Illegal Migration Bill

Debate between Lord Paddick and Baroness Fox of Buckley

Report stage
Wednesday 5th July 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, first, I address the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Swire. He wondered why the amendment had not captured the imagination of the House. Speaking for those of us on these Benches, the Bill is entirely focused on refugees and asylum seekers, who form a very small proportion—a tiny fraction—of the 1.3 million people given leave to remain in the country last year. So while I agree in principle with what the noble Lord says—that we should have a much firmer grip on the number of illegal immigrants in this country—his amendment is not germane to the Bill.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords—

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

I am very sorry, but on Report noble Lords are allowed to speak only once.

As the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, and the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, said, the Bill is focused entirely on criminalising the victims of people smugglers and not on the people smugglers themselves. We intend to support the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker: if his amendment is carried, at least there will be one line, or a few lines, in the Bill that will focus on the real problem, which is the criminal people smugglers and those who are carrying out modern slavery and trafficking, as the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, said.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, said, in effect, that this amendment was not necessary because under Section 1(4) of the Crime and Courts Act 2013, one reason for the National Crime Agency to exist is:

“The NCA is to have the function … of securing that efficient and effective activities to combat organised crime and serious crime are carried out”.


People smuggling, people trafficking and so forth are clearly organised and serious crime, but that then leads to the question raised by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, about priorities for the National Crime Agency. The strategic priorities for the National Crime Agency are set out in Section 3 of the 2013 Act, which says:

“The Secretary of the State must determine strategic priorities for the NCA”.


I have looked at the current strategic priorities for the National Crime Agency, as set by the Home Secretary, and people smuggling, trafficking and people facilitating the sorts of things that the Bill is supposed to combat are nowhere to be seen; there is nothing in the strategic priorities about it. How can the Government say that it is a priority of the Prime Minister to tackle small boats coming across the channel when it is not a strategic priority set by the Home Secretary for the National Crime Agency? The only way we can get the National Crime Agency to focus on people smugglers is to support the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, which is what we on these Benches will do.

Public Order Bill

Debate between Lord Paddick and Baroness Fox of Buckley

Report stage
Monday 30th January 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

That was a natural break in proceedings as I am now going on to talk about the definition of serious disruption.

As we have heard, Amendments 5, 14, 24 and part of Amendments 50 and 51 relate to the definition of serious disruption. The Minister will no doubt cite the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis in saying that the police would find it helpful if the definition of “serious disruption” were clearer.

Amendment 1, to which I have added my name, provides greater clarity in relation to, what—with the best will in the world—will ultimately be a judgment call by the police. I respectfully suggest that

“Significant harm to persons, organisations or the life of the community”


provides the clarity the police are seeking in ways that the alternative, from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, does not. It even provides examples of what might constitute “significant harm”.

I turn to the amendments in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead. The noble and learned Lord probably realised that he had gone too far in his definition when the Minister signed them. I am not a lawyer. At university, I studied philosophy, not law, but I am not sure that defining “serious” as being “more than minor” is that helpful or reasonable. Surely it begs the question, “Well, what is minor?” Does the noble and learned Lord define minor as “less than serious”?

Having taken a common-sense rather than legal approach, I thought that serious was the opposite of minor. They are at opposite ends of a spectrum, in the sense that black is the opposite of white, not just the next level up. There are 50 shades of grey, apparently, between black and white; anything lighter in tone than black is not white. To use another analogy, the definition of a serious injury is not “anything more than a minor injury”.

I am reminded of the story of a student at Oxford University where the rule was that cats could be kept as pets, but not dogs, so he called his dog “Cat”. Saying that “serious disruption” is “anything more than minor” does not make it serious, even if the noble and learned Lord wants to call it that.

Of course, if the Government want to ban all protest that prevents or would hinder individuals carrying out their daily activities to more than a minor degree, they should say that in the Bill. They should not try to disguise the fact by saying that anything more than minor is serious—that dark grey is white. More than a minor degree cannot reasonably be defined as serious. We will vote in support of Amendment 1 and, if necessary, against Amendments 5, 14 and 24.

Government Amendments 48 and 49 deserve additional mention, over and above their adoption of the noble and learned Lord’s definition of serious as anything more than minor.

The police are asking for clarity. Let me quote from Amendment 48. Among other things, proposed new subsection (3A)(c) states that

“(c) the senior police officer reasonably believes that one of the conditions in subsection (1)(a) to (b) is met in relation to the procession mentioned in paragraph (a), and (d) the senior police officer reasonably believes—(i) in relation to a procession mentioned in paragraph (b)(i), that one of the conditions in subsection (1)(a) to (b) is met in relation to the procession, or (ii) in relation to an assembly mentioned in paragraph (b)(ii), that one of the conditions in section 14(1)(a) to (b) is met in relation to the assembly ... (3B) The senior police officer may—(a) give directions under subsection (1) in relation to—(i) the procession mentioned in subsection (3A)(a), and (ii) any procession mentioned in subsection (3A)(b)(i) in relation to which the condition in subsection (3A)(d)(i) is met, and (b) give directions under section 14(1A) in relation to any assembly mentioned in subsection (3A)(b)(ii) in relation to which the condition in subsection (3A)(d)(ii) is met.”

