(3 weeks, 1 day ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, can I offer a legal perspective? In international law, a state exists only if four criteria are met. These were set out in the Montevideo convention of 1933 and it seems highly doubtful that Palestine satisfies any of these criteria at the moment.
First, a state must have a defined territory. This Bill would oblige the Secretary of State to recognise a state of Palestine on the basis of pre-1967 borders, but there is plainly no existing Palestinian control within those borders. This is wishful thinking. It is a fantasy. It is not the recognition of an existing territory. A defined territory depends on a peace settlement with Israel.
Secondly, a state must have a permanent population. According to UNRWA, around 2.5 million of the 5 million Palestinians who live in the West Bank and Gaza are refugees. I cannot understand how Palestine can claim to have a permanent population when half the people living there are waiting to live in another state, in Israel.
Thirdly, a state needs a Government who exercise effective control of the territory. But the Palestinian Authority operates in the West Bank and Hamas claims to govern Gaza. A Government of a state must govern the whole state.
Fourthly, the Government of a state must have independence, but the Palestinian Authority currently enjoys very limited powers because of Israeli control. Israel has that control for good security reasons, as the noble Lord, Lord Frost, pointed out.
I make it clear that all of this does need to change. I would welcome the existence of a Palestinian state. The Palestinian people are entitled to self-determination. But this will happen only when Palestinian leaders accept the political reality that Israel exists as the homeland of the Jewish people.
I was very grateful that the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester pointed out that today is the Jewish festival of Purim. We celebrate our victory over Haman, the chief minister to the King of Persia who wished to annihilate the Jewish community over 2,000 years ago. Fortunately, the King of Persia had a Jewish wife—I can confirm that they are often a formidable presence—and he sided with her and Haman was hanged. As with most Jewish festivals, the basic principle is very simple: “They tried to kill us; they failed; let’s eat”. All of this is sadly material to today’s debate, because progress towards the achievement of a state of Palestine is being held up by modern Hamans—lots of them—in the Palestinian community, whose primary objectives remain to kill Jews and to destroy the State of Israel.
(1 year, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the plight of the Palestinian people in Gaza is tragic indeed, but the House needs to focus on the causes of this tragedy. Gaza has received billions of dollars, pounds and euros in aid over the past decades, but this has not been used to improve education, health or the economy of Gaza. Much of it has gone into the Swiss bank accounts of Hamas leaders, and most of it has been used to build tunnels and attack Israel. If Hamas were now to release the hostages, and if Gaza were no longer used as a military base for attacking Israel, there would be no war in Gaza.
(1 year, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberI have explained what we are doing about the inquiry. The grounds for the exclusion of bidders from public procurement procedures are set out in the Public Contracts Regulations 2015. These rules set out the circumstances in which bidders must or may be excluded from the public procurement process. We have to follow those processes. The Procurement Bill, which was brought forward by this Government and debated extensively in this House, and is now being considered elsewhere, strengthens the grounds for exclusion, but we have proceeded with this contract on alerts. I emphasise the value of these alerts in warning and informing people where we have serious problems.
Can the Minister tell the House how much Fujitsu is being paid for this contract and how many other ongoing procurement contracts there are with Fujitsu?
I do not have information on other procurement contracts but I can tell the noble Lord that, in the year that has just finished, we paid Fujitsu £1.6 million for the alerts contract. If he looks on Contracts Finder, which is one of the transparency mechanisms that we have, he will see that the range of the contract is from £1.6 million to £5 million, but at the moment we have used Fujitsu for only the £1.6 million that I have outlined.
(2 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberIt is a prime ministerial appointment. The postholder is required to observe the seven principles of public life and helps the Prime Minister on Ministers’ interests and on investigations of alleged breaches of the Ministerial Code. It would be unusual for the details of a confidential appointment process to be published, but I can assure the noble Lord that work is in hand and I look forward to announcing the name of the new independent adviser once appointed.
May I suggest to the Minister that her inability to answer any of the questions asked by the noble Lord does not encourage confidence in this process? More excellent candidates would be likely to come forward and confidence in the process would be enhanced if the Government would commit to accepting the advice of the independent adviser when it is given on these important matters of integrity. Will the Government do that?
The noble Lord is trying to push me into a different direction but, like my noble friend Lord Howard of Lympne, I am keeping to the same answer. That is because I completely believe that this independent ethics adviser has to be appointed by the Prime Minister and has to be accountable to Parliament. It is important that we stick to that principle. People who are going to take up this important post will understand that, but they will also want to ensure that they have the confidence and trust of our Prime Minister.
