Criminal Justice System: Diversity

Debate between Lord Paddick and Lord Keen of Elie

Thursday 15th December 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am not in a position to comment on the constitution of the Charity Commission and I am obliged for the noble Lord’s suggestion that I should have a look at it. Clearly, I will. Beyond that, I am not able to comment.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, will the noble and learned Lord not agree that the disproportionate number of black and minority-ethnic young people stopped and searched by the police is a contributory factor to higher rates of conviction and incarceration?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

It would contribute to those rates only if the police found something incriminating.

Press Matters

Debate between Lord Paddick and Lord Keen of Elie

Tuesday 1st November 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I too thank the noble and learned Lord for repeating the Statement. I must declare an interest, in addition to being a victim of phone hacking by the press. In 2002, I was the subject of a kiss-and-tell story on the front page and eight inside pages of a Sunday tabloid newspaper. Many of the allegations were untrue and the rest were a massive intrusion into my private life by a former partner whom I had lived with for four years. He was paid £100,000 for the story. In the absence of an effective and independent press complaints system, my only course of action was to sue the newspaper and although I was able to secure a conditional fee agreement, many ordinary people are not. Lawyers acting for the newspaper tried every trick in the book to get me to concede, in which case I would have been liable for both my own and the newspaper’s costs and I would have been made bankrupt. If the paper had not admitted libel and agreed a settlement a week before the case was due to go to trial, and had I lost the action, I would have lost my home.

If newspapers do not sign up to an independent, royal charter-compliant, press complaints system that the public can have real confidence in, the press must be prepared to cover the costs if their refusal to sign up results in complainants having to take action through the courts. This was a cross-party agreement, reached at considerable effort and cost, resulting in a royal charter that the Government are preparing to consign to the dustbin. Not only that, they are preparing to ditch detailed scrutiny not only of the matters detailed by the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara, but of the relationship between the police and the press—issues that were to be covered in Leveson 2—despite such recent cases as that involving South Yorkshire Police, the BBC and Sir Cliff Richard.

If the Statement is designed to head off amendments to the Investigatory Powers Bill currently being considered, does the Minister not agree that it adds fuel to the fire, rather than dampening things down?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I begin with the observations of the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara. A consultation will not obfuscate, it will bring clarity—and that is its aim. Let us remember that the events with which we are dealing have been the subject of a further five years of development in policing and the press.

The Press Recognition Panel’s report is a useful reflection of how the recognition system is operating, and the Government will, of course, be looking at its conclusions in more detail in the course of the consultation process. Let us be clear: no decision has been made on this matter, which is why it has been set out for the purposes of consultation.

With regard to the observations concerning the police, let us remember that these matters were addressed in Part 1 of the inquiry. Sir Brian Leveson thoroughly reviewed the initial investigation of the Metropolitan Police Service into phone hacking—Operation Caryatid —and the role of politicians and public servants in any failure to investigate wrongdoing at News International. He was satisfied that the officers who worked on that operation approached their task with complete integrity, and that the decision made in September 2006 not to expand the investigation was justified.

I will not comment on the individual cases cited by the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson. It would not be appropriate to do so. I understand the observations of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, about his own experience of litigation, the uncertainties of litigation and where costs should lie. That is a vexed issue. It affects both parties to a litigation, whether they win or lose. That is why, again, it is appropriate that this should be the subject of further consultation at this stage. Nothing has been consigned to any dustbin, either the dustbin of history or the dustbin of any prior interparty agreement. Again, I stress that is why we are proceeding with this consultation process. We will report thereafter as soon as we reasonably can.

Investigatory Powers Bill

Debate between Lord Paddick and Lord Keen of Elie

Report: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 19th October 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, we remain sympathetic to the desire for ongoing scrutiny of the Bill, and this is already provided for. In these circumstances we suggest that these amendments are not necessary. The Bill requires that the operation of the Act will be reviewed after five years, which is an entirely appropriate period. It is also consistent with the recommendation, as indicated, of the Joint Committee that scrutinised the draft Bill. We must ensure that, before a review takes place, all the Bill’s provisions have been in effect for a sufficient period that a review is justified and can be meaningful. A review after three years, as provided for by Amendments 258A and 258B, runs the risk that this would not be the case.

We also fully expect the review after five years to be informed by a report of a Joint Committee of Parliament, in line with the recommendation made by the Joint Committee. In addition, concurrent with such a review the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament would have the opportunity to assess the more sensitive aspects of the operation of the Act. Let us remember that, in addition, the exercise of the powers provided for under the Bill will of course be subject to the ongoing oversight of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, who will be obliged to make an annual report to the Prime Minister.

The Government have listened to the previous debates in Parliament and amended the Bill to ensure that the Investigatory Powers Commissioner must, in particular, keep under review and report on the operation of safeguards to protect privacy. Furthermore, the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s reports must be published and laid before Parliament, providing Parliament with ongoing scrutiny of the operation of the Act. Accordingly, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment.

[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord for his explanation. We are still of the view that at least once every Parliament, before a general election is called, a Joint Committee of both Houses of Parliament, as suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Murphy, should look at what the Government have been up to during their time in office so that the electorate are fully aware of how the Government have used the Bill. However, at this stage I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Investigatory Powers Bill

Debate between Lord Paddick and Lord Keen of Elie

Wednesday 7th September 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, I rise to move Amendment 212A standing in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee. Clause 167 deals with the situation in which a judicial commissioner fails to approve a decision to issue a bulk interference warrant in urgent cases. When this happens, under Clause 167(2) the person to whom the warrant is addressed,

“must, so far as is reasonably practicable, secure that anything in the process of being done under the warrant stops as soon as possible”.

Our Amendment 212A adds a requirement that the actions taken to stop activity under the warrant are reported back to the judicial commissioner to confirm that his decision has been complied with. I beg to move.

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, has indicated, Amendment 212A seeks to mandate that in the event that a bulk equipment interference warrant is issued in an urgent case and the judicial commissioner later refuses to approve the decision to issue the warrant, the relevant security and intelligence agency must report any activity carried out under that warrant and any steps being taken to stop the activity to the judicial commissioner.

This amendment is not necessary. Clause 167(4) grants the judicial commissioner the power to require representations where they have refused to approve the decision to issue a bulk equipment interference warrant which was issued urgently. Under this provision, security and intelligence agencies may be required to set out what material has been acquired under the warrant as well as other details of the interference, and it will be for the judicial commissioner to determine exactly what information they require to make their decisions on a case-by-case basis. This provision as drafted ensures that the commissioners will have all the necessary information to determine how material should be handled and if any further interference is required to stop the activity. Therefore there is a reporting function in order that the judicial commissioner can make the appropriate directions under Clause 167(3).

In these circumstances, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment.

[Lord Paddick]

I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord for that explanation. I will carefully consider his response and look at the Bill, but at this stage I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Investigatory Powers Bill

Debate between Lord Paddick and Lord Keen of Elie

Wednesday 7th September 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick]

I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord for his explanations. On Amendments 194J, 201B and 210B, I accept what he said. I am grateful for the intervention of the noble Lord, Lord King of Bridgwater, and I look forward to the illustrations. While the Minister has his artistic streak going, perhaps he could also provide an example with regard to some of the other amendments, where, again, an illustration would be helpful.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

That plea to my artistic streak would require a somewhat abstract response, so perhaps the noble Lord could be a little more specific.

[Lord Paddick]

Yes, for example, with regard to the health records in Amendment 223B, I did not find the example of criminals engaged in manufacturing drugs an exceptional and compelling circumstance. Perhaps there is a better example than that. The absolutely intrusive nature of health records and the acknowledgement of that by way of the exceptional notification that the intelligence services do not hold any bulk personal datasets of health records tend to reinforce the argument that access to them should be restricted to national security grounds. I would be grateful if a more compelling example could be thought of, although obviously not at the moment.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I will be quite content to formulate and intimate a more compelling example.

[Lord Paddick]

I am grateful. On Amendment 194L and a warrant issued only for the purpose of gathering evidence for use in legal proceedings, I will have to read carefully what the Minister said, as I came to completely the opposite conclusion to the one he gave. However, at this time I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, Amendment 194M stands in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee. I shall also speak to our Amendment 194N in this group.

Clause 130 relates to the additional requirements in respect of warrants affecting overseas operators giving assistance to UK intelligence agencies to enable bulk interception. Subsection (3) lists matters that the Secretary of State must take into account before issuing a warrant that requires an overseas operator to give assistance. We believe that an important omission to this list is,

“the domestic law of the operator’s place of business”—

that is, that the Secretary of State should not require overseas operators to break the law in the country where the request for assistance is being made.

As far as Amendment 194N is concerned, Clause 131 refers to the approval of bulk interception warrants by judicial commissioners. Subsection (1) states that a judicial commissioner must review the Secretary of State’s conclusions as to the granting of the warrant. Our amendment suggests that this should go further and that both the Secretary of State’s reasoning and their conclusions should be considered.

In previous sessions of this Committee, we heard the view that the judiciary should not make decisions on the issuing of warrants—that is for politicians to decide—but simply review the decisions. But if the judicial commissioner has to decide whether to “approve a decision” and indeed decides not to approve a decision of the Secretary of State, surely the judicial commissioner has made a decision on the issuing of a warrant. Surely a judicial commissioner should review the reasoning behind the Secretary of State’s decision and not simply the conclusion. Without knowing the reasons why the Secretary of State came to their conclusion, how can a judicial commissioner decide whether the conclusion is valid? I beg to move.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, these amendments relate to a judicial commissioner’s consideration of a bulk warrant that is to be served on an overseas provider and what the commissioner is required to take into account when considering the Secretary of State’s decision to issue a bulk warrant. There is also a government amendment in this group which is technical in nature, and I shall address that in a moment.

Amendment 194M seeks to insert a requirement that, where an overseas telecommunications operator is likely to be required to provide assistance in giving effect to a bulk interception warrant, the Secretary of State must—before the warrant is issued—take into account the domestic law of the operator’s place of business.

