(1 year, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I think we need to remind ourselves that the United Kingdom is a party to the torture convention. The amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, raised a red flag in my mind because, when I saw the word “torture” and the implication in his amendment that Clause 28 as it stands could extend to granting immunity for acts of torture, that seemed to me plainly contrary to our obligations under the torture convention.
It is worth remembering two things about that convention. The first is that all states parties to it are prohibited from authorising torture in any circumstance. It is also an unusual convention because it creates a universal jurisdiction; in other words, any state party which finds somebody who has committed torture within its jurisdiction, wherever he comes from, can prosecute that individual for the act of torture. The idea of granting immunity from acts of torture, which is what this clause seems to do, is a false idea because you certainly cannot do that with regard to other states parties to the torture convention.
It seems to me that Clause 28 is fraught with danger for that reason. Therefore, I very much support the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson.
My Lords, may I add one footnote to the powerful speeches by my noble friends on these Benches? To confer blanket immunity may well have a counterproductive consequence, which is that the alleged victim may well be able to provoke the procedures of the International Criminal Court to be applied against persons in this jurisdiction. That would be extremely unfortunate.
(2 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I do not share the concerns that have just been expressed. It seems to me that Amendment 104E makes it very clear what the mischief is; it is making it a condition of access to accommodation that sexual services are provided. We all know what that means, and juries will know what it means. It is a real mischief and it needs to be addressed. If the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, divides the House on Amendments 104E and 104F, he will certainly have my support.
However, I have concerns about the drafting of Amendment 104F. My concern is that in several places it uses the concept of “arranging” an offence—not simply facilitating the offence but arranging or facilitating it. I do not really understand what the difference is and what is added by “arranging an offence”. I am not myself aware of other contexts where that concept has been used. It is a very vague concept and, I think, a rather undesirable one.
I am also troubled by proposed new subsection (3)(c) of Amendment 104F, which makes it an offence if a publisher is informed that its actions
“had enabled the arrangement of or facilitated an offence”
and it then
“failed to take remedial action within a reasonable time.”
All that is extremely unclear and uncertain as to the ingredients of the offence. No doubt that can be dealt with at Third Reading if others share my view. I emphasise that I support the amendments, but I draw attention to those matters that cause me concern.
My Lords, I have one point to add to what has been said by my noble friend Lord Pannick. The word “publisher” troubles me a bit. It is not defined in the amendment, and I am not quite sure what that word is directed to. Is it somebody in business as a publisher or somebody who simply publishes something, describing the activity rather than the trade? The amendment would be improved if something was said in it as to what exactly is meant by the word “publisher”.
My Lords, I pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, for pursuing this important matter, and to the Minister for his engagement on a number of occasions with those of us who support the noble Baroness and are concerned about this. During those discussions, I expressed the view that it is striking that there is such a radical difference of view between the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, with her enormous expertise in this area, and civil servants as to how the system is working in practice. I therefore suggested to the Minister that one way forward in this important area would be for him to agree that there should be an independent assessment—an independent inquiry—of an outfacing nature that can rely on the expertise of the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, and others in order to inform the department as to the way forward. That seems to be a constructive way forward, and I very much hope that the Minister will be able to say that the department is prepared to do that.
My Lords, I too pay tribute to my noble friend Lady Coussins for the determination with which she has pursued this argument. As a user of the court, it is crucial to have complete confidence in the interpreter. Most of us do not have the complete gift of language—which perhaps my noble friend has—over a wide range of languages. You have to rely on the interpreter; confidence in what the interpreter is doing is crucial to the way the proceedings are conducted, so the highest standards should be aimed for. I must say, I am surprised that it is taking so long for the advice my noble friend has offered to be accepted and put into practice.
(2 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am very happy to stand up for womanhood and motherhood, but this amendment is very puzzling indeed. What it would mean is that even if a person born male has lived as a woman for 20 years, even if they have undergone sex reassignment surgery, even if they have a gender recognition certificate, and even if they are assessed as posing no risk whatever to other women, the Home Office would be obliged either to place them in a men’s prison or put them in specially segregated facilities. The former option of putting them in a men’s prison would be a disaster; it would obviously be enormously dangerous to such a person. Placing them in specially segregated facilities would be demeaning; it would fail to recognise what legislation in this country has recognised for the last at least 15 years: that people who happen to be born in the wrong sex deserve our compassion and deserve recognition of their position.