(2 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I thank everybody who has participated, including those Members of the House who do not agree with me. It is fun to listen to alternative arguments.
I have just a couple of points to make. The problem with these clauses is that they were inserted without any kind of discussion. When constitutional issues are being addressed, and when, in particular, the independence of the Electoral Commission and its performance are being addressed, surely, of all things, that is something for cross-party discussion, and it is for the cross-parties to make up their minds how to make the Electoral Commission do its job and perform its function better than it has. That is a matter for Parliament: I am not going to advance different solutions to this, but the problem is that nobody has asked anybody else. That is why I describe this proposal as “new minted”. It is “new minted”, and that is one of its problems.
The other problem is with the phrase “must have regard to”. I “must have regard” to everything the Minister says. I am going to listen to it; I am going to be influenced by it. I might not feel quite as strongly as I did against him—I do not know—but the point is that you have to have regard to the statement by the Minister of the Government’s strategies, priorities and guidance, and that would influence any body of people, however independent-minded they are and wish to be. That, surely, is the point of this legislation. The Government want the commission to be influenced by the strategy and priorities paper.
If the Electoral Commission says, “Well, we have seen what the Minister has to say. We have read the statement and we think it’s a load of rubbish”, what happens then? Apart from anything else, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, will be briefed on a judicial review by the Government that the Electoral Commission was not exercising its powers correctly, and he would probably win. As I have told noble Lords before, he never won a single case in front of me; and as I have also told noble Lords before, on every occasion when he appealed, he won.
I would just add, on a serious note, that the noble and learned Lord makes an absolutely correct point. If the Electoral Commission said, “We do not agree with this document and we are not going to follow it”, there would be a real danger of judicial review. There would be a real danger, in particular, because this document would have the approval of Parliament, it having been whipped through.
My Lords, on that happy note, I think we had better let the House make up its own mind. I seek the opinion of the House.
(3 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Howard, raised a concern that there might be a Prime Minister who is unable to govern and to secure a majority for a Dissolution. There is a constitutional solution to any such problem, should it occur—that such a Prime Minister should resign and let someone take over who is able to command a majority in the House of Commons.
My Lords, the House does not need or want a history lesson, but over hundreds of years power has been reclaimed from monarchs by Parliament and the necessary transfer of power from Prime Ministers to Parliament. There is an imbalance in the balance of power between the legislature and the Executive, but it turns out that repealing the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011, which I think everyone in this House agrees should go, is more difficult than was imagined. We are an unelected House, but I can think of no better use of my vote today than to vote for Amendment 1 and allow the House of Commons to consider the matter properly and to reach its view, as the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, said. People disagree as to the nature of future constitutional circumstances but I am very proud of the fact that I have a vote that can send this amendment to the House of Commons and I, for one, will be content with whatever the House of Commons decides it wishes to do.
My Lords, I suppose I should declare a professional interest in the possibility of Miller 3.
I support the amendments in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Norton and Lord Butler. I do not suggest that the courts would today never entertain a judicial review in relation to Dissolution. The noble Lord, Lord Norton, mentioned the words of Lord Roskill in the GCHQ case in 1984—the law has moved on a long way in the nearly 40 years since then. Like other noble Lords, I find it very difficult to envisage a case in which the courts would entertain a challenge to the Dissolution of Parliament and the calling of a general election. However, I support the amendments because I think it would be wise, in this context, to proceed on the basis of never say never.
One of the vices of a provision such as Clause 3 is that it seeks to remove the possibility of the court exercising jurisdiction, however exceptional the circumstances may be or however grave the abuse of power by a future Prime Minister. I would much prefer to leave it to the judgment of a future Supreme Court whether the circumstances then existing justify exceptional judicial involvement and whether there is an abuse of power, rather than confirm a blanket immunity from legal challenge whatever the circumstances.
I also agree with the noble Lords, Lord Butler and Lord Norton, that there is a point of principle here: the Prime Minister would be exercising a very important power. It is wrong in principle that there should be an immunity from the rule of law—it is a very basic principle. That principle does not depend on whether the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, is correct in saying that, as a matter of description, this is or is not an ouster clause. What it purports to do is prevent the court saying, “What you have done is unlawful”. We should not be allowing the exercise of public powers to enjoy such immunity as a matter of principle.
We then have the argument the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, deployed, and which was raised in Committee, that the mere existence of this possible jurisdiction to entertain a judicial review may cause delay, expense or inconvenience. That seems to me to be entirely unrealistic. I looked to see whether there have been any cases analogous to the possible cases we are talking about. There is one. The Press Association reported on 8 April 1992, the day before the 1992 general election— won by John Major—that on 7 April, the day before, Mr Justice Macpherson had considered and rejected a judicial review application which was made by a Mr George Barnes, who was seeking to stop the 1992 general election going ahead. Mr Barnes was aggrieved by the manner, as he put it, in which the main political parties had chosen their candidates.
