Trade in Torture etc. Goods (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019
Debate between Lord Paddick and Baroness Manzoor
Lord Paddick
My Lords, the specific question I put to the Minister was that if an item is currently included in the list because it can be used in the course of capital punishment, it would be a very serious matter if such an item was removed from the list simply because the Secretary of State decided that that should be the case. That decision would be brought forward in regulations made under the negative procedure. Surely, given that this is such a fundamental issue and bearing in mind what we have seen—I understand that issues related to data sharing are not within the scope of this instrument—regarding the Government’s attitude towards capital punishment in other countries, such a decision should be subject to the affirmative procedure. Were the Minister to decide to add items to the list of goods that should be restricted I could understand why that could well be dealt with through the negative procedure, but such an important step as removing items that could be used in capital punishment from that list should be taken only by the affirmative procedure.
Baroness Manzoor
I understand the point raised by the noble Lord. We will work closely with the EU on the regulations that it has in place to ensure that when we consider any regulations relating to exports, we will look carefully at whether items should be either taken off the list or added to it. We are not currently making any policy changes at all and there are no plans to do so. If there are any plans to change the policy, I understand that they will go before the Commons and the Lords under the negative procedure. However, there are no plans to add to or change any element of the policy as it stands.
I understand the point the noble Lord is making: he feels it should be under the affirmative rather than the negative procedure. As it stands, it is under the negative procedure should the Secretary of State wish to add anything to that list. If I have not understood that question clearly, I will write to the noble Lord so that there is greater clarity on the affirmative or the negative—
Baroness Manzoor
As I indicated, we have no plans to remove or change the policy. The list is as it is. I understand the point the noble Lord is making. At the moment, that is how it stands. Should we need to change the policy at a later stage if something comes off the list, it will be done in the usual way, going to the Commons and here. But I can reassure both noble Lords that, as I understand it, the current intention is not to take something off the list. I am turning to my officials to check that that is correct and they are nodding furiously. That is the policy as it stands; there is no consideration of changing that policy and taking anything off the list at the moment. There is nothing further I can add to that, but I undertake to write to both noble Lords if I can fill out that answer a little more.
Lord Paddick
Perhaps I can help the noble Baroness by clarifying the question that she has agreed to answer. At the moment, it is presumably the European Union that decides what is on the list and what should be taken off it. By this statutory instrument, the Government are taking the power so that the Secretary of State can decide what is and is not on the list. If they are going to remove from the list something that can be used in the course of capital punishment, it should be by the affirmative and not the negative procedure.
Baroness Manzoor
As I said, I understand quite clearly the point that the noble Lord made. It is not our intention to take anything off the list, but I have undertaken to write to the noble Lord if I can add anything further. There is no policy change in this SI.
Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 (Amendment) Order 2018
Debate between Lord Paddick and Baroness Manzoor(5 years, 11 months ago)
Grand CommitteeRead Full debate Read Hansard Text
Baroness Manzoor (Con)
My Lords, this order was laid before both Houses on 5 November 2018. It adds Transport for Greater Manchester to the list of bodies that can apply to the courts for a civil injunction to address anti-social behaviour. It may assist the Committee if I give some background and context to the order.
The Government introduced the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 to provide the police, local authorities and other local agencies with a range of powers to enable them to effectively tackle and prevent anti-social and nuisance behaviour. These powers include a civil injunction which can be issued by the courts against any person aged 10 years or over whose behaviour has caused or is likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress to others. An injunction can include prohibitions to stop the perpetrator behaving anti-socially and positive requirements to get them to address the underlying causes of their behaviour. At present, the bodies which are able to apply to the court for an injunction are as follows: the police, including British Transport Police; local councils and housing providers; Transport for London; the Environment Agency and Natural Resources Wales; NHS Protect and the West Midlands Combined Authority.
The draft order before us today amends the 2014 Act to add Transport for Greater Manchester to the list of bodies which can apply to the courts for an injunction under Section 5 of the Act. This change follows a request from the Mayor of Greater Manchester, Andy Burnham, and will help ensure that Transport for Greater Manchester can take swift action to address anti-social behaviour taking place on Manchester’s transport network.
Transport for Greater Manchester is the passenger transport executive body responsible for the co-ordination and management of public transport across the 10 districts that make up the county of Greater Manchester. Transport for Greater Manchester owns the Metrolink tram system that runs through seven of the 10 districts that make up the county of Greater Manchester. It also owns and operates a total of 22 bus stations and provides a range of other bus services. The number of passenger journeys made using the Metrolink network in 2017 was 40 million. On its bus services in 2017, there were a total of 196 million passenger journeys.
