Investigatory Powers Bill

Debate between Lord Paddick and Lord Evans of Weardale

Tuesday 19th July 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Evans of Weardale (CB)]

My Lords, I was slightly puzzled by the comments from the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, suggesting that the National Crime Agency did not support these powers. The implication was—

[Lord Paddick]

I did not say that. Perhaps I can assist the Committee. What I said was that the security services—MI5, MI6 and GCHQ—have told me, in my visits to those agencies, that they do not require the retention of internet connection records for them to carry out their very important work around national security and serious crime. It is not the case, nor did I state, that the National Crime Agency does not support this measure. The National Crime Agency has supported it in its presentations to me. I have been to the National Crime Agency twice, because it failed to convince me the first time, and I am sad to say that it did not convince me the second time either.

[Lord Evans of Weardale]

I apologise if I misunderstood the reference to GCHQ and the National Crime Agency and the way in which that was phrased. I ought to declare that I am a former non-executive director of the National Crime Agency. I have been very affected in my thinking on this by the extent to which every law enforcement agency that I have spoken to, in particular the National Crime Agency, seems to believe that this is a very necessary power to enable it to have the evidential ability to pursue serious crime. That is where the distinction lies between the intelligence agencies, which are not seeking this as an evidential tool, and the National Crime Agency and other law enforcement bodies, which see it as an evidential necessity. Depending on a relationship between the NCA and GCHQ within the National Crime Agency seems an unlikely way around this. If there is an evidential requirement, we should put that in the Bill and provide it to law enforcement, rather than relying on GCHQ to provide it by some particular piece of machinery within the NCA, because that would not then be available to all those who might need it within law enforcement.

This is also relevant in terms of why, or the extent to which, other countries have not gone down this road. There is plenty of evidence that the United Kingdom has been considerably more successful, particularly in the pursuit and prosecution of paedophile crime online, than a number of other jurisdictions. That is partly because we have provided appropriate powers to law enforcement to be able to pursue this. The UK has been much more successful in terms of prosecution figures for very similar situations to those facing some European countries. We should continue to provide the powers that enable the UK to pursue those sorts of crimes, which are at the moment an absolute wave hitting the law enforcement community. If we do not provide it with the powers, we will leave a situation where very many people who have committed online paedophile crime are not prosecuted. From my point of view, that certainly does not seem a satisfactory way forward.

I am also slightly cautious about the argument that people can always get round this and that anyone applying their best security would not get caught. Almost all investigation, whether intelligence or criminal, relies on those who are criminals or threats to our security not being as good at what they are doing as they hoped. To say that we should not introduce powers because they are not infallible and that if someone applied all security measures they might be able to get around them would mean that we would provide very few powers to either the intelligence services or law enforcement agencies, because someone somewhere might be able to avoid them. Most people, most of the time, do not apply all the security that they could when they are undertaking either national security threats or crime. That is why we can catch them. We should provide as many powers as we can to catch these people before they damage us, and prosecute them afterwards.

Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

Debate between Lord Paddick and Lord Evans of Weardale

Monday 26th January 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Evans of Weardale]

I accept that this is a very important element, but it is not the answer to everything.

My second note of caution is that we need to maintain public confidence as we go down this route. That is as important for law enforcement as it is for counterterrorism. The noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, referred to the masses who are concerned about the snoopers’ charter. I have to say that the polling evidence I have seen does not necessarily demonstrate that the masses are enormously concerned about this issue. On the whole, the masses seem to be more concerned about their security than about the human rights issues that some people focus on. Nevertheless, there is an issue of public confidence and I do not wish to diminish that.

Despite those notes of caution, I support the amendment. I support it because it is, as the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, said, a restricted measure, not a blanket measure. I support it because it is drafted with a sunset clause, so that we are filling, as it were, a legislative gap until the totality of the issues can be properly considered in the light of the subsequent publication of various reviews that are under way. I think that it will fill a gap for that period. It seems to me to be a useful, rather than a hugely expansive measure, and one which has appropriate safeguards, so I support it.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I am not speaking here on a party-political, but on a personal basis. I want to tell noble Lords, first, about my personal experience of terrorism. It is not first-hand, either in terms of being a member of Special Branch or the security services, or having seen the aftermath of what took place directly. However, part of my role in the Metropolitan Police following the 7 July bombings was to talk to officers who had had to go down on to the tracks where terrorists had exploded these bombs and bring out the victims of those terrible atrocities. I know what we are talking about here in terms of terrorism and I use the Underground system every day.

In our earlier discussion on Amendment 75 and internal exile, as some put it, noble and learned Lords, in particular, as well as other noble Lords, emphasised the need for legitimacy. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, talked about the European Convention on Human Rights and the right to a private and family life. My concern is that the introduction of these amendments in this way may not be seen as legitimate by many people outside this place. A process has been set in motion. There is a process for reviewing RIPA, for example, and the whole landscape of the intelligence services. That process is in place.

The other issue that noble Lords—and, indeed, two who tabled this amendment—talked about in relation to internal exile is the danger of alienation and resentment. This follows the comments by my noble friend Lady Warsi in yesterday’s Observer about how engagement is essential. We need to engage with communities, not create alienation and resentment. My fear is that the way in which these amendments are drafted is likely to cause exactly that negative effect. My noble friend Lord King, in his opening remarks, said that we are facing a very serious situation. That is common ground. As I have said, I know from personal experience the sorts of dangers that we are facing. However, there is no common ground, I suggest, about the best way to deal with that serious issue.

There has been a lot of talk this afternoon about events in Paris. My understanding is that the information and intelligence that security services got was through mobile telephone communication between the two groups of terrorists which co-ordinated their attacks by that means. There is nothing in these amendments that would give the security services or the police the powers to identify that sort of communication. It exists already. Every day, not only the police and the security services, but other agencies specified in the amendments also have the power, as we speak, to identify who called who on a mobile phone, where and when. So despite all this talk about Paris and how the attacks could have been prevented, these amendments would not appear, on the facts as I know them, to make any difference to the situation.

Terrorists may be adept at using technology, as my noble friend Lord King said, but my understanding is that a lot of terrorists, particular the sort responsible for recent attacks—whether we are talking about the tragic death of Lee Rigby or about Paris—are using very old technology. The problem, as my noble friend Lord King rightly said, is getting good intelligence. That is about developing links with the Muslim community and with communities where the extreme right wing operates, and gaining their trust and confidence in order to get that intelligence.