I am sorry to interrupt the noble Lord in the middle of his flow, but I think his point was that the law has moved on greatly since Lord Roskill. So does not citing a decision from 1992 rather defeat his own argument?
No, because my point is that hopeless or frivolous applications will be dealt with speedily by the courts. This was plainly an application with no merit whatever, and my noble friend’s point, as I understood him, was that the mere existence of the jurisdiction could cause delay. I am giving an example of how the courts then, and today, would deal with a frivolous application.
The judge decided, unsurprisingly, that this was not a matter for the courts and that there was no basis for the application. The general election went ahead and it was entirely untroubled by the litigation. There was no delay, expense or inconvenience. The court dismissed a hopeless application speedily and effectively, as it usually does. For all these reasons, if my noble friend Lord Butler wishes to test the opinion of the House, he will have my support.
My Lords, I too attempted to darn this Bill in Committee and, indeed, spoke at Second Reading, and I too am opposed to this group of amendments. My core concern here is to safeguard my successors on the Bench and to avoid the risk of constitutional crisis, which would arise were there to be some future attempted legal challenge not as frivolous as that just indicated by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, but something dressed up as an altogether more coherent attack on a Dissolution, such as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, himself would be adept at managing.
Unlike the noble Lord, Lord Howard, but in common with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, and the noble Lord, Lord Beith, I do not think for an instant that the courts would ever actually reach the point of upholding such a challenge, even though, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, also says, things have undoubtedly moved on since the CCSU case. That, as it happens, was my very last case at the Bar, decades ago. Although it is very unlikely that such a challenge would succeed, it is very important to put in the Bill a provision that would provide the greatest possible discouragement to any mischievous person, instructing whosoever it may be, contemplating a challenge.
Clause 3 seems to me to be admirable for that purpose; it enables the courts to say, as Mr Justice Macpherson—a very old friend of mine, with whom I shared a room in chambers for decades—said in that case, “Chuck it out without more ado.” That is really the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Trevethin and Oaksey. That is the practical effect of Clause 3. It is not there, I would suggest, as revenge for Miller 2; nor does it—and this is the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks—create a risk that this will be a template or precedent for the future. Its relevance here is purely in the context and to underline the fact that Dissolution is essentially a prerogative act, preserved even since CCSU. We should leave it there, discourage prospective litigants and reinforce the courts in a robust rejection of any attempt that would delay and disrupt, to some degree, a Dissolution process. Leave it there.
My Lords, very briefly, I would like to respectfully adopt the arguments of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, and others, including the noble Lord, Lord Trevethin and Oaksey, and my noble friend Lord Faulks, in this matter.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, said, I think, that he could not see the courts getting involved in a Dissolution case, and I think the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said similarly. But, as my noble friend Lord Faulks has said, very many people, including many lawyers, could not see the courts getting involved in a Prorogation matter because, until the Supreme Court and Miller, that was considered to have been unarguably a political matter. But in a paradigm example of judicial activism, the Supreme Court in Miller did get involved, despite the unanimous decision—which some people find curious—of a strong divisional court below. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, referred later to the rule of law. My point is that, until the Supreme Court and Miller, as held by the divisional court, Prorogation was considered to be a political matter.
Does the noble Lord allow for the possibility that the reason why there was no precedent prior to Miller 2 was because no Prime Minister prior to that had abused, in the view of the court, the power to prorogue Parliament in order to frustrate his views in relation to Brexit?
The use of the word “abuse” is somewhat tendentious. As I was saying on the question of the rule of law, and as held by the divisional court, until the Supreme Court decision on Miller, Prorogation was thought to be an entirely political matter and therefore not subject to the jurisdiction of the courts. I suggest that the risk remains, and pray in aid the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, in this regard, because he jokingly referred to his possible involvement in Miller 3.
I rest my case. The Government are entitled for these reasons to insist on Clause 3.
(4 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, it is always an education to listen to the noble Lord, Lord Winston. I declare an interest as an expectant grandfather. One of my daughters, Shula Markeson, is expecting her second child, my fourth grandchild, in a few weeks’ time. In this expectant state, I find it extraordinary that until the pregnancy of the Attorney-General, to whom I send my best wishes, no one in Government seems to have recognised that Ministers, like other women, get pregnant and are entitled to paid maternity leave. The fact that we are considering fast-track legislation today, with all the defects in parliamentary scrutiny that that involves—a point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Gale—tells the House everything it needs to know about the low priority historically accorded by successive Governments to issues of maternity. I agree with my noble friend Lady Hayman and others that the Government need to give priority to more general reform.