Transport for Greater Manchester reports challenges with anti-social behaviour across its transport network. In April 2015, to address concerns about anti-social behaviour, it established the TravelSafe Partnership with Greater Manchester Police and with support from transport operators. The TravelSafe Partnership provides a dedicated team of police officers, special constables and security staff who regularly patrol the region’s transport network to reduce anti-social behaviour and provide high visibility reassurance to passengers and staff. Despite taking steps to reduce anti-social behaviour on the transport network across Greater Manchester, it remains a challenge. The most recent statistics show that in 2017-18 there were a total of 1,692 incidents of anti-social behaviour, which included incidents of intimidating, threatening and abusive behaviour towards passengers and staff.
Transport for Greater Manchester would now like to go a step further in keeping its passengers and staff safe by applying for civil injunctions direct from the courts, which currently it cannot do. The Government believe that the Mayor of Greater Manchester and Transport for Greater Manchester have put forward a strong case for this change, which will also bring their powers in this area into line with those of comparable bodies such as Transport for London. The Government recognise that anti-social behaviour can have a negative and debilitating impact on victims. It is right that the Government therefore do all they can to assist organisations such as Transport for Greater Manchester to take direct action against anti-social individuals on their transport systems, so that they can protect the public. I beg to move.
Lord Paddick (LD)
My Lords, I do not think I will be able to speak for very long. I thank the Minister for explaining the order. As she has explained, a civil injunction can be taken out against those causing others harassment, alarm or distress, and the order adds Transport for Greater Manchester to those able to apply directly to the courts for these injunctions, as Transport for London can. Clearly, if the West Midlands and London have this ability, there is no reason that Greater Manchester should not have it as well.
However, perhaps the Minister can explain to the Committee how the injunctions are used in practice. How are they enforced once they are granted? How effective have they been in London, where they have been available to Transport for London for some time? How many times have they been used, and to what effect? I have tried to find out. I consulted the chair of the Transport Committee of the London Assembly and she did not know of any issues around the granting of these injunctions, but it would be useful to know whether this is an effective measure, based on experience in other areas that have had these injunctions for some time.
Freedom of Information (Designation as Public Authority and Amendment) Order 2018
Debate between Lord Paddick and Baroness Manzoor
Baroness Manzoor (Con)
My Lords, the purpose of this draft order is to bring the public functions of the National Police Chiefs’ Council within the scope of the Freedom of Information Act. This is to make sure that there is continuity in the scope of the Act by extending it to the NPCC, in the same way as was done for its predecessor, the Association of Chief Police Officers.
Section 5(1)(a) of the Freedom of Information Act enables the Secretary of State to designate any person as a public authority if they appear to the Secretary of State to exercise functions of a public nature. Where a body is designated as a public authority under this limb, it is also necessary under Section 7(5) of the order to specify each of the body’s functions that appear to the Secretary of State to be of a public nature. Only those functions specified in the schedule to the order will be subject to the Act. As with ACPO, it appears to the Secretary of State that the NPCC exercises functions of a public nature in relation to all of its functions. The NPCC provides national police co-ordination and leadership by bringing together police forces across the UK as well as in the Armed Forces and the Crown dependencies. Some of the NPCC’s co-ordination and leadership functions are delivered in conjunction with the College of Policing, the professional body that provides the policing skills and knowledge necessary to prevent crime and protect the public. The functions set out in the order reflect those set out in clause 7 of the collaboration agreement that established the NPCC.
In addition to designating the NPCC, this instrument removes the designation of ACPO; this is a question of legislative tidying up. ACPO has been liquidated and no longer exists and the amendment updates the statute book to reflect that. The liquidators of ACPO were consulted as required and are content. As mentioned, there has been a statutory consultation with the NPCC to make sure that all the necessary functions were covered by this order as appropriate. The NPCC has made sure that there has been no retraction of transparency in the transition period when it took over the functions of ACPO. It publishes large amounts of information proactively and has responded to information requests on a voluntary basis in the short period when it was not formally covered by the Freedom of Information Act. This is highly commendable.
The order will enable the provision of a legally enforceable right to request information under the Freedom of Information Act. I commend it to the House and I beg to move.
