Financial Services Bill

Debate between Lord Phillips of Sudbury and Lord Neill of Bladen

Tuesday 3rd July 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

My Lords, I came to the City as a young lawyer in 1964 and am still there. Until last Christmas, I was a non-executive director of a well known City insurance entity. I agree wholly with the sentiments of the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell. However, the writing has been on the wall about the state of values in the City for very many years. The most recent shock—the LIBOR scandal as one might call it—is but one of many and there will be many more still to come, I am sad to say. It has been an open secret in the City that the culture has declined over the years to one of near amorality, where the law rather than normal moral instincts has been the arbiter of conduct. That in turn has declined, predictably, to a situation where too often if amorality is confronted with a significant loss of a good deal then there is little resistance left in the system and criminality occurs. Most of it is impossible to trace as it is in the form of market manipulation and oral conspiracies—whether within a firm or between different firms. It is a sad spectacle. To be fair, the vast majority of people in the City deeply regret where we have got to. Unfortunately, however, the culture of huge corporations tends to crush the moral life out of people in those entities. You get the occasional whistleblower who will stand out against the herd but one knows, I am afraid, what has happened recently to those few brave people.

The noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, is absolutely correct in his strategic overview of where we now are. We must, however, ponder this a little more than the space of this debate will allow. I am inclined towards giving serious thought to some sort of commission. It does not have to be a royal commission—a phrase which has attracted a good deal of adverse thought lately—but it is such a huge congregation of issues, not just confined to the City and certainly not confined to narrow misdeeds such as the LIBOR matter, that we may be better off with a royal commission that can look at the thing in the round, take its time, and let the criminal side of all this be separated and dealt with by the Serious Fraud Office or, conceivably, a special prosecutor.

My Amendment 109—to which my noble friend Lady Kramer and the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, have added their names, and which we will probably get to next time—ironically achieves almost the identical effect to that of the first part of Amendment 110ZA, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, so I am obviously in favour of that.

In closing, the other quick point I should like to make is to wonder whether there should not be a wider duty of integrity in the Bill than that which applies only to the FCA in proposed new Section 1D on page 17 of the Bill. The prudential authority should be subject to a similar integrity objective, and it might make sense to have such an objective for the whole financial regulatory sphere. That is all I wish to say beyond thanking the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, for raising this matter at this time.

[Lord Neill of Bladen]

My Lords, I should like to make a few observations about the amendment. We are at Committee stage of the Bill. While it is passing through your Lordships’ House there has been an enormous scandal about the fixing corruptly of the LIBOR rate by Barclays over, I understand, a period of years—a practice in which it is possible that other banks took part. They have thereby done enormous damage to the reputation of the City of London as a place where you can get honest dealing. The matters thus far brought to light show innate corruption, whereby it is seen as perfectly all right to rig the figures that you supply in order to fix the LIBOR rate and to bring in profit or reduce losses. That is a form of corruption.

One can go back to one’s early days with a bank. I banked with Barclays from the mid-1940s onwards. The notion of the bank then being involved in this type of activity was absolutely laughable. The banks have turned into merchant banks of the worst possible character, and that ethos is reflected in conduct that reveals a completely disgraceful picture.

The question is: what is the best way to have a wider inquiry into that matter? At the moment, it is a pity that what is called the Tyrie inquiry is being allowed to carry on on its own, without any thought as to whether or not the investigation of those facts would be central to any wider inquiry about the integrity of banks. However, how do you investigate integrity? The theory is that you are not allowed to look at other cases because Tyrie is dealing with the matter. In fact, it is the best possible evidence you can have of the way that bankers think today. You want to know all the details of that case and not exclude them from it, rather than ask a generalised question: how do we establish integrity or lack of it in the City?

I therefore assume that today we are having an exploratory discussion, that the amendment will be withdrawn, and that there will be time, at least by Report, to consider revised proposals of what might be done by way of investigation. The suggestions of noble Lord, Lord Carlile, are interesting and persuasive, but all this has just been pitched upon the House of Lords because of a curious financial scandal coming to light at this very time while we are in Committee. I hope that consideration will be given as to whether matters in relation to the banks and financial institutions could be better conducted after we have had time to think and the Government have had time to react to the amendment. I hope that some reasonable and rational delay will be introduced and that the amendment will be withdrawn.

Public Bodies Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Phillips of Sudbury and Lord Neill of Bladen

Monday 4th April 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Neill of Bladen]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, expressed the view that there should be an opportunity for parliamentary review when the Minister has decided that the situation is one in which he wants to make an order. Imagine the situation; there has already been consultation with whoever are the proper people to be consulted and, in the light of that, the Minister has concluded that it would be appropriate to make an order. What we are contemplating now, under Amendment 69, is the fact that under the Bill the Minister has time to consider whether he will tell Parliament what he wishes to do, complying with the obligation of setting out an explanation of what he is up to and what the evidence tells him, or whether he will just not tell the Houses what his intentions are, if this is going to be embarrassing or if he does not have the time. That is a discretion that ought not to be conferred. If the consultation has led the Minister to a particular conclusion and he is about to make an order, it is entirely appropriate that we, as Parliament, retain the power to look at his reasons and form our own view about the matter.

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

Is the noble Lord suggesting that Clause 11(2), which requires an explanatory document to be produced to Parliament before the order is laid for consideration, is different from what he is suggesting?

[Lord Neill of Bladen]

No, my Lords. The word “must” is already in Clause 11(2), and attention has been drawn to that fact. There is no “must” in line 3 on that page, which is where there ought to be a requirement. That is what the amendment is dealing with.