Electricity Capacity (Amendment) Regulations 2017

Debate between Lord Prior of Brampton and Baroness Maddock

Wednesday 25th October 2017 Lords Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Lord Prior of Brampton) (Con)]

My Lords, the draft instrument seeks to amend two secondary legislation packages for the capacity market. The powers to make this implementing secondary legislation are found in the Energy Act 2013, which, following scrutiny in the House and the other place, received Royal Assent in December 2013, with cross-party support. The five changes contained in the draft instrument are essentially technical to improve fairness, ensure the competitiveness of auctions and provide important clarifications to scheme operations. They were supported by the majority of respondents in consultation.

Before I explain the changes in detail, it may be helpful as a reminder to noble Lords if I say a few words of background about the capacity market itself. Ensuring that families and businesses across the country have secure, affordable energy supplies that they can rely on is a top priority. We are facing challenges to electricity security of supply resulting from the closure of older plant and the move towards less polluting, but more intermittent and inflexible technologies, such as solar, wind and nuclear. That is why we have the capacity market; this scheme ensures that there will be sufficient electricity capacity in Great Britain for this winter and beyond. It gives generators confidence that they will receive the revenue they need to maintain, upgrade and refurbish their existing plant, and to finance and build new plant to come on stream as and when existing assets retire. It also ensures that those who are able to shift demand for electricity away from periods of greatest scarcity, without detriment to themselves and to the wider economy, are incentivised to do so.

It does this by offering capacity providers, who are successful in competitive auctions held four years and one year ahead of delivery, a steady, predictable revenue stream on which they can base their future investments. In return for these capacity payments, providers must meet their obligations to deliver electricity or reduce demand at times of system stress or face penalties.

The capacity market is working. Fierce competition between providers in the auctions held to date meant that we obtained the required capacity at prices below the levels many had expected. That is good for consumers as it translates to lower costs on bills. The capacity market is driving investment in new, flexible capacity. The most recent four-year-ahead auction secured over 3.4 gigawatts of new-build generating capacity, including combined-cycle gas turbines, open-cycle gas turbines, small flexible engines and battery storage, as well as 1.4 gigawatts of demand-side response.

The clear message from industry and investors is that the mechanism retains their confidence and is the best available approach for ensuring our long-term security of supply. Industry and investors also stress that regulatory stability is crucial but that the scheme, operating in a rapidly changing environment, must be regularly reviewed to ensure it remains fit for purpose. The changes set out in the instrument are the latest in a series of amendments that ensure the scheme is kept relevant and workable. I will briefly expand on the amendments.

First, the instrument amends the method by which the costs of the capacity market are recouped from suppliers. It was felt the current supplier charge arrangements potentially gave an unfair advantage to embedded generators—smaller generators connected to the lower voltage distribution network—and could distort the outcome of the capacity auctions. That arises because, under current arrangements, suppliers are charged according to their share of total demand at peak times, measured by the demand they place on the transmission grid. That is their net demand. By contracting with embedded generators to run over winter peaks, some suppliers are able to reduce their net demand and therefore their share of capacity market costs, with others having to pay more. With some of the savings inevitably being passed on to the embedded generators, such arrangements unintentionally risk giving them a double payment for what is essentially only one contribution to security of supply. The instrument addresses the issue by amending the basis of the capacity market supplier charge and settlement costs levy from net to gross demand. That is a fairer way of sharing costs between suppliers: it ensures suppliers’ costs reflect their overall demand and helps ensure a level playing field between different generators in the auctions.

Secondly, the instrument seeks to prevent new and refurbishing plants being overcompensated in the capacity market where they are also in receipt of aid through risk finance schemes such as the enterprise investment scheme, seed enterprise investment schemes and venture capital trusts. Currently, there is a risk of double subsidy, which would likely distort the outcome of the capacity auctions. To ensure fair competition and value for money for consumers, the instrument asserts that where a capacity provider has accessed investment through one of these risk finance schemes to fund capital expenditure, their capacity payments must be reduced until such a time as this has been off-set. These off-setting arrangements ensure that the total amount of aid is capped at the amount awarded in the capacity market auction.

