Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

Lords Hansard - part two & Committee stage
Wednesday 3rd November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I have very much been in listening mode on this. Amendment 132B would require the oversight of the Secretary of State for police bodies to commission or deploy weapons, surveillance equipment or investigatory technology. I welcome the questions raised. All the speakers have thought about this matter far more than I have, and I look forward to the Minister’s response with interest. I do not know whether she is an expert on heli-tele, but I take the noble Lord’s point that technology as a whole is running ahead of regulation. That goes to the heart of the points made today. I also take the points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, on the purposes of her committee in looking at the possible regulatory approaches, such as a hard or soft approach.

Things are moving very fast; we all know that. We are all challenged in our day-to-day lives in the way we communicate with people. This institution has been challenged in the last 12 months, and things have changed dramatically. With an open mind, I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and the noble Lord, Lord Hain, for setting out their case for this amendment. I can do no better than echo the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, on heli-tele, which were absolutely to the point. I think the Committee is generally referring to some of the new, emerging technologies and the framework around them.

I have done quite a lot of work in Parliament on LFR and biometrics, but very little in this Chamber, so I am very pleased to have a chance to debate this with noble Lords this evening. I refer the Committee to some of the work I have done in the Science and Technology Committee on LFR, biometrics, forensics and so on. It makes for riveting reading.

We are really aware of the issues that noble Lords have raised. There are some links to the matters we debated on Monday relating to confidence in policing and the importance of policing by consent. We are mindful of the need to ensure that the police’s use of technology is appropriate, and it might assist the House if I begin by setting out some of the existing legal framework in this space. What noble Lords have talked about tonight covers a vast area, but I will give some of the headlines for a flavour of what we are doing.

The framework includes police common law powers to prevent and detect crime, the Data Protection Act 2018, the Human Rights Act 1998, the Equality Act 2010, the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 and law enforcement bodies’ own published policies. This framework places important obligations on those responsible for the deployment of technology, including the need to undertake data protection and equality impact assessments, and has provisions to regulate automated decision-making where there are significant implications for the individuals affected.

I also want to assure the Committee that the Government recognise the importance of ensuring that there is strong evidence around the use of technology in policing. To this end, we supported the appointment, in June, of Professor Paul Taylor as the National Policing Chief Scientific Adviser. Ensuring that all technological developments in policing are based on good evidence and the best understanding of science is absolutely crucial. Professor Taylor chairs a police science and technology investment board, which demands rigorous quality assurance of all proposals. He is also represented on the relevant National Police Chiefs’ Council committees and is developing national research and development guidance with the College of Policing.

We also recognise the need for appropriate co-ordination of investment decisions across the policing landscape. Therefore, with oversight from the ministerially led strategic capabilities and investment board, we are supporting the development, mobilisation and implementation of the 10-year national policing digital strategy, to ensure that the right infrastructure is in place across policing to harness and exploit the benefits of data and analytical capabilities.

Work under way includes establishing an NPCC data board to promote a consistent approach to developing data literacy; assessing efficacy, ethics quality and standards; and establishing a central data office within the Police Digital Service, which aims to improve data management and sharing across policing. The data office will provide the essential infrastructure for the sector to ensure strategic direction, central co-ordination, and accountability on national expectations of locally held data. Work is also under way to develop a national data ethics governance model, building on the work West Midlands Police has done to establish an ethics committee to advise on data science projects. The national model will also be developed in collaboration with the Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation and the Home Office.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

Lords Hansard - part two & Committee stage
Monday 1st November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I rise to move Amendment 123A in my name. I apologise to the Committee. If I had had my wits about me, I would have grouped it with the previous police bail amendments. I am grateful to Transform Justice for bringing this issue to my attention and for its help and support in drafting this amendment.

The Government continue to place tighter restrictions on when courts can remand children in custody. Those are much stronger than the restrictions currently placed on the police when they decide whether to remand a child in custody to court. Court criteria, most of which do not apply to the police, include that: the child must be between 12 and 17 years of age and be legally represented, other than in exceptional circumstances; they must have been charged with a violent or sexual offence or have been charged with an offence where an adult would have received a custodial sentence of 14 or more years; or they have a recent history of absconding while remanded; or they have a history of committing imprisonable offences while on bail; and there is a real prospect of a custodial sentence for the offence in question. In addition, remand in custody must be necessary to protect the public from death or personal injury or to prevent the child from committing further imprisonable offences.

The police remand many more children in custody than the courts. In 2019, the year with the most recent data available, over 4,500 children were remanded in police custody compared with 884 children remanded in custody by the courts. Some 60% of children remanded in custody by the police had been charged with non-violent offences and only 12% of those remanded in custody by the police went on to be remanded in custody by the courts. Two-thirds of children remanded in custody by the police do not receive a custodial sentence.

In Clause 132, the Bill suggests further strengthening the restrictions on courts remanding children in custody, including that the history of breaching bail or offending on bail must be “significant”, “relevant” and “recent”. If detention is being considered for the child’s own safety, this would be possible only if the risk cannot be safely managed in the community. It would have to be “very likely” that the child would receive a custodial sentence rather than a “real prospect”. Courts would also be under a statutory duty to record their reasons for imposing custodial remand, including a statement that they have considered the welfare of the child in their decision and that they have considered alternatives.