I suggest that this amendment is not necessary. The Bill already provides, at Clause 139(5), that Clause 41, which deals with the duty of operators to assist with implementation, applies in relation to a bulk interception warrant in the same way as it applies to a targeted warrant. Clause 41 makes it absolutely clear that a telecommunications operator may be required only to take “reasonably practicable” steps to give effect to a warrant. It also makes clear, at subsection (5), that for an overseas operator consideration must be given to the law of the relevant country and the extent to which it is reasonably practicable to give effect to the warrant without breaching it. So I suggest that this amendment is not necessary and, in these circumstances, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw it.

Amendment 194N seeks to alter the test that a judicial commissioner applies when considering whether to approve a decision to issue a bulk interception warrant. This topic has been the subject of intense scrutiny by three committees, the other House and, in the context of the targeted powers within the Bill, this House. As a result of that debate, the Government have already made considerable amendments to the Bill.

This amendment would require the judicial commissioner to consider the reasons given for the decision to issue a bulk interception warrant. The amendment is, I think, based on a misunderstanding of how warrants operate. The Secretary of State will receive a detailed application setting out the necessity and proportionality considerations. If he or she agrees, the Secretary of State will issue the warrant. He or she does not have to give reasons for that decision beyond confirming that he or she personally considers that the warrant is necessary and proportionate.

The judicial commissioner will then review the Secretary of State’s decision based on the evidence that was provided to the Secretary of State in the application. If the commissioner thinks that the evidence in the application is not a sufficient basis for the decision that has been made, he or she will refuse to approve the decision. In these circumstances, there are no reasons per se to be reviewed by the judicial commissioner. Given that, and given the progress that has already been made on this issue, I invite the noble Lord not to press this amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, I apologise; it is me again. In moving Amendment 201ZD in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee I shall speak to our Amendments 210ZD, 217D and 231ZC.

Clause 137 is about the approval of major modifications made in urgent cases to bulk interception warrants. These urgent requests for modification will be made by the Secretary of State alone. The judicial commissioner must approve any urgent change within a period ending with the fifth working day after the day on which the modification is made. Elsewhere in the Bill, the relevant period within which an urgent request for a warrant that has, for example, been granted by the Secretary of State alone and has then to be approved by a judicial commissioner—for example, in the case of the approval of interception warrants in urgent cases under Clause 24(3)—is the period ending with the third working day after the day on which the warrant was issued.

Our Amendment 201ZD would restore consistency to post-event approval of decisions by the Secretary of State in urgent cases by changing the relevant period within which judicial commissioner approval is needed in urgent cases of modification from five days to three days. Our Amendment 210ZD makes the same point relating to the urgent modification of bulk acquisition warrants in Clause 153; Amendment 217D to the urgent modification of bulk equipment interference warrants in Clause 173; and Amendment 231ZC to the urgent modification of bulk personal dataset warrants in Clause 196.

Will the Minister explain why, in the case of urgent major modifications of bulk interception warrants, the relevant period for judicial commissioner approval is five days and everywhere else in the Bill approval of urgent decisions is three days? I beg to move.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, while we must ensure that judicial commissioners have sufficient time to scrutinise effectively the decisions of the Secretary of State, I am sympathetic to these amendments. Indeed, the Government have already amended the Bill such that when an urgent targeted warrant is issued the judicial commissioner must approve the decision to issue it within three working days, as opposed to five. On this basis, I am happy to commit to take away the amendment for further consideration and accordingly I invite the noble Lord to withdraw it.

[Lord Paddick]

I am very grateful to the noble and learned Lord for his encouraging words and on that basis I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Paddick]

I want briefly to add our support for the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, and for his compelling arguments. I have never previously had contact with the security services but, in preparation for this Bill, I visited various places where they operate, and I am convinced that it is not simply a question of the high esteem in which James Bond is held: the perceived integrity of the people who work in the security services is a function of reality. These offences are of far more benefit to the public in reassuring them that, in the extraordinary circumstance that they were committed, such offences do indeed exist, rather than their being demonstrably necessary based on experience because the security services operate in this criminal way.

However, as the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, has said, it is something of an anomaly that there is no serious criminal sanction for an abuse of the bulk powers provided by the Bill, yet there are significant criminal sanctions in relation to all the other powers. On that basis, I very much support these amendments.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I am conscious of the strength of feeling that has been expressed about this matter, but let me make it clear that we do not accept that there is what was termed “a gap” in the criminal sanctions with respect to bulk powers. This matter was discussed during earlier Committee sittings, as the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, observed, under reference to Amendment 15, which proposed a new offence of unlawful use of investigatory powers. I understand the development that has taken place and the context of the amendments that have now been spoken to. On that earlier occasion, I referred to the civil penalties and criminal offences that apply in respect of the misuse of the powers in the Bill. In particular, I pointed out that a whole series of statutory offences is listed under Clause 1. But over and above that, it is important to bear in mind the availability of the offence of misconduct in public office, which is also referred to. I underline that because that offence would apply to instances of misuse of bulk powers in appropriate circumstances, and would certainly embrace circumstances in which there was a knowing or reckless misuse of such powers.

I also note in passing that, only two days ago, the Law Commission issued a consultation document entitled Reforming Misconduct in Public Office so that the matter could go out for further consideration. The Law Commission highlighted that the problem is that, often, there are overlapping offences which obscure the use of the offence of misconduct in public office. I rather fear that the introduction of a further statutory offence would simply create a further overlap with regard to such offences. We are at an early stage. The Law Commission has only just introduced that consultation document, but we will take account of it in this context. Although I quite understand the point that was raised by the noble Lord, Lord Butler, and indeed the ISC, in this context, we consider that misconduct in public office is available to deal with the instances that have been referred to.

Before the summer, in response to Amendment 15, we referred to the “inadvertent operational impact” that the creation of further statutory offences could have. The officers working within our intelligence agencies are entirely committed to the mission of keeping the country safe. They are professional and ethical in the way they conduct their work. We recognise the concerns raised about the potential misuse of investigatory powers but, as I say, the creation of new offences may unnecessarily inhibit agency staff and limit their ability to operate with confidence. We do not disagree that intelligence officers who are exercising these most sensitive and, indeed, intrusive powers should consider their actions carefully before using them, but we have seen no evidence that the dedicated men and women of our security and intelligence agencies give such matters anything less than the most careful consideration.

While deliberate misuse of these data can already incur criminal liability—indeed, we suggest that reckless misuse would be sufficient—the creation of a new offence would send a powerful and potentially damaging message to the men and women of our intelligence services. It may be taken to imply that more is required of them than is already the case and that innocent mistakes will in future result in criminal prosecution; for example, if they are construed as the product of reckless behaviour. I appreciate that it is not the noble Lord’s intention that this should occur but we must consider not just the letter of the law but what it will be taken to mean by those on the front line. There is a real risk that this amendment, if accepted, would suggest that they are not trusted to do their jobs, and that it could foster a culture of risk aversion in the agencies at a time when they are dealing with complex and evolving threats. That is certainly the concern expressed by the heads of the intelligence agencies, which I know they have communicated directly to members of the Intelligence and Security Committee.

The Government are clear that if anyone in a public authority were to act contrary to their obligations under the Bill, the matter would be taken extremely seriously. The current commissioners already ensure that they investigate and report publicly on the very infrequent cases of errors that involve serious misuse. These matters are brought into the public domain. In appropriate cases disciplinary action may be taken, up to and including dismissal, or civil or criminal liability incurred. The extent of that criminal liability will be determined by the prosecution deciding what form of offence should be prosecuted, at what level and, indeed, at what level of court for the purposes of penalty. Although misuse is exceedingly rare, intelligence agency staff are conscious of their obligations; indeed, from time to time they have been dismissed for misusing systems.

When these points are considered together, I hope noble Lords will agree that this puts beyond doubt the severe penalties that would apply in the event of deliberate wrongdoing by a member of a public authority—or, indeed, reckless behaviour. We therefore suggest that new criminal offences are unnecessary and potentially confusing, and, on the face of it, would adversely affect the operation of the agencies. In these circumstances, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Paddick]

If the Government are concerned about overlapping criminal offences, particularly the overlap with misconduct in a public office, why in Clause 56 have they created a new offence of making unauthorised disclosures? That seems to completely contradict the argument that the Minister has just offered the Committee.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I do not for a moment accept that it contradicts the argument. The objective is to ensure that we minimise any overlap in the context of such criminal offences.

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[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, Amendment 203A is in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee. I shall also speak to Amendments 204A, 204B, 210ZE and 210ZF, which are in this group.

Our Amendment 203A seeks to put into the Bill that a bulk acquisition warrant will not include obtaining third-party data not already in the possession of the operator. We have debated a similar point before and the Minister addressed third-party data in his letter to the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, on 27 July this year. However, can the Minister elaborate on the position of third-party data in relation to bulk acquisition?

Amendment 204A seeks to get it on the record that Clause 146(7), by allowing the warrant to cover,

“data whether or not in existence at the time of the issuing of the warrant”,

does not allow for speculative surveillance without suspicion.

Amendment 204B would put into the Bill that,

“A bulk acquisition warrant may not require data which relates to or includes internet connection records”.

This was touched on in our opening debate this afternoon on the Anderson review. In footnote 85 on page 33 of his report, Anderson states:

“A ‘Bulk Communications Data’ factsheet published with the draft Bill on 4 November 2015 stated ‘The data does not include internet connection records …’. I am told however that this is no more than a statement of present practice and intention: neither the Bill nor the draft Code of Practice rules out the future use of the bulk acquisition power in relation to ICRs”.

The Committee will recall that we on these Benches oppose the storage of the internet connection records of every man, woman and child in the UK for 12 months, whether suspected of an offence or not, by internet service providers as required by the previous provisions of the Bill. We believe this to be a disproportionate intrusion into privacy, for the reasons that I have already explained at length to the Committee. Law enforcement agencies would, however, be able to access such internet connection records only if someone was suspected of an offence. The Government have introduced additional safeguards in the Bill to specify what sorts of offences would warrant such intrusion, but without this amendment it is open to the Government in the future to allow law enforcement agencies to store and have access to internet connection records. We believe that this is two steps too far.

As far as Amendment 210ZE is concerned, Clause 157 refers to the “Duty of operators to assist with implementation” of bulk acquisition warrants. This amendment seeks to clarify that the person to whom the warrant is issued—the implementing authority—cannot be held liable for a breach of the warrant because of the actions of the operator.