I suggest to the House that these issues are far better addressed, as they are at the moment, by Home Office policy that considers the circumstances of the individual case, rather than by broad amendments of this nature, whatever the good faith of those who put them forward.
My Lords, I warmly support what my noble friend Lord Pannick has just said. It is a great mistake, certainly at this stage in our affairs, to attempt to legislate in this matter. It may be that the prison estate will be big enough in years to come so that one can segregate by gender reassignment in special prisons of their own, but we are nowhere near that at the moment and the proper way to deal with this is to rely on the discretion that exists at present.
It is quite striking if you look at the wording of the amendment—it makes no distinction between whether we are talking about male or female prisoners, but very different situations arise depending on which of these two characteristics you are considering. It makes no distinction for the time that the person may have lived in that new assignment. It makes no distinction, either, for the extent of the surgery and the appearance of the person over time as the reassignment process takes place.
It is very difficult for those of us who, I assume, have not faced this to appreciate the intense emotional problem that people who believe that they have been born into the wrong sex undergo. It is a very emotional matter, fighting against characteristics you have acquired that you do not believe belong to you. The way you deal with it is to believe that you are actually of the sex—of the gender, I should say—that you think you should have been. That involves not only reconstruction of the body but a mentality designed entirely to live the new life, which you believe is the one you should have been given. It strikes me as very cruel, if I may use that expression, to treat these people as if they had not reassigned themselves. It is not a choice. They are driven by the characteristics they acquired which forced them into their decision.
I make these points just to emphasise that we are dealing here with a very difficult problem. The offender requires as much consideration on the grounds of safety and emotional distress as the people around them in the prison in which they are placed. Legislation is not the way to go, certainly not at the moment. I personally have complete confidence in the way that the prison authorities are dealing with this very difficult problem at the moment.
(4 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I agree with the points made so forcefully by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton. My concern about the width of Clause 2 arises from the discussions and conclusions on this Bill in your Lordships’ Constitution Committee, of which I am a member. The noble and learned Lord has already mentioned the relevant paragraphs of our report, HL Paper 55, which we published on 4 May, and perhaps I may add very briefly to what he has said.
The Constitution Committee recognised that many of the international agreements to which Clause 2 would apply are technical in nature, and it recognised that the text of an international agreement cannot easily be changed, or be changed at all, after negotiations have concluded—points emphasised at various stages by the Minister. However, we take the view that that is no justification for allowing the law of this country to be changed by statutory instrument in this context without full parliamentary debate. That is because important policy decisions might arise in this context both on whether to implement an international agreement in domestic law and on the manner in which such an agreement is to be implemented.
International agreements often recognise a discretion for signatory states on a variety of matters, some of them of considerable policy interest and concern. Those policy decisions should be the subject of detailed debate and possible amendment of a Bill on the Floor of the House—or whatever the remote equivalent of the Floor of the House is. Those policy decisions should not be for Ministers to decide by unamendable regulations in relation to which there can be only limited debate.
I emphasise that this is not emergency legislation; it is a proposal from the Government for a permanent shift in power to the Executive. In Committee, the Minister did not make out any case for such a change in the law. If the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, divides the House, he will have my support.
My Lords, the matter has been so fully covered by the speeches already made that I have little to add, other than my full support for what has been said. However, I wish to emphasise three points.
First, the devolution arrangements in this clause have always troubled me. I refer to what I see as a lack of clarity about whether it is the Scottish Ministers or the Secretary of State who will exercise the powers referred to in Clause 2(1) in relation to “implementing” the international agreement on the one hand and “applying” it on the other. This is an indication, surely, that the Bill is seeking to crowd too much into this clause. It would be far better to leave these matters to primary legislation according to the ordinary and well-understood rules as to which legislature is to deal with what, according to what is reserved and what is not.
Secondly, the umbrella phrase “any international agreement”—I stress the word “any”—indicates that it is intended to catch a wide variety of international transactions relating to private international law. At present, leaving aside Lugano, we have no idea of what they might be. It seems likely, however, that they will not be many, but any one of them could be very important and raise issues which should not be left to the exercise of Executive power. The pressure on Parliament if we were to proceed by way of a Public Bill in the ordinary way and not by way of statutory instrument would be quite limited. Therefore, it is hard to see why we have to go down this road at all.
