Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Pannick and Lord Sentamu

Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Lords Hansard - part one & Report stage
Monday 10th January 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sentamu (CB)]

My Lords, I too support these amendments and thank the Government for their clarity; there were some other sections about which we were not sure in terms of their language. Again, sorry to sound as though I am stuck in a groove: in the Stephen Lawrence inquiry and its recommendations there is a definition of a racist incident and a homophobic incident. Parliament, in the other place, accepted all 70 recommendations. If you want to find how to phrase what the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, is talking about, it is already there in the Stephen Lawrence inquiry report and the recommendations that we made.

The thing about the law is that it must be predictable, easy to understand and not shrouded in mystery. I support the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. The Government need to be clear about this and the language because the other place accepted all 70 recommendations. It is in there, and it would be a mistake not to be very clear about the whole question of these homophobic incidents and the abuse that some people have suffered. I would support the Government in finding that language. They could put in similar words about what they have actually done about racism.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, that it is very important to have clarity that homophobic abuse is here covered. For my part, I understand—I ask the Minister to confirm whether he agrees—that the substance of these amendments does cover homophobic abuse, in particular proposed new subsection (6) of the new clause, which refers to Part 3A of the Public Order Act 1986, which, as I understand it, specifically covers homophobic abuse, as does proposed new subsection (6)(x)(ii), which refers to Section 66(1) of the Sentencing Code, which, again, I understand covers homophobic hostility as well as racial hostility. But clarity is absolutely essential here.

Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill

Debate between Lord Pannick and Lord Sentamu

Tuesday 15th November 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick]

I, too, support the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, on Amendment 1, and his proposal that the imposition of a TPIM should be a judicial and not an administrative act. If restrictions of this nature on basic liberty are to be imposed, they are to be imposed on British citizens, and imposed entirely outside the criminal law process. Surely it is necessary for the procedure to require that they be imposed by judges, particularly when they are being imposed by reason of serious allegations of wrongdoing on the part of the individuals concerned?

The Minister said at Second Reading—and I reminded your Lordships in Committee—that the Government’s approach to this Bill was to try to balance civil liberties and security by ensuring that the Bill goes,

“no further than is absolutely necessary”—[Official Report, 5/10/11; col. 1137.]

in limiting people’s rights. Those were his words. Surely that test, that criterion—which must be the right criterion—requires that these restrictions be imposed only with judicial approval. If the security services, with all the information available to them, are unable to persuade a High Court judge in a closed session, where the material is not disclosed to the individual concerned, that the restrictions are needed, the restrictions should not be imposed at all.

If the Revenue requires a court order before it is able to raid a person’s house in order to seize his documents, surely the Home Secretary should require a court order before she can require that same individual to remain in his house overnight, or not to contact other specified persons, or before she can impose any of the other specific restrictions under a TPIM order.

Your Lordships should have no doubt that for these orders to be imposed by a judge on application by the Home Secretary, and not to be imposed administratively by the Home Secretary herself, would substantially increase confidence in these orders in those sections of the community most suspicious of them.

[The Archbishop of York]

My Lords, this clause gives the Home Secretary power to impose measures for terrorism prevention—so in many ways she is acting like a judge—and investigation, so she is behaving like the DPP. That is not right. You cannot combine functions that belong to the courts and the Director of Public Prosecutions into one person. That is always going to be problematic.

In this country, one of the greatest joys is that no one is deprived of their liberty unless they have committed an offence defined in law, been investigated and gone before a court, which in the end imposes the deprivation of liberty. Of course, you tell me, “This is the United Kingdom; the Home Secretary could never be near this”. In Uganda, if the President felt that you were committing treason, he made an order and you found yourself arrested, locked up and deprived of the possibility of any defence. Of course, you would say, “That is terrible; it should not be like that”. Friends, it happened to me.

Therefore, I feel where you are going at the moment, if you are going to deprive and impose specific measures on a person, surely it should be by application to the courts, and it would be the duty of the Home Secretary to present evidence that persuades a judge. Of course, we will be told that the Home Secretary will act very quickly. As the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, said, it can be done ex parte, very quickly; there is no reason that cannot happen. For the sake of those of us who came to enjoy the separation of the Executive from the judiciary and still see it as the greatest defence for the liberties of people, I hope that the Government will accept that this will be an improvement to the Bill if this separation is made.

There should be no doctrinaire stuff about it. In the end, it cannot really be the same person who does all this. Thank God, I will never be Home Secretary. If I were, I would find this clause terrifying, because in my conscience I would not want to be the judge, jury and executioner all in the same place—and the DPP as well, all combined into one. For the sake, therefore, of keeping this fantastic balance of the Executive and the judiciary never meddling with one another, this legislature would do well to accept all of the amendments that have been tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick. This is what I rejoice about in this country—its liberty and its separation of powers.