The Bill as drafted does nothing to tighten the restrictions on the police remanding children in custody, or even to bring them into line with existing court restrictions. Amendment 123A intends to bring the Police and Criminal Evidence Act criteria for police remand of children into closer alignment with the court remand criteria. I beg to move.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for moving his amendment. As the Committee might be aware, I sit as a youth magistrate, usually at Highbury magistrates’ court. I have to say that I was not aware of the difference in the remand criteria; I should have known but I did not. I also thank Transform Justice for bringing this to my attention. The noble Lord has very thoroughly explored the differences in the number of youths remanded by the police versus those remanded by the courts. I would be interested to hear what the Minister has to say in response.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for raising this important issue of children remanded in custody. I quite agree that police custody is not a suitable environment for children and that they should not be detained there unless it is absolutely necessary.

The provisions introduced by this Bill will amend the “tests” set out by the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, also known as LASPO, which must be satisfied before the court remands a child to custody. These are intended to ensure that custodial remand is used only as a last resort, where there are no other options and it is necessary to protect the public.

Before the courts get involved, if a child is charged with an offence, Section 38 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 provides that the police must release them either on bail or without bail pending their appearance at court, unless one or more specified conditions apply. These conditions are that the child’s name or address are not known or are not believed to be genuine; there are reasonable grounds to believe the child will not appear in court to answer bail; the detention is believed to be necessary to prevent the child committing an offence, causing physical injury, loss or damage to property, or interfering with the investigation of offences; or the detention after charge is believed to be necessary for the child’s own protection or in their own interests.

I would like to reassure the Committee that there is already a degree of alignment between police bail and court bail, and the police custody officer must have regard to the same considerations as those that apply when a court is considering whether to grant bail under the Bail Act 1976.

I acknowledge the concern that many more children are remanded post charge by the police than are remanded by the courts while awaiting trial, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, outlined, and that this may give rise to consideration of risk-averse decision-making by the police. I do not necessarily believe this to be the case. It is important to remember that post-charge detention by the police serves a different purpose from youth remand in the courts, so it is unrealistic to expect an exact alignment of the conditions required to make decisions.

With this in mind, it is perfectly possible for the police to make a decision to remand a child post charge and for the courts to make a decision not to remand the same child to custody, and for both these decisions to be reasonable based on the evidence and circumstances before each party. In the overwhelming majority of cases, a child remanded by the police will be held for no more than 24 hours.

I also acknowledge the concern that police remand is a driver of custodial remand—that is, for example, that a court is more likely to view a child remanded by the police as dangerous. I am not aware of any data showing a causal link between police remand and custodial remand. A comprehensive evidence base comparing the circumstances whereby police bail after charge decisions are made under Section 38 of PACE would be needed, giving consideration to the threshold for grounds to refuse bail and whether custody officers have access to and apply all relevant information when making a bail decision.

Before I conclude, I take this opportunity to put on record my thanks and the Home Office’s gratitude to Brian Roberts, who was the department’s expert on the Police and Criminal Evidence Act. Sadly, he died last month after 50 years of public service as a police officer and then an official in the department. He is greatly missed by his colleagues.

On the basis of my remarks, I hope the noble Lord will be happy to withdraw his amendment.

Migration

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

Thursday 28th October 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I thank my noble friend for that question. As he was talking, I was just thinking how one of the awful moments for the Home Office was the Windrush scandal. One of the huge contributions that was made to this country after the war was by the Windrush generation. It has come to the forefront of people’s minds in the last few years, more than ever before, how people such as those in the Windrush generation helped this country, as did the Irish.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, do the Government agree that a lack of care workers is adding pressure on to the NHS? During the passage of the immigration Bill, the Government committed to this House to review skill shortages in the adult care sector and to look at visa options and immigration policy to plug the gap. The Government have commissioned a review from the Migration Advisory Committee. Has this review started, when can we expect the results and will there be an interim report?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My Lords, I think that the work has started, but I will correct that if I am wrong. The threshold, as the noble Lord knows, was previously set at degree level jobs. Modelling by the MAC suggests that the new border RQF 3 threshold strikes a much more reasonable balance between controlling immigration and business access to labour, so that will capture some of the cohort that he talks about. On the broader point, as we have seen in a number of sectors, employers will now have to think about paying their workers a more competitive salary to attract people such as care workers to do the valuable work that they do and have been doing throughout the pandemic.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

Lords Hansard - part one & Committee stage
Wednesday 27th October 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I rise to support the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, and I am very grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, taking us back to very late on Monday night, if the Minister remembers, when we were discussing Clause 15, on the disclosure of information. The Minister—I think, from memory, although it was late—implied that the disclosure of information was voluntary and that the clause was there simply to facilitate the disclosure of information. In challenging the Minister in that, I quoted from Clause 17.

I can be brief. Clause 17 enables the Secretary of State, if satisfied that a specified authority, educational authority or youth custody authority has failed to comply with the duties to collaborate or disclose information—including, presumably, sensitive personal information and information covered by a duty of confidentiality—to direct the authority to comply and enforce her direction through a mandatory order. That is what Clause 17 says.

