Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Debate between Lord Purvis of Tweed and Lord Falconer of Thoroton

Committee stage
Wednesday 14th February 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

My Lords, the power of this debate has been absolutely extraordinary. I think the House very much admires the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe of Epsom—the Minister—who looks to me like a man alone today. I very much hope that he will be able to produce something.

I support all the amendments. Listening to the debate, I was struck by one exchange which the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, started and the noble Lord, Lord Deben, followed up. I have wondered why the Government had drafted the Bill in the way that they have. By that, I have in mind its extraordinary beginning, which says:

“The purpose of this Act is to … deter unlawful migration”.


The next subsection begins “To advance that purpose—”, and then the Bill sets out the fact that this agreement has been entered into. This is obviously not there for political reasons only. It must be there to send a message to the courts that have to construe it. I am assuming—I very much hope that the Minister will confirm this—that it is in there not for political but for legal purposes. It is to send the message to the courts as to what the purpose and framework of the Bill is.

If that is right, I assume that what the courts are supposed to do is to construe this very unusual Bill in the context of its purpose. The courts are being asked, very unusually, to exclude the courts from determining whether Rwanda is a safe country. They are being asked to do that to deter illegal immigration. The exchange between the noble Lords, Lord Purvis and Lord Deben, underlined completely that there are certain categories of people where deterrence never comes into it—for example, the person who is being trafficked or the modern slave.

Presumably, having put all this material into the Bill, the Government intend that the courts should construe it in accordance with its purpose, giving an appropriately targeted meaning to these exclusions of court intervention. If it is absolutely apparent for an individual that deterrence could not possibly be given effect to by the Bill or its terms, obviously its unusual terms do not apply. Can the Minister confirm that the purpose of all these strange provisions—I have in mind Clause 1—is so that the courts have a very clear steer as to what the purpose is, and that they will construe the Bill in accordance with that purpose?

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, Mary is 19; she is in Gezira, in Sudan, just by the Ethiopian border. She has been offered employment as domestic staff in Dubai and her passport is taken away for the journey. The employment agency that recruited her from the refugee camp—because she is displaced, like many hundreds of thousands in Gezira—have also taken a record of her family and where they are from, including her grandparents, who are in Darfur. En route to Dubai, she is told that she will no longer work in domestic staff with a named family; she is now going to be in hospitality, and she is quite excited about this. However, on the way, she is rerouted to Europe because her agency said that the hospitality company and the family are no longer able to accommodate her, so she has an alternative job. She will now be going to Birmingham in the UK. This is an extremely long journey for her; she has no choice, of course, because she does not have any papers or a passport. Now that she is in a situation where she is really concerned about how she is getting to Birmingham and for her own safety, she is reminded that those who arranged the travel—originally to Dubai, remember—know where her family are. When she arrives, it is not hospitality in Birmingham—it is prostitution.

This Bill, and the Illegal Migration Act, will mean that she is detained in the UK, not referred to any support, and will be sent to a different country. The noble Lord, Lord Horam, thinks that the Bill will deter her from believing the company who recruited her to Dubai, and she will be deterred from coming to Birmingham. The nonsensity of it is quite hard to credit. We have the national referral mechanism for a purpose, which is to ensure that Mary does not become a double victim, but that is no longer an option for Mary. She is just an example, but it is not a theoretical one, and if noble Lords do not believe me, they should believe the noble Lord, Lord Randall, and the excellent work he does, and I hope the Minister was listening careful to his contribution.

According to the latest Home Office data on the arrival on small boats, between 1 January 2018 and 30 June 2023 some 9% were in this category; that is 7,923 people who were referred to the NRM. They are not all Marys; there are many other circumstances, but they follow a very similar trajectory of being lied to, trafficked and blackmailed. The Illegal Migration Act adds an extra sinister element to this blackmail, because Mary would be able to stay in the UK only if she is actively part of the prosecution of the gang in Gezira on the Ethiopian border, which is an impossibility.

The legislation put forward by the Government in the Illegal Migration Act will also no longer be able to be open to Mary. I asked the Minister at Second Reading how the Illegal Migration Act will continue to protect the victims of trafficking—an assertion he made—and he said he would write to me; I have not yet received that letter, so I hope he will be very clear today as to how these people will be protected. As the noble Lord, Lord Deben, said in his powerful contribution, according to Home Office information,

“the majority (78%) of reasonable grounds decisions for small boat arrivals since 2018 have been positive. Of the 780 conclusive grounds decisions issued, 78% were positive”.

These are not people who are gaming a system or, as the noble Lord, Lord Horam said, illegal asylum seekers: they are victims of a heinous crime, many of whom had no idea they would end up as part of a prostitution racket in England.

On Monday, I pressed the Advocate-General on the Government’s official position on whether Rwanda currently has the safeguards in place for those who would be relocated. I remind the Committee that I asked:

“If the Rwandan Government are ‘working towards’ putting safeguards in place, that means they are not currently in place. Is that correct?”


The noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart of Dirleton, replied, “It must do”. So the Government have said that Rwanda is not safe yet and I say to the noble Lord, Lord Bellingham, that this is not us saying that Rwanda is not safe yet—the Minister said that it is

“working towards having the safeguards in place”.—[Official Report, 12/2/24; cols. 64-65.]