Lord Paddick (LD)
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for outlining the details of this order. I have a few questions to put to her. According to the Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the order, the National Police Chiefs’ Council started its operations on 1 April 2015, presumably when it took over responsibility from the Association of Chief Police Officers. The noble Baroness said that ACPO is no longer in existence and that it had been liquidated, but the Explanatory Memorandum states that ACPO “is in liquidation”. Is there a difference between the two? I am not legally qualified to know whether there is.
My concern is that if ACPO was still operating up until 31 March 2015, only three and a half years ago, limitations on civil proceedings which could in theory be taken against the association can normally be brought for up to seven years. I wonder whether removing ACPO from its freedom of information obligations is premature. The order also refers to the collaboration between the National Police Chiefs’ Council and the College of Policing in connection with the implementation of standards and policies that are set by the College of Policing, the development in collaboration with the college of joint national approaches to criminal justice, value for money, service transformation, information management, performance management and technology, along with the development of joint national approaches to staff and human resource issues, including misconduct and discipline. Can the noble Baroness tell us whether the College of Policing is a designated public authority for the purposes of the Freedom of Information Act and if not, why not?
Data Retention and Acquisition Regulations 2018
Debate between Lord Paddick and Baroness Manzoor
Baroness Manzoor
My Lords, I am glad that we have been able to debate these regulations so thoroughly and consider carefully the proposed amendments to the Investigatory Powers Act. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, for his very balanced approach to this important issue, and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for their considered view on the issue of what constitutes serious crime. If I may refer them back to my letter, the position that I outlined there remains the Government’s position.
I will briefly say a few things, but I am conscious that almost everything that has been said tonight was said in Grand Committee—I can see the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, nodding—and I have followed it up in writing to all noble Lords who took part in that debate. I again apologise for any confusion that took place regarding the earlier part of the issue that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, raised, in relation to the meetings with the Ministers of State. I was not party to those discussions, so I apologise that I am not in a position to comment, but I hope that my letter went some way to addressing the issues that were raised with me in Grand Committee.
I will say a few things again for clarity. These regulations bring in additional safeguards. They ensure that the more intrusive requests for communications data will be accessed only in the investigation of serious crime and that the vast majority of requests by public authorities to access all communications data—approximately 200,000 requests are made per year—must be authorised by an independent organisation overseen by a Court of Appeal judge. There are very clear safeguards in place. We are taking powers away from our law enforcement agencies in the interests of privacy.
We are, of course, mindful of our duties to protect the public and properly to investigate crimes that they suffer. A balance must be struck and these regulations strike that balance correctly. As I have said, noble Lords may have differing opinions on whether our definition of serious crime in this context is appropriate. Let me be clear. I do not want our police to be unable to effectively investigate an individual sending grossly offensive messages to someone, causing huge distress to the victim who certainly considers the offence to be serious. I do not want to damage the effectiveness of our judiciary by limiting the ability of the police to investigate contempt of court. These are serious matters.
I refer the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, to page 2 of my letter. It is not just the sentence that the person who commits the crime receives. That is important in terms of the 12 months, but it is not the only issue. As the code of practice sets out clearly in paragraph 3.33, a range of factors should be considered, including but not limited to the circumstances of the case, the offender, the impact on the victim, the harm suffered and the motive for the crime. I hope that that goes some way to addressing the concerns that noble Lords raised.
We have a comprehensive code of practice which provides extensive guidance on what considerations must be taken into account by individuals applying for and authorising requests for communications. As I have said, each and every request must be assessed in relation to necessity, proportionality and seriousness. We are strengthening the safeguards and oversight of a regime already world-leading in these aspects, and we are creating a regime that is compliant with EU law.
I am grateful to Members of the House for their time in ensuring that this has been such a valuable and high-quality debate. We take these issues very seriously. I would now like the regulations to be approved and I commend them to the House.
Lord Paddick
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness. It is not primarily about the definition of serious crime being an offence punishable by 12 months’ imprisonment or more. It is about the fact that it goes beyond that to include all offences, whether or not they are capable of a 12-month sentence, that have communication as an integral part, all corporate offences, whether or not somebody can be given a 12-month sentence, and all offences involving a breach of privacy. Clearly that is going beyond the definition of serious crime: it includes lots of offences that are not serious.
I am not reckless enough to jeopardise these regulations by asking noble Lords to vote against approving them, but I hope that noble Lords will agree that the Government’s attempts to get round the CJEU judgment is to be regretted, and I wish to test the opinion of the House on my amendment to the Motion.