Thirdly, there is no sunset clause in the Bill. I could understand it if it had been intended to deal only with measures that needed to be in force before the end of the implementation period or measures that were otherwise urgent and short term, but, without such a clause, this Bill is entirely open ended. Committing all international agreements to the statutory instrument procedure at Westminster and in the devolved legislatures as a permanent feature of our law, whatever the political situation might be, seems to be highly undesirable.
(5 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberThere could be the possibility of a challenge if this point had any substance to it. I am concerned that we do not adopt or approve a statutory instrument without consideration of this point. The alternative would be to have a statutory instrument that specifies 12 April as exit day and if, as we approach that day, it appears that the date for us leaving the EU will be later than that, a further amending statutory instrument is brought forward.
I emphasise that I am not telling the House that this is, in my view, a fatal amendment to this statutory instrument. I am raising a concern that has been expressed by some lawyers about this point. I would welcome it if the Leader were to consider the point—with the law officers if appropriate—and address it tomorrow.
It is not just a question of alternatives, is it? If you look at the text of the first alternative, you cannot determine what the date is by looking at the words in the instrument. Is that the point that the noble Lord is seeking to make?
There are two points. You cannot tell the date on which we are to leave simply by reading the statutory instrument, and that date, on the drafting of the statutory instrument, depends on an external event which is certainly not within our control.
(5 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I have added my name to this amendment because I share the concern expressed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, that it is simply not appropriate for Explanatory Notes to be used as the means by which overbroad powers enjoyed by the Minister are to be confined. I will add one point, however: the Minister gave an answer to the concern that we are all expressing. The answer was given in a letter on 19 February to the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor of Bolton, the much respected chairman of the Constitution Committee. In her response to the Constitution Committee’s report, the Minister suggested that the courts would apply a well- established legal presumption that, if powers were intended to be used for any of the purposes set out in the amendment, there would have to be an express reference to that effect in the legislation. Indeed, the Minister also expressed concern that this amendment, if accepted and written into the Bill, would undermine this legal presumption in relation to other legislation that does not include an express reference to these limitations.
My concern about that argument is that these powers are being conferred in this Bill in a Brexit context. The Minister’s letter emphasises that the Government are going to use the Clause 2 powers only to implement obligations and agreements that seek to provide continuity in respect of those already signed by the EU. My concern is that in this specific legislative context it might be said that when a Brexit Bill of this nature does not contain these express limits on the Minister’s powers—the limits set out in the amendment—it should be contrasted with Section 8 of the main Brexit Act, the European Union (Withdrawal) Act, which expressly contains restrictions that are similar but not identical to these limitations. It is my concern that such a contrast might be drawn in this context.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, made the important point that the Pepper v Hart principle is a troublesome one but, if the Government are not going to accept this amendment, at the very least it would be helpful for the Minister to give the House the clearest possible response to it, in the terms set out in her letter—that the Government understand that the powers in Clause 2 do not extend to the sensitive issues—so that her comments could if necessary be relied on in court proceedings under the Pepper v Hart principle.
My Lords, we should be very grateful to the Constitution Committee for drawing our attention to this matter, which might otherwise not have been observed. I shall add just a few short points to those that have been made. The first is to stress the importance of the words in subsection (5), to which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, drew our attention:
“Regulations under subsection (1) may, among other things, make provision—”.
It is the words “among other things” that cause me concern. They appear in the Healthcare (International Arrangements) Bill as well: they seem to be a feature creeping in to this kind of legislation, which is quite disturbing. If we find that phrase, I suggest that we have to be even more exacting in setting out the qualifications to the power, otherwise the words “among other things” may be used to expand the power in a way that we have not foreseen. It is really very important, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, pointed out, that we take those words into account in what we make of this amendment.
My second point is to reinforce what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said about the comparison between Section 8 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 and what we have now, in reply to the point that we do not need to be concerned about that, because express provision would be needed for a regulation that sought, for example, to create a criminal offence. These exceptions, or almost exactly the same ones, are expressly set out in Section 8(7) as,
“regulations … may not … impose or increase taxation or fees … create a relevant criminal offence … establish a public authority”.
If it was thought appropriate to put those qualifications in that very important subsection, which does not contain the words “among other things”, I should have thought it was all the more important to have them here.
