there are also mechanisms if you want to end it. As Article 13 of the protocol states, it lasts as long as it lasts:

“Any subsequent agreement between the Union and the United Kingdom shall indicate the parts of this Protocol which it supersedes”—


so, if there is another treaty, this ends. There is nothing special about that; that is every treaty. A treaty lasts for as long as it lasts, and if there is a subsequent treaty then there is a subsequent treaty. So the noble Lord’s beef is not with us; it is presumably with the Government in order to open up the element of the withdrawal agreement and the associated TCA that he thinks are in contradiction.

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

Would the noble Lord deal with the Article 50 point? If it is intrinsically temporary and transitional, can it last for ever?

Trade Bill

Debate between Lord Purvis of Tweed and Lord Lilley

Report: 1st sitting: House of Lords
Wednesday 6th March 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Purvis of Tweed]

My Lords, we now know for a fact that only a tiny fraction of those rolled-over trade agreements to which we are a party and will have ratified before exit day will be considered continuity agreements. The reality is that within a short period of time—a number of weeks, in fact—we will not be able to rely on the fact that our existing trade agreements will be considered as continuity agreements. The noble Baroness, Lady Henig, is absolutely right that, for the vast majority of the agreements we enter into prior to exit day, there will have to be a degree of certainty as to the underpinning, replicating or agreement of standards after exit day.

In many respects, the only continuity agreements that will exist are those we will have ratified before exit day, which is a tiny fraction of those that exist. Everything else will be, in effect, a trade deal. The concern is that the Government may choose to use the regulatory framework in this Bill rather than the CRaG procedure in making treaties. It is absolutely right that in this Bill we should have a degree of legal underpinning of the standards to which we are now a party and which we wish to see continued after exit day.

In Committee there were a number of amendments from me, my colleagues on these Benches, the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, the noble Baronesses, Lady Henig and Lady McIntosh, and others. I am happy that this has coalesced around a cross-party amendment and I look forward to the Government’s response. On exit, we are looking to baseline the standards that already exist. It is necessary to maintain these standards in any of the agreements now that we are likely to carry forward—which can be permanent. Regulations made under this Bill would last for three years, but could be extended for a further three years and then a further three years. The lifetime of the regulations could become very long indeed.

As much as the Government say there is no difference in them as they are simply continuity and will not include any of the contents, that is merely a statement of policy. As we just heard on tariff policy, we know what schedules have been submitted to Geneva. However, we now know that if there is a likelihood of no deal, potentially there will be a revision to the schedules put forward by the Government. We cannot rely simply on the policy of the Government: we must rely on the legislation being clear.

We already know through the EU Select Committee of this House that there are some differences in the agreements that have already been signed beyond legal terminology. We know that interpretation of text can sometimes be as important as the text itself when it comes to trading relationships. That is why I have lodged Motions to debate each of the three deals that have so far been agreed, so that the Chamber has an opportunity to look at them. The noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, and others will, I am sure, want to take part in a debate on the Faroe Islands agreement and others. I have had to lodge the Motions to debate those agreements because the Government did not intend to do so. The EU Select Committee report said it was “bizarre” that the Government chose not to bring those agreements at least for consideration in the Chamber. However, they will be debated because I have ensured that. The Minister, who has expressed openness and transparency all along, was seemingly content for there to be no debate on those agreements—the only ones that we are likely to have, with the addition of Switzerland in the next week or so. That is regrettable.

With regard to the amendment, the Minister may say that she has difficulty with the words “reducing”, “standards” and, in particular, “animal … welfare”. Proposed new paragraphs (a) to (g) are reasonable areas in which we have current regulatory standards as a baseline that we wish to protect. The Government should have no problem in accepting proposed new paragraph (f) on labour rights. The Prime Minister seems to have accepted it as regards guaranteeing employment and labour rights, and I would be surprised—putting it lightly—if, the day after the Government said a “lock” would be put in place to guarantee the future of these standards, they opposed an amendment that secured those standards’ continuity.

If the Minister says that she is concerned about the word “reducing”, she need not be. We have well-established systems of oversight through the courts to consider whether the current regulatory regime for standards is being upheld. The Government seem content with their approach on migrating such existing laws into domestic law so it should not pose problems for civil society groups or any interested parties to consider whether or not standards are being reduced. In the amendment, we are stating that they should be upheld in the implementation of any new agreements by virtue of the continuity agreements being new treaties. That is reasonable.

The Minister should also be content with the use of the word “standards”, as this is commonplace. Indeed, that is clear in, for example, the Air Quality Standards (Amendment) Regulations 2016, which this Government brought forward and Parliament passed. None of those areas should pose them any difficulties.