I have already explained at length why professionals should use their professional judgment—as the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, just said—within existing policies, procedures, practices and protocols, rather than being forced to divulge sensitive personal information when it is not, on balance, in the public interest to do so. For example, there will often be a greater good to be derived from maintaining a relationship between, say, a youth worker and a young person at risk of becoming involved in serious violence than from divulging sensitive information to the police. All authorities dealing with these issues are committed to preventing and tackling serious violence. They may, from time to time, have a different perspective on the problem, or a different view on the best way to achieve what we all are desperately seeking to do.

This clause is one of the reasons why so many organisations believe that the Bill is really about a police-led enforcement approach, because it is the Home Secretary who can force them to comply, rather than the public health, multiagency, multifaceted approach that has been so successful in preventing and tackling knife crime in Scotland. Can the Minister give examples of where public authorities involved in preventing and tackling serious violence have obstructed efforts to achieve those objectives? If not, why is this clause necessary? We believe that Clause 17 should not stand part of the Bill.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, this group starts with government Amendment 72, which I will say a brief word about. The amendment requires the Secretary of State to obtain the consent of Welsh Ministers—not just consult them—before giving a direction under Clause 17 to a devolved Welsh authority. I understand that the change was requested by the Welsh Government, and we support it on this side of the House.

I turn to the debate on whether Clause 17 should stand part of the Bill, which was tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, who introduced it, and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. Their explanatory statement says that:

“The purpose of this amendment is to explore the extent of the Secretary of State’s powers to issue directions under this section and the consequences of failure to comply with such a direction.”


A number of very searching questions have been raised, and I have a few questions myself. It would be helpful if the Minister could give some more information on what a “direction” might be and what it might consist of under this clause. The central point made by both the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, was about the context of police-led enforcement rather than a more equal arrangement between other agencies such as education and the National Health Service.

In the House of Commons, the Minister said that it is envisaged that this power will be used extremely rarely. Nevertheless, could the Minister give an example of when this power might be used and what checks might be in place when it is used? What would the prior steps be before a direction is considered? How would an authority’s progress in acting upon a direction be measured? Further, can the Minister say something about how the Government see this power working in practice?

I thought the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, raised a particularly interesting question about what the sanction might be if a public servant fails to comply with an order to disclose information. My noble friend Lady Chakrabarti also spoke of the rare disputes between professionals and how these may be resolved by direction from the Secretary of State, rather than through the courts. She gave a historical context, if you like, to that status of professionals making their own judgments.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 73, I will speak also to Amendment 74 in my name.

Clause 18 states that those authorities that are, under this chapter of the Bill, under a duty to prevent and tackle serious violence

“must have regard to guidance issued by the Secretary of State”.

However, in the Bill, the only people the Secretary of State must consult are Welsh Ministers. As we will see in a later group, when it comes to similar guidance in relation to offensive weapons homicide reviews, Clause 31 requires the Secretary of State to consult

“persons appearing to the Secretary of State to represent review partners”

and

“such other persons as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.”

That is in addition to Welsh Ministers.

We on these Benches believe that the Secretary of State should also consult representatives of the authorities that will be subject to the guidance, and such other persons as may be appropriate to consult. That is the intention of Amendment 74. We also believe that such guidance should be statutory—that is, contained in regulations—to enable Parliament to scrutinise the guidance before those involved become subject to it, as set out in Amendment 73. I beg to move.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, we support the amendments put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. On Amendment 74, we believe it is vital that the Government should consult front-line organisations on the content of the guidance. They are the ones who know how this will, or will not, work in practice and their expertise is the driving force behind the duty. The Government have of course published draft guidance on this, and I ask the Minister whether this guidance is being consulted on.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, has made it clear that these are probing amendments. The noble Lord, Lord Beith, has just expressed scepticism about the number of initiatives which the Government have put forward in this section of the Bill.

Having said that, we support this part of the Bill on offensive weapons homicide reviews. Amendment 75 raises the question of what happens if a death is already covered by an existing review mechanism, and not duplicating reviews. When this question was raised in the other place, the Minister said:

“To avoid duplication of work, the Bill provides that these new offensive weapons homicide reviews will be required only where there is not an existing statutory requirement to review the homicide”.—[Official Report, Commons Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill Committee, 27/5/21; col. 268.]


Clause 23(5) provides that a review is not required under this chapter if a review of the death is already taking place under different arrangements. If I understand it correctly, I think this meets one of the questions raised by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, in his amendment.

Amendment 76 deals with data protection. It would prevent data being shared for these reviews if it breaches an obligation of confidence or any other restriction other than the Data Protection Act. These issues were debated in detail on Monday in relation to the serious violence reduction duty. Obviously, data sharing is absolutely key to a homicide review to allow us to identify and learn lessons from the death, and to decide on actions to take in response. However, as raised in the earlier debate, we must know how this is to be balanced with safeguards.

Clause 29 provides that a person may not be required to disclose information under this chapter that they could not be compelled to disclose in High Court proceedings. It would be helpful if the Minister could talk us through the specific provision of potential High Court proceedings.