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

The person who would have a right to asylum in the UK under this Bill would no longer have the right to asylum in the UK. It is completely different. They may have a right to asylum in Rwanda, but that is not the right that they had when they were here which is going to be taken away from them.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

Will the noble Lord explain why if I come here and am entitled to asylum that is not a right?

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

The right is to make a claim for asylum. That is the vested right absolutely. The right is the right to asylum.

United Kingdom Internal Market Bill

Debate between Lord Purvis of Tweed and Lord Falconer of Thoroton

Committee stage & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 28th October 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering, for putting down this question. The Law Society of Scotland makes a valid point about why there would be a new, and potentially competing, definition of sales between this legislation and the Sale of Goods Act. I will just ask two supplementary questions. The first is a genuine probing question about the Government’s view. Given that many sales are conducted online now—and probably the vast majority in the coming years—what is the Government’s view, with regard to this legislation, on the location where an online sale takes place and how that is covered by the definition?

The example given by my noble friend Lord Fox was about phasing in the banning of coal in England, but not yet in Wales or Scotland. It was a genuine question, and it was a shame that the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, did not have a chance to answer. On a reading of this legislation, someone in England who is banned from purchasing coal for use in their household in England would, under the definition of “sale” in Clause 13, be able to buy household coal from a Welsh or Scottish coal merchant, at a local or online sale, who would then be able to deliver. It would be good if that could be clarified, even if the Minister needs to write to us about it. It is a genuine issue to highlight.

My second question links to this amendment more directly. The noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering, and other noble Lords who have Scottish legal qualifications will be familiar with this. I see the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, on the Opposition Front Bench. Sales in Scotland often have a cut-and-paste element, stating that the law of contract of England applies. Of course, it does not in Scotland. That tends to be viewed as not having effect, and that the cut and paste is not accurate, as contract law is different north of the border. When it comes to the definition of sales through a contract, if the sale of an imported good is conducted within Scotland, is it considered local or not? If that is the case, does the contract law of Scotland apply under this legislation or is the default the law of contract for England? If the latter, that is problematic for transactions carried out north of the border.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

I am obliged to the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering, for raising these points. There is a raft of unanswered questions here. It is late at night, so I will try to focus on only the most important. Am I right in assuming that the market access principles, recognition and discrimination, apply to the rental and gifting of goods? If they apply to the rental of goods, what is the policy purpose? What is the purpose of applying them to the gifting of goods and what does it mean in practice? For example, does it apply to statutory requirements for the provision of food by food suppliers that are subject to statutory requirements?

The second head of issues concerns the position of public bodies engaged in commerce. I understand, but only from the Explanatory Notes, that the supplying of drugs by the NHS, even though it does so in a commercial context from time to time, is not covered by the Bill. Is this right? I have particularly in mind Clause 14(2), which says:

“‘Sale’ does not include a sale which … is made in the course of a business but only for the purpose of performing a function of a public nature.”


I read in the Explanatory Notes that that means the NHS supplying drugs. If that is right, what does the completely impenetrable Clause 14(3)(b) mean when it says:

“Subsection (2)(b) does not exclude a sale which is … not made for the purpose of performing a function of a public nature (other than a function relating to the carrying on of commercial activities)”?


Can the Minister explain this to the House? It matters quite considerably because I suspect it will cover a great deal of commercial activity performed by public bodies.

Thirdly, and separately, what is the position in relation to the goods that are made partly in one part of the United Kingdom and partly in another—for example, cars on an assembly line that crosses borders, or planes or high-tech equipment where parts from elsewhere come into it? As a result of Clause 15(3) and (4), is there a separate application to each of the individual components or does one look only at the completed goods?

Lastly, and this is perhaps the most significant, how do the Government envisage that this will operate? My understanding of Clause 6, on the non-discrimination principle, is that where a statutory or regulatory requirement in one part of the country discriminates indirectly, making the sale of those goods disadvantageous in another part of the United Kingdom, that disadvantageous provision can be supported only if it has one of the legitimate aims identified in Clause 8(6).

Let us take minimum alcohol pricing in Scotland. This is a relevant requirement which indiscriminately discriminates against incoming goods on the basis that alcohol brought into Scotland from England by a supplier is the subject of a disadvantage as defined in Clause 8(2); namely, minimum pricing makes it less attractive because the goods are more expensive to buy. As I understand it, this can be justified only if that minimum pricing statutory requirement has one of the following aims:

“the protection of the life or health of humans, animals or plants”

or

“the protection of public safety or security”.

Am I right in understanding that if, for example, a large supplier of alcohol from England into Scotland wished to challenge minimum alcohol pricing, he could do so by taking his buyer to court? There would then be a private law action in the courts of either Scotland or England—could the Minister tell me which it would be, assuming that the minimum alcohol pricing was in Scotland and the supplier was in England?—and the courts would have to decide whether or not minimum alcohol pricing was a regulation that had a legitimate aim.

The consequence of this Act—which is quite tricky to understand and is perhaps unthought-out—is that we in Parliament are handing over to the courts the determination of policies such as minimum alcohol pricing. That seems at the moment to be the consequence of the way that the Bill is drafted. I cannot believe that that is what any sensible Government would wish. Could the Minister please explain how Clause 8 works? I hope she can explain why my conclusions on the basis of Clause 8 are wrong—I really hope they are.