Public Order Bill

Debate between Lord Paddick and Lord Hope of Craighead

Report stage
Monday 30th January 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

I would like to speak next because my amendments have been mentioned and it is probably best that I explain what they are. I stress that the amendments under discussion are not my amendments: they are Amendments 5, 14 and 24 in this group, which substantially repeat amendments I tabled in Committee. There is a certain amount of revision of the words but essentially, I am making the same point as I did in Committee. They seek to give effect to a recommendation by the Constitution Committee, of which I am a member. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, who, as I speak, is still a member of that committee, for adding his name to the amendments.

The committee noted that the three clauses concerning locking on, tunnelling and being present in a tunnel—the offences that are the target of my amendments—use the term “serious disruption” to describe the nature of the conduct that the Bill seeks to criminalise. The committee noted that this could result in severe penalties, such as providing the basis for a serious disruption prevention order, and took the view that a definition should be provided. On that issue, I think there is a wide measure of agreement across the House—perhaps with the exception of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick—that a definition is needed because of the nature of these offences and the consequences that follow from them.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

I would like to clarify that I wholeheartedly support Amendment 1, which is a definition of “serious disruption”.

Public Order Bill

Debate between Lord Paddick and Lord Hope of Craighead

Committee stage
Wednesday 16th November 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 2 in my name I will speak to the other 12 amendments in this group. Amendment 2, supported by the noble Lords, Lord Coaker and Lord Skidelsky, and the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, is related to the offence of locking on. I remind noble Lords that the Government’s Explanatory Notes suggest that

“Recent changes in the tactics employed by … protesters have highlighted some gaps in … legislation”,


of which this is one. Suffragettes chained themselves to railings, so to suggest that this is a gap in legislation as a result of recent changes in tactics employed by protesters is nonsense. I expect the Minister will challenge such an assertion, but we can debate that when he responds.

This amendment would narrow the offence of locking on where such actions—attaching themselves or someone else to another person, an object or the road, for example, to cause serious disruption—by removing the wider offence of an act that

“is capable of causing, serious disruption”.

Can the Minister explain what “capable of causing” actually means? If someone locks on in a minor side road or at the entrance to a cul-de-sac, causing little or no disruption, but had similar action been taken on a busy major road it would have been capable of causing serious disruption, would they commit an offence in such circumstances? If they block a busy major road at 3 am when there is no traffic, whereas had it been 10 am they would have caused major disruption, does that amount to it being capable of causing serious disruption in another place and time? Amendment 2 seeks to restrict the offence of locking on to incidents where serious disruption is actually caused to probe what “capable of causing” means and how widely the offence would be applied.

Amendment 25 in my name would again remove “is capable of causing” in relation to the offence of tunnelling, for similar reasons. Can the Minister explain what sort of tunnel might be capable of causing serious disruption but does not actually do so? Why, in that case, does it need to be criminalised? Similarly, Amendment 36 in my name, supported by the noble Baronesses, Lady Chakrabarti and Lady Fox of Buckley, seeks to remove “is capable of causing” in relation to the offence of being present in a tunnel. Again, can the Minister explain how someone’s presence in a tunnel might be capable of causing serious disruption without actually doing so?

Amendment 3, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, which we support and is signed by my noble friend Lady Ludford, similarly seeks to limit the scope of the offence by removing the reference to causing serious disruption to two or more people and replacing it with

“serious disruption to the life of the community”,

as suggested by the Joint Committee on Human Rights. We support this amendment.

Amendment 4, in my name and supported by the noble Lords, Lord Coaker and Lord Skidelsky, seeks to restrict the offence to cases where there is an intent to cause serious disruption—not merely, as currently drafted in Clause 1(1)(c), being

“reckless as to whether it will have such a consequence”.

Can the Minister give an example of when someone who does not intend to cause serious disruption should be guilty of the offence—in this case, of locking on —when they are simply exercising their right to protest?