I also think it is regrettable that, in a Bill which belatedly recognises the needs of female Ministers, Clause 1 confers benefits only if the Prime Minister so allows at his or her discretion—a point touched upon by the noble Baroness, Lady Hussein-Ece. When he replies, can the Minister give an example of when the Prime Minister might refuse to allow a pregnant Minister to be designated in circumstances where she would be remaining in post but for her pregnancy? Why is this not a duty to pay maternity leave?
Also, can the Minister confirm that it is not intended by this discretionary benefit that the Prime Minister should ever be able to say to a pregnant Minister, “Very sorry but, because you’re pregnant, I’m going to sack you”? That is rightly unacceptable in all other walks of life. In his opening speech, the Minister said that the Bill sends out a “vital message” to women that they can pursue a political career, without needing to choose between that career and their family. Does the Minister really think that the conferral of the benefits on a discretionary basis is consistent with these laudable aims?
On the language of the Bill, Parliament has often referred to the person who gives birth to a child as a woman and, indeed, a mother. Examples have already been given and I add one—Section 33(1) of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 defines a “mother” as:
“The woman who is carrying or has carried a child”.
However, your Lordships should recognise that the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, was correct to point out that there are trans men, who were born female, who have given birth. One brought legal proceedings in the Court of Appeal last year. A judgment was given, in which noble Lords may be interested, by the Lord Chief Justice, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett of Maldon, in the McConnell case. It is reported in the third volume of the Weekly Law Reports for 2020 at page 683.
The Lord Chief Justice explained that the claimant had been registered at birth as female, but had transitioned to live in the male gender and had received a gender recognition certificate under the Gender Recognition Act 2004, stating that his gender is male. He then underwent artificial insemination, became pregnant and gave birth to a child. He brought legal proceedings complaining that the child’s birth certificate recorded him as the mother. He said that, because he had transitioned, he should be recorded as the father or as a parent. The Court of Appeal rejected his complaint and said that recording him as the mother was not a breach of his human rights.
The Lord Chief Justice said that, as a matter of common law and under the legislation governing the registration of births, the person who gave birth to a child is the mother, and the Supreme Court dismissed an application for permission to appeal. In light of that judgment, I do not think that there are any legal difficulties in referring to mothers or women in the Bill. The mother of Parliaments, in doing that, would be showing no disrespect to trans men.
(4 years, 3 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Austin, on his powerful maiden speech and thank him for his heroic efforts in fighting anti-Semitism.
Almost all this debate has focused on the contents of the agreement, which this House cannot amend. I will focus briefly on how the Bill implements the agreement into our law, a matter on which some of us would have wished to move amendments.
Like my noble friend Lord Anderson of Ipswich, I am particularly concerned about Clause 29, which makes all existing domestic law subject to the contents of this agreement, unless equivalent provisions have been enacted. I understand of course why this needs to be done as a matter of urgency before 11 pm tomorrow, but as a permanent provision on our statute book it is not acceptable. Clause 29 means that in all the areas covered by the agreement, from agriculture to transport, the legal clarity and certainty which our statute book aims to achieve, and usually does, is now subject to the terms of the agreement—terms which are in so many places deliberately vague in order to secure consensus between this country and the EU.
Because of the legal uncertainty that Clause 29 will inevitably cause, it is a great deal for lawyers—I declare my interest—but not for anyone else. Clause 29 should therefore have a shelf life of no more than six months. Clauses 31 and those following already confer broad powers on Ministers—I would say excessively broad—to make regulations to ensure the consistency of our laws with the agreement. Ministers should have a duty to do that and to sort the statute book out by 1 July next year, on which date Clause 29 should cease to apply.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor of Bolton, said, in the 21st report of your Lordships’ Constitution Committee, produced at unconstitutional speed yesterday, we give notice that we will be reporting on this and other constitutional concerns about this Bill early in the new year. We must pass this Bill today, but post-legislative scrutiny in January is essential.
(5 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, first, I am grateful to the noble Lord for what he said on a personal basis.
The noble Lord is addressing an extraordinarily important point, which we all share; obviously I am not here to answer for Parliament, but we are all aware of the facilities that this House makes available. I hope all Members of this House will avail themselves of those. The Ministerial Code is absolutely clear:
“Harassing, bullying or other inappropriate or discriminating behaviour wherever it takes place is not consistent with the Ministerial Code and will not be tolerated.”
