Asylum: UK-Rwanda Agreement

Lord Purvis of Tweed Excerpts

Monday 22nd January 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, I am happy to follow the noble Baroness. I am grateful for the committee’s work, especially since the Commons is not debating the treaty. These Benches agree with the conclusions of the unanimous cross-party report and will support the Motions. I am also grateful to the Minister for his comprehensive reply and fulsome response to a letter that I wrote to the Foreign Secretary in December.

Some outside the House may say that, over the coming weeks, we will be approaching our work in a constitutionally unusual way. The Government are insistent that we are constituted in the way that we are with the powers that we possess, but that we should not use them—in some form of appeal to the law to make us good at scrutiny, but not yet. We will do our job and we will scrutinise properly, and on the treaty too.

The treaty builds on the MoU, in certain areas with clarity, I accept, but in most other areas with assertion and optimism. Together with the Bill, the Government respond to the Supreme Court ruling not by addressing its substantive points but by setting them aside and presenting Parliament with alternative facts.

These Benches oppose the treaty and the Bill, which place the United Kingdom at material risk of breaching our international law commitments and undermining the rule of law by ousting the jurisdiction of the courts. They will lead to further substantial costs to the taxpayer, fail to provide safe and legal routes for refugees, and fail to include measures to tackle people-smuggling gangs.

The House will recall that, on 13 April 2022, at the start of all this, the Home Office Permanent Secretary said that there was insufficient evidence to back up the Government’s assertion that the agreement with Rwanda would provide value for money, so he sought and received a ministerial direction. Some £120 million had been spent. It is utterly unacceptable that, after repeated questions on funding from me and others in this Chamber, in 2022 and 2023, only in December last year was it disclosed that a further £120 million was committed at that time—secretly by Ministers, with no disclosure.

When I visited the reception centre in Kigali in the summer of 2022, I was told that this was an annualised rolling contract, renewable in March each year. So can the Minister confirm that there will be another £120 million committed for next year, over and above the £50 million the Home Office has indicated for the coming year—and will this also be kept secret? Is this being scored against official development assistance? Why is it not being reported on a project basis in a transparent way?

Incredibly, the Home Office now says that part of the £290 million is a credit line to the Rwanda Government—not for the purpose of the treaty, but a credit line. For what, precisely, and to whom? Who are the beneficiaries?

I can inform the House today that, on top of the £290 million, the Government quietly issued a tender last March for a £78 million contract for:

“Collection, transportation, and escorting individuals overseas through an MEDP”.


Given that the only partnership the UK is seeking to agree is with Rwanda, this is now £368 million willing to be committed. Can the Minister be clear what the projection costs are for 2025 and 2026, so that we have transparency.

These Benches want an immigration system that is efficient and fair, allows for regulated movement of people for our economy and takes into consideration need and capacity. We want a system that is not gamed, either from those within the UK or by organised crime abroad, but is one where we reject the pernicious and deliberate conflation of economic migration and those seeking asylum from political and personal persecution. That conflation meant that the previous Home Secretary and the Minister in this House repeated the untruth that

“there are 100 million people who could qualify for our protection, and they are coming here”.

Well, there are not, and they are not—and the Lords Minister stopped repeating this trope only after I cited the condemnation of the UK Statistics Authority, which formally asked Ministers not to repeat it.

The Home Office is a serial offender. Last week, the head of the UK Statistics Authority wrote to my colleague Alistair Carmichael MP about the Prime Minister’s wholly misleading statement on 2 January in which he said he had got rid of the backlog of asylum decisions by the end of 2023. It was misleading because the Home Office ignored 5,000 so-called “hard cases”, as it defines them. In a withering reply, Sir Robert Chote said that it was

“not surprising that the Government’s claim has been greeted with scepticism and that some people may feel misled”.

Furthermore, it should be noted the Home Office went full Kafka last week in sending us supporting evidence for its Bill. That evidence included this treaty, which it negotiated itself. And the justification for the necessity of this treaty, the Government say, is their own Bill.

Part of the pack is an updated country note for Rwanda, which updates one published just last spring. The one with barely dry ink was slightly inconvenient as it said a little too much about Rwanda’s human rights record and problems in processing asylum. Now, the language on human rights has been eased, massaged and sanitised. I emailed the independent inspectorate tasked with reviewing the country note and was told it had not yet concluded a review of the previous one to verify it. The Government, so eager to change the conclusions, did not even wait for the evidence from their own independent inspection body. All these aspects get to the central part of the issue and are why we must verify the treaty’s assertions before they are brought into force.

The Supreme Court’s ruling was clear. In paragraph 104, it says:

“The matters which we have discussed are evidence of a culture within Rwanda of, at best, inadequate understanding of Rwanda’s obligations under the Refugee Convention”.


