Policing and Crime Bill

Debate between Lord Paddick and Lord Harris of Haringey

Committee: 4th sitting (Hansard - part one): House of Lords
Wednesday 9th November 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Harris of Haringey]

My Lords, this amendment in my name raises the issue of people who, through negligence, have allowed their firearm to be lost or stolen. This seems to me something that should be taken much more seriously than it is at present. I do not want to bore the House with too many statistics, but roughly half of all recent terrorist plots that have been disrupted have involved situations in which those alleged to be the perpetrators have sought to obtain firearms.

In an average year, 800 registered firearms are lost or stolen. That means there is a seepage of firearms, most likely into the illegal economy. Whether those firearms are obtained by criminals or terrorists seems almost irrelevant. These are firearms that in many instances could kill or harm people, and certainly terrify them. In those circumstances, if an owner has negligently allowed their firearm to be lost or stolen, it seems there should be significant consequences. That is why this amendment proposes not only that they should they have all firearms certificates in their name revoked but that they should be banned from holding a firearms certificate for the rest of their life.

Those who might argue that that is a draconian penalty just need to think about what an unlicensed, stolen firearm in the hands of a criminal or a terrorist might do to somebody else’s life. This seems a punishment that fits the crime. I hope the Minister will accept that this is a serious matter and agree to take this away and tidy up whatever inadequacies there are in my drafting of the amendment, because it seems a no-brainer that we should take firm action against those who, through their negligence, allow dangerous firearms to get into the illegal economy. I beg to move.

[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, I support the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, although perhaps not quite in the terms he suggested. This is a very serious problem. Any firearm that is lost or stolen will almost inevitably find its way into the hands of criminals, whether terrorists or not. It is an extremely serious problem. Because we have world-class controls on firearms, stealing firearms is one of the few ways in which criminals or terrorists can arm themselves. Clearly, there would have to be some investigation to establish whether negligence was involved or not. I understand that, at the moment, when a firearms licence is up for renewal the police will consider what the security arrangements are to store firearms and, indeed, whether any firearms have been lost or stolen by that certificate holder. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Harris, that this is not taken seriously enough at the moment, that there are very serious potential consequences and that this definitely needs further consideration.

Policing and Crime Bill

Debate between Lord Paddick and Lord Harris of Haringey

Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard - part two): House of Lords
Wednesday 2nd November 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

My Lords, I rise notionally to support my noble friend Lord Rosser and his amendment, but first I record that I have recently completed for the Mayor of London a review of London’s preparedness to withstand a major terrorist incident. As part of that review I looked at the policing of the River Thames. I became aware of a lacuna—or at least what I understood to be a lacuna—that appeared to exist in the legislation, which these clauses fill and deal with by making it possible for police to stop and search boats on the River Thames. I was therefore delighted to see it. My recommendations on that were couched in those terms.

However, it appears that it is possible for anyone to sail up the River Thames without having any licence or even permit, which seems an extraordinary gap. While we were tidying up some of these matters, I would have thought it useful to tidy up precisely that one. Given that one is expected to have a licence to drive a car, with the car being required to be of a certain standard, it is surprising that there is no such requirement for sending a boat up the Thames.

I come to the specific question that I wanted to ask the Minister—she can answer the first one if she wishes. An hour and three-quarters ago, I received an email from Nigel—I suppose that I am taking a leaf out of the book of my right honourable friend the leader of the Opposition here. Nigel said:

“I’m an old retired police officer”—

so he must have been there with Brian—

“and I may be out of date but back in 1967 when I joined The Met, one bit of legislation they kept drumming into us was Sec 66 of The Metropolitan Police Act and it read police may stop, search and detain any vehicle, vessel, boat, cart or carriage in or upon which anything stolen or unlawfully may be found”.

At what point in the various reorganisations of London government and policing legislation was Section 66 of the Metropolitan Police Act repealed or changed? It may still be there, in which case what does this provision add to it? The Minister may not have that information immediately available in her brief, so I would be quite happy to receive a note at a later stage.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

I can tell the noble Lord.