Amendment 26, in my name, similarly seeks to narrow the tunnelling offence to cases where there is an intent to cause serious disruption, rather than where someone is merely “reckless” as to whether their tunnel might cause serious disruption. Can the Minister give an example of reckless tunnelling that might fall within the scope of the offence as drafted?

Similarly, Amendment 37, in my name and supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, seeks to narrow the definition of the offence of being present in a tunnel to cases where there is an intention to cause serious disruption. Would a journalist who goes to interview protestors in a tunnel be guilty of an offence of being reckless as to whether her presence in the tunnel might cause serious disruption, for example? Can the Minister provide any reassurance?

Amendment 6, in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, and Amendment 23, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, supported by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, and the noble Baroness, Lady Boycott, quite rightly attempt to place a definition of serious disruption on the face of the Bill, rather than asking us to sign a blank cheque where such a definition is decided by the Secretary of State subsequently by statutory instrument.

Similarly, in relation to the tunnelling offence and the being present in a tunnel offence, Amendments 27 and 38 in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, seek to provide a definition on the face of the Bill of serious disruption in relation to tunnelling.

Amendment 17, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, and supported by my noble friend Lady Ludford and the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, seeks to define

“serious disruption to the life of the community”

in Amendment 3.

Finally in this group, Amendment 54, in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, and my noble friend Lady Ludford, to which we give qualified support—subject to what the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, will say in explaining the amendment—seeks to provide a definition of serious disruption to major transport works, as suggested by the Joint Committee on Human Rights. However, we have concerns over the inclusion of “reckless” in this definition, for reasons I have previously explained.

I think noble Lords will see the complexity of this Bill and the problem we have in trying to cram so many amendments into one group. If the Minister is able to respond to each and every remark I have made, I will be astonished. I beg to move.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, my name is to Amendments 6, 27 and 38, which have been mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. They answer a question which was posed by the noble Lord, Lord Skidelsky, who asked if there is a definition of “serious disruption” in the Bill. There is not, and my amendments seek to provide a definition. I am concerned about the meaning of words, which is always crucial in Bills of this kind.

I am a member of the Constitution Committee and in our scrutiny of the Bill we noted that the clauses which use the phrase “serious disruption” create offences which could result in severe penalties. Most of them may be taken summarily before a magistrate, but then they lead on to other things. They could, in due course, lead to a serious disruption prevention order and all that that involves. The committee took the view that a definition should be provided.

We looked at Section 78 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, to which the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, referred, but, in our view, if one has to go down the line of designing a new offence, that definition was not tailored to the offences that we are talking about in the Bill. Therefore, the committee’s recommendation was that the meaning of “serious disruption” should be clarified proportionately in relation to each of the offences where the phrase arises.

In regard to locking on, I seek to say that “serious disruption” means

“a prolonged disruption of access to places where the individuals or the organisation live or carry on business or to which for urgent reasons they wish to travel”—

a hospital appointment, for example—

“or a significant delay in the delivery of time sensitive products or essential goods and services.”

So I have tried to design something that is very specific to the locking-on offence described in Clause 1.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Paddick and Lord Hope of Craighead

Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Lords Hansard - part one & Report stage
Monday 13th December 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, there is a lot of force in what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said about reasonable excuse. There is a problem, however, in that one would not know that one had a reasonable excuse until one had been charged with the offence. The advantage of the amendment spoken to by the noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker, and others is that it achieves certainty and intercepts the risk of being brought to court to have one’s reasonable excuse determined. Although I tend to agree with what the noble Lord said, it comes too late in the process, and the safest and most secure way of dealing with it is to intercept the process at the beginning, which is exactly what the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker, seeks to do.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, there are two problems here. Because of the behaviour of the lawless few, all Gypsy, Roma and Traveller communities are being stereotyped as troublemakers. The new law creates offences when people trespass on land with vehicles where, among other things,

“it is likely that significant damage or significant disruption would be caused”,

and, again, where

“significant distress … is likely to be caused”.