As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, said, the UNHCR position on Rwanda’s insufficient processes, the UK MoU and now the treaty and Bill are also clear—and it is responsible for interpreting the convention. But the Government have sought to undermine the UNHCR; on 24 May last year, the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Murray, who is in his place, told the House:

“The UNHCR is clearly a UN body; it is not charged with the interpretation of the refugee convention”.—[Official Report, 24/5/23; col. 968.]


Paragraph 65 of the Supreme Court ruling says:

“The first relevant factor is the status and role of UNHCR. It is entrusted by the United Nations General Assembly with supervision of the interpretation and application of the Refugee Convention”.


There can be no stronger rebuttal of the Government than that.

The Supreme Court also stated:

“It is also apparent from the evidence that significant changes need to be made to Rwanda’s asylum procedures, as they operate in practice, before there can be confidence that it will deal with asylum seekers sent to it by the United Kingdom in accordance with the principle of non-refoulement. The necessary changes may not be straightforward, as they require an appreciation that the current approach is inadequate, a change of attitudes, and effective training and monitoring”.


I asked the Government, with regard to their treaty commitment on refoulement, when the proposed mechanisms would be ready. The Minister replied to me, and in his response said:

“This mechanism is in development and will be in place once the partnership is operational”.


“In development”, and a process that may be extended with unlimited extensions. Does

“will be in place once … operational”

mean that they will need to be in place before it becomes operational, or that they will be put in place after the treaty is operational? It is unclear, and the Minister needs to be clear.

Equally opaque is the appeals process, which is fundamental to the court’s ruling. This is covered in Annexe B in the treaty. Given that these need to be in place in advance of the agreement coming into force, when will they be operational? I asked for a planned date. The reply with regard to the judges appointed was:

“The precise number of judges (and precise mix of nationalities) is being considered by the UK and Rwandan Governments … The process for selecting the co-presidents is being developed by the UK and Rwandan Governments and we will set this out in due course”.


We see “in due course” again, and “is being considered”, and “is being developed”. I asked the Government about the training of the judges, which the treaty says will have to be in place, and when that would be complete. Again, it is “being discussed”.

Article 14 also commits to Rwandan security service officers, which they term “liaison officers”, being part of the UK asylum process,

“including the screening of asylum seekers”.

This is quite extraordinary, given that the UK has provided asylum to six Rwandans after the Government had stated that Rwanda itself was a safe country. And there is no treaty restriction on the limits of the access to the operational processes of the Rwandan security services in screening UK asylum applications. Given that I was monitored and spied on after meeting an opposition leader in Kigali, I say to the Minister with great seriousness that this section needs very careful consideration.

Finally, Article 19 covers the resettling of asylum seekers currently in Rwanda to the UK, which the noble Baroness referenced. The Minister replied to me, saying that the UK was now committed to receiving those asylum seekers from Rwanda who are the most vulnerable. If Rwanda cannot accommodate vulnerable asylum seekers in Rwanda, why are the Government proposing to send vulnerable asylum seekers to Rwanda? I also asked how many there were. The Government said:

“As the partnership is not yet operational, we have no figure or specific information to provide to you as to the number of non-Rwandan refugees who may be resettled in the UK or their circumstances. We expect this number to be very small”.


The Minister’s response to me sought to be reassuring. He said:

“This is not a 1:1 agreement”.


I think most people will be reassured by that—but if it is not one for one, what is the figure and when will we know? Is it capped?

The Government cannot legislate new facts that are more politically palatable; they cannot mislead by deliberately misstating data; they cannot release new reports that sanitise ones that themselves have just been released; they cannot expect us to ratify a treaty when its essential elements remain unclear, with no details of timeframe or even of its commencement. They cannot do these things and expect us to turn away or to say, as some might, “Something must be done; this is something, so we must do this”—or, as the Foreign Secretary told me last week, on the lack of any of the promised new safe and legal routes, we just have to do it because we have to think out of the box. The Supreme Court was pretty clear in paragraph 104 of the ruling that when it comes to safety, thinking in the legal box is a practical necessity. The treaty does not in itself create a new reality, and therefore there are too many outstanding questions for us to assent to its ratification now.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, it is a particular pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, who I know will appreciate, although I think he and I will disagree on this topic, that I always listen to anything he says with real care, and often I learn from it. I am very grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, and his illustrious committee for the report, which I have read and reread. I am also grateful to the powers that be for providing time for this debate, which the noble and learned Lord opened with his customary skill and persuasiveness. As judges who find themselves in a minority are wont to say, I have the misfortune to take a different view. So, although I will vote for the first Motion if there is a Division on it, I will vote against the second.

Let me clear one point out of the way first, although it is an important point, about the procedure that lies behind this debate. As my noble friend Lord Sandhurst explained, under the current legislation this House cannot block the treaty. That is as it should be: it would be a significant rewriting of the role of this House for it to block a treaty or to do any such thing. Under the relevant Act, the other place can delay a treaty again and again, but this House has no such power. I accept that there is a real debate to be had about the role that Parliament, and especially the other place, should have with regard to the review and ratification of treaties. This all used to be done under the prerogative, but times have moved on.