[Lord Harris of Haringey]

The noble Lord already has the answer apparently.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, I rise briefly to support the amendment to which I have added my name. I declare an interest: I gave evidence for the de Menezes family at the inquest into the death of Jean Charles de Menezes, whom noble Lords will remember was shot by accident by the police, suspecting him to be a suicide bomber. Sadly, I experienced the adversarial nature of inquests at first hand. Indeed, during the lunch break on the day that I gave evidence, the coroner had to warn the legal team for the Metropolitan Police and basically tell them to “cool it”.

A very adversarial system operates at the moment, whereas it should be an inquiry after the truth. Having experienced it first hand, I can say that it is absolutely necessary for the families of the bereaved to be as well represented as the police where there has been a death at the hands of the police, or a death in police custody, to use the technical term. For those reasons, I support the amendment.

[Lord Harris of Haringey]

I speak to my amendment in this group, which is similar except in terms of who ends up paying. I tabled this amendment very much for the reasons mentioned by my noble friend Lord Rosser and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick—the nature of inquests and the importance of creating a level playing field to enable the coroner to get to the truth of what has happened in cases of tragic death. The cases that I have been involved with relate to deaths in custody. For a number of years, I was chair of the Independent Advisory Panel on Deaths in Custody, which was concerned with not only police custody and deaths following police contact, but with deaths in prison and in secure mental hospitals. On a number of occasions, I spent time with the families of those who had died, as far as they were concerned, at the hands of the state.

I remember one family very movingly describing the experience of the inquest. They wanted to know what had happened to their loved one. They were not necessarily looking to apportion blame or for someone’s head on a platter. They just wanted to know the facts. They were confronted with a complicated legal system, with everybody else being fully represented—at public expense. They were having to fight for legal representation through the legal aid system.

I do not know how many noble Lords have been in a coroner’s court when such matters have been discussed. They are not always the easiest of environments. I remember one person describing that there was one small area for everyone to wait—counsel, witnesses and the bereaved families themselves. There were not sufficient chairs in the waiting room for everyone concerned. They described walking down the corridor and hearing behind them the trundle of wheeled suitcases filled with legal papers being dragged by highly paid legal officials, employed by the state to argue and create confusion around what had happened to their loved one. For that reason, we should consider the proper operation of the inquest to enable the truth to be obtained.

What concerns me about the present system is that when this issue was raised in the past, we were told that families were eligible for legal aid. But it is not as simple as that because there are strict criteria on the income that people can have in order to obtain legal aid. Of course, when a case relates to a family, it is not related to an individual, so before eligibility for legal aid can be established, the financial means of every single member of the family has to be assessed, whether or not they are actively engaged in the process. That can be long and drawn-out, extremely intrusive and not helpful. The reality is that the legal aid pot is tiny, and it becomes increasingly difficult to deal with cases humanely.

The purpose of my amendment is slightly different from that of my noble friend Lord Rosser. Yes, there should be parity of funding, but rather than an off-the-top call on the legal aid fund—therefore diminishing the amount of aid available to people who need it for criminal cases, for example—the agency that had custody of the individual at the time of their death should provide the funding. The agency will almost certainly be paying a substantial number of legal costs. In the case of a death in a police custody suite, it is probable that several police officers were involved, all of whom may be legally represented separately at the expense of the state. The police force itself may be represented separately, and at the expense of the state. Then there is the bereaved family, who may be quite traumatised by what has happened and facing extreme difficulties because they do not know what to do. If it were not for charities like INQUEST, with which I have worked over the years, which provides support for such families and has a panel of lawyers to assist them, many families would essentially go unrepresented at inquests. Yet it is important that those families have the right to challenge the evidence being presented to make sure that they are satisfied that as far as possible, the truth has been obtained at the inquest.

Policing and Crime Bill

Debate between Lord Paddick and Lord Harris of Haringey

Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard - part one): House of Lords
Wednesday 2nd November 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick]

I was trained in how to deal with these sorts of situations before Tasers were invented. Batons and firearms are not the only alternatives. Using shields, either those specially produced in order to deal with these situations or even NATO-type shields, particularly in the confined space you find on a mental health ward, is an alternative to the batons and guns which the noble Lord seems to suggest are the only alternatives to a Taser.