Thirdly, the instrument seeks to remove an inconsistency in the way demand-side response capacity is de-rated relative to other capacity types. De-rating is the process by which the volume of a provider’s capacity is adjusted to reflect the reliability of the technologies being used. Unlike other participants, demand-side response providers can nominate a lower amount of capacity to bid into an auction than the capacity they estimated at pre-qualification stage, but that nominated amount is not currently subject to de-rating. The instrument addresses that by ensuring that the nominated value is de-rated, thereby improving the overall reliability of the capacity that is procured. I hope noble Lords have got that.

Fourthly, the instrument clarifies the requirement that capacity market participants maintain credit cover until they have fully discharged all the requirements against which the credit cover has been lodged. In addition, the instrument puts beyond doubt that a party’s credit cover will not be drawn down where a termination fee is due unless the termination fee is unpaid.

Finally, the instrument amends the name, but not the substance, of the capacity market warning—a notification that must be issued in specific circumstances under the scheme. Revision to the capacity market notice better reflects the nature of the notification and will be clearer for participants.

My department published two consultations on these changes during September and October last year. In total, 38 responses were received across the two consultations. There was significant support for the majority of the proposals raised. I look forward to hearing what noble Lords have to say about the proposed changes.

[Baroness Maddock (LD)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for reminding us of the long hours we spent on the primary legislation with the noble Lord, Lord Grantchester, who is in his place on the Labour Front Bench. We are sadly missing a previous Member of this House, Lord Jenkin of Roding, who understood absolutely all this very complicated legislation. Because it is so complicated it is not surprising that after a period of time we need to make some adjustments to it. It would appear that most people involved in this complicated market are in favour of the adjustments the Government wish to make to the previous legislation.

However, one of the areas in which I was involved in my early days in this House was the committee that looks at secondary legislation. In those days we looked quite carefully at the way government departments deal with these matters. There are rules laid down. Given that the way we deal with secondary legislation means we cannot really change it very much, it is important that government departments stick to the rules. I know that committee has highlighted this over the years. I draw the Minister’s attention to the fact that although they held consultations at the end of 2016, one of which closed in December, they did not respond to them until 22 March 2017. We will discuss another instrument in a moment and I will raise similar issues then.

I am happy to support what the Government are doing. It seems uncontroversial, but I charge the Minister, now he is in the department, with looking at the way they follow the rules on how we consult on and deal with secondary legislation.

[Lord Grantchester (Lab)]

My Lords, I also thank the Minister for his introduction to the regulations before your Lordships’ House. I agree with him that they are by and large technical in nature. I second the remark by my noble friend on the Liberal Democrat Front Bench that we miss Lord Jenkin for all the understanding he brought to the House on these quite technical matters.

We are in favour of the amendment regulations tonight because they introduce refinements, clarifications and new wording to manage the system around the operation of the capacity market. From my reading of the Explanatory Memorandum, which is excellent— I thank the Minister’s department for its clarity—I commend the Minister and his team for introducing these regulations to correct the imperfections in the original instrument, which could have led to double payments and loopholes that could have been exploited to the detriment of the consumer. However, that is not to say that there is universal approval for the capacity market. There is a debate to be had regarding whether it has achieved its objectives and whether it is good value for money. While strictly speaking the capacity market is not the subject of the regulations, I nevertheless have one or two questions to put to the Minister on how it is operating.

I liken the capacity market to a quasi-insurance policy. I agree that the lights going out would be a catastrophic event with severe consequences for the Minister, his Government and the nation. The capacity market is designed to ensure that this will never happen. This winter, 2017-18, is the start of the first delivery year and the date from which payments will start, even though there have been five capacity market auctions to date. The contracts for these auctions are for either one year or four years. What is the grossed-up value of these contracts, which I understand is somewhere near the total cost of the capacity market for availability of energy sources until 2021, excepting that there are also the one-year contracts to be awarded for the next three years? Is it useful to consider this figure in assessing the value-for-money aspects of the policy against achieving its objectives? The Minister in the other place suggested that the increase in customer bills amounted to £2 per customer per year. My question to the Minister is to understand the grossed-up figure that has been paid to generators and, from that, the size of the bill to the public.