I am not sure that is the clarity the police are seeking.

These amendments go far beyond a too-weak definition of “serious disruption”. In considering whether a protest may result in serious disruption, the senior officer must have regard not just to the protest they are considering but to any other protest being held in the same area, even if they are organised by different people, involve different people, or

“are held or are intended to be held”

on the same day. The next thing the police will be telling protesters is that they cannot protest in central London because “There have been a couple of protests this month already”.

What is more, the police can define what “in the same area” means. When the police were given powers to designate a delimited area for a limited time for stop and search without suspicion under Section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000, they designated the whole of London every day for years. There is nothing in these amendments to stop the Metropolitan Police, for example, designating the whole of London as the area in which the cumulative impact of protests needs to be taken into account.

The police are asking for clarity, so can the Minister please explain proposed new subsection (2ZH)(a), to be introduced by Amendment 48? What does

“all disruption to the life of the community … that may occur regardless of whether the procession is held”

mean? How can the life of a community be disrupted if a procession is not held?

These amendments would give the police extraordinary new powers to limit where, when and for how long marches and assemblies can take place, even if the protest is going to be peaceful and is not itself going to cause serious disruption, but, taken together with others in the area, even on a different day, may cause serious disruption. They would also allow the police to define what “area” means. These are yet more totally unjustified, unreasonable and excessive powers being given to a police service that no longer enjoys the confidence of large parts of society. We will vote against the amendments.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, we genuinely saw a demonstration there during an argument about what might constitute a “serious” or “minor” disruption. We could argue for ages whether it was “serious” or “minor”, but one thing I want to stress is why I support raising the threshold to the maximum and why I will support the amendments.

However, I want to ask the Minister, and the Government in general: who are the Bill and these amendments aimed at? Too much of the justification for the Bill that we heard in Committee, in newspaper articles since and in statements by Ministers, focused on the tactics of Just Stop Oil and Extinction Rebellion. Those organisations boasting that they wanted to maximise serious disruption to people’s lives to force and shock society into acting undoubtedly did not help those of us trying to be liberal about the right to protest. They did not exactly help my side of the argument, and I am certainly no fan of those tactics—but how on earth will the Bill confine itself to only those protesters? That is my point.

When we were talking earlier about serious disruption, the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, made the point that those of us who get stuck in traffic jams know what serious disruption is. She used the point to illustrate that she feels there are too many cars on the roads, but in London—and not only London—there are lots of disputes concerning low-traffic neighbourhoods. Local people will tell you that, because the councils have put up obstacles and bollards on local roads, journeys that once took 15 minutes often take an hour and a half, and that that often goes against public consultations.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Paddick and Baroness Fox of Buckley

Consideration of Commons amendments & Lords Hansard - Part 2
Tuesday 22nd March 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I will speak to my Motion F2 and the other amendments in this group. I start by joining the Minister in paying tribute to the selfless actions of PC Keith Palmer, who tragically died five years ago today.

I apologise for the length of my remarks, but there are numerous important issues contained in this group. I promise not to spend an average of more than two minutes on each Motion. There are few subjects on which I am an expert, but the policing of public order is one. I was one of a small cadre of advanced trained public order senior officers, and I have extensive experience of policing events. I remind the House that the majority of police forces outside London told HMICFRS that they did not need new public order legislation, and that the limiting factor in policing protests was the number of public-order-trained police officers they had to police protests. A whistleblower who worked for HMICFRS said that the conclusions in its review of public order policing did not reflect the evidence that the inspectorate had gathered. Having read the report in full, I agree. There is no justification for more public order legislation.

In relation to Motion E, the police already have powers to impose any conditions necessary—including an outright ban—on public processions, if a senior police officer reasonably believes that it will result in serious public disorder, serious damage to property or serious disruption to the life of the community, or if the purpose is to intimidate others. Adding a noise trigger to those powers will do more harm than good. As I said in Committee, from my experience, the more conditions you impose on a procession, the more likely those conditions are to be resisted and, therefore, the more police officers you will need to enforce them. As I have said, police forces already say that they do not have enough public-order-trained police officers.

A peaceful protest with no anticipated violent infiltrators and an agreed route—however large—can be policed with a minimum number of police officers and a lot of traffic cones and miles of white tape. Imposing conditions which the organisers are resisting is likely to require between double and five times the number of police officers. This is because confrontation must be anticipated, and the conditions may have to be imposed by force—such as a march wanting to take a different route. An outright ban on a protest, as well as being unlikely to be successful—as we saw with the Sarah Everard vigil on Clapham Common—requires about 10 times as many police officers as are required for a compliant, peaceful demonstration. How many police officers would it have taken to police the Sarah Everard vigil, in the middle of a common, if there had been agreement between the police and the organisers? The more conditions which can be imposed, and the more draconian those conditions, the bigger the drain will be on already overstretched police resources.