My last point is made with reference to the point made about Lord Steyn’s use of Explanatory Notes. I had the privilege of sitting with Lord Steyn for a number of years and of discussing with him how Explanatory Notes might be used. I do not think that at any point in our discussion he suggested to me that Explanatory Notes could be regarded as a form of legislation or its equivalent—certainly not. He was referring to them as a means of understanding ambiguities in legislation; he thought that one could look to the Explanatory Notes to understand the legislation one was seeking to explain. That was his point, and it was made in a number of cases where I agreed with him. It would be a mistake to think that he was embarking on something outside the normal use of Explanatory Notes, which is to explain but not to legislate. For these reasons and the others mentioned, I warmly support the amendment that the noble and learned Lord has brought to our attention.
(5 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberI am very grateful. I do not have immediate access to that judgment, but perhaps the Minister can provide the House with some assistance in relation to it. Can the Minister also confirm what I understood her to say: no information will be provided abroad under the Bill, unless and until there is an agreement with the relevant state—here the United States? My understanding—again, I think the noble Baroness said this, but I should like her to confirm—is that before any such agreement has practical effect, it must be put before this House and the other place for approval. Ratification cannot take place unless and until, under CRaG 2010, Parliament has had that opportunity. It seems that is the time at which both Houses of Parliament can consider whether they wish to approve such an agreement, if it does not contain the sort of assurance that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, is seeking.
I can respond to two of the noble Lord’s points. First, I am happy to agree with him about the stages in which we are moving, which was my earlier point: we are at the preliminary stage of negotiation, rather than the CRaG stage. As for whether the provision of information over which we have control is a breach, that is still open to question. That is why I said that I realised it had not been tested. I was certainly thinking about the very point that the noble Lord makes. It is quite different if you have an individual—that is absolutely plain—but if you are gathering information nevertheless, it runs up to the big question of whether that is a breach. It is an uncertain point, so we have to be very careful.
I am entirely in agreement with the noble and learned Lord. All I was saying was that I would not wish to assert to the House that it would be a breach of our international obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights to provide information to another state in circumstances where we are not extraditing a person to that state. The courts and the European court may take a different view. I have no doubt that in the legal proceedings arising from the case referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, one of the grounds of challenge would have been that this is a breach of the human rights of the individual concerned, who, as a consequence of our providing the information, may face a death penalty. That is why I should like the Minister to give any further assistance to the House on what the court said.
(7 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 86BA, in my name. It concerns the application of data protection principles in the context of the law of trusts. The law has long recognised that a trustee is not obliged to disclose to a beneficiary the trustee’s confidential reasons for exercising or not exercising a discretionary power. This is known as the Londonderry principle, named after a case decided by the Court of Appeal, reported in 1965, Chancery Division, page 9.1.8. The rationale of this principle was helpfully summarised by Mr Justice Briggs—recently elevated to the Supreme Court—in the case of Breakspear v Ackland, 2009, Chancery, page 32, at paragraph 54.
The principle is that the exercise by trustees of their discretionary powers is confidential. It is in the interests of the beneficiaries, because it enables the trustees to make discreet but thorough inquiries as to the competing claims for consideration for benefit. Mr Justice Briggs added that such confidentiality also advances the proper interests of the administration of trusts, because it reduces the scope for litigation about how trustees have exercised their discretion, and encourages suitable people to accept office as trustees, undeterred by a concern that their discretionary deliberations might be challenged by disappointed or hostile beneficiaries and that they will be subject to litigation in the courts.
There is, of course, a public interest here, which is protected by the inherent jurisdiction of the court to supervise and, where appropriate, intervene in the administration of trusts, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe, stated for the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Schmidt v Rosewood Trust Ltd, 2003, 2 AC 709.
The problem is that, as presently drafted, the Bill would confer a right on beneficiaries to see information about themselves unless a specific exemption is included. A recent Court of Appeal judgment in Dawson-Damer v Taylor Wessing, 2017, EWCA Civ 74, drew attention to the general applicability of data protection law in this context unless a specific exemption is enacted.
My understanding, which is indirect—I declare an interest as a barrister, but this is not an area in which I normally practise—is that in other jurisdictions such as Jersey, the data protection legislation contains a statutory restriction on the rights of a data subject to make a subject access request where that would intrude on the trustees’ confidentiality under the Londonderry principle. Indeed, I am told that those who practise in this area are very concerned that offshore trustees and offshore professionals who provide trust services are already actively encouraging the transfer of trust business away from this jurisdiction because of the data protection rights which apply here, and which will apply under the Bill.