My friend—not in the parliamentary sense but in the actual real-world sense—Alexander Horne has co-authored a paper with Professor Hestermeyer on this topic, under the aegis of the Centre for Inclusive Trade Policy, and I am grateful to them for advance sight of it. I do not agree with all the paper’s conclusions—Alex will, I hope, forgive me for saying that—but it is a valuable contribution to an important debate. As my noble friend Lord Howell of Guildford said, our procedures in this context are not replicated in many other countries and may well require review and perhaps updating. But that is not the issue today; the issue today is not our procedures for ratifying and discussing treaties but the treaty itself. As my noble friend Lord Sandhurst noted, the issue is the treaty, not the Bill, which we will debate at Second Reading next week.

I know that many noble Lords do not like the Bill—I look forward to some vigorous and perhaps lengthy debates on the Bill—but next week’s Bill is not today’s topic. We are looking at the treaty, not the Bill, although it is interesting that I have not so far—I think I am the last speaker from the Back Benches—heard a speech today that says, “I like and support the Government’s policy in this area and I will vote for the Bill next week, but I just don’t like this treaty or the way the Government have gone about it”. For some reason, those opposing the treaty also oppose the policy underlying it and will also no doubt oppose the Bill next week.

I suggest that there is nothing objectionable about the treaty, what it does or what it says. It improves the protections as compared with the previous memorandum, not least by providing that persons can be removed from Rwanda to the UK, and only to the UK, thus directly addressing the risk of refoulement that lay at the heart of the Supreme Court’s judgment.

The thrust of the argument of those in support of the second Motion is, “We can’t be sure that the Rwandan Government will actually do what they say they will do”. That is not the view I take, but it is a position that of course I understand, in which case I respectfully say: put some measures into the Bill to make sure that the Rwandan Government live up to their obligations; or, if noble Lords cannot be satisfied by way of such amendments, vote against the Bill. To pick up the metaphor of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile: if you do not like the foundations, do not build the skyscraper—but let us have the argument about the skyscraper, not the foundations.

Before I sit down, I will respond to an important point made by the noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, which deserves a proper response. He made the point that my noble friend Lord Murray of Blidworth was wrong when he informed the House, when he spoke from the Front Bench, that the view of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees as to the interpretation of the refugee convention was not binding. That was the point that the noble Lord made this afternoon; he has made it before as well. His contention was that it is binding. He also said that the Supreme Court has said that it is binding. He quoted from the decision of the Supreme Court—let me reply to it.

The statement he referred to in the decision of the Supreme Court was that the UNHCR is entrusted with the

“supervision of the interpretation and application of the Refugee Convention”.

The Supreme Court did say that, but that shows that the UNHCR is not itself mandated with giving a binding interpretation of the convention. It does not have that right. Its role is to supervise the interpretation of the convention by the signatory states.

Indeed, the Supreme Court goes on to make that point in the rest of the paragraph from which he quotes, paragraph 64 of the judgment. The Supreme Court goes on to say, citing its own decision in the case of Al-Sirri in 2013, that the UNHCR’s guidance—note that word, guidance—as to the interpretation of the convention

“should be accorded considerable weight”.

So it should, but when judges say that something should be accorded considerable weight, they are necessarily saying that it is not binding. The UNHCR does not hold the pen on the interpretation of the convention. That was the point that my noble friend Lord Murray of Blidworth made, and indeed it is a point that I have made on previous occasions.

I am very happy to give way to the noble Lord.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I am grateful, since the noble Lord mentioned me, because I know interventions are unusual in this debate. I quoted the noble Lord, Lord Murray, word for word from Hansard when he said:

“The UNHCR is … a UN body; it is not charged with the interpretation of the … convention”.—[Official Report, 24/5/23; col. 968.]


The Supreme Court disagreed very clearly. I did not insert the word “binding”; Hansard will show that. I quoted like for like, and I think the Supreme Court’s position was perfectly clear that the noble Lord, Lord Murray, was wrong.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

I know that this is a legalistic point, but that is the thing about the Supreme Court: it tends to make them. It went out of its way to say that the UNHCR is not interpreting the convention; it is supervising the interpretation of the convention by the signatory states. That may seem to be a subtle distinction, but it is critical, because it remains the right of the states themselves to interpret the convention. At least we have managed to have one intervention in this afternoon’s debate. That exchange has shown that we can all look forward to some interesting and vigorous debates next week and thereafter—but that is not today’s business.

I invite the House not to take a sideswipe at the policy—or, in advance, at the Bill—by way of the second Motion. Of course, we should support the first Motion, but I urge the House to vote against the second Motion.