Amendment 210ZF seeks to ensure that, under Clause 158, “Safeguards relating to the retention and disclosure of data”, if internet connection records were subsequently stored, no such record could be disclosed unless the individual concerned was suspected of having committed an offence. I beg to move.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I agree with the noble Lord’s intention in Amendment 204 to ensure that communications data can be acquired in bulk and analysed in real time. Indeed, the Bill already permits this. I draw attention to Clause 146(5) and 146(6), which provide for such a scenario as he suggests in this amendment. These subsections specify the conduct which must be described in the warrant and any conduct that it is necessary to undertake to do what the warrant expressly requires. If it was therefore necessary to obtain bulk communications data in real time, these provisions would allow it.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I had understood that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, also referred to Amendment 204 but if he did not, I apologise.

I turn then to Amendment 203A, which seeks to exclude the ability for a bulk acquisition warrant to require a communication service provider to obtain third-party data where it is not already in its possession. I do believe that the noble Lord referred to that.

[Lord Paddick]

I did.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

It will be recalled that the issue of third-party data was discussed during the last Committee session before the Summer Recess, when my noble friend Lord Howe explained that it is absolutely right that where a communication service provider holds or is able to obtain communications data, whether in relation to its own services or those provided by a third party, the data should be available to be acquired under the Bill. Put simply, data that already exist and are held or can reasonably be obtained which could save a life, convict a criminal, prevent a terrorist attack or provide an alibi should not be put out of the reach of law enforcement. The point we would make clear is this: a bulk warrant can require a communication service provider to obtain and disclose third-party data only where it is necessary and proportionate to do so, and where approved by a judicial commissioner. The provider is required to comply with a request to provide communications data in bulk, including third-party data, only where it is reasonably practicable for it to do so. Given these safeguards, I suggest that any further restriction on obtaining third-party data would not be appropriate.

This is of course a separate matter from the retention of third-party data, where the Prime Minister gave a clear commitment when she was Home Secretary that we will not require a telecommunications operator to retain third-party data. We are working on provisions to address that matter in the Bill.

We understand that the purpose of Amendment 204A is to limit the bulk acquisition of communications data to those which are held by the communication service provider only on the day that a warrant is served. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, indicates otherwise.

[Lord Paddick]

If I can assist the noble and learned Lord, Amendment 204A is to probe and seek reassurance on the record that this is not simply to allow speculative surveillance without suspicion. I accept that a warrant has to authorise the acquisition of an ongoing stream of content but this would just assure the Committee that it does not mean speculative surveillance without suspicion.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I do not think that there is any suggestion that it would involve speculative surveillance without suspicion but, technically, we should not require the agencies to make repeated applications for a warrant in order to maintain their access to such material. I hope that reassures the noble Lord, and I shall therefore move on. Perhaps I had misunderstood the extent of the noble Lord’s amendment, but there would be an unnecessary workload on the agencies if they had repeatedly to apply for warrants in this context. However, I am sure that that was never the noble Lord’s intention.

Amendment 210ZE seeks to ensure that the authority implementing a bulk acquisition warrant cannot be liable for a breach of that warrant as a result of an act or omission by the communications service provider on which it has served the warrant. The Bill outlines errors that must be reported to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, and the draft Bulk Acquisition Code of Practice provides additional detail on error reporting processes. The code draws distinctions between errors made by the requesting agency and those made by a communications service provider on which the warrant is served. We believe it is clear that anyone implementing a warrant is responsible for any error they, and they alone, make, and that they are not responsible for any error made by anyone else. Therefore this amendment is unnecessary.

Amendments 210ZF and 204B would add to the current list of reasons for which it may be necessary to disclose or copy communications data obtained under a bulk acquisition warrant. Such disclosure and copying must, of course, be kept to the minimum necessary for a limited number of purposes. The amendment adds, in the case of internet connection records, a requirement of necessity in respect of an individual having committed an offence.

In tabling amendment 210ZF, I understand the noble Lord is seeking to understand whether a bulk acquisition warrant could require a communications service provider to provide internet connection records in bulk. The Government have been clear that one of the aims of the Bill is to provide technology-neutral legislation—a point referred to earlier by my noble friend Lord Howe—to take into account future changes in the way that we communicate. While we have been clear that internet connection records are not currently acquired in bulk, it is of course worth being clear that current legislation would allow the agencies to acquire internet connection records in bulk, where necessary and proportionate to do so.

I can confirm to the Committee that the agencies do not currently acquire internet connection records in bulk and have no current intention to do so. It is, however, important to ensure that we do not legislate against the possibility of internet connection records being acquired in bulk, should the agencies make a case which demonstrates that this might be necessary and proportionate in the interests of national security in the future.

We strongly believe that it is right that the intelligence agencies have the power to acquire communications data in bulk. Indeed, David Anderson, in his recent review of the utility of the bulk powers within the Bill, said:

“Bulk acquisition has been demonstrated to be crucial in a variety of fields”,

and that,

“bulk acquisition has contributed significantly to the disruption of terrorist operations and, through that disruption, almost certainly the saving of lives”.

Clause 158, which this amendment seeks to alter, outlines the safeguards relating to the acquisition of communications data under a bulk warrant. Any application to obtain communications data in bulk is subject to the strongest of the safeguards in the Bill, which we have discussed at length in relation to other provisions. A warrant to acquire communications data in bulk must be both necessary and proportionate for the interests of national security, must specify the operational purposes, which are the only reasons the data can be selected for examination, and will be subject to the double lock of Secretary of State and judicial commissioner approval.

It is in this context and in the context of these very strong safeguards that we think it right, as is currently the case, that the bulk acquisition power should remain technologically neutral, with the safeguards applying equally to all types of communications data defined by the Bill.

As David Anderson recommends in his report, the Government will also keep the bulk acquisition power under review in order to ensure that it remains necessary and proportionate alongside any other mechanisms which might be developed, such as the request filter. Taking into account the fact that the agencies require such clear authorisation from both the Secretary of State and the judicial commissioner, should they ever consider it necessary and proportionate and in the interests of national security to proceed with such bulk acquisition, I suggest that this amendment is unnecessary and I invite the noble Lord to withdraw it.

[Lord Paddick]

I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord for his explanation. As far as Amendment 204B and the potential for bulk acquisition of internet connection records are concerned, it is, to us, a rather alarming prospect which I do not think has yet been raised in the public consciousness. It is absolutely certain that we will return to this issue on Report. At this stage, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Investigatory Powers Bill

Debate between Lord Paddick and Lord Keen of Elie

Tuesday 19th July 2016 Lords Chamber

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, we recognised during the passage of the Bill thus far that care must be applied to the acquisition of internet connection records—in particular, that they should not be acquired for trivial purposes. Their value to law enforcement has been widely recognised, and the Bill, as introduced, already restricts access to four specific purposes. In addition, local authorities cannot acquire them for any purposes.

However, in response to a suggestion from the shadow Home Secretary in the House of Commons, the Government committed to consider further restrictions which would provide greater reassurance that the powers to acquire internet connection records would only ever be used proportionately. These amendments therefore apply a threshold to the acquisition of internet connection records when the statutory purpose is for the prevention and detection of crime. This means that they will be able to be acquired only for offences that are sufficiently serious that an offender can be sentenced to at least six months’ imprisonment.

In implementing this threshold, however, it is important that internet connection records can continue to be used for certain offences which, for whatever reasons, carry a lower sentencing limit. I am sure that noble Lords will agree that internet connection records should be available for these offences. These are: the investigation of any offence where the sending of a communication is an integral part of the offence: for example, offences related to stalking, cyberbullying and harassment which can, if not investigated, quickly escalate to more serious offences; offences relating to breach of a person’s privacy, such as stealing personal data, which recognises the importance of protecting privacy in the digital age and the need to fully investigate any suspected breaches; offences committed by corporate bodies—for example, corporate manslaughter, where a penalty of imprisonment cannot apply; and any offence meeting the serious crime threshold in the Bill for the most intrusive powers, ensuring that these powers can be used to investigate offences involving the use of violence, conduct that results in substantial financial gain and conduct by a large number of people in pursuit of a common purpose.

A number of consequential amendments are made as a result of this amendment. The Government and law enforcement are clear about the value and importance of accessing internet connection records to prevent and detect crime, and to keep the public safe. That has been recognised during the passage of this Bill thus far, including by noble Lords at Second Reading. The amendments build significantly on the safeguards that the Bill already applies to the acquisition of communications data. They are based on the amendments proposed by the Opposition in the House of Commons and they will ensure public trust in the use of these vital powers. I beg to move.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, the restrictions on using internet connection records set out in these amendments are welcome. However, we intend to propose the removal of internet connection records from the definition of communications data that the Secretary of State can require a telecommunications operator to retain when we come to debate Clause 83. The intended effect of that amendment would be to make it impossible to obtain internet connection records unless they were retained by the telecommunications provider for its own business purposes. I will leave any further comment on internet connection records until we reach Amendment 156A to Clause 83.

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[Lord Keen of Elie]

I invite the noble Lord to have a little more confidence in the parliamentary procedures in the UK, in the scrutiny that is being given by our institutions to the provisions of the Bill, and even in the Committee procedures of this House. We have looked with care at these matters repeatedly and have come to a view regarding ICRs.

[Lord Paddick]

Will the Minister give way?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

Not just yet. The fact that other jurisdictions may have taken a different view is to be noticed but is not necessarily of any great moment in this context.

I want to deal with the suggestion by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, that somehow GCHQ could provide the alternative route into all this material, and that somehow the security services would be there at the beck and call of the police authorities in order to in-gather and provide the appropriate information by different means. He asserted that the security services said, “We do not need”. That is far too hard-edged. They have other means but they did not say, “We do not need” in that context.

The noble Lord suggested that I had made an assertion on a previous occasion about the admissibility of certain intelligence acquired by the security services. I did not make an assertion; I made a statement of fact. Intelligence acquired through interception cannot be used as evidence in court. That is the factual position.

[Lord Paddick]

This Committee is part of the process of the scrutiny of legislation, and therefore this House should have respect for noble Lords who wish to use it to challenge what the Government are proposing. With regard to the greater success that the UK has had compared with, say, Germany in the prosecution of paedophiles, will the Minister confirm that that is using existing legislation without the use of internet connection records?