The irony is that the data protection law is driving trust business towards less transparent offshore jurisdictions and away from the better regulated English trust management businesses. I have received persuasive representations on this subject from the Trust Law Committee, a group of leading academics and practitioners, and I acknowledge the considerable assistance I have received on this matter from Simon Taube QC and James MacDougald.
This is plainly a very technical matter, but it is one of real public interest. I hope that the Minister will be able to consider this issue favourably before Report.
My Lords, I want to add a word in support of the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, particularly with reference to the concerns that some people have expressed about money being moved out of the very closely and properly regulated regime of English trust law to offshore organisations and jurisdictions which are less careful about how people’s money is handled.
I should declare an interest as Chief Justice of the Abu Dhabi Global Market Courts. I am not suggesting that this has anything to do with Abu Dhabi, but it has introduced me to an aspect of trust law with which I was not previously familiar, and it bears closely on the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. He referred to Jersey as one of the jurisdictions of concern. One aspect of its legislation which has come to my attention through my connection with Abu Dhabi is the Foundations (Jersey) Law 2009. This is a structure set up by statute under Jersey law which is matched with an equivalent statute in Guernsey. It creates a form of trust which is, as it were, a hybrid between a trust and a corporation with a number of aspects that are described very well in Sections 25 and 26 of the Jersey law.
One of the points about the foundation, which appears in Section 25, is that a,
“beneficiary under a foundation … has no interest in the foundation’s assets; and … is not owed by the foundation or by a person appointed under the regulations of the foundation a duty that is or is analogous to a fiduciary duty”.
So the beneficiary under that system is rather different from a beneficiary under our system, where undoubtedly they have an interest in the foundation’s assets. But also to the point is Section 26, which provides that foundations are,
“not obliged to provide information”.
That has its counterpart in the point made about the Data Protection Act in that jurisdiction. It says that except,
“as specifically required by or under this Law or by the charter or regulations of the foundation, a foundation is not required to provide any person … with any information about the foundation”.
It goes on to say in subsection (2) that the,
“information mentioned in paragraph (1) includes, in particular, information about … the administration of the foundation … the manner in which its assets are being administered … its assets; and … the way in which it is carrying out its objects”.
I do not wish in any way to criticise how the foundation laws are run in Guernsey or Jersey, but it is a pattern which, if repeated in less scrupulous jurisdictions, has obvious attractions. People move into a foundation and nobody knows what part of the foundation money they own, because they are not supposed to own any part of it, and the foundation is not obliged to disclose any information at all. There is a risk that those who are keen, for whatever reason—it could even be for matrimonial reasons—to conceal their assets could move them offshore from a trust such as we have in this country, closely regulated and subject to the ordinary rules, to one of these other bodies, which we would not wish to encourage. One has only to look at the Criminal Finances Act 2017 and some of the clauses in the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill that is before the House to see that we are taking a completely opposite line to the foundations laws, because we are insisting that we should be provided with information about what organisations of this kind hold and, indeed, who holds what assets. We have not got as far as actually requiring trusts to do that but, certainly, anyone who puts his money into a company, in an attempt to conceal his assets within the company, will be forced eventually to have that information disclosed.
I add these points to suggest that the point that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, made has a great deal of substance, which one can trace through the foundations law. I stress again that I am not criticising how this is administered in Jersey or Guernsey—that is not really the point. The point is that those who would wish to copy their systems are subject to less close scrutiny. I also emphasise that I am not suggesting that we in this country would want to adopt a foundations law; that would really be quite contrary to how our current legislation is proceeding. So there is an important issue here about protecting ourselves—and those who set up trusts here and administer them properly according to our rules and conventions—against a loss of business, which would be detrimental not only to those who run the businesses but to the whole ethic by which we practise our trust law.
I hope that the Minister and those advising him will look carefully at the Jersey and Guernsey examples, with a view not to criticism but to sensing the risk to which the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, drew our attention.
(9 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, Oxford is well represented today. I declare an interest as a fellow of All Souls College. I find this a genuinely difficult issue. I am supportive of the Government’s general objectives in Part 5; far more supportive, I think, than some of the speakers who have addressed noble Lords this afternoon, particularly in the earlier debate.
