(10 years, 3 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I have indicated my opposition to Clauses 65 and 66 standing part of the Bill and I agree with everything that has been said by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham. I do not understand why the Government are seeking to single out judicial review for such provisions, unlike any other form of civil litigation, unless the objective is to discourage judicial review claims. Where is the evidence of any mischief that these clauses are designed to remedy? Courts already have ample powers, which they exercise in appropriate cases, to require third parties to pay costs.
I am particularly concerned about the effect that these clauses will inevitably have because the reduction in legal aid already makes it extremely difficult for claimants to secure funding for judicial review on matters of public importance. If claimants are able to demonstrate that they have a properly arguable case on its merits, and if they satisfy other requirements such as standing and time limits, they should not be obstructed further by complex requirements—as these are—to disclose financial information.
In any event, Clause 65 is far too broadly drafted, referring as it does to financial resources “likely to be available” to the applicant. What does that mean? Does it cover the family and friends of the applicant, the law firm or law centre that is providing services pro bono and the charity that is supporting the claim? For all these reasons, I am concerned that Clauses 65 and 66 will impose a wholly unnecessary hurdle that will impede the delivery of justice in this important area of the law.
My Lords, first, I apologise to the House that I was a little late in arriving; I was giving evidence before the House’s Constitution Committee. I endorse what I heard of the speech made by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, and I support my noble friend Lord Pannick in what he has said. The situation with regard to judicial review is that it is much more difficult for one to be funded in the way that ordinary civil actions are funded. In the case of ordinary civil actions, it is well established that the conditional fee arrangement, although it has been modified by recent amendments, is working reasonably well. Certainly as far as claimants are concerned, they are in a position to take on responsibilities which they could not otherwise take on.
However, in judicial review, it is very rare indeed that any damages or any form of financial benefit to the claimant are involved, so a claimant in that situation will have much greater difficulty in financing an application for judicial review than he would if he was bringing a claim for an injury in a motor accident, for example. This is just one more difficulty which is placed on the claimant, which makes it particularly important that the possible, very serious, unintended consequences of these provisions are looked at very carefully. It is very important that there should be access to justice, as that goes to the very heart of the rule of law. Access to justice should be easier in the case of judicial review than it is otherwise.
In India, for example, which is not somewhere you would normally look to for expeditious legal proceedings, the Supreme Court can respond to a postcard that is written to it. We have a much more complex process than that, but they thought it very important that the traditional jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of India, which is based on the very same provisions in our system as judicial review, should be available for the widest audience. Therefore they allow that to happen.
As far as I am concerned, one of the most important decisions I gave as a judge of first instance was on an application by the Child Poverty Action Group. I stressed in my judgment—which anybody can refer to—how important it was to extend the rights of audience and to take a generous view of standing. Otherwise, matters that affected the whole of society would not be examined by the courts. Each person entitled to supplementary benefit at that time was going to get only a very small sum of money, but it was a sum of money that was extremely important to them and made the difference to the whole of their existence. However, they could not finance the case themselves. If you take away legal aid in that sort of situation, and then add to the problem as this legislation does, that is something to worry about.
My Lords, Amendment 82 would introduce a new clause to prevent the Lord Chancellor from using the powers which he was granted under the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012—LASPO—to alter eligibility for legal aid in judicial review proceedings. Amendment 85 would ensure that the new clause comes into force on the enactment of the Bill and so would not be dependent on the discretion of the Lord Chancellor.
Your Lordships will recall that during the debates on LASPO—and they were detailed, anxious debates—Ministers repeatedly gave assurances that restrictions on legal aid in the Bill did not affect and restrict judicial review. Had the Bill contained such restrictions, I have no doubt that Ministers would have found it difficult to secure the approval of this House. Instead of bringing forward proposals for restrictions on the availability of legal aid for judicial review by way of primary legislation, so that they could be fully scrutinised, the Lord Chancellor has limited legal aid in judicial review by subordinate legislation. As your Lordships will know, such subordinate legislation receives only limited scrutiny in this House: amendments cannot be tabled and the convention is that we rarely table—far less approve—a fatal Motion, however foolish the regulations may be.