On the question of an evidential basis, why, in the operational case for internet connection records, is the need for evidential material not included in any of the examples provided by the National Crime Agency? Why, when I visited the NCA on a couple of occasions, was none of the examples that it gave of a need for evidence that could be presented in court? Indeed, the case studies presented to me at GCHQ confirmed that the work done by GCHQ in conjunction with the NCA was sufficient for the NCA to bring successful prosecutions, notwithstanding that the interception of content is not acceptable in giving evidence in court.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am most obliged to the noble Lord for his intervention. Of course, I did not accompany him to the NCA, so I do not know what examples he was or was not given, and nor did I prepare or draft the operational examples that he referred to earlier. Of course, there are other means by which evidence may be gathered for the purpose of prosecution, but we are looking to the most effective means of doing this going forward, remembering that people are moving away from telephonic communication—using mobiles and telephone systems—and into the use of internet connection by way of such examples as WhatsApp. Our police forces will be blinded if we allow that development and do not attempt to keep up with such developing technology.

On the question of whether there is an evidential requirement, I note that the noble Lord now acknowledges that there is an evidential requirement in the sense that intelligence gathered by way of interception is not admissible as evidence in court.

The question of the cost of carrying out this exercise was raised. The figure of £1 billion has been put about repeatedly, and the experience in Denmark has been referred to on many occasions. However, one has to look at this from the perspective of the United Kingdom and its approach to this matter. We do not accept the estimate of £1 billion that has been given, and indeed—in response to the inquiry from the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Chester—the current estimate of costs is about £175 million. Our figures factor in the existing infrastructure and the requirements already placed on individual communications service providers, as well as the technical complexity of their networks in this context.

One has to bear in mind that, for example, the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 and the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 already provide for the retention of source IP addresses and port numbers, which make up part of an internet connection record. So I cannot accept the assertion from the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, that none of these records are provided for under existing legislation. Furthermore, the Bill allows the Government to require the retention of communications data, including internet connection records, only when necessary and proportionate. One must not lose sight of that test in this context.

So we consider that a case was made in the reports regarding internet connection records. We entirely agree with the view arrived at by the Joint Committee. The noble Lord, Lord King, has already quoted from its report that,

“on balance, there is a case for Internet Connection Records as an important tool for law enforcement”.

That has been clearly established by the work that has been done. I acknowledge that of course the Committee of this House wishes to scrutinise this legislation, and it is right that it does so, but it is helpful if it does so against the background and with an understanding of the pre-legislative scrutiny that has already taken place, with regard to the three reports and indeed the recommendations of the Joint Committee. So we submit that the ability to require the retention of internet connection records is a fundamental power that will provide substantial benefits to law enforcement and indeed to the security and intelligence agencies. It is in these circumstances that I say that we cannot support Amendment 156A.

I turn for a moment to Amendment 147A, which seeks to require judicial commissioner approval for applications to acquire internet connection records. I hope that I can persuade noble Lords that the amendment is not needed because we already have a stringent authorisation regime in place that protects against the abuse of applications for communications data. Indeed, the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, alluded to the suggestion that somehow our security agencies and police would have such time on their hands that they would simply roam around such communications data for their own amusement. One is entitled, surely, to discount such a proposition.

The Bill contains robust safeguards for every stage of the acquisition of any form of communications data. This includes requiring the use of an expert single point of contact; authorisation by a designated senior officer who is independent of the investigation and who must be of a rank approved by Parliament; comprehensive oversight by the new Investigatory Powers Commissioner; and the new offence of unlawfully acquiring communications data from a telecommunications operator.

On top of those general requirements, there are extra, specific safeguards for the acquisition of internet connection records. So internet connection records will be able to be acquired only if they are needed for one of the four specified investigative purposes—and local authorities, for example, will be barred from acquiring internet connection records in any form. As well as these protections, we have also tabled an amendment that provides for a crime threshold that must be met before internet connection records can be acquired. We addressed this issue earlier. This will prevent their use for low-level crimes.

So while we recognise that there are sensitivities concerning internet connection records, they will, among other things, be fundamental in resolving IP addresses in certain cases. For example, where the telecommunications operator uses technology that allocates the same IP address to a number of different customers, the internet connection record will help to determine the specific individual in whom law enforcement is interested. There has been cross-party agreement that we need to solve the problem of IP address resolution and I cannot see how it would make sense to require judicial authorisation for some types of IP address resolution but not for others, simply because of the technology that a telecommunications operator uses.

If a public authority were considering acquiring internet connection records in a way that was novel or contentious, it would certainly be right for additional safeguards to apply. That is why the draft communications data code of practice requires any novel or contentious application for communications data to be referred to the judicial commissioner. The Government believe that it is absolutely right that novel or contentious cases are referred to the commissioner, but we do not believe that the tried and trusted authorisation system for communications data should be fundamentally changed when there is no evidence that it is not working. Furthermore, none of the three independent reports that we have referred to and which informed the drafting of this Bill—from David Anderson, the ISC and RUSI—suggested or recommended any changes to the authorisation regime for communications data.

Finally, the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, referred to the recent opinion of the Advocate-General in the case of Watson in the CJEU, which came out this morning. We note what was said in a fairly lengthy opinion. Your Lordships will be aware that that is the opinion of the Advocate-General, not the judgment of the court; a final judgment is anticipated in the autumn of this year. The Government maintain that the existing regime for the acquisition of communications data and the proposals in the Investigatory Powers Bill are compatible with EU law, and clearly it would not be appropriate to comment further while legal proceedings are ongoing. In these circumstances, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

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[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, perhaps this is a bit of light relief. Clause 77(1) defines what conduct is lawful when it comes to obtaining communications data, and Clause 77(2)(a) goes on to say that someone cannot be sued if what they do,

“is incidental to, or is reasonably undertaken in connection with”,

the lawful conduct defined in subsection (1). So far, so good. Clause 77(2)(b) goes on to say that someone cannot be subject to any civil liability in respect of conduct that,

“is not itself conduct for which an authorisation or warrant … is capable of being granted”,

under various acts set out in subsection (3) and,

“might reasonably have been expected to have been sought in the case in question”.

If I understand this correctly—and I am sure I have not—if that conduct could and should have been authorised but was not, they can be sued, but if it was not something that could or should have been authorised, no civil liability arises. Either that cannot be right, or it is capable of misunderstanding and should be changed. Can the Minister put the provision in plain English? Our amendment is probing to ensure that we know what we are dealing with. I beg to move.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, the provisions on the lawfulness of conduct authorised by Part 3 replicate those that apply currently in the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. As we made clear in response to an identical amendment in the other place, the Bill goes no further as regards providing indemnity from civil liability for conduct that is incidental to, or reasonably undertaken in connection with, a communications data authorisation.

The provision as drafted ensures that a person who engages in conduct only in connection with an authorisation cannot be subject to civil liability unless that activity could itself have been authorised separately under a relevant power. That, we submit, must be right. The amendment would remove that provision entirely, which, in effect, would mean that a person acting lawfully under an authorisation that had properly been granted under the Bill would be at risk of civil liability if some incidental or reasonably connected conduct were not expressly covered by the authorisation.

I notice that it is a probing amendment. In those circumstances, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw it.

[Lord Paddick]

I thank the noble and learned Lord for what he has said. However, we tabled this probing amendment in order to understand what the provision means. Unfortunately, simply saying that it replicates legislation that is already on the statute book does not really help our understanding. Perhaps the noble and learned Lord can say whether the provision has been applied in the past under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am not in a position to give a specific answer to that question, but I am content to write to the noble Lord on the point.

[Lord Paddick]

I am very grateful to the noble and learned Lord for his promise to write on this issue. My question is genuine. Perhaps it is because I am not a lawyer and my brain is not very big, but I contend that the provision is impenetrable. At this stage, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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[Lord Paddick]

I am very grateful for the lengthy explanation that the noble and learned Lord has provided. However, I still have questions. One of the examples he gave was to be able to interfere with equipment of a group of people who are accessing a particular website. I guess that you would need to know the IP addresses of the devices that were accessing that website to interfere with them, and that would be within the terms of our amendment. I may have lost concentration, and apologise to the Minister if so, but I cannot remember him addressing targeted examination warrants, where presumably the security services—the only ones who would apply for such a warrant—would know the identity of the people. I am still not clear about the need for thematic targeted examination warrants.

The big question that I have around testing and training is: who are the poor innocent people targeted by the warrants used for testing and training purposes? How is it decided who should be targeted? Will the Minister say what that other information is that needs to be specified in the warrant?

I accept that the withdrawal of these powers would be a mistake but, as the Minister acknowledged to begin with, these are probing amendments. I am grateful for the explanations he has given so far. Perhaps he might write to me to deal with my further and more difficult questions, but at this stage I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I shall be happy to write to the noble Lord on the three particular points. I do not think that they were the more difficult questions but they may be the ones that I did not fully answer, and I am content to write to him.

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[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am obliged to the noble Lord for his suggestion that this is essentially a probing amendment, which he directs at what he perceives as anomalies in the Bill. For reasons that I shall expand on, those anomalies do not exist.

Amendment 176 seeks to introduce a clause that would enable the Secretary of State to make regulations requiring that the authorisation of property interference under the Police Act 1997, where the purpose is to enable the interception of communications, should be subject to the equivalent approval processes as set out under Part 5 of this Bill, including double-lock review by a judicial commissioner. That is how I understand the amendment and the noble Lord indicates his agreement.

It is worth being clear that interception warrants are not issued under the Police Act 1997, but are currently issued by the Secretary of State under Part 1 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act. However, sometimes it may be necessary for intercepting authorities to carry out property interference to enable interception to take place. In these circumstances, the intercepting authority would need to ensure that appropriate property interference authorisation is obtained in addition to an interception warrant.

Clause 14 will restrict the ability of law enforcement agencies to authorise this type of equipment interference under the Police Act 1997. The restriction will mean that where the purpose of the interference is to enable the acquisition of communications, private information or equipment data, the activity can no longer be authorised under the Police Act 1997. As a result, the amendment in question is not required, as it will not be possible to authorise the type of activity it envisages under the Police Act 1997.

In future, if it is necessary to interfere with property to enable interception to take place, the interference with equipment will need to be authorised under Part 5 of the Bill. The Bill and its associated codes of practice make it clear that an equipment interference warrant cannot authorise activity which would constitute live interception of communication in the course of its transmission. As a result, both an equipment interference warrant and an interception warrant will be required.