Amendment 77 is based on a recommendation of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. The DPRRC has said that guidance on this chapter of the Bill provided by Clause 31 should be subject to parliamentary scrutiny and done through a statutory instrument subject to the negative procedure. We support the committee’s suggestion and call on the Government to look carefully at all the committee’s recommendations.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for explaining his amendments to the provisions in the Bill which establish offensive weapons homicide reviews. Before I turn to the specifics of the amendments, it may assist the Committee if I first set out the context and rationale for the introduction of these reviews. Noble Lords asked a lot of questions and I will do my best to get to all of them. If I have missed any, I will write to noble Lords.

Every homicide is a tragedy and the Government are committed to doing all they can to prevent the senseless loss of life and tackle serious violence. We are naturally disturbed by data showing that homicide has risen by about a third in England and Wales between 2014-15 and 2018-19. We have also seen that homicides involving offensive weapons now make up a large and growing proportion of all homicides—approximately 354 out of 732 in 2019. Homicide is now the fourth leading cause of death for men aged 20 to 34, behind suicide, drug overdoses and car accidents. Yet there is currently no legal requirement to formally review the circumstances around the majority of homicides involving an offensive weapon.

This provision will require local agencies to consider the circumstances of both the victims and perpetrators during an offensive weapons homicide review, and identify lessons that could help prevent future deaths. By deepening our local and national understanding of homicide and serious violence, together we can improve our response and ultimately save lives.

The amendment would change the definition of a “qualifying homicide” whereby, alongside the other requirements already set out in Clause 23, an offensive weapons homicide review would be applicable only if no other mechanism is available to review or hold an investigation or inquiry into the death. We agree with the sentiment of the amendment that it would not be necessary or proportionate to require the review partners to conduct an offensive weapons homicide review where the homicide already meets the conditions for an existing review—for example, a domestic homicide review—as this would involve duplication of work and create an unnecessary burden on the review partners, yet produce the same outcomes. However, we do not consider the amendment necessary as Clause 25 already provides for the relationship between offensive weapons homicide reviews and other review requirements to avoid duplication of effort, including disapplying the duty to conduct an offensive weapons review in certain cases.

The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, cited coroners’ inquests as an example of existing reviews that would preclude a homicide from qualifying for a review under Chapter 2 of Part 2 of the Bill. We should remember that inquests are designed for a different purpose. They are legal inquiries into the cause and circumstances of a death, and are limited to the four statutory questions of who, where, when and how or by what means a person came about their death. Further to this, in many homicides where an offensive weapon is used, there will not be an inquest because the criminal trial will answer the statutory questions and an inquest will not need to take place.

The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, also asked if consultation with coroners had taken place at an official level. It has and that will continue during the design phase.

Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Criminal Conduct Authorisations) (Amendment) Order 2021

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

Tuesday 12th October 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness for tabling this regret Motion for debate today. It brings the House back to the detailed, thoughtful and vital discussions which were held on what is now the Act during its passage earlier this year.

The first priority of any Government, and of this Opposition, is to ensure the safety and security of our communities. We pay tribute to those who serve honourably and put themselves in harm’s way to protect us, and to prevent and disrupt serious criminal activity. The Act addresses the necessary, though difficult, use of covert human intelligence sources to combat serious crime. The key purpose was to place the authorisation of CHIS activity on a statutory footing, where previously there was not that underpinning. The version of the Act which was passed was not the draft that a Labour Government would have passed but we did support it, as urgently needed legislation which created that statutory footing and contained some improvements on the status quo.

I recognise the significant contribution that this House made to improving the Act as it passed through Parliament, including securing extra protections for children and vulnerable people, ensuring access to compensation for innocent victims, and increasing oversight mechanisms. I pay particular tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, for his work on securing notification of all authorisations to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, providing real-time oversight by the IPC.

The order about which today’s Motion is tabled makes a series of changes in secondary legislation which are consequential to the Act. They include: updating requirements to keep records of authorisations granted under the Act, extending some existing safeguards on matters subject to legal privilege to the new authorisations, and updating the designations of the rank of a person able to grant an authorisation with a public authority. Here I should say that I listened with great interest to what the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, said about the relative seniority of police officers needed for particular authorisations. I look forward to the Minister’s response to the questions which he raised.

The Motion, however, deals with a wider issue which was debated as part of our deliberation on the then Bill. During its passage, colleagues from across the House sought a wide array of improvements to the Bill. The Labour Party particularly sought for the Government to look seriously at the possibility of prior judicial authorisation as a gold standard. We also tabled amendments in the Commons and supported amendments in this House, including those tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza, on the key issues raised in today’s Motion. These were changes which would have put explicit limits on the type of activity that could be authorised on the face of the Bill itself. As a House, this was one of the issues we sent back to the Commons for further consideration, although we were ultimately unsuccessful.

The Human Rights Act is a proud achievement of the previous Labour Government. It provides safeguards to this Act and to all public authorities that take action under it. Adding explicit limits to the face of the Bill would, though, have provided clarity and reassurance, and positioned the protection of human rights as an integral part of this package. But as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, said, this argument was had and lost when the Bill was before Parliament.

As has been well rehearsed, the inclusion of limits has been modelled by countries which are our allies and have similar judicial systems to ours, and with which we co-operate on security matters: Canada is the obvious example, a point made by the noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza. While those countries are able to do this, these Benches and our Commons colleagues remained unconvinced by the Government’s argument that we could not.