It seems to me that the starting point has to be that there is a disturbingly large number of people out there who are prepared to take violent action for ideological and religious reasons. There is an even more disturbingly large number of people who are prepared to encourage or to condone such violence. For me, the most shocking part of the appalling events in Paris were not the attacks on the journalists and the kosher supermarket by deranged Islamists, it was that a minute’s silence for the victims was unenforceable in many French schools, because of sympathy for the murderers and their supposed cause from students and, presumably, their families. This demonstrates, I think, that in France there is an alarming failure to understand the basic principles of a liberal democracy; a democracy which protects the freedom of religion—rightly so—of those who refuse to recognise the basic rights of others.
My starting point is that the Government are rightly determined to prevent such developments here; developments which breed religion-inspired violence. Having said that, I share the concerns which have been expressed this afternoon about the impact of these provisions on freedom of expression and academic freedom in universities. My concern is very similar to that of the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy. It is that the duty which the Bill will impose is very difficult to reconcile with the very idea of a university whose primary role is to encourage academic debate and dissent. I think that a code which can be enforced by legally binding directions is far too blunt an instrument in the context of a lecture hall or a seminar room. If you try to wear a policeman’s hat and an academic gown at the same time, you are unlikely, I think, to perform either task adequately.
The Minister’s helpful letter to noble Lords on this issue makes the point that academic freedom is not absolute, even in a university. The Minister is absolutely right: the law already restrains freedom of speech, in universities as elsewhere, through the law of defamation, restrictions on threatening or abusive words or behaviour, and prohibitions on support for proscribed organisations. Universities have no exemption in that context, but this Bill would impose duties that are far more extensive and far more destructive of basic academic freedom than anything which is contained in current law.
I would prefer universities to be excluded from Part 5, but would be much reassured on this difficult subject if the Government would support Amendment 105, in the name of the noble Baronesses, Lady Lister of Burtersett, Lady O’Loan, Lady Buscombe and Lady Sharp of Guildford, or something like it. Their amendment would write into the Bill the protection for freedom of speech currently contained, as your Lordships have heard, in Section 43(1) of the Education (No. 2) Act 1986. I note that, in the Minister’s letter to noble Lords, he says that the duty under the Bill,
“is in no way designed to cut across the importance of free and open debate”,
particularly in universities. Good, I am very pleased to hear that. But then let the Bill say so expressly, to provide reassurance to the many good people in universities and elsewhere who are very concerned, and rightly so, about this issue.
My Lords, I entirely support the points that have been made by all noble Lords who have spoken in favour of these amendments. I have a rather particular point to make about wording, which I do as a former chancellor of the University of Strathclyde, which of course is in Scotland.
Clause 41(1) makes it clear that Part 5 of the Bill applies to Scotland as well as to England and Wales—it does not apply to Northern Ireland, as the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, said. However, this gives rise to a problem about drafting. One has to be absolutely sure when one refers to legislation—as, for example, Amendment 105 does, along with Amendment 108 and others—that the legislation referred to applies to Scotland as well as to England and Wales. The problem with Amendment 105—which I entirely support in principle—is that Section 43(1) of the Education (No. 2) Act 1986 applies only to England and Wales, and does not apply to Scotland. The right to freedom of speech, and all the points that have been made in favour of the exercise of freedom of speech and about the difficulties of enforcing measures of the kind that we are talking about and so on and so forth, have just as much power and effect north of the border as they do in England and Wales. If Amendment 105 were to be agreed with the form of words which it has at the moment, it would create difficulties north of the border. That could be cured very easily by simply taking out the reference to,
“the duty in section 43(1)”,
of the 1986 Act, and substituting the words “the need to ensure that freedom of speech is maintained”. Freedom of speech in Scotland is deeply ingrained in the law of the country by, for example, Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. One of the features of the 1986 Act is that it was passed some years before the Human Rights Act 1998 was enacted. Nowadays, you look to the convention rights in the Human Rights Act to see whether you have a right that you wish to assert. It is certainly true that Section 43 goes rather further and is quite detailed about the nature of the duty, but I have searched as best I can through the legislation in Scotland and, so far as I can see, there is no equivalent provision in either the education Acts or the university Acts in Scotland, which cover the same field.