The answer to the question regarding the success of this quasi-insurance is mixed. First, there will be no blackouts—I am sure that the Minister will be able to sleep well at night—but perhaps he could give some assurances regarding the “black start” that would be needed to re-energise the network following any blackout.

Secondly, has the certainty of return from the capacity market brought forward investments, especially in new gas build? Here, the policy does not seem entirely to be working. Do the plans to which the Minister drew attention in his opening remarks finally translate into certainty of new build being on the horizon?

Thirdly, is the cost to the consumer worth while, and has it been effective? I think that I can reply on the Minister’s behalf and say that to a certain extent it has already brought benefits in that the spikes in cost in marginal supplies to the grid have been reduced. Volatility has been lessened, which has already reduced net costs through bills to the consumer. Nevertheless, how likely would blackouts have been without the existence of the capacity market? That is the ultimate insurance question.

Lastly, has the capacity market brought flexibility and a diverse mix of energy sources to security of supply? On the demand-side response, the auctions are only for one-year contracts, which could hardly be described as bringing certainty. Can the Minister confirm whether there are plans to bring forward four-year auctions for DSR? Have the Government considered bringing forward the statutory review date of this policy from being four years into its operation? There could be other points along the way that are sooner than that at which some of these questions could bring forward further amendments.

Electricity Supplier Obligations (Amendment and Excluded Electricity) (Amendment) Regulations 2017

Debate between Lord Prior of Brampton and Baroness Maddock

Wednesday 25th October 2017 Lords Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Lord Prior of Brampton) (Con)]

My Lords, these regulations amend the Electricity Supplier Obligations (Amendment & Excluded Electricity) Regulations 2015. They make provision for indirectly exempting eligible energy-intensive industries from part of the cost of funding the contracts for difference scheme. They aim to avoid putting these industries at a significant competitive disadvantage.

The transition to low-carbon—and the securing of our energy supplies—must be done in a way which minimises the cost to business and domestic consumers. Our industrial gas prices are internationally competitive but our industrial electricity prices have moved out of line with other European countries. The UK’s industrial electricity prices for large consumers in the EU 15 were the highest after Italy’s in 2016, as set out in The Clean Growth Strategy. This places UK electricity-intensive manufacturing industries at a competitive disadvantage and increases the risk of some deciding to relocate.

In order to meet our legally binding climate change and renewable energy targets, we have implemented a number of policies designed to incentivise generation of electricity from renewable resources. The costs of these policies are recovered through obligations and levies on suppliers, which pass these additional costs on to their customers. This results in electricity bills being higher than they otherwise would have been.

The CfD scheme is such a policy. It gives greater certainty and stability of revenues to electricity generators by reducing their exposure to volatile wholesale prices. The scheme is financed through a compulsory levy on electricity suppliers, which pass the costs on to domestic and business users through their electricity bills. The levy currently stands at almost £2.52 per megawatt hour. The funding costs of the CfD can reduce the attractiveness of the UK as an investment location and increase the risk that companies will invest or even move elsewhere. This is a scenario we wish to avoid, particularly as we exit the EU.

We intend to safeguard the competitiveness of those energy-intensive industries that are exposed to the additional costs arising from the CfD by exempting them from a proportion of these costs. An exemption scheme allows for real-time changes in energy use to be taken into account and provides certainty to business. The European Commission approved our state aid proposal to exempt certain EIIs from the cost of the CfD in December 2015.

