(8 months, 3 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I will make a brief comment on two aspects of Clause 14 which have been developed today and which were considered in my report. Amendments 23 and 25 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Fox, would restrict the changes relating to internet connection records in Clause 14 to the intelligence services only. The noble Lord correctly noticed that, while I support the use of ICRs for the new target detection purpose in condition D1, I mentioned at paragraph 4.18 of my report that it would be
“open to Parliament to require further safeguards”
and suggested that those safeguards include
“making the extra condition available only to UKIC”—
in other words, the intelligence services—
“at least in the first instance”.
I pointed out a range of safeguards that already apply to ICRs. These are fully set out in the draft addition to section 9 of the code of practice that was helpfully provided in advance of these debates. I also pointed out, by way of mitigation to my proposal that only UKIC should have access, that
“working arrangements … could facilitate the use of UKIC powers in the service of NCA or CTP in particular”.
That is as much as I am told I can say on working arrangements, though noble Lords may be able to use their imaginations.
Clause 14, instead of going for this workaround, opted to give the NCA, though not counterterrorism policing, its own direct access to the new power. It is certainly true that the NCA has primary responsibility for many of the crimes where the new power may prove most useful—in particular, child sexual abuse, where it has strong potential. I will listen to what the Minister says about that, but I think there is no great division of opinion between us on this issue. We are really debating different mechanisms by which the NCA might get access to this material, and although it is not precisely what I suggested, I have no objection to the more direct route taken in the Bill.
I turn to Amendments 21, 24 and 26 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord West of Spithead, which would introduce a requirement for requests by the intelligence services and the NCA to be independently authorised by the Office for Communications Data Authorisations. This would be an exceptional state of affairs for communications data requests by the intelligence agencies. Existing ICR requests are internally authorised and some of those, in particular under condition B and C, will be arguably, as I said in my report, as intrusive as requests under the new condition.
However, the noble Lord has emphasised the undoubted intrusiveness of the new condition and I know from my own correspondence with the ISC that, very much to its credit, it has looked at this issue in considerable detail. Furthermore, I raised the possibility of independent authorisation for such requests in my report. While I said that the full double-lock procedure would be disproportionately burdensome, independent authorisation by OCDA, which is not a possibility on which I commented expressly, sounds as though it could be a more manageable proposition. I have some sympathy with Amendments, 21, 24 and 26. They raise an important issue on any view, and I look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say about them.
My Lords, I thank the three previous speakers in the short debate on this group. There are no opposition amendments in it, so I shall set out some more general questions that arise out of the amendments spoken to.
Why have the Government brought forward the widening powers to obtain communications data when the original Bill did the opposite? Can the Government provide an exhaustive list of the bodies that will be able to use these communications data collection powers? Why are they not in the Bill or the Explanatory Notes? Giving bodies such powers during any criminal investigation appears out of step with the rest of the Bill, which covers investigatory powers for national security or serious crime reasons. Why is this power so broad as to cover any criminal investigation? Given that the double lock exists for most of the powers in the Bill, why have the Government given wide-ranging powers for intelligence authorities and the NCA to self-authorise accessing internet connection records while undertaking subject discovery work? How does this compare to the powers for conditions A, B and C, which cover access to ICRs, for more restrictive purposes? Finally, what will the role of the IPC and the ISC be in monitoring how the new powers are used?
I was particularly interested in what the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, said when he was commenting on the two other speakers in this short group. I, too, will listen with great interest to what the Minister has to say on this, but this is all done in the spirit of exploration, as my noble friend Lord Coaker said. I look forward to the Minister's comments.
(1 year, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, my Amendment 81 is a bit wider than that of the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, who is certainly a heavyweight in my book. I agree with what she has had to say about that.
