Criminal Justice and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Paddick and Lord Carswell

Monday 28th July 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Carswell (CB)]

My Lords, in brief compass I will say, if I may, that I support the amendments and all that has been said about Clause 64 by those who have opposed it. I am a little hesitant to express matters in terms of my experience because the vast experience of noble Lords with judicial and advocacy experience is such that mine appears very minor. However, it is rather personal and I may be able to give the Committee some idea from that why I regard this as not only undesirable but unnecessary.

The courts have quite sufficient powers to deal with the matters contained in Clause 64. I can tell the Committee exactly why I say I know that. When judicial review was coming on stream in Northern Ireland in 1984 it was exactly the time I became a judge in the High Court. I was put in charge of those matters coming before the High Court and grew up with it. If I may say so, I helped to shape it and to form the judicial approach to the development of judicial review in our jurisdiction. I was very attentive all the while to the way in which it was being developed very well indeed in the jurisdiction in England and in other jurisdictions. I know from personal experience that the judges have the necessary powers. All they need to do is exercise them sensibly and robustly, with a careful eye to the justice of the individual case.

Once you write down these things and put them into legislation, as I have had occasion to say to the House before, two things happen. The first is that you cannot legislate for everything; there will be difficult and borderline cases when the shoe pinches and the exercise of discretion is an essential part of achieving justice. Secondly, once you write things down, it will give rise to an industry of finding ways round it. As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said, it will give rise to satellite litigation. For those reasons I strongly oppose the adoption of Clause 64. It may well be right—and I would not rule it out—that the pendulum should swing to some extent. The Government may have some perfectly valid points about matters that should be attended to, but this is not the way to do it.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I rise briefly to speak to this amendment. It will become apparent very quickly that I am not a lawyer, and never have been, but I have been involved in one case of judicial review as a result of becoming a victim of phone hacking.

The fact that I was a victim of phone hacking became known to the police, but the police did not inform either me or other victims when that information came to their notice. As a consequence, together with others, we took the Metropolitan Police to judicial review on two counts: first, over its failure thoroughly to investigate phone hacking in the first instance; and, secondly, on its failure to inform those that it knew were either victims or potential victims of phone hacking to enable them to take steps to guard their privacy. The court found that whether the police should have investigated thoroughly the first time round was entirely a matter for the police. However, on the issue of whether the Metropolitan Police should have informed the victims of phone hacking, the court found that it was under a legal obligation to inform them. That important principle was therefore established through this judicial review.

Bearing in mind that by the time we brought the judicial review we had been informed by the police that we were victims of phone hacking, can my noble friend the Minister confirm that the outcome of that application would not have been substantially different for us? In other words, we already knew that we were victims, but we wanted to establish the principle that the police should have told us earlier. If Clause 64 were enacted, we may not have been able to bring that judicial review and establish the important principle that the police must inform victims of this sort of crime as soon as they become aware of it.