To give one example, your Lordships may recall that on 7 May this House debated a Motion of Regret, which I had tabled, in relation to the Civil Legal Aid (Remuneration) (Amendment) (No. 3) Regulations 2014. Those regulations made a fundamental change. They provided that the Lord Chancellor must not pay legal aid fees unless the court gives permission to bring judicial review proceedings, or, if the court neither refuses nor grants permission, the Lord Chancellor thinks it reasonable to pay legal aid remuneration. Eleven noble Lords spoke in support of the Motion of Regret. The Minister batted at both ends, bowled and fielded on his own with no support from any noble Lord.
Legal aid for judicial review is too important a matter for secondary legislation. If the Lord Chancellor wishes to reduce legal aid in the context of judicial review, let him bring forward proposals for primary legislation so that they can be properly scrutinised and fully debated. Amendments 82 and 85 would secure that objective and would nullify the regulations that we debated on 7 May.
I have also added my name to Amendment 82A, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham. I will say something very briefly about it. It addresses the residence regulations that would have confined legal aid to those resident in this country. In our debates today on Part 4 of the Bill, it should not go unrecorded that on 15 July the High Court declared those regulations to be an unlawful exercise of the powers conferred by the 2012 Act. That was because Parliament had identified those services qualifying for legal aid by reference to need, and the regulations adopted a different criterion. Indeed, under the regulations, many people with the greatest need and whose cases are properly arguable would be denied legal aid. The case is the Queen on the Application of Public Law Project v the Secretary of State for Justice, 15 July 2014.
At paragraph 60 of the judgment of Lord Justice Moses, with which Mr Justice Collins and Mr Justice Jay agreed, the court referred to the comments of the Secretary of State for Justice, Mr Grayling, in the Telegraph newspaper on 20 April. That was two weeks after the argument in the case had concluded in court, and before the judgment of the court was given. Mr Grayling, the Secretary of State, said that,
“yes, you’ve guessed it. Another group of Left-wing lawyers has taken us to court to try to stop the proposals”.
The High Court commented on this newspaper article at paragraph 60 of the judgment. Lord Justice Moses said that these comments by the Lord Chancellor were,
“unrestrained by any courtesy to his opponents, or even by that customary caution to be expected while the Court considers its judgement, and unmindful of the independent advocate’s appreciation that it is usually more persuasive to attempt to kick the ball than your opponent’s shins”.
At paragraph 83 of the judgment, the court added that the Lord Chancellor’s reliance in that case on “public confidence” in his defence,
“amounts to little more than reliance on public prejudice”.
This is a quite remarkable judicial rebuke for the Lord Chancellor, and I hope that he will reflect on what the court says.
This is the last group of amendments that we are considering on Part 4. As this Committee leaves this part, I suggest to noble Lords that that judgment of three judges in the High Court confirms the criticisms that this Committee has heard about the Lord Chancellor’s lack of understanding of the central role of judicial review in maintaining the rule of law, and it provides yet further reasons why this House will want to give the most careful scrutiny to Part 4 of the Bill on Report in October. I beg to move.
My Lords, I have added my name in support of the amendment that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has advanced so elegantly. It is perhaps appropriate that it should be considered this afternoon because it will be recalled that this morning I was gently—but I do not think appropriately—chided by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, for going too far in my comments about legal aid provision with regard to judicial review and the effect of the action being taken in that respect. I respectfully suggest that what we have just heard indicates that there is real reason to be concerned at the reduction of legal aid in respect of judicial review. The points made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, with regard to the shortcomings of regulations being used in respect of this area of legislation are very well founded.
(11 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberPerhaps my noble friend, who regularly appears in the Supreme Court and is familiar with many of its judges, can help us as to how many of them have family commitments.
I am sure it is true that all Supreme Court justices—particularly the 11 men, if it is those to whom the noble and learned Lord is referring—have family care commitments. However, the same point can be made about all senior men in all other professions. We all have family care commitments. The difficulty, as the noble and learned Lord knows, is that the family care commitments that address the needs of children and, perhaps more relevantly at the senior levels of the judiciary, aged parents, tend in our society to fall on women rather than men. That is a social fact.