That clear message is given to new Ministers right at the outset—I can testify to that from this week—but I accept the spirit of what the noble Lord said.
Does the Minister agree that, if bullying and harassment will not be tolerated, any Minister guilty of such conduct should no longer remain in post?
The noble Lord is wise and knows very well that whether people remain in office is a matter not for me or him but for the Prime Minister. In fact, this Prime Minister updated the advice around the code last August, to include greater clarity on how investigations into alleged breaches will take place. It made it very clear that if there is an allegation of a breach, the Prime Minister will consult the Cabinet Secretary. If he feels that it warrants further investigation, he may ask the Cabinet Office to investigate the facts of the case and refer the matter to the Independent Adviser on Ministers’ Interests, Sir Alex Allan.
(7 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I support the Bill. The House should be very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, for pursuing the subject, because these by-elections are doing severe damage to the reputation of this House. We do important work here—scrutinising legislation and in committees—and by and large we do that work very well. However, the credibility of this House is undermined by the farce, and it is a farce, that membership can be won in a by-election in which a handful of electors vote for candidates whose eligibility depends on the accident of birth. The by-elections are quite simply an embarrassment to this House.
We should also bear in mind a point that has not yet been mentioned in this debate. Hereditary peerages, with very limited exceptions, can descend only through the male line. Only one of the hereditary Peers in this House is a woman: my esteemed colleague on the Cross Benches, the noble Countess, Lady Mar. Her title is an exception to the no-women rule, as most Scottish peerages can pass to a daughter if there are no sons. The noble Countess has been one of the 92 since 1999 but no woman has been elected in a by-election since 1999, and there is only one woman on the register of nearly 200 hereditary Peers who have put themselves forward to be considered at future by-elections. I simply cannot understand how it can be consistent with basic principles of equality for this House to maintain by-elections when eligibility as a candidate is effectively excluded for women. This is relevant to the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Hamilton of Epsom, as to whether by-elections are a less satisfactory means of becoming a Member of this House than appointment by the Prime Minister. Yes, by-elections are less satisfactory for many reasons, but one of them is that the appointment procedure does not effectively exclude women.
The main argument that appears to be advanced in opposition to the Bill by the noble Lord, Lord Trefgarne, and the noble Earl, Lord Caithness, is a historical one. The deal was done in 1999. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Rennard: there is no other area of law and practice where Parliament feels itself bound by what its predecessor did. Why should the approach adopted by Parliament a generation ago bind this one? This House in 2017 is no more bound by what was decided in 1999 on hereditary Peers than it is by decisions taken in 1999 on the economy or foreign policy.
The only other argument that has been advanced this morning is that advanced by the noble Lord, Lord Cope, who says that hereditary Peers have individually been valuable Members of this House. No doubt they have, but there will be nothing to prevent the leaders of the political parties or indeed the House of Lords Appointments Commission putting forward the names of hereditary Peers for membership of this House if their individual qualities make that appropriate.
The Bill raises a clear issue of principle on which the House will need to take a view. I echo the hope expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, that noble Lords who do not support the Bill will resist any temptation to table a series of amendments that will unnecessarily take up time and may prevent the Bill making progress. Let us instead have a full debate in Committee on the only issue raised by the Bill: should these by-elections be retained or abolished?
My Lords, as an elected hereditary Peer who voted for the passage of the House of Lords Act 1999, I feel bound to oppose this Bill for the same reasons as put forward by my noble friend Lord Elton and others. I have the highest regard for the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, but regret that he insists on bringing this matter up again at this time. I repeat what I said when we last debated this matter only last December—namely, I do not believe that the public view the presence in this place of 92 Peers by succession as any more offensive than the presence of around 700 Peers who sit here by appointment. Furthermore, I do not think it is correct to argue that the hereditaries who sit in your Lordships’ House have any less legitimacy than the life Peers. It is now very competitive to enter this House if you happen to be a hereditary Peer. I think the last by-election on the Deputy Speakers’ list worked very well. Noble Lords were able to interview the candidates at a hustings before casting their votes. They certainly do not get the chance to do so in the case of Peers who are appointed to this House.
Furthermore, the hereditaries who sit in your Lordships’ House are generally younger than life Peers, at least when they take their seats. They are more geographically representative and I believe that their link with history and tradition adds to their legitimacy. It is a good thing that prime ministerial patronage and nomination by party leaders are not the only way by which people may become Members of your Lordships’ House.
Following those arguments, does the noble Viscount think that we should have more hereditary Peers?