All GRT people are likely to be criminalised by these new offences because people’s prejudices will result in them anticipating damage, disruption or distress, despite no previous experience of the GRT people concerned, or any other evidence—just their own prejudice. The second problem is that there is no option for many GRT people other than to trespass on land because local authorities do not, and do not want to, provide authorised pitches. Imagine the reaction of motorists if there were no local car parks and double-yellow lines on every road? That is the equivalent of what GRT people face.

That is the reason for these amendments. In the absence of removing the whole of Part 4 from the Bill, we will vote with the noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker, should she divide the House. At the very least, the police should not be allowed to seize caravans when they are peoples’ homes and the statutory duty on local authorities to provide authorised sites should be reinstated. That is the purpose of my Amendments 55ZC and 55AA. These may be planning issues, but the clerks have ruled that these amendments are within scope.

Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006 (Specified Scottish Authority and Barred Lists) Order 2019

Debate between Lord Paddick and Lord Hope of Craighead

Wednesday 26th June 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I welcome this order as achieving the necessary consistency between the two jurisdictions. Nobody doubts the value of the barring system in protecting vulnerable children from abuse in its various forms. The position in Scotland is accurately set out in paragraph 7.6 of the Explanatory Memorandum, which states:

“Existing Scottish legislation does not require Disclosure Scotland to consider individuals for barring where the individual has already been considered by the DBS”,


in England or Wales,

“and the DBS has considered all relevant information. Nor does it require Disclosure Scotland to apply a bar in cases that are barred under England and Wales legislation”.

That sets out what in Scotland is the system to avoid duplication, and also to maintain consistency.

As I understand it, the aim of this order is to achieve the equal position in England, Wales and Northern Ireland, with a view to enabling the authorities on both sides of the border to work together better to protect children and vulnerable adults. I think that every noble Lord in this House would support the broad aims. I am not in a position to join with the noble Lord in the criticisms he made—I do not have that information. As far as I am concerned, the order deserves to be supported because it is achieving what everybody wished it to achieve: consistency to enable the authorities to work together.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for explaining this order. I now understand why the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, wanted to speak first—I too am relying on the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee’s 53rd report, so I will try to say things in a slightly different way.

I understand that the purpose of the order is to ensure that those placed on a barred list by the Disclosure and Barring Service in England, Wales and Northern Ireland are not also placed on the barred list in Scotland by Disclosure Scotland for exactly the same reason—so-called double barring—so that, if there is a successful appeal in one jurisdiction, the person does not have to go through a second appeal process in the other jurisdiction. I also understand that this protection against double barring was supposed to have been brought in in 2012 and is being done now simply because of an oversight, as the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, pointed out.

I further understand that the current computer systems do not allow automatic checking of the Disclosure and Barring Service against the Disclosure Scotland barred list but relies on the DBS, for example, asking Disclosure Scotland to do a manual search of their list if it believes the subject has a Scottish connection. There is no date, other than beyond January 2020, for changes being made to the IT systems to allow automatic checking, as the contract with the current IT company has been terminated but the system is being maintained by the current company until the new one takes over in 2020.

While I can understand the reasoning behind the protection against double barring, is it not in the overriding interests of public safety for the name to appear on both lists, rather than relying on the Disclosure and Barring Service making a specific request of Disclosure Scotland if, and only if, they suspect a Scottish connection, at least until the IT issues have been sorted out?

To avoid the scenario where a successful appeal to the Disclosure and Barring Service does not result in the barred person being removed from the Disclosure Scotland list, if the person is barred for exactly the same reason in Scotland, what is to stop the Disclosure and Barring Service, as a matter of course, alerting Disclosure Scotland whenever there is a successful appeal against inclusion in the England, Wales and Northern Ireland list, and vice versa? The Government have failed for seven years to implement the protection against double barring. What difference will another six months or so make, until a reliable IT system is in place that can automatically check one list against another, particularly as there seems to be a perfectly reasonable workaround—or have I misunderstood?