Post-legislative scrutiny can take many forms, but where powers are exercised on the basis of secret intelligence, the options are more limited. Select Committees can do little, because they lack access to classified information. The Intelligence and Security Committee has that access, but its remit is focused on the intelligence agencies themselves. It is not equipped to review the operation by police and prosecutors of the new criminal offences in Part 1 of the Bill—or the new procedures in that part—or, indeed, to concern itself with the questions of damages and legal aid in Part 4.
The Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation—its origins dating back to the 1970s—is the solution arrived at in one part of the national security landscape. The independent reviewer is an independent person with full security clearance—but without bureaucratic apparatus—reporting to government. Reviewers serve Parliament and the public by reviewing operational matters which, for national security reasons, neither they nor the usual inspectorates can scrutinise themselves. Their findings are often referred to by the courts and their recommendations taken on board by police, agencies and government.
The independent reviewer has spawned two imitators, in Australia and, more recently, in Ireland. I mention that because the independent monitor in Australia and the planned independent examiner in Ireland—the Bill has recently been published—are each entrusted with scrutinising the operation of national security law in its entirety, not just counterterrorism law. The same principle should apply here. The use of laws governing hostile state activity can be both as secretive and as sensitive as the use of laws against terrorism. That, no doubt—as the Minister said in the last grouping—is why the Government have already agreed to extend the jurisdiction of the independent reviewer to Part 2 of the current Bill, which is all about foreign power threat activity rather than terrorism.
Equally compelling, I suggest, are the arguments for independent review of Part 1. Part 1 is a complete recasting of the law against espionage, sabotage and acting for foreign powers. The offences and police powers are novel and untested; the risk of unintended consequences must be high. The offences will presumably be the subject of prosecutions. However, there is no mechanism for systemic oversight, either of the offences or of the far-reaching powers of entry, search, seizure and, in particular, detention, which are the subject of Clause 6, Clauses 21 to 26 and Schedules 2 and 6 to the Bill. Powers such as these can be controversial in their application: they are the meat and drink of the independent reviewer’s work.
Part 4 is all about terrorism and so falls even more naturally within the existing powers of the independent reviewer. History has shown the value of the scrutiny of the independent reviewer, not least in the years after 9/11, during which my noble friend Lord Carlile performed the role with such distinction. It is all the more necessary in this ever-questioning age. Indeed, something of this nature is a prerequisite for what has been called the “democratic licence to operate” that our secret state requires. The current independent reviewer, Jonathan Hall KC— who performs the role with imagination and acuity—has been consulted on this amendment. He is the obvious person to review Part 4 because of the terrorist connection. I suspect he could take on Parts 1 and 2 as well: our counterterrorism law is neither novel nor, for the most part, as controversial as it once was. But in case his apparently infinite energy should ever flag, my amendment—inspired by Clause 54, which it replaces—gives government the flexibility to appoint a different person to review Parts 1 and 2.
My Lords, I do not have anything more to add other than to say that we support Amendments 80 and 81. The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, summed it up in his closing comments: the current Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Jonathan Hall, has been consulted on this amendment and agrees that it would be a suitable way forward. I look forward to the Minister’s response.
I thank the noble Lord for making that clear. It will have an impact on the way we address this whole group, because it is a very extensive group and many different groups from different sections of society have contacted us all, I suspect, and raised their concerns. I have been contacted by groups from business, the legal profession, universities and political parties. Some 400 NGOs have written to me, as I am sure they have to other noble Lords.
My Amendment 88, also in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, would ensure that guidance is provided on the foreign influence registration scheme. Other noble Lords have gone into more specific concerns and explorations of what particular definitions might mean.
I thought it might be most helpful in opening this group, in a sense, to raise two particularly powerful concerns that have been raised with me. I want to cite two groups that have contacted me. The first is the company AstraZeneca, which sent around an email that I thought it worth citing to show this company’s concerns, which illustrate other, wider concerns. It said:
“Clause 70, as drafted would, we believe, impose a requirement for persons in our overseas operations to register each and every dealing with not just Members of the UK Government … but also in Government Agencies such as the Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency, The National Institute for Clinical Excellence, The Environment Agency and others where we have regular contact”
on medical issues. AstraZeneca is asking a very profound question about how far these requirements will go and how much impact they will have on its day-to-day business. The email goes much further, but that is the gist of the concern raised.
