Public Order Act 1986 (Serious Disruption to the Life of the Community) Regulations 2023

Debate between Lord Pannick and Lord Lisvane

Tuesday 13th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lisvane (CB)]

My Lords, I make no comment on the merits of the policy that this proposal would introduce; it is the manner in which the Government have proceeded that has caused me, as it has my noble friend Lord Pannick, great concern. The Home Office has behaved in a way for which I can find no kinder word to use than “disreputable”.

For a start, the Explanatory Memorandum—whichever edition we are in now—did not mention the fact that the proposal had been rejected by your Lordships. When the committee quite rightly inquired why that was not mentioned, the reply could have won an Oscar for weasel wording:

“The details that have been included … are those which we … considered relevant to the document”.


When you are caught bang to rights, the proper response is an apology, not an obfuscation. Yet more astonishing —my noble friend Lord Pannick has already referred to this—is that in the section of the Explanatory Notes outlining anything that might be of interest to Parliament or the JCSI, the single word “None” appears.

Then there is the question of consultation. The Home Office ignored the Government’s own consultation principles and consulted on a selective and skewed basis. It brought to mind the Sellar and Yeatman description of the passage in Magna Carta which they alleged said:

“No baron should be tried, except by a special jury of other barons who would understand”.


In this case the Home Office set out to consult a selection of people it knew would support it, not those who might have a different view. A kind description would be that that was “not straightforward”.

Tom Hickman KC, the professor of public law at UCL, who has already been mentioned, pointed out:

“Where a public authority chooses to conduct a consultation process, that consultation must be conducted properly and fairly”.


He pointed to a ruling by the Court of Appeal that a consultation conducted before certain Covid-19 regulations had been unlawful because it had been conducted on an entirely one-sided basis. I do not see how the consultation carried out by the Home Office in this case could be described as proper and fair.

This instrument and the Explanatory Memorandum —again, whichever edition you care to quote—must have been signed off by a Minister. I think we might be told which Minister it was, and which Minister took the view that this was an appropriate way to treat Parliament. I hope the Minister here will be able to tell us. I do not want to see, and I am sure your Lordships do not want to hear, any pabulum about collective responsibility.

As I suggested earlier, I do not take a view about the merits of what this instrument would achieve. My concern is for the way in which Parliament is being treated and for the apparently resentful and sullen way in which the committee’s questions have been answered.

I am sorry—and I do understand what the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, was saying earlier on—that His Majesty’s Opposition do not wish to go further than regretting what is in front of us. Governments shrug off regrets; they make no difference. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, said in the Queen’s Speech debate last year, if we make no difference, why do we not just go on talking? Incidentally, I should tell your Lordships that, in my recent email conversations with the noble and learned Lord, we have focused on England’s chances in The Ashes, and I know that we all send him our warmest good wishes in his convalescence.

This brings me to the fatal amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb. At this point, it is very important to recall that it is a very easy thing for a Government to withdraw an SI, redraft it, relay it and start the process again. It is also—and, of course, the business managers will balk at this—not that difficult to achieve a change by primary legislation in a relatively short time. As some noble Lords have said, that is actually the right way to proceed. It is not just what you want to achieve: it is the propriety of the means that you use to get there. If noble Lords do not want this sort of thing to happen again, we should vote it down, so if the noble Baroness presses her amendment to a Division, I shall support her.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

May I ask the noble Lord whether, with all his decades of experience of parliamentary procedure, he has ever seen a set of regulations that so defies constitutional propriety?

[Lord Lisvane (CB)]

I think the noble Lord will know the answer, and it is no.

Northern Ireland Protocol Bill

Debate between Lord Pannick and Lord Lisvane

Committee stage
Monday 7th November 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, when the purpose and the intended effect of a clause are unclear, it sometimes helps to look at the Explanatory Notes to the Bill. These are produced, of course, by the Government, and are designed to explain. But if we look at the Explanatory Notes to Clause 18, we see that the confusion and uncertainty are even more manifest.

Look at paragraphs 96 to 98 of the Explanatory Notes. Paragraph 96 tells us that:

“Clause 18 clarifies the relationship between powers provided by this Bill and those arising otherwise, including by virtue of the Royal Prerogative.”