[Lord Harris of Haringey]

I, of course, defer to the extensive knowledge of the noble Lord, who was born many decades before the Taser was invented. He is right that of course there are alternative methods, but pinning somebody against a wall and pushing them hard and repeatedly with a NATO shield is also a fairly violent response. We are not talking about nice situations; we are talking about a situation where something major in terms of an intervention is needed to save somebody’s life. Under those circumstances, I think a blanket proscription which says you must not use a Taser is a mistake.

There are also questions about why this amendment refers simply to mental health wards. There are violent incidents every night in accident and emergency departments. Are we saying that we would permit the use of a Taser in an incident in an accident and emergency department, but if exactly the same incident occurred in a mental health ward that would not be the case? The noble Baroness may actually be saying that Tasers should not be used at all. That is fine—it is a perfectly legitimate argument, and there is a debate to be had, but it seems a strange anomaly to make a distinction between one type of hospital ward and another.

The issue that has to be addressed is why so many incidents get out of hand in mental health wards. If that can be resolved—and I suspect it will mean staffing and may mean improved training and a lot of de-escalation—concern about the sheer number of times the police are called out to incidents of this sort would be diminished. The fact is that that is the problem, and that is the problem that must be addressed. A blanket ban on Tasers does not solve that problem; it just creates other problems, which is unsatisfactory.

The noble Baroness also referred to the overuse of Tasers elsewhere in the community, the probable discrimination and the fact that black people are more likely to be tasered than others. That is a real concern. I am aware that in London, at least, the mayor’s office requires that on every single occasion that a Taser is drawn, an individual is red-dotted when a Taser is pointed at them or a Taser is discharged, the circumstances are recorded and it is reported to the Mayor’s Office for Policing And Crime. I assume that the Minister has those figures to hand. It would be very interesting to know—it is quite a substantial number of cases. It is also interesting that often the mere act of red-dotting an individual—pointing the Taser at them—is enough to de-escalate the situation without discharge. It would be interesting to know whether those statistics tell us in how many instances Tasers were used in a mental health ward. I assume that the detail that is collected would enable that; I hope it does. It is certainly important that whenever a Taser or any other force is used, it should be properly recorded together with the circumstances and the ethnicity of the person against whom it was used. I understand that that is included in guidelines which are emerging from the College of Policing. I strongly welcome them because that will enable us to have a baseline to be able to see what is happening and to deal with issues where there is discrimination or overuse of force under whatever circumstances. By “overuse of force”, I do not mean just Tasers; I mean all forms of force.

Policing and Crime Bill

Debate between Lord Paddick and Lord Harris of Haringey

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard - part one): House of Lords
Wednesday 26th October 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, I fear it will be like this for the rest of the afternoon. Amendment 124A is in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee, and I shall speak to the other amendment in the group, Amendment 124B.

Clause 14 amends Part 2 of the Police Reform Act 2002 in relation to keeping complainants—people who have complained about the police—informed of the progress of the investigation of their complaint. Subsection (3) substitutes the matters contained within it for those matters that subsection (3) of the 2002 Act required the complainant to be kept informed about. Basically, subsection (3) sets out what the complainant needs to be kept abreast of. One of the matters in the 2002 Act was to keep the complainant informed of,

“any provisional findings of the person carrying out the investigation”.

This requirement is no longer listed in the new subsection (3), and the amendment is to probe why it is no longer a requirement. Amendment 124B relates to the substitution of subsection (9) in Section 21 of the 2002 Act made by Clause 14(7), which again omits “any provisional findings” from the requirements in the 2002 Act. I beg to move.

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

My Lords, I understand absolutely the objective of the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and I have a lot of sympathy with what he is trying to get at. However, perhaps there is also need to look at the extent to which the public who have been victims of crime are also kept informed of the progress of investigations into those crimes. In exactly the same principles that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, has outlined in terms of complaints against police officers, ought they perhaps also be applied to people who have been victims of crime?