The other group that emailed me is the Law Society. Of course, all these groups, including the Opposition, support the broad aims of the registration scheme but are concerned about the practical impact and whether it will have a cooling effect on their ability to conduct their existing business. The Law Society email says:
“The Law Society supports the Government’s ambition to protect national security and ensure public safety. However, we are concerned that the proposals in this Bill could have serious implications for access to justice … Law Society members have shared significant concerns with us about the potential impacts of FIRS more generally. These include concerns … that the scheme risks damaging the UK’s largest exporting industry (financial and professional services) and its reputation as one of the world’s most attractive jurisdictions for cross-border business and trade and destinations for foreign investment.”
I have given just two examples, but there are many others. This whole scheme has raised a lot of questions in other sectors; we have heard about political parties and universities. I look forward to this being a wide-ranging debate and the noble Lord giving as full an answer as he can in summing up, but I am grateful for his confirmation that the policy will be available before Report so that, if we choose to, we will have ample time to take matters further.
My Lords, while I very much welcome the fact that this policy is under review, I hope your Lordships will agree, in view of the great interest that has been expressed in this subject outside this place, that we take the opportunity to express, at least in summary, the very grave concerns that some of us have about this part of the Bill.
In that spirit, I shall speak briefly to the five stand part notices in my name, signed also by my noble friend Lord Carlile, the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter. They would leave intact the enhanced tier, which I believe to be of real value for our national security, but if carried they would remove Clauses 66 to 70, the so-called primary tier of FIRS.
(1 year, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I apologise for not being present at Second Reading. I cannot even claim, like the noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, that I was broadcasting the benefits of line-by-line scrutiny to a foreign power. I was performing a long-arranged judicial function in the Channel Islands.
I am well disposed in principle to Clause 1, and I entirely understand why the concept of protected information is not limited to “secret” or “top secret”, as the JCHR recommended. However, in the interests of obtaining a little more clarity, perhaps I might press the Minister on this point. Paragraph 63 of the Explanatory Notes states:
“Protected information includes, but is not limited to, classified material.”
Three examples are given. One is about information on the identity of police officers working with security and intelligence services. One is about information on intelligence officers operating in a foreign state. I suspect that they do not get much more classified than that. One is classified information on a defence system.
Bearing in mind that those examples appear to relate to classified information, I would be grateful if the Minister could explain, first, what circumstances he can envisage in which it should be an offence to obtain or disclose information that is not classified, or that could not reasonably be expected to be classified, applying Clause 1(2)(b). Secondly, how is one supposed to know that non-classified information is protected, given that the only controlling factor, other than the purpose of protecting the safety or interests of the United Kingdom—which, as the Committee has just heard, is very broadly framed—is that access should be restricted in some way? On one view, “restricted” could apply to anything, however innocent, that is not actually published. I assume that such a broad meaning is not intended, but could the Minister give us more of a clue as to where the line is drawn?
My Lords, this group relates to the new offence of obtaining or disclosing protected information. Both amendments pertain to what information should be included in this offence. While the offence currently applies to all restricted information, Amendment 4, moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, would confine the offence to “secret” or “top secret” information. This amendment reflects recommendations by the JCHR.
His Majesty’s information assets may be classified into three types: “official”, “secret”, and “top secret”. The practical effect of the amendment is therefore to exclude the disclosure of “official” information from the offence. However, according to a 2018 Cabinet Office paper, official information could have
“damaging consequences if lost, stolen or published in the media”
but is
“not subject to a heightened threat profile.”
The Official Secrets Act 1989 includes offences on the disclosure of each classification of information. Amendment 6, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and which the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, put his name to, leaves out part of the definition of protected information, which states that
“it is reasonable to expect that access to the information, document or other article would be restricted in any way”.