I will be interested to hear the Minister’s response to the questions put to her by noble Lords across the House today, particularly on what ongoing monitoring there will be of the operation of the Act and whether amendments of any kind are required. Specifically, will oversight of the Act be led by the IPC’s oversight of the practical arrangements? Presumably, any concerns which could be raised will be addressed by the IPC.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)]

My Lords, it is worth reminding ourselves that the original Bill contained a restriction in relation to the Human Rights Act. The person operating under this Bill with authority will operate on behalf of Her Majesty’s Government and will therefore be bound by the authority of the Human Rights Act in relation to the activities which they can undertake. That is an important consideration which was raised in the debate on the Bill.

Terrorism Act 2000 (Proscribed Organisations) (Amendment) (No. 2) Order 2021

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

Thursday 15th July 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I, too, thank the Minister for explaining this order. As she said, terrorist groups now recruit, radicalise and train individuals from a distance, distributing terrorist material at the click of a button. Young people, mainly young men, are sucked into a world of conspiracy theories, fascist propaganda, race hate and quasi-military action. The use of the internet for propaganda and training purposes has had an impact on this potential threat to our way of life; it also means that the Government have to respond to this threat in a sophisticated and direct way. The Government, quite rightly in the Opposition’s view, have a responsibility to act to protect young people from being sucked into this world and to protect the public from the race hate, bombs and bloodshed that these groups promote. We will support today’s order.

This is the third white supremacist hate group that Parliament has proscribed in the past year. The group, called the Base, was founded in 2018 and has been operational since then. That was three years ago. There have been TV programmes about it and there is plenty of information on the internet on its activities, so the question of delay arises—the central point that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, made in his contribution. Is the Minister satisfied that this group and far-right groups like it are properly monitored and that action, such as today’s proscription order, is put in place in a timely manner for the protection of the public? My honourable friend Mr McGinn, in the other place, asked about the status of the proscription review group and the Minister, Chris Philp, described proscription as a powerful tool to degrade terrorist organisations. I would be grateful if the Minister could update the House on the work of the review group—for example, on how often it meets, whether she believes that the current review process is working satisfactorily and whether there is there a robust strategy within which it works. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, spoke in some detail on the information available 18 months ago, in January 2020, and made the point that there seemed to be enough information available 18 months ago to ban this group, so why the delay?

As I understand it, ministerial responsibility for dealing with these types of potentially terrorist groups currently lies with the noble Baroness. This is following the resignation of Mr Brokenshire. Yesterday in the debate in the other place, fulsome tributes were paid to Mr Brokenshire, which I am sure were well deserved. My honourable friend the Member for Barnsley East, Stephanie Peacock, in yesterday’s debate expressed a desire to meet the Minister to talk about another far-right group that is potentially terrorist in its nature; she referred to the details of that group yesterday and her work through the relevant all-party group in looking at potential right-wing terrorism activity. I hope that the Minister will meet my honourable friend so that she can explain the nature of the threat as she sees it.

There are 77 terrorist organisations currently proscribed under the Terrorism Act 2000. Four are far-right groups and the majority are Islamist groups. Last October, the new director-general of MI5 warned that violent far-right terrorism was now a threat, with eight of 27 serious terrorist plots stopped in the final stages in the past three years linked to neo-fascist and racist groups. Online chat forums and video games are used as recruitment tools. The number of those under 18 among those arrested over the last three years has almost trebled. I believe that this trend is worrying and getting closer to home. The use of hateful ideologies to prey on young and vulnerable people is wrong and abhorrent and the Government have a responsibility to do everything in their power to crack down on them.

I close by paying tribute to the dedication, courage and skill of counterterrorism police and our security and intelligence services. We should be grateful that most of the proscribed organisations have never carried out a successful attack on UK soil.

Immigration (Collection, Use and Retention of Biometric Information and Related Amendments) Regulations 2021

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

Monday 7th June 2021 Grand Committee

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for introducing these two instruments. The first—the Immigration (Collection, Use and Retention of Biometric Information and Related Amendments) Regulations 2021—makes a series of changes to the capture of biometric information on foreign nationals, including asylum seekers, those who arrive at the border undocumented and those who are detained or bailed under immigration powers. The second—the Immigration and Nationality (Fees) (Amendment) Order 2021—makes some technical changes to definitions to reflect the gradual movement of the Home Office from physical documentation to a digital system.

I have a number of questions, some of which replicate the questions just asked by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. In the policy statement published alongside the 2014 Act, the Government stated they planned to retain biometric information for up to 10 years. What is the rationale for now extending the limit from 10 to 15 years? It seems an arbitrary increase.

The impact of the regulations appears to be that sensitive biometric information can be held for significantly longer periods of time. Can the noble Baroness confirm that that is indeed the Government’s intention? The regulations provide for the general limit of 15 years, but also provide that the Secretary of State may retain information for as long as necessary, for immigration purposes. Is there guidance on what “necessary” means in this context? The examples given in the supporting documents of where information will be held for longer include where

“the person is subject to a Deportation or Exclusion Order.”

In what other situations should we expect data to be routinely held for longer than 15 years?