(10 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I shall speak also to Amendment 165. Your Lordships now turn to Clause 73, which concerns the costs of interveners in judicial review proceedings. Your Lordships will know that often in judicial review cases the court allows a person or body to intervene because they have knowledge or experience which may assist it in resolving the legal issues. Clause 73 states that interveners may not receive their costs other than in “exceptional circumstances”, and it adds—this is my concern—that, unless there are exceptional circumstances, an intervener must pay any costs that have been incurred by a party as a result of that intervention.
I cannot understand why such a provision is necessary or appropriate. The current legal position is clear and fair: the court has discretion over whether to order a party to the judicial review to pay the intervener’s costs or whether to order the intervener to pay costs to a party. Clause 73 is manifestly unfair. It will create a strong presumption that the intervener must pay costs, even if the intervention is helpful to the court in raising points that assist it in arriving at its substantive judgment. The Minister may say that the intervener can resist paying costs on the basis that there are “exceptional circumstances”, but there is nothing exceptional about the intervener assisting the court: it happens every week in judicial review cases. In any event, if there is a statutory presumption, rebuttable only by showing exceptional circumstances, that the intervener must pay the costs, public interest bodies will be far less likely to intervene. The courts will be denied assistance from those public interest bodies, which will be greatly to the public detriment and greatly to the detriment of the legal system, whether the intervention is from Liberty, the GMC, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees or, indeed, the Home Secretary—because a number of interventions in judicial review cases are made by government departments. None of this makes any sense whatever.
Amendment 164 would provide that it is a matter for the discretion of the court whether to order costs to be paid by or to an intervener. I commend that amendment to the House. I beg to move.
I support the amendment. It is a feature of Clause 73, as I am sure the Minister will have noticed, that it does not mention the Supreme Court—one should be thankful for small mercies—but it creates a very unbalanced situation. As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has explained, interventions are extremely helpful. Nobody has a right to intervene—courts at every level give permission if they are persuaded that the intervention would be of use to them—so that I cannot see that there is any compelling reason for turning interveners away. The court values them, and certainly, from the point of view of the Supreme Court, in my experience where we allow an intervention we derive benefit from it.
The regime that the clause seeks to create seems rather unbalanced. From the Supreme Court’s point of view, as we are a court of appeal, it would much rather, I am sure, that those who had a point to make were able to make it at the Court of Appeal level if not at the level of the High Court. While I welcome the absence of the Supreme Court from this clause, it adds to my feeling that there is something wrong about it. Given that the intervener has no right to intervene and that the courts are perfectly capable of controlling the volume of intervention and the time taken by interveners, which the Supreme Court does regularly, I cannot see any value in the reform, if one can call it that, that the clause seeks to bring about.
(10 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, Amendments 17, 18 and 19 are in my name and that of my noble and learned friend Lord Hope of Craighead. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Taylor, the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, the Immigration Minister, Mr James Brokenshire, and members of the Bill team for the helpful—to me, at least—meeting that we had last week.
Your Lordships had a wide-ranging debate on Clause 18 in Committee. These amendments have a narrow focus. Amendments 17 and 18 address the parts of Clause 18 that tell courts and tribunals to give little weight to private life in defined circumstances—for example, where a relationship with a British citizen was established in this country at a time when the claimant was here unlawfully. Amendment 19 addresses the provision that says that the public interest requires deportation in defined circumstances.
These amendments would modify the absolute nature of the relevant parts of Clause 18. My understanding from the debates that we had in Committee is that there is no dispute from the Government about two propositions; I would welcome assurances on this. The first proposition, which I understand to be uncontroversial, is that there may be compassionate cases—it may be unusual, but there may be cases—where, on the particular facts, Article 8 requires more than little weight to be given to the relevant factors; or where Article 8 requires no deportation despite the terms of new Section 117C. Such cases may be unusual or out of the ordinary, but they are at least conceivable.