The statutory instrument before us updates and improves the 2015 regulations. It brings them into line with the terms of our state aid approval, allowing us to commence the scheme. We recognise that the exemption will redistribute the cost of financing the CfD among other electricity consumers. We estimate that this will increase annual household electricity bills by around £1 between 2018-19 and 2023-24. None the less, we have taken steps to reduce consumer bills, which are now lower than they might otherwise be. Indeed, our energy efficiency policies reduced the average household energy bill by £161 in 2016. After taking account of the cost of policies for delivering cleaner energy, supporting vulnerable households and investing in upgrading our buildings, there was a net saving of £14 on the average household energy bill in 2016. Energy efficiency is the best long-term solution for tackling fuel poverty.

Since April, 70% of the £640 million per year energy company obligation has been focused on low-income households through the affordable warmth part of the scheme. This will upgrade the energy efficiency of more than 300,000 homes per year, tackling the root cause of fuel poverty. Certain households can also get £140 off their electricity bill for winter 2017-18 under the warm home discount scheme.

These regulations amend the original 2015 regulations. These amendments are necessary to bring those regulations into line with the Commission’s state aid approval. We are also making certain technical changes to the regulations to improve the administration of the scheme. The effects of the amendments include, among others: changes to eligibility; allowing new or restructured businesses to claim the benefit of the exemption; a requirement on beneficiaries to notify us, to help us ensure that they receive the exemption to the correct level and only if they are eligible; and allowing a company to apply for the exemption if it does not obtain electricity directly from a licensed electricity supplier.

The House of Lords Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee raised a number of points relating to consultation and timing, provision for direct competitors and the impact on consumer bills. I will summarise the main points. The policy to exempt eligible energy-intensive industries from a proportion of the costs of CfD had been subject to three previous consultations. The third consultation covered technical amendments to the regulations rather than policy changes, as the policy had already been consulted and agreed on previously. Our original intention was for these regulations to come into force at the end of February. However, some of the technical issues needed further consideration to ensure that the amended regulations achieve their aim. We involved stakeholders throughout the whole of this process.

Our original intention had been to provide relief to direct competitors—businesses which do not meet the eligibility criterion on electricity intensity but which manufacture the same product as eligible companies in the same sector. This was to create a level playing field and prevent market distortions within sectors. We submitted a state aid notification to the European Commission to address this issue. However, the Commission does not think our proposal is compatible with the relevant state aid guidelines. We are currently considering alternative options which may be open to us within the scope of these guidelines.

These draft regulations will make the necessary changes to the 2015 regulations to allow us to exempt eligible energy-intensive industries from up to 85% of the indirect costs of funding the CfD scheme. As well as providing these businesses with greater long-term certainty, the measures set out in these regulations will reduce the price differential between eligible energy-intensive industries and their international competitors, mitigating against the risk that these companies are put at a significant competitive disadvantage and might choose to move their production abroad. I commend these regulations to the House.

[Baroness Maddock (LD)]

I am grateful to the Minister for ranging a little wider than the regulation before us. I was going to ask him about how some of this fitted in with the Government’s wider policy aims, particularly on decarbonisation. I recognise that industries that are intensive users of energy find some of the decarbonising regulations quite difficult. I recognise that there is a balance to be struck, but I would be interested to know whether the department has looked carefully at or has any figures about what the balance will be on decarbonisation after this.

The Minister also replied a little to the criticisms of the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee. I read with interest what it had to say because six weeks are recommended for consultation, but there were precisely five weeks, and it is rather bad practice to consult across the summer holiday period, which is what the Government did. That was pretty unfortunate. They were trying to get regulations in place by February 2017. In the end, they did not come until March, so I think something is not working quite right in the Minister’s department. He is fairly new there, so I challenge him to see whether in the next year it can have less criticism from the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee when it brings forward matters such as this.

Apart from that, I recognise that the Government are trying to balance several things: how they can help industries that are intensive users, the regulations for decarbonisation and state aid rules from Europe. I recognise that that is not easy. I hope they have it right. I cannot profess to understand some of the very complicated matters in these types of regulations—I wish we had Lord Jenkin of Roding here as he would put us right if we had got it wrong. We are happy to support these regulations as far as they go. I hope we are not supporting something that we will regret in future.