On the immigration fees order, it seems odd that the cost of processing data already held is the same as the cost of enrolling new biometric data. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, made this point and gave a vivid example from his experience as a police officer. Can the Minister give a fuller explanation of this apparent disparity?

Photographs of facial images were raised by the Labour Party during the passage of the 2014 Act. Where a person is granted citizenship, their fingerprints are destroyed, but the photograph is kept until they apply for a passport. For those who never apply for a passport, this means their photo will potentially be kept indefinitely. Does the Minister know how many people this impacts and why a time limit has not been considered?

Regulations under the 2007 Act set out what information a biometric document may contain. The Explanatory Memorandum tells us:

“These Regulations provide that other information may … be included … limited to information connected with … immigration status or nationality.”


What other information is this expected to include?

On the power to prevent the use of a digital immigration document, is there a risk that a digital status could be cancelled without the person being notified, bearing in mind that the number of successful appeals demonstrates how often the Home Office makes incorrect decisions and that digital status is also a person’s access to work, healthcare and the right to rent, et cetera? What will be the system for effectively switching off a digital status, as it were?

A related issue following on from the Domestic Abuse Act, which we recently considered, is that Southall Black Sisters and more than 50 other expert organisations have raised concerns over changes to the enrolment of biometrics for migrant survivors of domestic abuse. They have been informed that victims of abuse must now travel to immigration centres, rather than the existing system, which used local post office locations. Southall Black Sisters and others have raised concerns over the impact on these extremely vulnerable victims of being required to criss-cross cities to access the service and over the resource strain that this will put on the specialist community organisations which would support them when they do this.

I have seen the letter to Marc Owen, who is director for visas and citizenship, dated 19 May 2021, and his response, dated 24 May. The expert organisations were not consulted on these changes and have requested a meeting with the Minister. Would the Minister be able to commit to looking at these issues and meeting those organisations, which have a specific concern regarding the lack of access through the Post Office system to these facilities? My understanding from reading the letter to Marc Owen is that the contract with the post offices is coming to an end, so they will not offer these facilities in future. Therefore, there will be some seven centres for the whole of England and Wales and only one in London, in Croydon, where the people from these centres would be expected to go to register their access, if I can put it like that. This will be very resource-intensive for the organisations supporting them, because they will have to accompany them and help them with their applications. It was a much simpler process when they were able to go to local post offices. That is the point that I am making to the Minister.

British Nationality Act 1981 (Immigration Rules Appendix EU) (Amendment) Regulations 2021

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

Monday 7th June 2021 Grand Committee

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I, too, welcome this instrument and, along with the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, I shall raise a number of questions, many of which overlap with the questions that they have already asked.

The British Nationality Act provides that a child born in the UK automatically acquires citizenship where, at the time of their birth, at least one parent is British or settled. A person waiting for their settled status to be resolved or who is eligible but has failed to apply would not count as settled during that time. This instrument amends the current law and provides that, first, a child born after the end of the grace period may be considered British from the date that their parent is granted settled status after a late application, and, secondly, that a similar protection is given to a child born after the grace period where their parent had applied to the scheme before the deadline but was still awaiting their status on the date the child was born.

We welcome this instrument, which seeks to fill a gap in provision for children born while their parents are still awaiting confirmation of their settled status or who are eligible but enter a late application. For absolute clarity, will a child born in the UK under these circumstances automatically—and by that I mean with no separate application—acquire citizenship when their parents’ status is confirmed to reflect the situation as it would have been before 30 June? Secondly, can I confirm that they will not have to register to access their citizenship and be charged the exorbitant fee, now declared unlawful, which children registering their British citizenship currently face?

Crucially, how will parents and children be alerted to the child’s right to citizenship? That was a point that was emphasised by the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. We welcome the fact that the non-exhaustive reasonable grounds for a late application have now been published. What is being done to reach those people who are eligible but have not made an application? Will public services that expectant parents come into contact with be aware of and able to advise on this law change?

The organisations the3million, Amnesty International and the Project for the Registration of Children as British Citizens have written to Home Office Ministers to welcome this step of securing children’s rights to citizenship. They have asked them to seek to clarify the law under this instrument on a number of points.

One question is around what information will be made available to an EU citizen who becomes settled on or after 1 July about the provisions of new Section 10A, and what it means for any children of theirs. What records will the department maintain relating to: first, the timing of any application for settled status, particularly of persons applying by the deadline but whose applications are granted after that date; secondly, the eligibility of settled status immediately before 1 July of persons granted settled status on or after that date; and, thirdly, the reasons for a grant of settled status on or after 1 July? What records will be kept for those different scenarios?

A further question is whether the department will provide access to these records to the child to whom new Section 10A applies. What other steps will the department take to ensure that the child is able to confirm their British citizenship, whether during childhood or adulthood? This was a point that the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, made as well. Will the department provide access to these records to the parent—whether the parent is an EU citizen or otherwise—adoptive parent, local authority or other carer with parental responsibility for the child?

On those still awaiting their settled status while the deadline approaches, what extra initiatives are the Government putting in place to handle the extremely high backlog of cases of people who applied in time but are waiting for a Home Office response? In May, the backlog stood at more than 300,000 cases. Can the Minister give an update on that figure? We know that people are already being impacted by the Home Office’s delay and that it is affecting their ability to get a mortgage or their university applications. These applications have been held up by the wait people are currently undergoing.

