Localism Bill

Debate between Lord Pannick and Lord Greaves

Monday 31st October 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick]

I understand the point and am grateful to the Minister. However, the clause introduces clarity by amending the common law, which the Minister is concerned to maintain. The clause does not maintain the existing common law rules, which the Minister considers entirely adequate. The clause excludes from consideration anything that is said or done prior to the council meeting at which the issue is to be discussed, however extreme the previous statement may be. I entirely accept that what the councillor said prior to the council meeting may not be determinative of whether there is unlawful predetermination, but it must be relevant. That is the objection to Clause 25: it purports, in the Minister’s words, to restate the common law, which the Minister regards as entirely appropriate and unexceptionable. What it actually does is amend the existing common law in a way that will prevent real cases of predetermination being brought and succeeding.

Real concern was expressed in this debate that it is absolutely vital that local councillors should be able to express their views on matters powerfully and strongly if they wish. The noble Baroness, Lady Eaton, and the noble Lords, Lord True and Lord Greaves, made this point. I entirely agree with them that that is the common law position. The cases make it absolutely clear that local councillors deciding any matter are not impartial in the sense required of a judge; they have political allegiances, their politics involve policies and they are entitled to express their views—of course they are. The case of Lewis v Redcar and Cleveland Borough Council in 2009, covered from page 83 of Volume 1 of the Weekly Law Reports, is the leading Court of Appeal judgment. It says that any local councillor who expresses his views powerfully and strongly on any view is not guilty of unlawful predetermination so long as he is prepared to keep an open mind when he goes to the council meeting.

The noble Lord, Lord Sewel, and the noble Lord, Lord Snape, asked for reassurance in relation to the role of party groups and party whips in local government. That, too, has been considered by the courts. In the same case of Lewis v Redcar and Cleveland Borough Council, the Court of Appeal approved an earlier judgment in 1985 by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf—then Mr Justice Woolf—where he said:

“I would have thought that it was almost inevitable, now that party politics play so large a part in local government, that the majority group on a council would decide on the party line in respect of the proposal. If this was to be regarded as disqualifying the district council from dealing with the planning application, then if that disqualification is to be avoided, the members of the planning committee at any rate will have to adopt standards of conduct which I suspect will be almost impossible to achieve in practice”.

[Lord Greaves]

I apologise for intervening, but I wonder whether the noble Lord is aware that there is a very widespread view within local government, which in my view is widespread in its application, that on things that are thought to be quasi-judicial like licensing and planning applications there is no party whipping. There may be discussions, but no party whip is applied.

[Lord Pannick]

I understand that, of course; I am responding to the point made that if our amendment were to be carried, this would in some way affect the existence of that whipping that does take place in local government—those elements of party control that are effective. Let me just complete the citation from Mr Justice Woolf: he concluded that there is no objection to any of this so long as, when the councillors come to the council meetings, they have an open mind in the sense that they are prepared to listen to the competing arguments.

The noble Lord, Lord Greaves, was rightly concerned that we should do nothing that should enable lawyers to make lots of money out of all this. That is a very laudable objective. My concern is that Clause 25 is so unclear that it will inevitably provoke litigation, and it will do so because the Minister says that it is not changing the common law but merely expressing it, whereas its terms manifestly do change the common law.