Data Retention and Acquisition Regulations 2018
Debate between Lord Paddick and Baroness Manzoor(6 years, 1 month ago)
Grand CommitteeRead Full debate Read Hansard Text
Baroness Manzoor (Con)
My Lords, the retention of, and access to, communications data is crucial in enabling investigators to obtain intelligence and evidence that can prevent terrorist attacks, disrupt the activities of serious organised crime groups and establish culpability so that offenders can be brought to justice. It is used to investigate crime, keep children safe, locate missing persons, support or disprove alibis and link a suspect to a crime scene.
These regulations introduce additional safeguards in our communications data regime to ensure that it complies with EU law. They also bring into force the code of practice for communications data under the Investigatory Powers Act. We have consulted publicly on the changes to the legislation and the code between November 2017 and January 2018.
The regulations provide for the independent authorisations of communications data requests. Sir Adrian Fulford, the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, is given this power and will delegate this responsibility to a newly appointed body of staff, to be known as the Office for Communications Data Authorisation. The OCDA will report directly to the IPC and will be responsible for considering the vast majority of requests to access communications data made by public authorities. The new body is expected to begin operating in April 2019, with independent authorisation being rolled out across public authorities over the course of 2019. Internal authorisation of requests will continue to be permitted in urgent cases—for example, where there is a threat to life and where requests are made for national security matters which are outside the scope of EU law.
The regulations restrict to serious crime the crime purpose for which events data such as call histories and location information can be retained and acquired. The primary safeguard to ensure that communications data is not acquired for trivial offences is the important test of necessity and proportionality, which must be considered every time an application for communication data is made.
The code of practice provides detailed guidance on how a public authority should consider the seriousness of an offence, including taking into account important factors such as the impact on the victim. In addition to this test, the regulations create a new threshold of serious crime, below which data cannot be acquired. As intended by the European Court, we have carefully considered how serious crime should be defined in the UK in the context of communications data. We propose to use as a starting point the definition which already exists within the IPA for the more intrusive interception and bulk powers, then making some adjustments in relation to communications data while leaving the original definition in place for more intrusive powers.
For communications data, we propose an adjusted definition, which includes offences that attract a sentence of one year rather than referring to offences for which the expected custodial sentence is three years, as in the case for interception. This reflects the less intrusive nature of the communications data, but nevertheless prevents data being acquired in the investigation of trivial offences. We have worked closely with the operational community to consider the importance of obtaining communications data against a range of offences, with a particular focus on cases where it was anticipated that communications data will be an important—or indeed the only—investigative tool. One area highlighted by law enforcement agencies was stalking and harassment offences. These can attract low sentences or fines, but such activity can often escalate into more serious offences, and when the activity takes place online, the ability to obtain communications data is a vital tool. Our proposed definition of serious crime for communications data acquisition also includes offences which involve, as an integral part of the offence, the sending of a communication or breach of a person’s privacy to ensure that all offences related to stalking and harassment are in scope.
The final adjustment of the serious crime definition already existing in the Act is to enable communications data to be obtained for investigations of offences committed by corporate bodies. We consider offences such as corporate manslaughter to be sufficiently serious to warrant the use of communications data in their investigation despite being punishable by fines. The generally less intrusive entity data—such as the name of a subscriber to a service—can still be obtained in relation to the full range of crimes, where it is necessary and proportionate to do so. To ensure that the serious crime restriction can be brought into force on 1 November, the regulations amend the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 until Part 3 of the IPA is brought into force early next year. RIPA remains the legal framework for accessing communications data.
The new code of practice provides comprehensive guidance on the data retention and acquisition regime. It is well over 100 pages long, and provides further detail on roles and responsibilities. The code takes account of the changes made in these regulations, particularly the role of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner and the OCDA.
These changes support the important right to privacy and the right of citizens to be protected from crime and terrorism. They ensure that public authorities can continue to access retained communications data in a way that is consistent with EU law and our responsibilities to protect the public. The additional safeguards, the clear requirements set out in the code of practice and the independent oversight provided by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner establish clear limits around the use of these powers, and provide reassurance that communications data is being used only where it is necessary and proportionate to do so. I beg to move.
Lord Paddick (LD)
My Lords, I remind the Committee that I was a police officer for over 30 years, rising to the rank of Deputy Assistant Commissioner in the Metropolitan Police, and—contrary to popular belief—my certificate of service states that my conduct was exemplary. I acknowledge the importance of communications data in the investigation of serious crime as the Minister has outlined. I also welcome, as far as they go, the independent authorisation provisions contained in these regulations.