The Government also seem to have been opaque in recent days about animal health, hygiene and welfare—the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Henig—and whether it is necessary to continue these approaches when we engage in trade agreements. In many respects, this is the litmus test for how the Government will approach the discussions. The Secretary of State’s rather glib comparison on television at the weekend between the process of surface-washing salads with chlorine prior to packaging and its use as a decontaminant in the United States as a replacement for good hygiene practice at farm level and in slaughterhouses, thereby directly masking poorer hygienic practices, was utterly misleading. He should not have said that. The EU, with full UK support, has made it clear that good hygiene practice is a prerequisite to the application of hazard-based controls, and that these are an essential element in any discussion on market access for such animal products.

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord for pointing out the distinction between whether chlorine washing is bad for our health or masks the different treatment of animals during their lives. Is he saying that chlorine washing is not bad for our health, whether it is used on fruit from the EU or animals from the US? He and others have been using the issue as a scare to make us think that our health would be put at risk by having things rendered salmonella-free by this kind of treatment, whether by the EU or the US.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed]

It is a shame that processes do not allow interventions on interventions. When have I said that this is a health risk? When has the noble Lord heard me say that? He intervened on me and said “he”, as in “me”.

[Lord Lilley]

I apologise and withdraw in that case.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed]

I am grateful for that. The point I am making is that the EU, with full UK support, has had a consistent position on the use of chlorine on chickens—that it should not be used to mask the lack of hygiene on farms and in slaughterhouses. The separate issue of the effect of its use on public health is, and always has been, a moot point which the European Union has always recognised, and that is why it has consistently commissioned a number of reports. The final conclusion from those reports, which the EU and the UK have relied upon, has come from the World Health Organization, which has said that, as far as the use of chlorine in agriculture is concerned, the current position is the one to be maintained, because the primacy is that the United States, as a policy, uses it to mask poor hygiene practices in farms and slaughterhouses. When it comes to trade and the trading of goods, that is the critical aspect, and that would be reflected in a trade agreement.

Trade Bill

Debate between Lord Purvis of Tweed and Lord Lilley

Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 30th January 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

My Lords, I congratulate the Minister on introducing this debate and focusing on rules of origin, which is the main complexity that will arise with trading goods. I suggest that this should not be exaggerated. It is the big difference between free trade areas and customs unions but I note that the Swiss, who have a free trade agreement with the EU—not a customs union—do not seem to be too upset about that. They do not seem to be calling for a customs union. They seem to be coping with all the problems that noble Lords have told this House are insurmountable; the Norwegians likewise.

The Canadians have a free trade agreement with America but are not calling for a customs union. Even our Canadian Governor of the Bank of England, when he returns to Canada and joins in the political process there, is not going to call for Canada to have a customs union with the United States to overcome all these supposedly insurmountable difficulties. They are not insurmountable and they are going to get somewhat simpler.

The EU is bringing in the REX system for self-declaration of rules of origin—you will have to do the calculations but you will not have to buy a certificate; you will just declare the origin of the goods. Of course, you will have to get it right; as with any self-declaration, you will be open to investigation and checks if there is any reason to suppose you are cheating, but it will simplify the process greatly.

Can the Minister confirm that we will be able to join the pan-Euro-Med convention on rules of origin if we have a free trade agreement with any member of that convention—for example, Israel? I believe that when you belong to it you can begin to assess diagonally, as they say, the components of your goods when you export among them. If that is open to us, it will ease things as far as we are concerned for a large group of countries.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed]

It is less a point of the inability to trade with countries on WTO rules of origin principles—they have been established for many years and will continue, and the EU uses them with non-EU countries. The difference the noble Lord is alluding to is a mutual recognition of the rules of origin principles that we have agreed through the EU with, for example, Norway and Switzerland. This means that, as far as cumulation is concerned—and given that the majority of British imports and exports are cumulated products with our biggest market—the critical factor is the non-burden that comes with other checks that we would not have if we were a non-member of either a customs union or, indeed, a grouping that meant that all other regulations were aligned, as those countries have opted to do, and I think his position is that we should not do.

[Lord Lilley]

I am not sure that I said any of the things that I think the noble Lord is both telling me I said and that are not true. I suspect what he said is true but it is not what I said. Forgive me if I do not really respond to his point, which I do not fully understand.

My point was that there is the pan-Euro-Med convention which has the same rules of origin among all the countries. Cumulation is allowed between them. You can join the convention when you have a free trade agreement with one member of it—at least, that is what I am asking the Minister to confirm is the case and will be the case when we have a free trade agreement with Israel, to start with.

The noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, talked about the costs. I do not know if she is familiar with the study of the costs—which I think is the most recent and the most authoritative—carried out by the World Customs Organization. It searched through all the previous studies and found them to be deficient. The level of cost is actually much lower than had previously been thought. That must be true if the Swiss assessment of the total cost of their trade across the borders is correct, because they believe that it is only 0.1% of the value of their trade, including the cost of complying with rules of origin.

I advise the Committee as a whole to read that report. I am sorry that I cannot give the reference but I can give the reference to a document in which the reference is given—namely, a document that I myself wrote called Fact—NOT Friction. I urge noble Lords to read it, as they will find the appropriate reference.