Crime (Overseas Production Orders) Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Paddick and Lord Hope of Craighead

Ping Pong (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 11th February 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, Amendment 13A in this group is in my name. I make it clear from the outset that we support this Bill, which is why at Third Reading in the other place we did not vote against it. What we did—and what Labour did in the other place—was to vote against the Government’s Amendment 13 proposing a new clause after Clause 15, because it does not go far enough. It does not ensure that death penalty assurances are secured from foreign states to make sure that data provided by the UK, whether by law enforcement agencies or private companies, does not lead to someone being executed. The Government claim to have come a long way in their amendment, but it requires only that a Secretary of State seek death penalty assurances, not that any agreement is dependent on death penalty assurances being received.

The UK is a signatory to the European Convention on Human Rights, which is incorporated into UK law by the Human Rights Act 1988. It is also a signatory to Protocol 13 to the convention. Article 2 of the convention states:

“Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which the penalty is provided by law”.


Article 15 states:

“In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligations under this Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under international law”.


Article 57 states:

“Any State may, when signing this Convention or when depositing its instrument of ratification, make a reservation in respect of any particular provision of the Convention to the extent that any law then in force in its territory is not in conformity with the provision”.


However, the UK is also a signatory to Protocol 13 to the convention, Article 1 of which states:

“The death penalty shall be abolished. No one shall be condemned to such penalty or executed”.


Article 2 of the protocol states:

“No derogation from the provisions of this Protocol shall be made under Article 15 of the Convention”.


Article 3 states:

“No reservation may be made under Article 57 of the Convention in respect of the provisions of this Protocol”.


In other words, there should be no death penalty in any circumstances whatever. That is our international legal obligation.

The UK has been clear—until this Conservative Government took office—that it will campaign to remove the death penalty wherever it exists in the world and will never facilitate the execution of anyone in any foreign state. The difficulty with the type of agreement covered by this Bill is that data provided by the UK to an American law enforcement agency, for example, could result in someone in the US being sentenced to death, contrary until recently to both the UK’s international obligations and its declared intention to do all it can to eradicate the death penalty wherever it exists in the world.

I say “until recently” because, in a High Court case in October last year, it was revealed in correspondence from the Home Secretary to the then Foreign Secretary that, in the case of two ISIS terrorists, evidence was going to be supplied to the US without a death penalty assurance. His letter said that,

“significant attempts having been made to seek full assurance, it is now right to accede to the MLA”—

mutual legal assistance—

“request without an assurance”.

The then Foreign Secretary replied that in this,

“unique and unprecedented case … it is in the UK national security interests to accede to an MLA request for a criminal prosecution without death penalty assurances”—

a unique and unprecedented case to provide evidence to the US that may lead to executions. The Bill as drafted allows the Government to enter into a data exchange agreement where potentially there would be no death penalty assurance in any case. The Government’s new clause requires the Secretary of State only to seek such assurances; it does not bar the Secretary of State from entering into the agreement without death penalty assurances.

The Government will say that not entering into an agreement with the US could potentially allow terrorists and paedophiles to be a threat for longer. We say that we will not stand in the way of such an agreement provided that it does not result in UK data resulting in people being sent to the electric chair. The first thing to say about what the Minister said in her opening remarks is that these agreements are about securing legal authority to enable data to be provided that can be used in evidence in criminal proceedings. It is about giving legal cover for the handing over of data. It should not prevent the arrest and detention of dangerous suspects while that formal legal authority is obtained, and it can still be obtained through existing MLA arrangements, as in the case of the ISIS suspects. It may delay the trial, but it should not prevent the arrest and detention. Even if there were circumstances that I cannot personally envisage where the arrest and detention of a dangerous criminal were delayed, if the US says it will not sign an agreement containing death penalty assurances then it is the US that is prepared to allow the threats from terrorists and paedophiles to go on for longer by having to rely on the current MLA system.