I should like to give the Committee some background to discussions I have had with Ministers and officials on these regulations. Two weeks ago, at a meeting with the Minister of State for Security and Economic Crime, the Minister of State for Countering Extremism, the Minister for Equalities, and officials, I raised my concerns about the definition of serious crime in these regulations and one other issue. The Minister for Security and Economic Crime and his officials were unable to answer my concerns at that meeting but the Minister promised to find the answers and get back to me. Having heard nothing by yesterday afternoon, I alerted the Government to the fact that, in the absence of any explanation, I would seek to oppose the regulations when they reached the Floor of the House. At 8 pm last night, the Minister of State for Countering Extremism called me because she had been told that I was unhappy with the regulations. I repeated my main concern, as clearly expressed in the meeting with Ministers and officials on 10 October, and she undertook to provide me with a copy of the relevant part of the Minister’s opening speech this afternoon. I received this at 10 am today and I am grateful for the advance sight of the relevant part of the speech. Having reflected for some time on the Minister’s opening remarks, provided to me in advance in writing, I wish to explain to the Committee why I am still not satisfied with the Government’s response.
In the Investigatory Powers Act 2016—the Act of Parliament under which these regulations are being made—“serious crime” is defined as offences for which the expected custodial sentence is three years for a person over 18 with no previous convictions. In other legislation currently before the House—for example, the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill—the definition of serious crime is the same as in the Investigatory Powers Act 2016. An expected custodial sentence of three years’ imprisonment for a person without any previous convictions is not, as I understand it, a maximum sentence of three years’ imprisonment. Taking shoplifting as an example, the maximum sentence for theft is 10 years in prison but someone stealing a can of beans from Tesco could not be expected to be sent to prison for three years for such an offence. Can the Minister explain exactly what “expected custodial sentence” means in practice? Can she give some examples of the types of offences that would fall within this category?
However, these regulations not only lower the bar to 12 months’ imprisonment or more, down from three years, but—the Minister will correct me if I have this wrong—defining serious crime as an offence that someone is capable of being sentenced for must mean that the maximum sentence is 12 months or more, which is a much lower threshold than the definition in the Act. Furthermore, it disregards any enactment prohibiting or restricting the imprisonment of individuals who have no previous convictions, as opposed to the Act, which has regard to such restrictions. If I am right, this shows that this is a much lower standard for defining serious crime than is contained in the Act itself.
The Minister talked in her introduction about preventing data being acquired in the investigation of trivial offences. The CJEU judgment on this matter, which has prompted these regulations, talks about the objective of fighting serious crime, not the prohibition on using communications data to investigate trivial crime. There is a significant difference between serious crime and trivial crime. My view is that the Government have stretched the definition of serious crime beyond credible limits, to an extent that is not compliant with the CJEU judgment in this matter.
However, the regulations go further still, to include any offence committed by a body corporate and any offence,
“which involves, as an integral part of it, the sending of a communication or a breach of a person’s privacy”.
Clearly, “any offence” does not differentiate between a serious offence and any other type of offence. The CJEU explicitly stated that the use of communications data must be restricted to the investigation of serious crime but these regulations define any crime as being serious if it is committed by a body corporate or involves the sending of a communication or a breach of privacy, when clearly some of these offences will not be serious by any reasonable definition. I am reminded of the Oxford undergraduate who tried to get around college by-laws prohibiting undergraduates from keeping dogs in their rooms by calling his dog “Cat”.
The Minister has explained how the Government arrived at such a position:
“We have worked closely with the operational community to consider the importance of communications data against a range of offences, with a particular focus on cases where it was anticipated that communications data will be an important—or indeed the only—investigative tool”.
Baroness Manzoor
The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, makes a very important point. When I write, I will ensure that the issue of how it will be overseen by the oversight body and how it is dealt with is addressed very clearly. I will write to all noble Lords and I will also place a copy in the Library.
Lord Paddick
In that letter perhaps the Minister will expand further on harassment and stalking offences, which can quickly escalate, to use the expression she used. Of course, if stalking involves fear of violence, or serious alarm or distress—in other words, if it escalates—the maximum sentence is five years and therefore it would be covered anyway by the definition of serious crime as being something with a maximum sentence of 12 months. Therefore, an offence involving communications as an integral part would not be necessary. Perhaps she can clarify that as well when she writes.
