European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Wednesday 21st March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Liddle (Lab)]

My Lords, I move this amendment on behalf of my noble friend Lord Adonis. He apologises for his absence this morning. I assure noble Lords that he is not having the well-deserved lie-in that many of us feel that we are entitled to; he is on a trip to Dublin with the noble Lord, Lord Heseltine, and Sir Nick Clegg to see what can be done about the question of the Irish border and how to resolve that particular trilemma.

The purpose of the amendment is to draw the Committee’s attention to what is written in Clause 17. We hear lots of soporific, mellifluous legalese in these discussions, but I draw the Committee’s attention to what Clause 17(1) of the Bill actually says. The Minister can perhaps then give me a little tutorial on why it is necessary and not as dangerous as it appears to be to my eye. The clause states:

“A Minister of the Crown may by regulations make such provision as the Minister considers appropriate in consequence of this Act”.


That is a sweeping enabling power for the Executive. The aim of the amendment is to establish from the Government the purpose of their having this sweeping power. This Bill is about Britain’s withdrawal from the European Union. It covers, as we have seen in the debate about Brexit since the referendum, many different aspects of our national life, so what is meant by this clause?

To the extent that we have any bedtime these days, for my bedtime reading I am trying to read books that explain the rise of populism in Europe. In a way, Brexit is a general phenomenon of a rise of populism in Europe and the United States. One book that I am reading at the moment is Professor Richard J Evans’s first volume on the rise of the Third Reich. One moment that makes me proud to be a social democrat is that it was the Social Democrats alone who voted against the enabling Act that set up Hitler’s dictatorship. I am not for one moment of course suggesting that there is a parallel, but why do we as a House have to grant the Government this sweeping legislative power? Can the Minister please explain? I beg to move.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, at the risk of the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, thinking that I am adding to the soporific legalese, I support what he said. It is not just the noble Lord who is concerned about Clause 17. Your Lordships’ Constitution Committee addressed Clause 17 at paragraph 206 of its report on the Bill:

“We agree that the Government may require a power to make ‘transitional, transitory and saving provisions’. However, we are concerned that the Bill creates a power to make ‘consequential provisions’ which is potentially very broad in scope, has the capacity to go well beyond what are ordinarily understood to be consequential matters and includes a Henry VIII power. If Parliament has approved, subject to detailed and appropriate circumscription, other broad delegated powers for ministers, it would be constitutionally unacceptable to undo these restrictions and protections by conferring a general power on ministers to make ‘consequential provisions’ to alter other enactments. We recommend that the power to make ‘consequential provisions’ in clause 17 is removed”.


The concern is that this Bill will confer enormous powers on Ministers under, for example, Clauses 7 and 9 to make delegated legislation. It is difficult, in the context of such powers, however amended, to see why it is also necessary for Ministers to enjoy this broad power, as the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, described it, to make consequential provisions. The concern is that the restrictions that Parliament will impose on the other powers that Ministers will enjoy under Clauses 7 and 9 may be evaded by Ministers by the use of this consequential power.

I am particularly concerned about the risk of that, because if your Lordships focus on paragraph 17 of Schedule 7 to the Bill, on page 51, you see a quite extraordinary provision, which states the following:

“The fact that a power to make regulations is conferred by this Act does not affect the extent of any other power to make regulations under this Act”.


Therefore, it seems to me, as a matter of law, that the fact that we spend hours—it seems like days—looking at particular provisions as we seek to restrict the power that Ministers will enjoy under Clause 7 will have no effect, by reason of paragraph 17 of Schedule 7, on the scope of the power that Ministers also enjoy under Clause 17.

I would welcome some reassurance from the Government that they are thinking about the Constitution Committee’s recommendation. I would welcome some explanation of why Ministers need these consequential powers to make delegated legislation and some assurance from the Minister that he is thinking about whether it is also necessary to include paragraph 17 of Schedule 7, or whether the Bill could make it absolutely clear that any power in Clause 17 must be interpreted consistently with the restrictions that will be contained elsewhere in the Bill.

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall) (Lab)]

My Lords, with apologies to the Committee, I should have made it clear when the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, moved his amendment that, if it is agreed to, I cannot call Amendments 253 to 256, by reasons of pre-emption.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

Clearly, when I say that we will give consideration to these matters, I mean that I am making more work for myself in that context. Of course we are going to discuss with officials how best to structure this legislation to meet the concerns that have been expressed. That may lead to amendments, in which case they will be available before Report, and it may not, in which case I will be happy to indicate at Report why such amendments have not been brought forward.

[Lord Pannick]

Will the Minister address the concern I expressed that the breadth of Clause 17(1) is such that it could be used by Ministers to evade the restrictions that will be contained in the other powers that Ministers enjoy under Clauses 7 to 9, particularly in the light of paragraph 17 of Schedule 7? Will he consider that point?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I will certainly give consideration to that point, but it is not immediately clear to me that the clause could be used to evade those limitations. I will address it in due course.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)]

My Lords, I strongly support the amendment. It is essential that the status of retained EU law in our law should be determined by Parliament as part of this Bill. I supported an amendment that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, moved earlier to say that retained EU law should be treated as primary legislation. It is so treated by the Bill for the purposes of the Human Rights Act. It is highly desirable that this should be fixed definitely as part of the arrangements and not left to be decided, as it were, ad hoc from time to time by the use of the power to which the noble Lord, Lord Bassam of Brighton, has drawn attention.

Originally, the amendment that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, proposed covered the whole of this law. I am inclined to think that the Clause 2 provisions, which are already in our law, have the status given by our law already. Some of them are statutes and some are subordinate legislation. Having considered this a little further since we discussed this some long time ago, I am inclined to think it might be wise to restrict the provision that this should be regarded as primary legislation to the Clause 3 provisions.

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, in the previous debate the Committee deliberated on the vice of Clause 17(1). The amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Bassam of Brighton, identifies a specific reason why Clause 17 (1) is so objectionable. When the Constitution Committee put to Ministers our concern, to which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, has just referred, that the Bill should identify the legal status of retained EU law, the answer from Ministers was that if necessary or appropriate they could use the powers conferred by Clause 17(1) to designate what legal status retained EU law would have, and designate different parts of retained EU law for different purposes. The Constitution Committee made its view very clear in paragraph 69 of its report:

“It is constitutionally unacceptable for Ministers to have the power to determine something as fundamental as whether a part of our law should be treated as primary or secondary legislation”.


We debated what legal status should be given to retained EU law earlier in Committee. I respectfully agree with the observations made just now by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern. I emphasise, however, that it is the width of Clause 17 (1) that is so objectionable as it enables Ministers to assert that they could use it to make changes of such constitutional enormity to our legislation. I agree, therefore, with the concerns that the noble Lord, Lord Bassam of Brighton, has expressed.

[Lord Cormack]

My Lords, I will briefly add my support. I point out to my noble and learned friend, who gave a very sensitive reply to the previous debate, that a culture has grown up in Parliament in recent years: the proliferation of so-called “Christmas tree Bills”, which include very few specific proposals, allowing Ministers to hang whatever baubles they like on them. Together with the deep suspicion, that we all have, of Henry VIII provisions, I hope that that explains to my noble and learned friend why, with all the far-reaching consequences of this Bill, we are most anxious that the prerogative should remain with Parliament and that it should not be for Ministers to determine what is primary and what is secondary. I hope that building on his sensitive and—I do not want to sound patronising—sensible remarks at the end of the last debate, he will take on board what has been, and is being, said on this point.