In practice, this activity is likely to be authorised as a combined equipment interference and interception warrant. Paragraph 3 of Schedule 8 to the Bill enables the Secretary of State to issue such a combined warrant to the relevant intercepting authorities, such as the NCA. This reflects the fact that the Secretary of State is responsible for issuing targeted interception warrants, and the Bill ensures that combined warrants always default to the most senior level of authorisation. Any such warrant would always also go through the double lock of judicial commissioner authorisation.

I hope that reassures the noble Lord that the amendment is not necessary and I accordingly invite him to withdraw it

[Lord Paddick]

I thank the noble and learned Lord for what he has said, but I did ask whether he would be prepared to offer an opinion about the deployment of a covert camera into somebody’s home without the need for either Secretary of State or judicial commissioner approval and what, in the Government’s opinion, is the right level of authority. I accept what he says about an interception warrant being required if equipment interference is for the purpose of intercepting communication. However, if it is for the purpose of observing what is going on inside an office or a home, I do not believe that that amounts to interception of communication as such, even though the people who are present in the room are communicating with each other. I do not think that amounts to interception of communication as intended by the Bill.

The other issue that I was hoping the noble and learned Lord could enlighten the Committee on is that equipment interference warrants issued to the security services require the double lock of the Secretary of State and a judicial commissioner, but equipment interference warrants issued to law enforcement do not require that double lock, because a police chief can self-authorise the issuing of such a warrant to such agencies. We have to bear in mind how intrusive that can be. We have already discussed that the equipment interference may not necessarily be in order to intercept communication, and the noble and learned Lord gave the example earlier of looking for a pornographic image on a computer. Despite what he said, it still seems an anomaly that the security services require a double-lock authority and the police do not.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am not sure to what extent I can respond before the noble Lord sits down, but let me be clear that I do not accept that there is an anomaly, because we are dealing here with two entirely different circumstances that are not directed to the present amendment. As regards a camera being placed in someone’s room, I undertake to write to the noble Lord on that if that will assist him, although it does not appear to me to assist with this amendment.

[Lord Paddick]

I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, who has all the time in the world to add comments until I finally withdraw the amendment. However, I beg leave to withdraw it at this stage.

Orgreave: Inquiry

Debate between Lord Paddick and Lord Keen of Elie

Wednesday 13th July 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

It is not a case of the Government delaying coming to a conclusion. As I indicated in an earlier answer, the IPCC has specifically pointed out that a decision on an inquiry at this stage could cross over into further investigations into potential criminal prosecutions. With regard to the disclosure of the unredacted report by a newspaper on 4 May 2016, the entire unredacted report was not disclosed. However, that which was disclosed did show a number of senior officers acting in common in regard to Orgreave and Hillsborough; that is correct. As regards the observations that have been made by the temporary chief constable and the MPs, I agree that those observations were made.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, does the noble and learned Lord agree that an investigation similar to that conducted by the Hillsborough Independent Panel might be the way forward?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, that will be a matter for the new Home Secretary.

Investigatory Powers Bill

Debate between Lord Paddick and Lord Keen of Elie

Monday 11th July 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

I shall speak briefly to the amendments set out by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, about co-operation with companies based oversees. A real concern to multinational companies is a conflict of law between the country in which they are based and the UK. That concern has been expressed to us as well. As we go through the Bill, we will see that co-operation between countries is increasingly important. As communication moves from cellular communication to communication using the internet, many of the companies that people use to communicate with each other—Facebook, WhatsApp and other platforms of that sort—are based in the United States. The more warrant authorisation processes are harmonised, the more there can be international agreements between countries and the more success we will have in securing communications data and intercept evidence as a result of people moving from cellular to the online environment. I generally support what the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, said about the importance of resolving these issues and forging as many agreements as possible with countries, particularly those where these widely used communications platforms are based.

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, I shall begin by addressing the amendments which relate to the serving of warrants and the giving of notices to overseas telecommunications operators. The first, Amendment 63, appears to remove the ability to serve a warrant outside the United Kingdom when the United Kingdom has entered into an international agreement with the country where that person or company is established. Perhaps that was not the intention. It seems counterintuitive to prohibit the service of a warrant on a person outside the United Kingdom when they are based in a territory with which the United Kingdom has an agreement which expressly provides for the service of warrants overseas. I wonder whether it was intended to do the opposite and provide that a warrant might be served on a person outside the UK only pursuant to a relevant international agreement.

In any event, it is important to remember that, although discussions are ongoing, there is currently no international agreement between the United Kingdom and the United States. As the Home Secretary has previously stated, the UK and United States Governments have begun considering a framework under which US-based communications service providers could disclose data directly to the United Kingdom for serious criminal and counterterrorism investigations in response to a UK order requesting the content of the communications—that is, a warrant. We are eager to press forward with developing an agreement. In response to the observations of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, I can say that timetabling will depend on changes to the relevant US domestic legislation, a matter to which the United States Attorney-General recently referred. But it is not possible to give a more exact timetable so far as that is concerned.

Taking up the point of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, of course it would be beneficial to all concerned that we should achieve some form of international agreement with regard to these matters, and it is hoped that the agreement with the United States might provide a template to take this forward. But let us accept that we are at a very early stage.

It is important to be clear that any company complying with warrants under an international agreement will not face enforcement action. I am perfectly content to put that important point on record for the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, who opened by explaining that these were essentially probing amendments, and I appreciate that. However, it is also important to explain that such agreements will not by themselves require a company to comply with a United Kingdom warrant. Even when an international agreement is in place, it remains vital that the Bill continues to exert extraterritoriality in relation to interception warrants. This also provides the legal certainty that some companies have been asking for.

Amendments 64 and 65, made to Clause 41, would set out that it would not be reasonably practicable for an operator outside the United Kingdom to comply with a warrant if that involved acting contrary to any laws or restrictions in the jurisdiction in which its principal office is located. These amendments are unnecessary because subsection (5) already makes it clear that, in determining whether it is reasonably practicable for a company to comply with a warrant, any requirements or restrictions under the law of the territory in which it is based must be taken into account. I do not want to quote the matter at length, but I will just refer to the relevant provision. In Clause 41(5), the matters to be taken into account include,

“any requirements or restrictions under the law of that country or territory that are relevant to the taking of those steps, and … the extent to which it is reasonably practicable to give effect to the warrant in a way that does not breach any of those requirements or restrictions”.

Therefore, it appears that this issue is already addressed. Indeed, what is said in the Bill replicates the existing position under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, as amended by the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014.

I believe that the intention of Amendment 65A is to provide additional protections for staff employed in the United Kingdom by telecommunications companies whose principal offices are established overseas. Again, this additional language is unnecessary, and I will seek to explain why. In respect of interception warrants, the Government have already amended the Bill in response to concerns from overseas companies to make it clear that a warrant must be served in such a way as to bring the contents of the warrant to the attention of a person who is capable of providing assistance in relation to it. Clearly, an employee based in the United Kingdom who has no access to relevant information would not be such a person, as they would not be capable of providing the assistance required. The concern that enforcement action will be taken against junior local employees is also misplaced, since it is the telecommunications operator, rather than any individual, who is subject to the duty to provide assistance. I also make the point that it would not be in the interests of the relevant agency to serve a warrant or a notice in such a way that meant it could not be complied with quickly and efficiently. But the broader point is that if there is a conflict between United Kingdom law and the internal authorisation processes of an individual company, then of course United Kingdom law must always take primacy.

Amendments 104 and 105 would permit a person not to comply with a technical capability notice if the notice would require the person to act in a way contrary to any law or restriction in their country or territory. This amendment reads across provisions from other parts of the Bill—those relating to interception warrants and targeted communications data requests, as the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, noticed—but it does so inappropriately.

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[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, my noble friend Lady Hamwee and I have Amendments 26 to 31 in this group. Under Amendment 31, we have concerns about the breadth of warrants. These warrants are described as targeted interception warrants or targeted examination warrants. Noble Lords will no doubt recall that targeted examination warrants relate to where a bulk interception has resulted in coming across content that belongs to a UK citizen and, therefore a targeted examination warrant is required in those circumstances. Clause 17(1)(a) provides that a targeted interception warrant or a targeted examination warrant may relate to,

“a particular person or organisation”.

An organisation could cover hundreds, if not thousands, of people. I am indebted to my noble friend Lady Hamwee, who tells me that it could, in fact, relate to the National Trust—I am not sure about horticultural terrorism, but they have more than 1 million members. We are probing whether it is appropriate to have a targeted interception warrant that is targeted at an organisation, particularly when in Clause 17(1)(b), it says that such warrants can only apply to,

“a single set of premises”.

The potential contrast between the number of people who might be affected in terms of an organisation being targeted by a targeted interception warrant but only a single set of premises seems stark.

Similarly, Clause 17(2)(b) says that such a warrant may relate to,

“more than one person or organisation”,

so again it is very broad. The number of people––potentially innocent people––caught up in such a targeted interception could be extremely large.

Amendment 27 relates to Clause 17(2)(a), whereby,

“a group of persons who share a common purpose or who carry on, or may carry on, a particular activity”,

can be targeted by an interception warrant. To narrow the potential for this to affect a large number of individuals, the amendment would require each person to be named or identified using a unique identifier. While we accept that with, for example, members of a gang involved in drug dealing, one may not know the names of the individuals concerned, one might from surveillance footage be able to accurately describe the individual whom one wants to target by means of that warrant. A similar argument is suggested by Amendment 29 in relation to Clause 17(2)(b).

Amendment 30 relates to Clause 17(2)(c) and queries the issuing of warrants for “testing or training activities”. While Clause 17(3) defines what such activities are, it does not seem clear to us why it would be necessary to issue a targeted interception warrant to test equipment or train individuals in its use. One would have thought that, if it was a training or testing exercise, it could be done with the consent of whoever is being targeted by the training or testing activities. Amendment 31 therefore suggests that Clause 17(3), in relation to “testing or training activities” be deleted. I beg to move.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, some of these amendments were discussed in the other place. They would remove the ability of the warrant-requesting agencies to apply for a warrant against an organisation; they would require a warrant to name or identify each individual involved in an operation, and they would remove warrants for testing and training activity.