I shall summarise our position using someone else’s words:

“Our amendment would prevent authorities in this country sharing data with overseas agencies where there is a risk of the imposition of the death penalty. More than 50 years ago parliament as a whole passed a law which ‘opposes the death penalty in all circumstances’. That is the law of the land. It means we do not co-operate with any government if the consequence could be capital punishment. Parliament has for a long time believed that the death penalty is so abhorrent, and the risks of a miscarriage of justice so awful, that we outlaw it. Our ban applies to all countries where the death penalty is still on the statute books. But government Ministers are desperate to cosy up to Donald Trump’s administration in the US, where the death penalty is still imposed. Our amendment simply blocks data sharing co-operation with all countries if the death penalty is a risk”.


I have just quoted, word for word, the shadow Home Secretary Diane Abbott from her column in the Daily Mirror on 28 January this year about the Labour amendment that was replaced in the Commons by Amendment 13. However, Amendment 13A is designed to have the same effect as the Labour amendment passed by this House.

The opposition parties have worked together on this issue from the beginning, but this should not be a party-political issue; it is a question of fundamental human rights. Again, the Minister will correct me if I am wrong, but essentially this Government are willing to sacrifice people to the electric chair in America if that is what it takes to secure the kind of agreement that the Bill covers. Asking us not to tie the hands of those negotiating the deal really means, “Do not ask them to insist on death penalty assurances”.

The question is: do we stand by Article 2 and Protocol 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights, and do we oppose the death penalty in other countries, or do we not? If we are prepared to see people being executed on the back of evidence provided by the UK, then noble Lords should support the government amendment rather than Amendment 13A. This is a question of principle, a question of conscience and a question of human rights, and we should support it on all sides of this House.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I have been struggling to understand what the Government’s position might be. I think I picked up the Minister saying that the amendment concerns prosecutions in the United Kingdom only. With great respect, if that is right, I do not understand how that fits in with the language of the statute and the amendment itself. I will explain where I am coming from.

Section 52 of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016—the section being amended—is headed “Interception in accordance with overseas requests”. We are contemplating a situation where a request comes from another country, presumably for prosecution in that country, on the basis of information that we have obtained via intercepts. The whole point of Section 52, without the amendments, is to authorise the making of interceptions in accordance with that request.

My understanding is that subsections (6) and (7) of Clause 1 deal with a precaution against the kind of point that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, was talking about—our international obligations. I agree almost precisely with the background which the noble Lord traced for us, set against Article 1 of Protocol 13 of the European Convention of Human Rights, which provides that sentencing to death is a violation of the right to life under Article 2 of the convention. If one applies Article 1 of Protocol 13, it would seem to be a breach of our convention obligations to provide information to a foreign country that would lead to somebody being sentenced to death. I do not know whether that has ever been tested in a court, because I do not think the issue has been brought before a court—I am not aware of that happening. However, there seems to be a strong prima facie case that if the Secretary of State was proposing to do that, he could be stopped on the grounds that it would be in breach of this country’s international obligations.

I am puzzled about whether the Minister is right that the purpose of this section is to enable us to prosecute in our own country, where we have no death penalty. The idea of an international agreement is, I think, that it should be reciprocal; it would be a bilateral agreement with a particular country—let us assume it is the United States—and there would be obligations on both sides. We would seek the benefit of the agreement to obtain information for us to prosecute cases of child abuse, which the Minister referred to; one would very much want to secure an agreement which would enable that information to come to us. However, in the context of Section 52, the thrust seems to be the authorisation of intercept information by us to provide for prosecution abroad. I am having difficulty seeing how that fits in with what the Minister said earlier.