Investigatory Powers Bill

Debate between Lord Paddick and Lord Harris of Haringey

Report: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 19th October 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, Amendment 196A is in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee. It seeks to remove internet connection records from the type of communications data that can be acquired in bulk. Noble Lords will be very well aware of my views, and the agreed view of the Liberal Democrats, on internet connection records. We believe that they are unnecessary and disproportionate, for the reasons that I have articulated in detail throughout the passage of the Bill.

I shall just remind your Lordships what internet connection records mean. Internet service providers are being forced to keep a record of every website that everyone in the UK has visited in the last 12 months, whether the subscriber is suspected of crime or not. Even though only the first page of each website visited is shown, visiting www.relate.org.uk could, for example, immediately indicate that your marriage was in trouble. However there are some safeguards, including some concessions extracted by the Labour Opposition, to ensure that only the internet connection records of those suspected of crimes that could result on conviction in a sentence of 12 months’ imprisonment or more can be examined by law enforcement agencies.

We are also grateful to the Labour Opposition for securing the review of bulk powers carried out by David Anderson QC, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation. We are particularly grateful to David Anderson for highlighting in paragraph 2.41(b), on page 33 of his report on bulk powers, that,

“it is not currently envisaged that the bulk acquisition power in the Bill will be used to obtain internet connection records”.

However, in a footnote at the bottom of that page, Mr Anderson states that he has been told,

“that this is no more than a statement of present practice and intention: neither the Bill nor the draft Code of Practice rules out the future use of the bulk acquisition power in relation to ICRs”.

In Committee, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, said:

“I can confirm to the Committee that the agencies do not currently acquire internet connection records in bulk and have no current intention to do so. It is however important to ensure that we do not legislate against the possibility of internet connection records being acquired in bulk, should agencies make a case which demonstrates that this might be necessary and proportionate in the interests of national security in future”.—[Official Report, 7/9/16; cols. 1087-88.]

Surely we should be legislating for a proven need, not not legislating against a possible but unlikely proven one.

Noble Lords will remember that the security services—GCHQ, MI5 and MI6—have all said that they do not need internet connection records in order to do their work. The power to acquire communications data in bulk, including the power to acquire ICRs in bulk, is available only to those agencies. The power to acquire internet connection records in bulk is therefore not needed. They are not collected in bulk at the moment, and there is no current intention to do so. If this were an opposition amendment to include ICRs in bulk data acquisition, the Government would quite rightly say it was unnecessary. The power to acquire ICRs in bulk also strips away all the safeguards that are in place when law enforcement agencies apply for individual internet connection records.

This is the online equivalent of Section 44 of the Terrorism Act, which allowed the police to stop and search people without any reasonable suspicion. The former Home Secretary, now the Prime Minister, Theresa May took that power away from the police because she considered it disproportionate.

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

Surely Section 44 was for target hardening and deterrence rather than for any other purpose.

[Lord Paddick]

I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Harris, but that is not what I understood Parliament’s intention was when the legislation was enacted. We can argue the point. If the analogy with stop and search sounds familiar to noble Lords next to me, including the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, it is because it is an analogy that was used by the shadow Home Secretary Diane Abbott in describing the powers under the Bill, which she describes as draconian.

The pieces of this legislative jigsaw are beginning to fall into place. Telephone operators already keep a record of the details of every phone call made and every text message sent. Internet service providers are being forced by this Bill to keep a record of every website, you, I and everyone else in this country have visited over the previous 12 months, which is a provision this House agreed to on Monday in a Division when it rejected the Liberal Democrat amendment to prevent it. A request filter, operated by or on behalf of the Government will be constructed. It will have direct feeds into the databases of communications providers, including access to the sensitive personal information of every subscriber to telephone and internet services in the UK, every call they make and every website they visit. The House agreed to that provision in a Division on Monday when it rejected the Liberal Democrat amendment to prevent it. The power is then given by this part of the Bill to allow all that sensitive personal information—details of every phone call made and every website visited—to be downloaded at will by the security agencies with no further authorisation. I hope that at least some noble Lords are feeling uncomfortable at that prospect. Our amendment removes internet connection records from the data that can be acquired under a bulk acquisition warrant. I beg to move.