As was set out in the other place, it is important that those responsible for keeping us safe have the powers they need. We consider that the amendments would undermine those necessary powers, but I appreciate that the noble Lord is advancing essentially probing amendments and I respond in that spirit.

Let me start with the amendment regarding unique identifiers. As was explained in the other place, it is not always possible at the outset of an investigation to know or have identified all the individuals who may be subject to a warrant during that investigation. When a warrant is granted against a kidnap gang, for example, the Secretary of State may not know that there are four members of the gang rather than three. The ability to grant a warrant against the gang to establish its size and to identify co-conspirators is precisely why RIPA provided for so-called “thematic” targeted warrants. They are an invaluable tool in allowing the agencies to investigate complex or fast-moving threats, and it is important that we do not undermine their ability to use that tool.

I reassure the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, that the Bill already provides at Clause 29(8) that the warrant has to specify, for example, the phone numbers to be intercepted. Furthermore, Clause 29(4) provides a safeguard for warrants that relate to a group of persons who share a common purpose or who carry on a particular activity—for example a paedophile network—by requiring that the warrant must name or describe as many of those persons so far as is reasonably practicable. I am afraid that I do not accept the analogy with the National Trust—I do not consider it apposite at all.

It is already the case that the warrant will name or describe particular people whose communications are to be intercepted as they become known over the course of the investigation. This is an important safeguard that will assist the oversight of thematic targeted warrants. It is therefore in these circumstances that I suggest that the amendment is not necessary.

Perhaps I may move on to the amendments that seek to remove the ability to grant a warrant against an organisation. Such a change would be operationally damaging and is, moreover, unnecessary. The Bill and the statutory code of practice impose strict limits on the issue of warrants, including in relation to organisations. Such warrants are not open-ended. Their scope must be sufficiently limited that the Secretary of State can properly assess the necessity and proportionality of the interference. Further, under the Bill a judicial commissioner will need to approve the Secretary of State’s decision. In those circumstances the Bill will not allow for overly broad warrants to be issued.

I turn finally to testing and training warrants. The amendments would remove the ability to apply for a warrant for testing or training purposes. Again, I suggest that that would be damaging operationally and would result in a consequent reduction in safeguards. It is vital that those who are authorised to undertake interception are able to test new equipment and to make sure that those responsible for using that equipment are properly trained in its use. Of course there is an element of systems here in the context of the equipment. While it is possible for some testing of equipment to take place in a controlled environment, it is sometimes necessary to test equipment outside of controlled environments to ensure that it will work in real-life situations. There are therefore strict controls which govern the handling of material obtained in this way during such tests. However, we believe that it is right that it should be possible to test this equipment in scenarios where it can be checked that it is working effectively and to help ensure that the users are operating it correctly. Without the ability to test equipment, we will increase the risk of mistakes being made where individuals are not able to receive adequate training in the use of equipment.

The warrant application process in these circumstances allows the Secretary of State to understand the potential risk that communications will be intercepted incidentally to the purpose of the testing or training, and to agree the measures to be taken to reduce the chances of communications being accidently intercepted. There are clear safeguards in place to protect the privacy of citizens. Accordingly, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

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[Lord Keen of Elie]

A thematic targeted warrant will be granted only in circumstances where the Secretary of State is satisfied that it is necessary and proportionate. None of the examples cited by the noble Lord comes within a hundred miles of that.

[Lord Paddick]

I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord for his explanation and I am reassured to some extent by, for example, some of the provisions he highlighted in Clause 29(8) and (4). I understand that in fast-moving situations such as a kidnapping it may be necessary to add people to the warrant or to encompass additional individuals who are not specifically named on the warrant. However, I wonder whether some safeguards can still be provided in slower-moving situations, or whether, as in the case where there are provisions for the urgent issuing of warrants, those provisions could be used in these cases.

As for the strict limits on the targeting of organisations, I accept, as I notice the Labour Front Bench also accepts, that these warrants must be necessary and proportionate, and that they provide some safeguards against overreaching in the use of these warrants. I am still puzzled about training and testing warrants. I accept that new equipment and individuals need to be trained in real, live situations, but I am a little concerned about who the individuals and organisations are that might be targeted in these training exercises, bearing in mind that the whole suggestion is that the normal provisions of proportionality and necessity, in terms of suspicions that these individuals are up to no good, would not apply in these situations. Therefore, what is learned? What privacy is being intruded into in the course of these training and testing activities?

My concerns remain about some of those areas, but I am reassured by other things that the noble and learned Lord has said and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, my noble friend Lady Hamwee and I have Amendments 37, 121, 153 and 161 in this group. Basically, these amendments relate to Clause 20, “Grounds on which warrants may be issued by Secretary of State”. We suggest an additional paragraph, where a warrant is issued for the purposes of preventing or detecting a serious crime, or in the interests of the economic well-being of the UK,

“only where there is a reasonable suspicion that a serious criminal offence has been or is likely to be committed”.

I refer to the briefing provided by Liberty, which points out that one of the greatest problems, recurrent in every power in the Bill, is the lack of a reasonable suspicion threshold for surveillance warrants to be authorised for the purposes of preventing and detecting crime. It states that:

“Intrusive powers can be authorised in order to ‘prevent and detect serious crime’, or even (in the case of communications data) to collect tax, prevent disorder, or in the interests of public safety. However, these general purposes are left wide open to broad interpretation and abuse without requiring a threshold of suspicion”.

The briefing says that a requirement of reasonable suspicion, when the purpose to prevent and detect serious crime is invoked, would prevent the potential abusive surveillance of law-abiding citizens that has regrettably been seen in the past.

The threshold of reasonable suspicion has long been an important safeguard for citizens and law enforcers against the risk of arbitrary use of police powers. The necessary and proportionate standard invokes an important assessment of the extent of the intrusion, but it does not, as we read it, require a burden of proof. Perhaps the Minister could explain how or why the “reasonable suspicion” test should not be applied to the various powers covered in our amendments. I beg to move.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, explained, these amendments seek to provide that certain authorisations can be given only where there is a reasonable suspicion that a serious criminal offence has been, or is likely to be, committed. It is almost like trying to compare apples and oranges. The construct of the Bill is not around reasonable suspicion. It is around necessity and proportionality. They achieve the same goal, but in different ways. These amendments are not necessary and, in the case of communications data, would undermine the ability of law enforcement and other public authorities to catch criminals and to keep the public safe. First, let me assure the Committee that for a warrant to be issued for the prevention or detection of serious crime, a sufficiently compelling case will always be required; a speculative warrant could never be approved under Clause 20. The same is true for authorisations to obtain communications data for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime. So these amendments respond to a concern that, I suggest, is misplaced.

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[Lord Keen of Elie]

For example, in the case of a missing person there may be no reasonable suspicion but it may still be necessary and proportionate to grant a warrant in those circumstances. I hope that that is concrete enough.

[Lord Paddick]

I am very grateful to the Minister. While I accept that there are some cases where the test of reasonable suspicion is not required—he gave the very good example of a missing person—I still wonder why the Government are averse in all circumstances to having a “reasonable suspicion” test. If I understand what he is saying, I accept that it is implicit in the necessity provision of issuing a warrant. At this stage I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Investigatory Powers Bill

Debate between Lord Paddick and Lord Keen of Elie

Monday 11th July 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am obliged to the noble Baroness. It was raised by Scottish colleagues—Scottish colleagues with whom I do not agree—but I am quite happy to undertake to write to her. I should say it was raised by the Scottish Law Society, not the Scottish Bar.

Amendments 18 and 246 were spoken to very clearly by the noble Baronesses, Lady Hollins and Lady O’Neill, and the noble Lords, Lord Lipsey and Lord Oates. While I am quite happy to write on the matter of press regulation and the commencement of Section 40, press regulation is not the purpose of the Bill. I have to make that clear in this context because while I understand the points that are being made, they do not arise directly in the context of these amendments.

Moreover, the relevant amendments are not considered necessary. There is already a criminal offence where unlawful interception takes place on a public or private telecommunications system or a public postal service. There is also a cause of action which applies in a limited set of circumstances, where the criminal offence does not apply. Where there is an allegation that unlawful interception has taken place on behalf of a public authority, a person may seek recourse through the Investigatory Powers Tribunal, which has the power to provide redress, including awarding damages.

Where the conduct relates to an individual who does not belong to a public authority, there are other causes of action which may be applicable. I may have misunderstood the noble Baroness that the tort which currently exists in the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000—allowing an individual to take action against a person who has the right to control the use or operation of a private telecommunications system and who intercepts a communication on that system—has been added to the Bill by way of Clause 8, and that happened after the debate on the Bill in the other place. In these circumstances, we are not prepared to accept the amendments.

Turning to Amendments 20 and 21, Clauses 6(2) and 6(3) are important because they provide that where a public authority, or a telecommunications operator, is acting in accordance with a warrant properly obtained under the Bill, or the provisions of Clauses 42 to 50, they can be sure that they are not breaking any other law or required to obtain additional authorisations. This legal certainty is vital for those engaged in the essential work of keeping us safe.

The first amendment seeks to provide that future legislation could make that conduct unlawful for certain purposes. I understand the principle the noble Lords seek to achieve but I do not believe it is necessary. Nothing in the Bill prevents Parliament amending the legislation at a future date to make any of the activity unlawful or provide that some additional authorisation is required.

The second amendment seeks to amend subsection (3). The purpose of this subsection is to make clear that conduct undertaken in accordance with a warrant or which is authorised by any of Clauses 42 to 50 is to be treated as lawful. This is vital in providing companies with reassurance that by complying with a warrant they will not be acting unlawfully in relation to their regulatory obligations or other legislation. The effect of this amendment would be to provide that the conduct is lawful only for the purposes of the Bill. My concern, were we to accept this amendment, would be that we would remove the legal certainty that the companies and agencies rely on to do their job and to keep us safe. We therefore do not accept the amendment.

Amendment 84 relates to exceptions from the duty not to make unauthorised disclosures about warrants. It is absolutely right that the Secretary of State should be accountable to Parliament, even for the most sensitive decisions concerning the most sensitive powers. But when it comes to such matters, which necessarily must remain secret, it is absolutely right that Parliament provides a mechanism for the Secretary of State to be held to account, while at the same time doing nothing to jeopardise national security. That is the very reason for the existence of the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament.