As noted by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and in the Explanatory Notes, this is a subjective view of the information.
Given that security officials and civil servants would likely have knowledge of whether or not information is restricted, the inclusion of this line, which would create an offence for when a person should reasonably expect it to be restricted, could impact journalists and civil society. I therefore think that this is an opportunity for the Minister to clarify how he expects that people should be able to reasonably expect that information is restricted or not. I look forward to his response.
(3 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I will speak to Amendments 71, 72 and 73. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, for putting his name to Amendment 71; I thank both him and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, for putting their names to Amendments 72 and 73.
These amendments as a group look at time limits and prohibitive requirements. Amendment 71 would ensure a maximum timeframe—five working days—within which a contested DAPO made without notice was brought back to court. There may be cases where a particular programme has to be assessed but the police may not know whether it is readily available, and it may take a certain amount of time to get an assessment for a programme. The purpose of this amendment is to put a time limit on that rather than it dragging on for a longer period.
Amendments 72 and 73 address the same issue but from a different perspective: that is, if there is a positive requirement as part of a DAPO, either to go on a course or to go to drug rehabilitation, the person who is to be submitted to the DAPO should agree to go on that course. While I understand that putting negative requirements on alleged perpetrators is something one can do without their permission, positive requirements will have a far greater likelihood of success if, first, they have been assessed and, secondly, the person agrees to go on whatever course it may be. There could be a number of different elements to this. I have mentioned drug and alcohol and domestic abuse courses, but there are also mental health issues with a number of the alleged perpetrators. All this needs to be taken into account, and that is the purpose of this group of amendments. I beg to move.
My Lords, I welcome the introduction of DAPOs but believe that, in certain respects, clearer rules are required to ensure that they are used in a practical and proportionate manner. It is in this constructive—I hope—spirit that I have put my name to the amendments in this group.
The potential scope of a DAPO is extraordinarily wide. Under Clause 33, it may include any prohibition or restriction considered necessary to protect a person from the risk of domestic abuse, expressly not limited to what are referred to as the “examples” of non-contact, residence and tagging provisions in subsections (4) to (6). I remind the Committee that even the types of measure that can be imposed on suspected terrorists under the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011—TPIMs—are exhaustively spelled out in the Schedule to that Act. They include some measures that one assumes would never be imposed in the context of domestic abuse, but the contrast in approach is striking none the less. With such a powerful and open-ended instrument as the DAPO, it is important that we get the safeguards right.
Of course, it will sometimes be necessary to impose the DAPO without notice. Amendment 71 would ensure that those cases did not fall between the cracks and were brought back to court as soon as practical, and in any event within five days. That matters for the reasons given just now by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, and more broadly because DAPOs are highly personalised and highly intrusive. Without the presence of the person against whom the order is made, no one can be sure that the most effective and appropriate DAPO will have been arrived at first time around. Indeed, Clauses 31 and 34 acknowledge the principle that, if DAPOs are to be effective, they must be suitable and enforceable having regard to such matters as the work and educational commitments of their subjects, any other court orders or injunctions which may apply to them, and the interests of other persons including children.
As to Amendments 72 and 73, I comment only that in my days as a Crown Court recorder, it was axiomatic that one did not impose a positive requirement, such as a drug or alcohol rehabilitation order, or a mental health programme, in the absence of the intended subject of that requirement. These interventions are costly and, if they are to be effective, they require not just the presence but the consent and indeed the commitment of the subject. I have strayed there into Amendment 81, which we will come to shortly.
Self-evident as these matters may be to some, there is an advantage to putting them clearly in statute so that magistrates and their clerks are in no doubt as to the position. The amendments in this group are particularly compelling to me because they are supported by the Magistrates Association and by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, in his capacity as a magistrate with current front-line experience. I hope that the Minister will look favourably on them.