I say to those who support the amendment that I entirely understand the points they make about practical difficulties but it is important not to exaggerate the problems. Judges regularly take time off from judging to do other things. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, mentioned that judges are regularly appointed to head inquiries. Supreme Court justices sometimes take four to six weeks off to sit on the Court of Final Appeal in Hong Kong. One could give many other examples. The idea that the system cannot—
(12 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, this amendment is in my name and those of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, and the noble Lords, Lord Faulks and Lord Hart of Chilton. The amendment arises out of a concern expressed by your Lordships’ Constitution Committee, of which I am a member, and it relates to Clause 4, which will transfer responsibility for the allocation of legal aid from the independent Legal Services Commission to the Lord Chancellor’s Department. Decisions on legal aid in individual cases will henceforth be taken by a civil servant, who will be designated by the Lord Chancellor as the director of legal aid casework.
At paragraph 15 of the Constitution Committee’s report, we expressed a concern as to whether there are sufficient guarantees of independence in the Bill for the director of legal aid casework. The Constitution Committee also noted with concern that Clause 4 says nothing about the qualifications and experience required for such a post. The Joint Committee on Human Rights has, in its report, similarly expressed concern about institutional independence from the Government so as to prevent an appearance of a conflict of interest when decisions are taken about the availability of legal aid and the Government’s decisions may be challenged.
Given the central importance of the functions that will be conferred on this director, it is, I suggest, appropriate, and indeed necessary, to include in Clause 4 provisions that recognise the need for the Lord Chancellor to focus his mind on these issues of qualification and independence. Amendment 13 is not prescriptive as to the details; it leaves the detail to the Lord Chancellor. However, it is essential that this important issue of principle is addressed in the Bill. I beg to move.
My Lords, as is always the case, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has summarised the arguments in support of the amendment with admirable clarity. There is very little that I can add but, looking at these provisions, I should have thought that the Minister—although he may prove me completely wrong—would say, “Of course, that’s exactly what I will do. I will see that the person appointed as director has the qualifications that I consider necessary. How could I do otherwise?”. Likewise, I should have thought that he would say that of course the director must be independent. However, I urge the Minister not to be led astray by some argument on those lines. It is significant that the committees have expressed the concern to which the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, referred with the view that the position should be clearer. I say respectfully that the committees were right to take that view. We are concerned here with access to justice, which is a fundamental constitutional right. Where a right of that sort is involved, it is appropriate that the position is dealt with clearly.
The issue of what sort of civil servant would be appropriate to fill a particular role is always difficult. I remember a time when it was automatically assumed that any Permanent Secretary in what became the Lord Chancellor’s Department would be a qualified member of the Bar or a qualified solicitor. That no longer happens; the days when a barrister or solicitor would perform that role are past.
It is a different type of task that the director will perform. He will have the say-so in determining who is given access to justice—because without legal aid there may be no access to justice, and we all know that that would be a very worrying situation. Therefore, perhaps the Minister will recognise that, irrespective of the good intentions of an officeholder, sometimes it is of benefit if the person concerned is familiar with the subject involved. The experience of senior civil servants filling roles of this sort is that often departments do not feel comfortable with the independence of one of their civil servants who has been—if I may put it this way—seconded for a time to fill an office such as the one about which we are talking. In that situation it is very easy for a department to start giving instructions to “one of their own”—a civil servant whom they see as belonging to the department.
I hope that the Minister will forgive me if I give an example that occurred just before Christmas in connection with the Bill and which caused me to write to him on behalf of two of my noble friends who, with me, wanted to get the assistance of the chief executive of the NHSLA, Steve Walker. A later amendment suggests that there should be a process and a safety net to ensure that, where there might be a claim for medical negligence, a medical report should be obtained prior to litigation being started. We wished to have the advantage of the great experience of that official but were told politely and courteously that he would not be able to give us that assistance because the subject was too political for him to become involved with. I was very surprised and I am now glad that the Minister has properly responded to my concerns—although I have not received his letter—and that the position has been rectified. However, it illustrates how easy it is, when a senior civil servant is on attachment in a role such as that of the director, for those who are experienced in a department not to appreciate how important it is not to interfere with the independent way in which the individual performs their functions. Therefore, these amendments are sensible and I hope that the Minister will feel able to accept them.