To put beyond doubt that the Secretary of State is, and will continue to be, accountable to Parliament through the ISC for decisions relating to warrants, the Government amended Clause 54 and Clause 123 to make clear that the Secretary of State may disclose matters relating to warrants to the ISC. This will allow the ISC to carry out its statutory functions in holding the Government to account, while maintaining our security. It is right for the ISC to carry out this function and it would not be appropriate for disclosure to be made to Parliament as a whole. To do so would breach the long-standing principle of successive Governments to neither confirm nor deny matters relating to intelligence and security and could risk jeopardising our national security. Accordingly, I invite the noble Lords not to press their amendments.

[Lord Paddick]

Can the Minister clarify whether it is not then an offence for the Secretary of State to disclose the existence or content of a warrant to the ISC? That is not our understanding of the Bill.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

It may be then that we have to agree to disagree. It is my understanding of the Bill and it is our position that the Secretary of State is entitled to make disclosure to the ISC for the purposes of answering to the ISC in this context.

National Identity Cards

Debate between Lord Paddick and Lord Keen of Elie

Tuesday 5th July 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

Thank you, my Lords. And it remains open. Be that as it may, our borders are open to those who carry a British passport. Since the time of Henry V, those who present a British passport have been entitled to enter this country.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

Noble Lords will have been appalled by the murder of 32 innocent people in Brussels in March at the hands of terrorists, in a country where the carrying of national identity cards is compulsory. Can the Minister say how identity cards would make us safer in the UK when they appear not to make people in Belgium any safer?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

As may be appreciated, the position of the Government is that they would not contemplate introducing identity cards at present. If they believed that their introduction would bring a material increase in security, their position would of course change.

Police: Armed Officers

Debate between Lord Paddick and Lord Keen of Elie

Wednesday 8th June 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

The noble Lord is right to observe that there is a concentration of authorised firearms officers in the London metropolitan area; indeed, there are more than 2,000. Beyond those areas, however, more collaborative arrangements have developed, with authorised firearms officers working on a regional basis rather than simply within individual forces.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, the former head of the Anti-Terrorist Branch John Grieve has said and continues to say that communities will defeat terrorism, not the police and the security services alone. While the investment in armed police officers that the Minister mentioned is welcome, what investment are the Government making in community policing to build trust and confidence with those communities from which vital intelligence will come to prevent terrorist attacks happening in the first place?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

Clearly, this Government have been committed to the development of community relations. The use of firearms is one aspect in that context.

Domestic Abuse: Rural Communities

Debate between Lord Paddick and Lord Keen of Elie

Tuesday 24th May 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

The position of the Government is that police and crime commissioners will take a leading role in co-ordinating the response to issues of domestic abuse. Indeed, this will be done in parallel to the national statement of expectations, which is a blueprint for local areas and local partnerships, at the head of which will be our successful commissioners.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, is the Minister aware of the family relationship centres in Australia? These are local hubs co-ordinating family and relationship services; providing integrated, wraparound family and relationship support. Will the Government look at this initiative as a better way of providing a triage service for identifying needs and making referrals to wider services, particularly in rural areas where such services are unlikely to be easily accessible locally?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

The Government are already making headway in this area, and indeed have expanded the troubled families programme so that it now includes domestic violence and abuse as one of the six core themes.

Immigration: Public Services

Debate between Lord Paddick and Lord Keen of Elie

Tuesday 10th May 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

It takes time to recover from the experience that we had up until 2010, but major steps are being taken. The Government are committed to investing £7 billion in school places by 2021, to increasing NHS funding in England by £10 billion in real terms by 2020 and to investing £20 billion in housing in the next five years, including £8 billion in affordable housing.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, that is all very well, but clearly, as the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, said, it is not sufficient. Can the Minister tell the House why the Government are not building more new hospitals, schools and houses, using the additional income they are receiving from foreign workers, who are paying significant sums in income tax and national insurance?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

As I stated a moment ago, very considerable sums are being expended in these areas. Indeed, we expect to deliver 600,000 new school places by 2021.

Young Asylum Seekers: Deportation

Debate between Lord Paddick and Lord Keen of Elie

Monday 9th May 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

Whether it be a matter of assistance for voluntary return or of compulsory return where someone has overstayed and has no right to remain, in the first instance this Government will always seek to ensure that there are appropriate reception arrangements for a person returning to a country of origin.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, many of these young people have no memory of the countries that they are being deported to and no experience of living independently in those countries. Can the Minister imagine a teenage relative of his being deported to somewhere like Afghanistan to fend for themselves? Will he explain how this policy is justified?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

The majority of unaccompanied minor children making asylum applications are aged 16 or 17 years, have not been here for many years and have not lost contact with their country of origin. With regard to the country of origin, at least one-third of those making applications in 2015 were from either Albania or Afghanistan. In the circumstances where they volunteer to return, appropriate arrangements are made to assist them. Meetings with NGOs or social workers are arranged for them, and they are given considerable assistance, equivalent to a maximum value of £1,500, if they go through the voluntary return procedure.

Investor Visas: Money Laundering

Debate between Lord Paddick and Lord Keen of Elie

Monday 9th May 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

The question, in my respectful submission, is not well aimed, and there is no question of persons being able to buy their way into the United Kingdom. There is a means by which they can invest in the United Kingdom, but they are subject to very clear checks, which have been improved since 2014.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I am greatly encouraged by what the Minister has said about investigations going on into pre-2015 cases. Can he tell the House how many tier 1 visas have been revoked as a result of those investigations?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

At the present time, I am not aware that any tier 1 visas have been revoked. Of course, tier 1 visas lead on to an application for indefinite leave to remain. When that application is made, one issue that is addressed is any suggestion of criminality.

Investigatory Powers Bill

Debate between Lord Paddick and Lord Keen of Elie

Wednesday 27th April 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I entirely concur with the noble Lord’s observations. The introduction of the double-lock mechanism in the context of the warrant underlines the importance of these developments. When the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, responded to the Statement on the Bill in November last year, he observed that it appeared that, in broad terms, the Bill had struck the difficult balance between public interest and privacy.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, the part of GCHQ responsible for ensuring the security of our national infrastructure, such as the national grid and our telecommunications network, is very keen on enhancing encryption. Another part of GCHQ wants to weaken encryption, so that it can access confidential information. Can the Minister say which side of GCHQ the Government are on?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

It is not necessary to be on either side of the wrong question. The position is simple: encryption is effected by means of an algorithm, which is sometimes called an encryption key. If you sequence an encryption key, you encrypt; if you reverse the process, you decrypt. This Bill will not give any party access to the encryption key, which will be held by the provider.

Immigration Bill

Debate between Lord Paddick and Lord Keen of Elie

Monday 1st February 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I should add that the guidance on immigration officers’ use of powers is set out in the enforcement instructions and guidance, which are published on the UK Government website. But I would be content to write to the noble Lord to set out an outline of the proposed training for those immigration officers who are going to have the limited power conferred by Clause 22 with regard to the preservation of evidence that they believe has been the product of some criminal act.

There was one further point made by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, about the false positive, as he termed it, and the administrative burden. I respectfully suggest that that burden will be no greater than the burden imposed upon police officers in circumstances where immigration officers believe that they have encountered the product of a criminal act and then telephone or radio the police and invite them to attend a premises. So there is a question of balance here, but it is not, on the face of it, going to be a disproportionate burden when compared to the present circumstances in which the matter is, in any event, brought to the attention of the police.

[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lords, Lord Alton of Liverpool and Lord Kennedy of Southwark, for speaking to this group. I also thank the Minister for his explanation of Amendment 184. I will read with care what he said on that particular amendment.

As far as Clause 21 is concerned, which is the power to search premises simply to establish whether a civil penalty should be imposed, I am a little confused, because I am not sure how an immigration officer can establish whether a breach of the law is something that should be responded to by way of criminal prosecution or by civil penalty until the search of the premises and the necessary paperwork has been found. If the immigration officer has reasonable cause to suspect that a criminal offence has been committed, there is an existing power to carry out that search. Now it may be that in the course of that search, using the power under the suspicion of a criminal offence having been committed, the paperwork is found to show that it is not a serious breach and therefore that a civil penalty would be more appropriate. But the search can still be conducted without a specific power to search on the basis of a civil penalty.

The Minister said that having the power to search on the basis of a civil liability would ensure that only non-compliant employers and landlords would have action taken against them. But surely a compliant employer will offer up the necessary documentation and a search without the consent of the employer or landlord will not be required. Therefore, again, I do not see why that power is necessary.

As far as Clause 22 is concerned, if it were simply a case of restraining people who were on the premises from interfering with something that was believed to be evidence of a criminal offence while the police are called and come to investigate the matter, I might be a little more sympathetic. But the Minister kept talking about seizing and retaining property, and said that immigration officers would not be in the evidence chain. Clearly, if they seize and retain the property, they are in the evidence chain: the police cannot give evidence of the fact that the property was in the premises if the immigration officer just appears at the police station with the property and tells the police officer, “I found this”.

As I said earlier, it is very important to question people in situ about, for example, a bag of drugs. It may be necessary for there to be forensic examination of those drugs for, say, fingerprints or perhaps even DNA, or for the property to be photographed in situ. That is something that I would have confidence that only the police would think about, rather than an immigration officer who is there to enforce the law on immigration rather than to deal with these other, arguably more serious, offences.

As far as the administration burden is concerned, with property being taken and given to the police versus the time that the police would have to spend going to collect the property from the premises, with the greatest respect, I do not think that the Minister realises the administrative burden that goes with police seizing property and the problems associated with it. I say that it would be a disproportionate burden on the police were immigration officers able to seize such property. But, at this stage, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am obliged to noble Lords. I shall begin by addressing the points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Alton, and the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, in the context of the report from Stephen Shaw. Of course the background to this was the detailed Report of the Inquiry into the Use of Immigration Detention in the United Kingdom by the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Refugees and the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Migration, of which the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, was a member. That led to the appointment of Stephen Shaw, and as the noble Lord, Lord Alton, has observed, he recently reported on this matter. My noble friend Lord Bates, upon receipt of that report, made a Statement to the House in which he pointed out that the Government welcomed the important contribution that Stephen Shaw had made to the debate about effective detention and accepted the broad thrust of his recommendations. That will be the subject of a further response in due course, and certainly I hope before the Report stage. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Alton, will allow me to defer any detailed comments on the points he raised until that further response is made. But what I add is that we welcome observations that he may have to make following his visit to Yarl’s Wood on Wednesday. His comments will be received in the appropriate spirit because this is a demanding area and one in which the Government are willing to seek to respond to the broad thrust of the recommendations that Stephen Shaw has made.