Let us assume that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, is right that this is really dealing with provision of information to go abroad. Then one comes right up against Article 1 of Protocol 13. What mechanism does one install to prevent a breach of the article? I think I am right that the mechanism of an assurance is well established in international law. In fact, in 2006 the United Nations produced a very helpful note, Diplomatic Assurances and International Refugee Protection, which traced the mechanisms that had been established to protect people who were being sent abroad by a country in answer to a request. The message in the United Nations paper is that one can protect oneself or one’s country against a breach of the international obligation by obtaining an assurance. However, the emphasis is on obtaining the assurance, because an assurance is given by the requesting country to the country from which the information to go abroad is being requested.

There was sometimes some doubt about whether that mechanism was reliable in a case where the threat abroad was of torture, because some countries are really not capable of preventing torture being perpetrated by all manner of officials, so an undertaking in that sort of situation is not really reliable. The paper goes on to say that if one is dealing with the kind of problem that we are contemplating—the risk of a death penalty being imposed—that is easily verifiable and an assurance could be relied upon as a secure protection against a breach of the international obligation.

Policing and Crime Bill

Debate between Lord Paddick and Lord Hope of Craighead

Report: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 12th December 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I recognise the point that the noble Viscount has made about the general increase in the level of sentencing, which has caused me considerable concern for quite some time. However, there is force in the point that the noble Baroness made about repeat offences. The people who commit this kind of offence tend to be victims of an obsession. There must be a risk that a number of these perpetrators will do it again, and if the first sentence is ineffective as a deterrent a judge is really inhibited in visiting the appropriate penalty on a repeat offender, particularly if it is even a further repetition, if he is restricted to the levels that presently exist. For that reason, among the others that the noble Baroness mentioned, I would be inclined to support her amendment.

[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, I strongly support the amendment. While I accept what the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, said about overcrowding, we need to differentiate between many offences that do not deserve a custodial sentence, and in fact would be more effectively dealt with by a non-custodial sentence, and those that really need long custodial sentences, for the very reasons that the noble and learned Lord has just articulated. These are offences where, particularly in the case of repeat offences, a longer custodial sentence is needed. That is why we will support the noble Baroness should she decide to divide the House.

Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill

Debate between Lord Paddick and Lord Hope of Craighead

Wednesday 20th November 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

I add just a short point to what the noble Baroness has said. When one looks at the draft guidance at page 26, one can see what the Government are thinking of here. The point is made that making the public aware of the perpetrator and the terms of the order can be an important part of the process in tackling anti-social behaviour. One can follow the thinking behind that proposition. When one reads on, however, one sees that there will be circumstances in which either the police or the council may decide not to publicise the fact that an IPNA has been made. It seems to me that the power—or the discretion, perhaps one should say—to decide whether or not publicity should be given is being taken away from the court and given to the police or the council. Will the Minister explain why that is being done, bearing in mind the point that the noble Baroness has made about the discretion which exists within Section 49?

It is a very big thing to take away from the court the power to restrict publicity, bearing in mind the reach of the whole of Part 1, which is what we are concerned with, including Clause 5, which permits an application for an injunction to be made without notice being given to the respondent. The court would have no power to stop the press if they happened to be there reporting what had taken place. It would be a very serious matter to go as far as the clause goes without a full explanation why exercise of discretion is being taken away from the court and being given to the police or the council, who are not answerable to the court for what they do.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I speak from personal experience of dealing with the previous regime under ASBOs. There was a tendency among some local authorities to publicise how many ASBOs they had been granted by publishing a rogues gallery of photographs of people against whom ASBOs had been granted. This was done for political purposes, not to pursue the ends of justice. Some young people thought that having an ASBO against them—or, in this case, an IPNA—was a badge of honour that they could show off to their mates. They were young people with a juvenile attitude. It almost encouraged them to breach the ASBO because their picture had been publicised and they had local notoriety. There is a danger that this provision could make what was a very unhelpful situation under the previous regime even worse.