(13 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberDoes the noble Lord understand that no judicial review may be brought without the leave of the court? Does he understand that the courts are highly experienced in hearing speedily—by which I mean within days if necessary or within weeks—any case that is urgent, as these cases, if they were brought, would clearly be?
Very briefly, my Lords, I got involved in this affair with a lot of other members of the Bar and I have to say where I stand. I totally support the legal analysis of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, who is totally correct. Of course, it puts me in a very odd position because I am a Conservative and part of the coalition, but I cannot help that. I know that what the noble Lord said is right.
(13 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I hope that I will not be accused of being self-righteous if I say that I share the concerns that have been expressed by the noble Lords, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath and Lord Howarth of Newport.
Behind the moral issue and the issue of principle, I think that there is a legal issue. The Minister will recall, as mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, that it was suggested to her on the previous occasion when we debated the matter that she might wish to take specific advice from the law officers as to whether the Government’s approach is consistent with this country’s obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights. The concern, which is very simple indeed, is that the Bill removes a property right without any compensation, in breach of Article 1 of the First Protocol to the ECHR and, therefore, that the amendment that noble Lords approved was not only wise but necessary.
When we last debated this matter, the Minister’s answer was that the ID card remained the property of the Government and therefore there was no difficulty. With respect, however, that is no answer at all. It is very well established in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights—indeed, it is common sense—that, when the Government grant a licence or an authorisation to do something, that of itself establishes a property right. If that licence or that authorisation is then removed by the Government, contrary to the expectation that has been created, the Government have a duty, other than in the most exceptional circumstances, to pay compensation. That legal obligation is precisely consistent with the substance of our debate on the previous occasion and with the amendment that was approved by noble Lords.
I therefore join the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, in asking the Minister to explain whether she has indeed taken specific advice from the law officers, to deal in more detail with the substance of this concern and to explain to noble Lords how it can be that what the Government intend to do is consistent with this country’s international obligations.
If there is a breach of human rights, of course that is a worry, but it is the job of the Court of Human Rights to put it right. If we are concerned with a matter of principle—I understand what the noble Lord is saying—surely the policy of a previous Government cannot be constitutionally binding on the next Government. Whether it is unfortunate and whether there is criticism, the policy of this Government was in fact accepted by this House. If we have got it wrong and the noble Lord is right, that will not affect the validity of this piece of legislation in this country. However, if an application is later made to the Court of Human Rights, it may decide that the point of principle here is that this Government—I do not always agree with them or, indeed, with any Government—have the entitlement in constitutional principle to reject the advice of the previous Government.
I have, of course, enormous respect for the knowledge and judgment of the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Alloway, but on this occasion, with respect, I do not agree with his opinion. It is part of the law of this country that the Minister, like all other Ministers, has a positive duty under the Human Rights Act to confirm to this House and the other place that the legislation that the Government are bringing forward is consistent with the European Convention on Human Rights. That is the law of this country. I respectfully ask the noble Baroness to tell this House, consistent with her duty under the law of this land, why she is confident—if she is—that this proposal is consistent with our international obligations.
I support the noble Lord’s Amendments 1 and 175. What he said was wholly consistent with the acknowledged function of this House to protect the constitution and to amend the Bill as it goes through, to delay it and afford the other place an opportunity to reconsider or, indeed, to compromise. What the noble Lord said is wholly consistent with that. What the Opposition will say in a moment is not, so I am not speaking about the Opposition. This is a sound approach for the reasons that I have given and it was very well presented.
I have added my name to the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Lester of Herne Hill, for a simple reason: this is a bad Bill. It confers excessive power on the Executive. It is of fundamental importance to include in the Bill as many protective provisions as possible.
Amendment 1, read with Amendment 175, has a simple purpose. It would restrict ministerial powers so that they can be exercised only in a way that is compatible with judicial independence and human rights and freedoms; is used proportionately; and does not prevent a public body performing its functions to establish facts or to give expert advice independently and impartially. I cannot imagine that the Minister could possibly disagree with any of those well established principles. I suspect he might say that he is doubtful that such principles need to be expressed in the Bill. However, he does then need to explain to the Committee why such principles were expressly included in the 2006 Act. He also needs not merely to explain this question of precedent but to address the question of principle.
Given the breadth of the powers that the Minister seeks in the context of the Bill; given the concerns that were expressed about the scope of those powers by your Lordships’ Committee on the Constitution, of which I am a member, and by your Lordships’ Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee; and given the concerns expressed by many of your Lordships at Second Reading, it is of vital importance to identify in the Bill important constraints on the exercise of these powers. It is important for two reasons. It is important to ensure that future Ministers are as careful in their use of the powers as I am sure the Minister will be. It is also important to reassure public bodies and members of the public that we in Parliament have not lightly conferred such powers on Ministers, but rather that we have been anxious to emphasise in the Bill that there are important limits on what Parliament is willing to authorise Ministers to do.
The importance of Amendment 1, read with Amendment 175, is confirmed by the much weaker protection that the Minister is inviting the Committee to add to the Bill in his amendments. The Government’s amendments, although a welcome improvement on the original Bill, are insufficient. They simply require the Minister to consider defined matters before exercising powers. They do not—as they should—prevent the Minister making an order if and to the extent that it would interfere with the independence of the judiciary, or concern functions which require to be exercised independently of Ministers as they involve giving impartial advice or the scrutiny of Ministers’ actions. For example, government Amendment 108, which we are considering in this group, will require the Minister to consider only the extent to which the functions affected by the order need to be exercised independently of Ministers. If the functions do indeed relate to such matters, primary legislation should be required to ensure proper parliamentary scrutiny. Amendment 109, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Lester of Herne Hill, would remove from Clause 8(2) “the Minister considers that” in relation to necessary protections.
It should not be simply a matter of the Minister forming an opinion on these matters; the Bill must provide that he or she cannot make an order if it would remove necessary protections, such as interfering with the independence of the judiciary. That would ensure—