I turn to Amendment 185, moved by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, but before doing so I will make this observation. He spoke about strip searches. I take issue with that term. There are full searches but they are not strip searches. It may be that he wishes to come back on that, but I take issue with the term “strip searches”; they are full searches.

[Lord Paddick]

Can the Minister tell us the difference between a full search and a strip search?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

It is set down in detail, but in general it means that someone is not stripped. It means that articles of clothing are removed and returned in turn, but without them being stripped.

I return to Amendment 185, which would limit the Secretary of State’s ability to direct officers to search for nationality documents to those in respect of whom she has made a deportation order under Section 5(1) of the Immigration Act 1971, preventing its use for those whom she intends to deport. It may help if I explain that the Secretary of State, in accordance with regulations made under Section 105 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, issues a written notice to those foreign national offenders who are liable to deportation under Section 5(1) of the Immigration Act 1971 stating that she intends to seek a deportation order against them. Such persons may be detained by virtue of paragraph 2(2) of Schedule 3 to the Immigration Act 1971. Therefore, the reference to “intends to” is simply a way to ensure that such persons are within the ambit of the new powers while in detention. Being able to direct a search for nationality documents once a person has received such a notice but before a deportation order is made reduces the risk of documents being destroyed when the person knows that deportation is a realistic prospect. That is the purpose of the provision in its present form and why we resist the proposed amendment.

Amendments 186 to 188, 190, 192 and 193 seek to limit the Secretary of State’s disposal options on nationality documents which are not used to remove a person, by ensuring that they must be returned to the person who was previously in possession of them or who appears to be entitled to them. On that last point the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, is of course right to say that the country which issues a passport is the proprietor of that passport, while the person to whom it is issued is the user. It is therefore that country which is entitled to claim ownership, as it were, of the passport document. That touches upon the point he mentioned about the potential risk of returning a document to an issuing authority creating a danger for a person in particular circumstances. That is a point I will take away and consider because it had not immediately occurred to me in this context.

The reason why the Secretary of State should be given the wider power indicated in the present clauses is because there may be circumstances in which she would wish to remove from circulation forged or counterfeit documents. The idea that, having identified a passport as forged or counterfeit, she should return it to the person who had been using it seems a little unusual. It is in these circumstances that the wider power is sought.

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[Lord Keen of Elie]

The noble Baroness is of course quite right and I apologise to the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, for omitting her name from the reference. Of course it is acknowledged that the report was the precursor to Stephen Shaw’s helpful and incisive report on this matter. I am obliged for that.

[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the Minister for his explanation. As noble Lords will be aware, many amendments at Committee stage are probing amendments, so the explanations given by the Minister on this occasion have been very helpful.

On Amendment 185, I mentioned that the Secretary of State has to serve a notice on people—a formal notice of the intention to make a deportation order. The Minister pointed to that as being the meaning in the Bill. I asked the question: if that is the case why is that wording not on the face of the Bill rather than the rather vague wording that is currently there? Maybe the Minister can reflect on that between now and the next stage.

As far as the definition of nationality documents is concerned, I accept that under the Dublin agreement, as long as we are a member of the European Union, it is important to establish the first place of safety in terms of where the person should apply for asylum. I am reassured that Secretaries of State must at all times act reasonably. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, I move the amendment in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee. We also have Amendment 201 in this group.

Amendment 194 relates to Schedule 5 and amendments to the search warrant provisions in the Immigration Act 1971. We have already debated all premises warrants under Amendments 171, 172 and 173 in relation to the seizure of vehicles driven by someone illegally in this country. These provisions relate to search warrants issued to search for personnel records and nationality documents, and again allow any premises owned or occupied by the person specified in the warrant without having to specify the premises. The only thing I would say to that is that the explanation given under those previous amendments appeared to be simply to bring the Immigration Act into line with the Police and Criminal Evidence Act. Will the Minister say whether there are other specific reasons why all premises warrants would be valuable in the circumstances?

Amendment 201 is to probe the extension from one month to three of the time during which a search warrant issued under the Immigration Act 1971 can be executed. I accept that these provisions bring Immigration Act search warrants into line with those issued, predominantly to the police, under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, as amended by Section 15 of the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005. However, is this necessary or safe in immigration cases?

The Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association points to evidence in the March 2014 report of the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration in relation to the use of the power to enter business premises without a warrant by immigration officers. It found that in 59% of the cases examined, the required justification had not been made out. I appreciate that this provision is to extend powers given by warrant but the chief inspector’s report indicates the need for increased, not less scrutiny by the courts of the powers used by immigration officers. I beg to move.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I am obliged to the noble Lord. As he indicated, Amendment 194 would remove the ability for immigration officers to seek an all premises warrant where they have a power to enter and search premises for material which is likely to be relevant evidence of an immigration offence under the 1971 Act. As the noble Lord anticipated, one purpose of this is to bring the provisions on such warrants into line with those for police warrants under PACE.

In addition, Amendment 201 is intended to do the same thing, but I should perhaps explain that when the immigration warrants were originally provided for, as running for one month, that was in parallel with the time that a police warrant would run under PACE. Subsequently, the warrant under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act was extended to a three-month period, so they fell out of sequence. The difficulty is that, from time to time, there are joint immigration officer and police operations which involve warrants being granted, and it is not convenient that the immigration warrant should be a period of one month while the police warrant is for a period of three months. The purpose of Amendment 201 in particular is simply to bring the time limit back into line with that which applies for police warrants.

Coming back to Amendment 194 and the use of all premises warrants, it is considered appropriate that an all premises warrant should be available to immigration officers, not only because that is consistent with the form of warrant available to police officers pursuing their own powers but because there are many circumstances in which an all premises warrant will be required for effective recovery of material pertaining to either illegal working or potential offences in respect of landlords and illegal renting. For example, where you have someone who has a number of restaurants employing persons who may be suspected of being illegal immigrants, you may have a warrant in respect of particular premises and then discover that all the records are actually kept elsewhere—in an office, a lock-up, or something of that kind. Therefore, it is appropriate that all the premises that are subject to the control of a particular employer should be available under the warrant, otherwise we would have a very long, drawn-out, step-by-step process of knocking down one domino, going from one warrant to the next one, and so on. It is in these circumstances that it is considered appropriate that an all premises warrant should be allowed in the case of immigration officers. I hope that that addresses the concerns or reservations expressed by reference to Amendments 194 and 201. In a sense, they bring immigration warrants into line with police warrants, but they were in line with police warrants before the amendment to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act. In addition, there are substantive reasons why it is practical and effective for immigration officers to have an all premises warrant facility available to them.

Government Amendments 195 to 200 and 202 to 209 may look rather complex, but have at their core a very simple proposition; that is, in Scotland it is not lawfully possible to secure an all premises warrant and a multiple entry warrant. Therefore, it is necessary to ensure that immigration officers operating in Scotland do so within the bounds of the Scottish criminal justice system.

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[Lord Keen of Elie]

I shall go on to deal with government Amendment 214B, which is not concerned with warrants per se, but to clarify that the person who can undertake the role of custody review officer under Section 24A of the Criminal Law (Consolidation) (Scotland) Act 1995 includes a police inspector and is not limited to a person of equivalent rank. In Scotland, immigration officers currently have a power to detain pending arrest, and charge for immigration and nationality offences under Section 24 of the 1995 Act, which is similar to arresting a person pending charge in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. Under Section 24A of that Act a “custody review officer” may authorise an extension of the period for which a person can be held in detention under Section 24. This role has always been undertaken by a police inspector and the amendment is simply to ensure that there is no possible ambiguity in the provision that provides for this operational practice. Amendments 214C and 214D are minor and technical and simply remove redundant wording from the Bill.

I hope that these explanations will satisfy noble Lords and that they will feel able not to press their amendments, and I shall move the government amendments.

[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for the explanations that he has given. I still have concerns relating to the Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration’s report on immigration officers’ use of powers to enter premises without a warrant. In 59% of cases examined the required justification had not been made out. Giving immigration officers similar powers to those of police officers to enter any premises owned or occupied by the person named in the warrant and to do it over an extended period where it is not a joint operation with the police still causes me some concern.

I am not sure whether there is similar malpractice, so far as police officers are concerned, in the execution of PACE warrants, but the Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration’s report seems to suggest that the exercise of powers by immigration officers is not perhaps as thorough as it is by police officers. My concerns remain, but at this stage I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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[Lord Keen of Elie]

On the last point, the Secretary of State will act reasonably, and is lawfully obliged to act reasonably, so there cannot be any real difficulty about that. On the noble Lord’s first point, our complaints procedure may be so comprehensive that it is difficult for him to get his arms round it. However, I would be content to write to outline that procedure in more detail if he felt that would assist.

[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the Minister for the explanations that he has given. As he said, many of them were similar to points that we had already debated. I am very grateful for his explanation about the broadening of the definition, which he did not cover on the previous amendments. I shall read with interest, and very carefully, what he has said on that issue.

On Amendment 215, I echo what the noble Lord has just said about the many and different avenues of complaint. How can somebody who has a genuine grievance against the Immigration Service possibly know which body to turn to among all that complexity? The Minister did not address the concerns that I expressed on behalf of many communities about their lack of trust and confidence in the Independent Police Complaints Commission, and the concern that those who are likely to come into contact with the Immigration Service are likely to be more vulnerable and less aware of their rights than those who do make complaints to the Independent Police Complaints Commission.

The Minister made reference to the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration. I have to confess to not knowing exactly what the chief inspector’s remit is, but if it is similar to that of Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary, it is purely a monitoring function—an investigation and review function—rather than a complaint-examining function. Indeed, if any complaint were made to the Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration about the conduct of the immigration office, I would expect him to refer it to—

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I should have added that Independent Police Complaints Commission’s remit was extended to investigating complaints and serious conduct matters relating to the exercise of immigration enforcement powers by Section 41 of the Police and Justice Act 2006 and the UK Border Agency (Complaints and Misconduct) Regulations 2010. I had omitted to mention that.