That is what Clause 18(2) says. Paragraph 97 deals specifically with Clause 18(1). It says:

“Subsection (1) provides that Ministers can engage in conduct (i.e.”—


and I emphasise that it is “i.e.” and not “e.g.”—

“sub-legislative activity, such as producing guidance) relevant to the Northern Ireland Protocol if they consider it appropriate in connection with one or more of the purposes of this Bill.”

If that is the intended purpose of Clause 18(1), why not say so? Why not limit the scope of Clause 18(1) specifically to say that Ministers can produce guidance? We could then have a debate about whether it is properly drafted, whether it is too broad or whether there should be some controls. I am afraid that what we find in Clause 18(1) bears no relationship whatever to what the Explanatory Notes tell us that Clause 18(1) is designed to achieve. My conclusion from that is that there must be real doubt here; that Ministers know what Clause 18(1) is designed to achieve and are reluctant to be specific because they do not want proper controls on the scope of their powers.

[Lord Lisvane (CB)]

To follow the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, I wonder whether one route might be for the Minister to give us a glimpse behind the veil. What were the instructions given to parliamentary counsel? In other words, what were they asked to achieve by means of Clause 18(2)?

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Lord Pannick and Lord Lisvane

Committee: 11th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 28th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lisvane (CB)]

My Lords, this amendment is in my name and those of my noble friend Lord Pannick, my noble and learned friend Lord Judge and the noble Lord, Lord Tyler. It is grouped with Amendment 355ZZA in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted, which I venture to suggest has a great deal of merit.

Amendment 355 may appear to address a minor matter but it is an important matter of principle. The exception from the duty to publish provided by paragraph 2(1) of Schedule 5 depends on a Minister being satisfied that a relevant instrument, as defined in paragraph 1(2) of the schedule, has not become or will not become on exit day retained direct EU legislation. I entirely appreciate the argument that, in that case, there may be little point in publishing some or all of it. However, where the argument goes off course is that, while paragraph 2(2) allows a Minister to give a direction to the Queen’s printer not to publish a specified instrument or a category of instruments, paragraph 2(3) allows this to be done by mere ministerial direction.

The Delegated Powers Committee, of which the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, and I are both members, was critical of this. At paragraph 49 of its 12th report, the committee said:

“Amending the law by direction … is highly unusual. The delegated powers memorandum”—


that is, the Government’s delegated powers memorandum to the committee—

“justifies this on the ground that it is a ‘limited administrative power’. Even so, to allow Ministers to amend the law by a mere direction, with no associated parliamentary procedure, sets an ominous precedent. Such a direction is what Henry VIII might have called a proclamation”.

It does not matter that this power is proposed to be used in relatively uncontroversial circumstances and that the identification of any instrument or category of instruments may be relatively straightforward. The important point is what the Delegated Powers Committee calls an “ominous precedent”. This may seem a little Cassandra-like, although I think that the Delegated Powers Committee is believed rather more often than was Cassandra with her repeated nul points, but, right on schedule, along comes the Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Bill, which makes much use of the unwelcome concept of making law by public notice—in effect, by proclamation, with no role at all for Parliament.

In the referendum campaign, much was made of parliamentary sovereignty, and it has been a recurrent theme of our debates in Committee. I suggest that we should be sharply aware of procedures or processes that tend to diminish or extinguish the role of Parliament in favour of that of the Executive. I beg to move.

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, I have added my name to this amendment and I agree entirely with what my noble friend Lord Lisvane has said. I simply add that sub-paragraph (3) is also objectionable. It states:

“A Minister of the Crown must publish any direction under this paragraph”.


However, it does not even say how or where the Minister is to publish. It gives complete discretion to the Minister.

I also have a wider concern about paragraph 2: that is, the power for the Minister to create an exception to the duty of the Queen’s printer to publish retained direct EU legislation. The Minister recognised in the previous debate, and appropriately so, the importance of the law being publicly identifiable so that everyone knows what the corpus of retained EU law is. However, paragraph 2 contradicts that. To give a discretion to the Minister to exclude something from the material that is to be published by the Queen’s printer if the Minister takes the view that a relevant instrument will not become direct EU legislation leaves matters completely uncertain. I suggest that a much more sensible approach is that, if the Minister takes the view that a particular instrument is not becoming retained direct EU legislation, the Minister should have a duty to ensure that it is not included in the material that is to be published by the Queen’s printer.

What we want, and what the public are entitled to have, is a body of material that in the view of the Government constitutes the retained direct EU legislation that is to become part of our law. These matters should not be left to the discretion of Ministers.