On child citizenship more widely, earlier this year, the Home Office’s £1,000 fee for children registering their citizenship was ruled unlawful by the Appeal Court. The court found that the Government had failed in their duty to consider the best interests of children impacted by this scandalously high fee. Can the Minister say what the Government’s action will be when they reconsider this unlawful fee?

Domestic Abuse Bill

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

Consideration of Commons amendments
Tuesday 27th April 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Burt of Solihull (LD)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baronesses, Lady Finlay of Llandaff and Lady McIntosh of Pickering, for their tenacity in protecting the interests of vulnerable children and abuse victims. Their knowledge and experience have fuelled their tenacity and insistence that a solution be found. The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, has used his great experience in the family courts, and I have had, if not exactly the same level of experience, raw enthusiasm in backing the cause.

However, that would have all been to no avail if the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson of Tredegar, had not only seen what we were trying to achieve but gone the extra mile in seeking a solution, despite the fact that we did not have all the incontrovertible evidence he sought. I am sorry that he is not in his place, but I know that the Minister will pass on these remarks. When we suggested that the Government, not the NACCC, should obtain the evidence, he has come up with the amendment, which I hope the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, will be minded to accept, to go and get the evidence. The widening of the definition of a child contact centre will catch many informal organisations—those that we are most concerned about—in the net.

All that any of us wants is to protect our children at a most difficult and vulnerable time, to ensure that unskilled and even unscrupulous people do not get anywhere near those children, and that those children are received into a welcoming environment manned by skilled, trained and compassionate people. We are not there yet and, as the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay of Llandaff, said, the movers of the original amendment will be setting two-year reminders in their diaries after the passing of the Bill, so the Government can expect timely reminders if the report has not appeared as the deadline looms.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I too pay tribute to the tenacity of the noble Baronesses, Lady Finlay of Llandaff and Lady McIntosh of Pickering. Although I have experience in the family courts and was aware of the child contact centres, I was not as well briefed on this issue as I am now, given the noble Baronesses’ backgrounds on this matter, particularly the legislative history of the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh.

I should also pay fulsome tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, who is relatively new to our House. We met him a number of times; he has properly engaged on the issues and expressed scepticism, which is sometimes helpful to people moving amendments. He has come up with a solution. Although, as the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, said, it may fall short of what we were hoping for, it nevertheless provides a road ahead for addressing the concerns that he expressed. He has potentially come up with a proper solution for the various loopholes in the child contact centre system, if I can put it like that.

As the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, said in his introduction, the Government’s problem was one of evidence. As we repeated in numerous meetings, it is very difficult to get evidence of contact centres that come and go, perhaps operating in particular communities and essentially functioning under the radar. I am glad that the Government appreciated that point to the extent that they are willing to take on the responsibility of seeing whether this is a real problem and whether appropriate measures can be put in place to protect children who go to these child contact centres.

The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, asked three good questions for the Minister to answer. The noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, went on to quote Sir James Munby’s support for the earlier amendments. Sir James Munby has unequalled experience in these matters, so the Government should listen to what he says.

In conclusion, the noble Baroness, Lady Burt of Solihull, and I have sat on a lot of committees together over the last couple of years and she has always been sensible in her support of the noble Baronesses, Lady Finlay and Lady McIntosh. As she said, I hope that the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, accepts the Government’s amendments and that we continue to work together for the next couple of years to ensure that the Government follow through on their promise to review the existing provision.

[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)]

My Lords, first, I thank and agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Burt, and the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, in paying tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, and my noble friend Lady McIntosh for their tenacity in pursuing this issue in the interests of vulnerable children. We have all been mindful of that throughout these discussions and are grateful to them. I am also grateful to noble Lords for their tributes to my noble friend Lord Wolfson. I will pass on their thanks and appreciation, and I know that he would have liked to have been here to see the conclusion of this important matter. But I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Burt, for saying that my noble friend went the extra mile. That has been the Government’s approach to the Bill throughout and, even those provisions that will not be in the Bill have launched some important work, which will continue to bear fruit and help victims of domestic abuse, whether legislatively or not.

The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, asked three questions on which I hope I can provide reassurance. Her first was about whether contact centres mean the people who work in the place. Yes, we are going to review the way that a place is used, rather than a building, which may be empty. Her second was about the spirit of the amendment. Again, yes, we want to build an evidence base through the review that assesses the need for regulation, along the lines that the noble Baroness proposed. Her third was about promoting the judicial protocol. That protocol is being updated and will be communicated by the judiciary, not Her Majesty’s Government. That will provide an opportunity for its promotion but, as I am sure she and other noble Lords understand, that is a matter for the judiciary.

My noble friend Lady McIntosh asked some questions about the review. As I say, we want to establish a robust evidence base about the scale of the problem, so that we reach a fully informed decision about any further steps necessary. We would welcome her input and that of others into establishing the terms of the review. We will also be engaging the judiciary, among others, so the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, about Sir James Munby is well heard.

That has answered all the questions raised. Again, we are very grateful to all noble Lords for their engagement on this and hope that it is a sensible resolution. I hope that noble Lords support Motion A.