The second proposition, which I understand to be uncontroversial—again, I would welcome assurance on that—is that the Government, I think, accept that if the court or the tribunal concludes that Article 8 requires more than little weight to be attached to the factors in a particular unusual case, or Article 8 requires no deportation, the domestic court or tribunal must apply Article 8. That clause is not intended in any way to amend the obligations of the courts or the tribunal under the Human Rights Act. My understanding—I urge the Minister to correct me if I am wrong—is that Clause 18 is not intended in any way to override the principle stated by Lord Bingham of Cornhill for the Appellate Committee in 2008 in the case of EB (Kosovo) at paragraph 12, that,
“the appellate immigration authority must make its own judgment and that judgment will be strongly influenced by the particular facts and circumstances of the particular case … there is in general no alternative to making a careful and informed evaluation of the facts of the particular case. The search for a hard-edged or bright-line rule to be applied to the generality of cases is incompatible with the difficult evaluative exercise which article 8 requires”.
These amendments seek to ensure that there is consistency between the wording of Clause 18 and the obligations of courts and tribunals. The helpful letter dated 28 March from the noble Lord, Lord Taylor, pointed out, accurately, that it is far from unique for legislation to identify matters for courts to take into account, and the noble Lord gave a number of examples. However, in each of those examples Parliament told courts and tribunals to have regard to particular principles or factors. In none of those examples did Parliament tell courts and tribunals what conclusion to reach. My concern remains the absence of any recognition in the clause as drafted that they may be cases where the Government’s preferred result is not consistent with Article 8. My concern is the suggestion in the legislation that the court or tribunal should arrive at a particular result even though the Government, as I understand it, recognise that the court or tribunal will be required to enforce Article 8.
A long time ago, AP Herbert wrote the very entertaining Misleading Cases. My concern is that Clause 18 is misleading legislation, and we ought to do something about it. I beg to move.
My Lords, I added my name to the noble Lord’s amendment because I, too, find it difficult to know quite how the court will deal with a particular case where it feels that more than little weight should be attached to the various matters referred to in the various paragraphs that are under consideration. It is quite striking when you look back—as I invited the noble and learned Lord to do a moment ago—to the earlier part of new Section 117A, that there is no attempt to modify, appeal or amend Section 6 of the Human Rights Act itself. If you go to Section 6, of course it takes you back to Section 2, which tells the court that, in considering whether there is a breach of the duty under Section 6, it must take into account decisions of the Strasbourg court.
It is not inconceivable, although it may be unusual, there could be a real problem for a court which is following the Human Rights Act directions and is trying to take account of what one finds in new Section 117A, bearing in mind the point that the noble and learned Lord made to me not very long ago about the purpose of setting this out in the Bill. I think that I entirely understood him to say that the purpose of this was to lay down clear guidance to the court, which the court is expected to follow. I absolutely understand the reasons why the Minister says that, but that makes it all the more important, I respectfully suggest, for the Government to avoid the temptation to be too prescriptive about the conclusions that must be reached.
The problem that comes up so often when one thinks about this sort of thing is that legislation is a fairly blunt instrument. Last week, we debated the IPP legislation; the previous Administration set out tests that the judges were required to apply in sentencing prisoners to indefinite terms of imprisonment, but it turned out that in practice the judges had to sentence people to draconian sentences more often than they would have done if left to themselves, which created a very real administrative problem for the Government. That is an example of how a blunt instrument can be too blunt and can avoid dealing with a case in the way that Lord Bingham of Cornhill explained in the case of EB (Kosovo), to which I was also a party.
It really is important to avoid being too prescriptive. Use of the word “normally” gives us that little bit of leeway. If it is not there, the court is driven to finding another way round the problem and, if it finds the prescriptive language in the various subsections that we are looking at, it will have another look at the way in which the whole chapter was introduced by the phrase to which I drew attention earlier: “must have regard to”. Then it will say, “All right, it’s a rule, but it’s not something that we must follow because we have only to have regard to it”. That takes us back to the debate about the Strasbourg court that I was talking about; those who do not particularly like to be told what to do by Strasbourg would rather not have regard to it, because they do not feel that they are obliged to.
If the Minister would like, as I think he would, to have courts regard these as principles or rules to which they should always have regard in the interests of the public at large, I suggest that we should avoid the trap that has been created, otherwise the courts in these unusual cases will feel that they have to find another solution. That may, in the longer run, be more damaging to the overall package that has been put forward in the interests of trying to solve this problem. Once you undermine the basic philosophy that the Minister is putting across, which I understand, by creating this trap for the courts in these particular cases by telling them what the conclusion must be, you begin to devalue the whole package. I think the Minister would rather not do that. That is why I felt that I should support the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and his amendment.