Investigatory Powers Bill

Debate between Lord Paddick and Lord Harris of Haringey

Report: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 11th October 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, Amendment 13 is also in the name of my noble friend Lord Strasburger. In Committee, we moved an amendment that would have triggered implementation of the Privacy and Civil Liberties Board that the Liberal Democrats in the coalition Government insisted was part of the package of measures included in the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015. We withdrew that amendment but the Government have failed to give us any hope that it will be accepted. At this stage we are introducing a new amendment to establish an alternative Privacy and Civil Liberties Board based more closely on the well-regarded American model.

In the United States the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board is an independent, bipartisan agency within the executive branch. It comprises four part-time members and a full-time chairman, and the board is vested with two fundamental authorities: first, to review and analyse actions the executive branch takes to protect the nation from terrorism, ensuring that the need for such actions is balanced with the need to protect privacy and civil liberties; and secondly, to ensure that liberty concerns are appropriately considered in the development and implementation of laws, regulations and policies related to efforts to protect the nation against terrorism. We want a similar body in the UK, and we are not the only ones who do. The Prime Minister, when Home Secretary, committed the Government to,

“ensure we have more transparency from Government”,

which we are doing through this Bill. She continued:

“We will also reduce the number of bodies that are able to have access to the communications data”,

which, again, we are doing through this Bill, and,

“establish a privacy and civil liberties board based on the US model”.—[Official Report, Commons, 10/07/14; col. 472.]

It is only the latter commitment that this Government have failed to fulfil and which this amendment seeks to address. Noble Lords will see that the wording of the amendment seeks to reflect as accurately as possible the American model, which is widely seen as a world-class example of its kind.

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

Is the noble Lord therefore saying that the American approach to this matter is totally protective of civil liberties?

[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, I am saying that the American model provides significant safeguards, in that somebody represents the side of privacy and civil liberties in the argument; it is not simply a case of the security agencies’ side being put, as perhaps some might see in this country.

Unlike the previous amendment, this amendment does not seek to replace the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation. On the contrary, noble Lords will see that the independent reviewer must be consulted on the appointment of members of the board. This is complementary to, not a replacement for, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation. The current reviewer, Mr David Anderson, has previously argued that the post of independent reviewer is under-resourced and that it does not cover a wide enough range of laws. He said:

“If appropriately staffed and directed by the Independent Reviewer, the proposed new body could sharpen that investigative function and increase its scope”.

I accept that Mr Anderson also has concerns, and no doubt my noble friend Lord Carlile of Berriew, his predecessor, will tell us that he too has concerns. However, it continues to be the view of the Liberal Democrats—

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, I am very grateful to those who contributed to this debate. As far as my noble friend Lord Carlile of Berriew is concerned, I am not familiar with the Patriot Act but I know that the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board has made a significant difference in redressing the balance of some laws in the United States. Even though the noble Baroness, Lady Buscombe, spoke to members of that board and asked whether the Government must listen to it, the fact is that the Government in America did listen and acted on some of the board’s recommendations.

Clearly, these people would need to be security vetted. They will be appointed by the Secretary of State, who could impose whatever conditions she thought fit on those people.

On sloppy drafting, I am afraid it is that no more than three members of the board should be of the same political party rather than that three members should not be of any political party, which is what I think my noble friend suggested.

[Lord Harris of Haringey]

I am sorry to interrupt the noble Lord again, but could he clarify what that phrase is intended to mean? The way I, and I think my noble friend, read it is that, of a board of five, three can be of the same political party. Is the noble Lord saying that it is in the interests of civil liberties and all these other things to have a board of which three members are from the same political party—presumably the government party? Will that really then be an independent board?