Domestic Abuse Bill

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 17th March 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Benjamin, for her commitment on this issue—a commitment that all speakers in the debate share. As the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, said, all Peers who have spoken have acknowledged the link between pornography and violence against women.

Of course, we strongly agree that there needs to be a mechanism to prevent children accessing pornographic material. We also believe that the Government have failed to show leadership on that matter and have dragged their feet. They should already have brought the online harms Bill forward.

As Part 3 of the Digital Economy Act was going through, we in the Labour Party criticised it as inadequate because it failed to focus on where some of the most serious harm was caused—for example, by not tackling social media sufficiently. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, also made that point.

My understanding is that we now have a timeline for the online harms Bill, with pre-legislative scrutiny expected immediately after the Queen’s Speech—before the Summer Recess—and that Second Reading would be expected after the Summer Recess. I would be grateful if the Minister could confirm that my understanding of the timetable is correct.

We think that there are real inadequacies in Part 3 of the Digital Economy Act, and that the best way to deal with this matter is in full, and as a priority, in the online harms Bill. That will give time for the Commons to consider the amendments to this Bill that we have already sent back to it, including the supervision of dangerous perpetrators, ensuring that all women have access to life-saving services, and ensuring that child contact centres are regulated to protect our children.

I freely acknowledge that the decision we have taken to abstain on this matter has been a difficult one—but I think it would be wrong to give a misleading sense of certainty by passing this amendment, when that certainty is not merited by the Digital Economy Act. For that reason, we shall abstain on this vote.

[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)]

My Lords, as the noble Baroness, Lady Benjamin, outlined on Monday when we began this debate, her Amendment 87A would require the Government to undertake an investigation of the impact of children’s access to online pornography on domestic abuse, and to review the commencement of Part 3 of the Digital Economy Act 2017.

Her Majesty’s Government are committed to ensuring that the objectives of Part 3 of the Digital Economy Act will be delivered by the online harms framework. Children will be at the heart of our new online safety Bill, which will bring in a new era of accountability for online services. I am afraid I cannot comment on the timings that the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, asked about, as announcements about the Queen’s Speech and other things have not yet been made. I am sorry to disappoint the noble Lord on that.

We are confident that the online safety Bill will provide much greater protection for children than would have been the case with Part 3 of the 2017 Act. Unlike that Act, the online harms regime will capture both the most visited pornography sites and pornography on social media, thereby covering the vast majority of sites where children are most likely to be exposed to pornography.

One of the criticisms of the 2017 Act was that its scope did not cover social media companies, where a considerable quantity of pornographic material is available to children. Research by the British Board of Film Classification published last year found that across a group of children aged between 11 and 17, 44% intentionally accessed pornography via a social media site, compared to 43% for dedicated pornography websites and 53% via an image or video search engine.

Crucially, however, just 7% of children accessed pornography only through dedicated pornography sites. Most children intentionally accessing pornography were doing so across a number of sources, including social media, as well as video-sharing platforms, fora, and via image or video search engines, the majority of which would not fall within scope of the Digital Economy Act, but will fall within the scope of online harms legislation.

Implementing Part 3 of the 2017 Act would therefore leave a significant gap in meeting the Government’s objective of preventing children from accessing pornography —an objective that has also been raised by noble Lords who have spoken in the debate. Our online harms proposals will achieve a more comprehensive approach and allow us to address children’s access to pornography in the round, and avoid children moving from one, more regulated, area of the internet to another, less regulated, area to access pornography.

In addition, recent technological changes could render Part 3 of the 2017 Act ineffective in protecting children if it were introduced as an interim measure. One of the Act’s enforcement powers was the power to require internet service providers to block access to material on non-compliant services. Internet service providers themselves have made it clear that they are no longer the sole gatekeepers to the internet. Current and future developments in the way the architecture of the internet functions mean that they may not always be able to offer effective blocking functions, which might make this power obsolete. These potential enforcement challenges could make age-verification very difficult to enforce via the 2017 Act, even as an interim measure.

The most recent prominent change is the introduction of DNS over HTTPS—that is a bit of a mouthful; it is also known as DoH—which, in specific implementation models, could provide an alternative route to access online content that bypasses the current filtering function of internet service providers. Other proposed internet encryption standards may in future limit even further the ability of providers to filter. The Government are actively engaging with the industry to ensure that the spread of DoH and future internet encryption standards do not cause unintended consequences. For example, specific implementation models of DoH could circumnavigate the current filtering mechanisms of internet service providers, which are used to block access to child abuse content.

The noble Lord, Lord Browne of Belmont, raised the definition of internet service providers in the Digital Economy Act. A reference in legislation to internet service providers or similar is usually applied in the traditional sense, requiring the major internet service providers to block access to certain websites. The Secretary of State would have to prepare revised guidance to the regulator to implement Part 3 of the 2017 Act. As the noble Lord has said, this guidance, coupled with the broader terminology of an “internet access service”, as used in European Union legislation, might offer sufficient flexibility to extend the duty for internet service providers to cover other means of accessing the internet, where technically feasible. However, the key point that my noble friend Lady Williams of Trafford set out in her letter to the noble Baroness, Lady Benjamin, was that, given the evolving nature of how internet services are provided, this approach lacks the necessary certainty.