Baroness Manzoor
Of course, I will be happy to do that. I shall address the points put by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser. He asked how we will prevent the powers being used for less serious offences, which is essentially the question on which I have been asked to write, but I shall try to give a brief view of our response. The Office for Communications Data Authorisations will receive a full case setting out the need for communications data. It will need to set out why the request is necessary, proportionate and sufficiently serious to warrant the intrusion. The IPA then provides for oversight of this.
The Investigatory Powers Act provides for an Investigatory Powers Commissioner, whose remit includes providing comprehensive oversight of the use of the powers contained within the Act and adherence to the practices and processes, which as noble Lords know are described in the code of practice. The IPC is a member of the senior judiciary and is entirely independent of Her Majesty’s Government or any of the public authorities authorised to use investigatory powers. That is very strong oversight. The IPC is supported by inspectors and others, such as technical experts and legal experts. The IPC and those who work under the authority of the IPC will ensure compliance with the law by inspecting public authorities and investigating any issue which they believe warrants further independent scrutiny. If there were any issue, they would be there in an independent capacity—it is not just somebody locally at the authorities making that decision.
The IPC must report annually on the findings of its audits, inspections and investigations. This report will be laid before Parliament and made available to the public, subject to any necessary redactions made in the public interest. Separately, the Investigatory Powers Act requires that the security, integrity and deletion of retained data by telecommunications operators is overseen by the Information Commissioner, who provides the UK’s data protection oversight function. Just to conclude on that, because the oversight is important, Section 260 of the IPA requires that the Secretary of State must publish a report reviewing the operation of the Act and lay it before Parliament after five years of its passing.
I hope that I have answered most of the questions that noble Lords have put to me. As I said, if there are any issues that I have missed or not grasped as fully as I could have done, I am happy to write to noble Lords and place a copy of the letter in the Library. I am aware that across from me there is greater expertise than I have, but I hope that I have been able to allay any fears and concerns and that noble Lords are assured that we are looking at safeguarding and protecting, as well as ensuring transparency, in this important area.
Crime: Local Authority Funding
Debate between Lord Paddick and Baroness Manzoor
Lord Paddick
To ask Her Majesty’s Government what impact reductions in local authority funding have had on crime levels.
Baroness Manzoor (Con)
My Lords, the Government’s Serious Violence Strategy sets out our analysis and the trends, drivers and risk factors behind the recent increases. We had an excellent debate on those issues on Monday. Our analysis points to changes in the drugs market as being a major factor. In particular, these changes have been driven by an increased supply of cocaine, increased use of crack cocaine and the growth of county lines as a means of drugs supply. The growth of social media has also facilitated this.
Lord Paddick (LD)
My Lords, young people are being drawn into gangs because they seek a sense of belonging. The positive alternatives to gangs, which used to be provided by local authority youth services, and by charities and community groups through local authority core funding, are no longer there because grants from central government to councils have been reduced by 49% in real terms since 2010. Do the Government accept responsibility for the loss of those vital services, and what are they going to do about it?
Baroness Manzoor
My Lords, as the noble Lord knows, local authorities are responsible for allocating funding to youth services, in line with local needs. The Government have made more than £200 billion available to councils for spending on local services up to 2019-20. The Government, in partnership with the Big Lottery Fund, have also invested £80 million, £40 million to #iwillFund and £40 million to the Youth Investment Fund to increase opportunities for young people.
Sharia Law
Debate between Lord Paddick and Baroness Manzoor
Baroness Manzoor
My Lords, the Government do take this issue very seriously, and that is why we undertook a review. The review’s findings were put in place on 1 February and a Ministerial Statement was made. However, we must ensure that reform of marriage is not done in a piecemeal fashion because it is a complex area of legislation. We are looking at that area carefully and, as I said, within the communities we are putting much greater effort into working with other organisations such as advice centres, voluntary organisations and NGOs to raise much greater awareness so that these issues can be tackled.
Lord Paddick (LD)
My Lords, the report says that,
“those proposing a ban on sharia councils provide no counter proposal or any solution for anyone seeking a religious divorce … We consider the closure of sharia councils is not a viable option”.
Do the Government agree?
Baroness Manzoor
Sharia councils provide a service for some of the women who need to go to them, but they are not a viable solution in terms of equality for those women. We are therefore trying to raise awareness among sharia councils and the women who go to them—90% of the work done by those councils in fact regards divorce. Raising awareness will ensure that sharia councils themselves ensure that they are signposting correctly for those women.