[Lord Paddick]

The fact is that it is up to the Secretary of State to appoint those members to the board. One would hope that the Secretary of State would use the freedom provided by this amendment to ensure that the board is balanced. As with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, I also have my brief. However, on this occasion it would be disrespectful to the House to press this amendment to a vote. Despite my brief, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Investigatory Powers Bill

Debate between Lord Paddick and Lord Harris of Haringey

Tuesday 19th July 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, this amendment is one of several in this group in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee. Amendment 158A probes what is meant by the term “any other information” in terms of the purpose of an equipment interference warrant. Clause 93(2) states that an “equipment interference warrant”,

“requires the person to whom it is addressed to secure interference … for the purpose of obtaining—(a) communications”,

which is defined in Section 126(1); “(b) equipment data”, defined in Section 94; and “(c) any other information”, which is not defined. Can the Minister at least give some examples of what “any other information” means? Amendments 185B and 185C cover the same point in other subsections of Clause 93.

Amendments 158D to 158M and Amendments 169B to 169T make a different point—to try to ensure greater targeting of equipment interference warrants. Clause 95 sets out the subject matter of targeted equipment interference warrants. Clause 95(1)(b) states that the warrant may relate to,

“equipment belonging to, used by or in the possession of a group … who share a common purpose or who carry on, or may carry on, a particular activity”.

Such a broad and potentially large group of people can only in the loosest sense be described as targeted.

Amendment 158J applies the same arguments to targeted examination warrants in Clause 95(2)(b). Similar arguments of not being too broad and not being sufficiently focused apply to Clause 95(1)(f):

“equipment which is being, or may be, used for the purposes of a particular activity or activities of a particular description”.

Instead, Amendment 158H would insert:

“A targeted equipment interference warrant may be issued only if the persons or equipment to which the warrant relates are named or specifically identified using a unique identifier”,

which could, for example, be the IP address for a particular device. Similar wording in Amendment 158M would apply to targeted examination warrants.

It is worth remembering what targeted examination warrants are for. If, as a result of the bulk collection of the content of overseas communications, the security services discover UK-based communications that they want to examine the content of, they must first have a targeted examination warrant. This is to prevent the bulk collection of the content of communications of UK citizens. How then can it be right that such a targeted examination warrant applies to such a broad range of communications as,

“a group of persons who share a common purpose or who carry on, or may carry on, a particular activity”?

If the security services know that the communication is UK-based, they must also know whose communication it is and can therefore specify that in the warrant.

Subsections (1)(g) and (h) and (2)(d) and (e) of Clause 95 make provision for the issuing of targeted equipment interference warrants and targeted examination warrants for the purposes of testing, maintenance of equipment and the training of people. Amendments 158F, 158G, 158K and 158L would leave out those provisions.

In the first Committee sitting we discussed the issuing of interception warrants for the purposes of testing equipment and training agents, and the noble and learned Lord responded to the debate at cols. 105 and 106. In response to the Minister’s explanation, I said that I was still puzzled about training and testing warrants. I accepted that new equipment required testing and individuals needed to be trained in real-life situations but said that I was concerned about who the individuals or organisations were that might be targeted in these training exercises, bearing in mind that the normal provisions regarding proportionality and necessity in terms of suspicions that these individuals were up to no good would presumably not apply in training and testing situations. If they were real bad guys, a non-testing and training warrant could be issued. The noble and learned Lord failed to convince me then, but perhaps he can try again now.

Amendments 169B and 169T make the necessary consequential changes to the requirements that must be met by warrants in terms of the details that must be included in equipment interference warrants. I beg to move.

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

My Lords, I listened very carefully to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and his explanation of his amendments, but I was not at all convinced. If we believe that there is a need for the Bill, which I do, but have reservations about some of the issues around encryption, we have to ensure that the relevant agencies have some tools in their kit box. One of those tools has to be the ability to interfere with or look at the specific equipment. What the noble Lord is trying to do is to restrict the availability of that power to such an extent that it would effectively become almost useless. It would simply be available if you have one named individual. Therefore surely it is right that a significantly broader power should be available to engage here.

The question that the Minister who is going to respond needs to answer is this: how will the test of proportionality be applied in such cases? Presumably it is not proportionate to have such a broad sweep contained within the authorisation that it is inappropriate and overly onerous. The mechanism is therefore this: how is it determined that this is a proportionate and proper use of the power, and can we and the public be reassured that the mechanisms exist to ensure that that proportionality is adhered to?