[Lord Grantchester (Lab)]

I thank the Minister again for his clear introduction to the regulations before the House tonight. As on the previous regulations, the amendments to the 2015 regulations are largely technical, although in this case it is largely as a result of receiving state aid approval which requires these amendments. The Government have also brought forward other technical amendments to clarify the 2015 regulations and to improve their workings. I am content to approve the regulations as they reduce the disadvantages to energy-intensive industries, but they give rise to many serious questions concerning the impact of the policy and the relative effect on different businesses and their competitiveness.

The main contentious issue arises from the exclusion in these regulations of the intended extension of relief to energy-intensive businesses that do not qualify as having high energy costs as specified in the order. While the European Commission was happy to approve the 2015 regulations, subject to the alterations we are debating tonight, it was not happy to include the extension the Government sought for businesses other than those specified as being energy intensive.

In the 32nd report of your Lordships’ Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, dated 27 April 2017, it seems the Government are happy to drop this altogether with the thought that the CFD exemption will not have a significant effect on competition within the UK after all. Can the Minister clarify what sort of businesses these are, what their response is to the change in the Government’s position and what the cost is of the competitive disadvantage that they no longer consider significant? Has the assessment changed following dialogue with the commission? The Government’s answer refers only to the UK. What is the competitive position of these excluded businesses internationally? On Brexit, perhaps the Minister could outline the Government’s intention regarding state aid provisions that are part of EU membership once we leave. Is it the Government’s intention merely to amend the regulations to include the original intention once the UK has indeed left the EU?

The Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee was also critical of the Government’s short consultation in summer 2016—the noble Baroness, Lady Maddock, drew attention to this feature of the department as well. Perhaps the complexity of the provisions and the adjustments in the Government’s response could entail further and more meaningful consultation regarding the numerous interactions between various government policies influencing renewables and the energy-intensive industries. There are also many questions around the costs of the exemptions for energy-intensive industries on other business and consumers.

One of the questions debated in the other place concerned the fall in the costs added by these regulations, from £1.80 to £1 a year on consumer bills. The Minister in the other place seemed unable to explain the significant drop. What is the grossed-up cost of this measure? Is that what has changed, or the estimates of the number of businesses in the intensive energy sector? How is the discrepancy to be explained? This highlights the complexity in analysing and understanding the impact on businesses and how they will react.

The Government have said they are developing a package of measures to support businesses to improve their energy use and efficiency. The Government are said to be revitalising the Green Deal. They are also considering the costs to the charitable sector. Could the Minister add to these statements tonight and give any indication of timescales? The Government have launched an independent review of the cost of energy, to be chaired by Professor Dieter Helm, in response to the report of your Lordships’ Economic Affairs Committee. Can the Minister update the House on this?

The costs to the consumer of the various government schemes are also subject to the levy control framework. This has also come in for severe criticisms from many sides, including the National Audit Office. Once again, the Government have realised they must have a rethink and start a review. How is that review progressing?

Although the regulations today can be approved in so far as they clarify various measures the Government are undertaking, nevertheless there are huge issues around the Government’s framework that demand swift resolution.

Fuel Poverty

Debate between Lord Prior of Brampton and Baroness Maddock

Thursday 19th October 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Prior of Brampton]

My Lords, I am not able to answer that question. It is not specifically related to the Question in front of us, but it is none the less extremely important and I will write to the noble Lord later.

[Baroness Maddock (LD)]

My Lords, can the Minister tell us why the Government have extended from 12 months to 18 months the period in which the energy company obligation will operate, and why they have put a cap on boilers in that transition period? Could the Government use the upcoming Budget to make sure that emergency funding is available to the most vulnerable for boiler repairs and replacement?

[Lord Prior of Brampton]

My Lords, I believe that the ECO is there until 2028. I do not recognise the 18-month figure that the noble Baroness mentions, but I will check that afterwards. As for how we spend the money under the energy company obligation, there is clear evidence that it is better put towards longer-term improvements such as insulation than the short-term repair of boilers. However, part of the ECO is spent on boiler repair.