The second issue is the impact on trust and confidence in the police, as the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, has just said. The impact of the policing of the Sarah Everard vigil was hugely negative, and the government proposals will simply increase the potential for, and frequency of, such scenes. By banning some demonstrations on the basis of anticipated noise, and not others, the police will be subjected to accusations that they are being political rather than practical. They will be accused of being selective about which protests can take place for political reasons—such as banning demonstrations against war, as they are likely to be enormous and noisy, but allowing demonstrations in favour of war to go ahead, as they are not likely to be very well supported, to take a Russian example. Such a change in the law is likely to draw the police reputation into even more disrepute. In addition, I ask how many times the business of this House or the other place has been disrupted because of noise by protestors. I suggest none —and I do not believe that the House has double glazing. In any event, the police can always divert disruptive demonstrations away from sensitive areas. This change—the noise trigger—is unnecessary and damaging, and we will be voting to support the Labour amendments.

Motion F is about maintaining the current position, where the police can impose conditions on those holding an assembly, a static protest or a meeting but cannot ban it altogether. The Government argue that their proposals simply bring assemblies into line with the powers that the police have in relation to processions, but there are very good reasons why the two should be treated differently.

As I said in Committee, on 13 January 1986 in the House of Commons, the then Conservative Home Secretary, later Lord Hurd of Westwell, explained why processions were being treated differently from assemblies:

“We stopped short of a power to ban”


assemblies

“because we believed that that would be an excessive limit on the right of assembly and freedom of speech. For this reason, clause 14 does not permit the police to impose conditions changing the date and time of an assembly.”—[Official Report, Commons, 13/1/1986; col. 797.]

We agree, and the effect of my amendment is to achieve the same result.

Already, if a senior police officer reasonably believes that an assembly may result in serious public disorder, serious damage to property or serious disruption to the life of a community, or that the purpose of the assembly is to intimidate others, he or she can, under existing legislation, impose conditions on where the assembly takes place; tell an existing assembly to move somewhere else; limit how long it goes on for; and/or limit the numbers attending. The wording of my Amendment 80G in Motion F2 is different from simply insisting on the amendment we made to remove the new provision proposed by the Government on Report —as Motion F1 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, does—but the effect is the same.

The only thing the police cannot do under existing legislation is to ban a static protest altogether. The police already have all the tools they need to deal with unlawful assemblies, but to give the police the power to stop people protesting at all smacks of Putin’s Russia, not the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. I will seek the opinion of the House on Amendment 80G in Motion F2.

On Motion G, we share the concerns of others that all large demonstrations that have the potential to spill over into the road and, either by accident or design, impede vehicular access to Parliament could be banned even when Parliament is not sitting. We believe that this is legislative overreach, relying as it does on the discretion of the police to enforce it or not. However, we do not agree that the police should be able to give permission to allow entrances to Parliament to be blocked when Parliament is in session, so we do not insist on Lords Amendment 82.

On Motion H, we share the concerns of others that those who engage in peaceful sit-down protests, however short the duration, should face the potential penalty of imprisonment for highway obstruction where previously they could have been only fined. As we saw with the Insulate Britain protests, existing legislation, including the application for and enforcement of injunctions, can be successfully used to deal with persistent offenders, including imprisonment for those who breach injunctions. However, with the undertaking given by the Minister at the Dispatch Box that imprisonment is intended to be used only in the most egregious cases, we hope that this increased penalty does not have the chilling effect it may otherwise have done on peaceful protest.

On Motion N, we are grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, for raising the issue and for the Government’s response.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I regret that we heard the Home Secretary and now the Minister accept the principle of the Opposition’s fast-track public space protection orders in relation to Motion H and use that to justify broader anti-protest amendments as a balance in protecting non-protesters. I regret it but I am not surprised. The danger of advocating any measures that strengthen anti-protest measures is that it sets a tone that suggests that some protesters are good and some are bad, which politicises a general and universal right that I think we should defend. Putting that to one side, I want to oppose the Government’s doubling-down on a noise trigger and follow on particularly from the remarks made by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, and others who have expressed their opposition so well.

I want to nod to the democratic dilemma of this ping-pong and whether we are actually blocking democracy. When summing up the rejection of the second tranche of anti-protest amendments on Report, the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, chided all of us who opposed them for ignoring the public’s demand that authorities deal with new forms of protest activities such as those we have seen used by Extinction Rebellion and its offspring, such as Insulate Britain.

I disagreed that those amendments would have dealt with those new forms of protest. I thought they were so broad as to sweep up all and any protests, including anyone who might have wanted to protest against net zero, to take an example of a different political side. The state also already has huge powers, whether the Emergency Workers (Obstruction) Act or the Public Order Act, as we have heard, that could have been used to deal with these forms of protest which are a particular nuisance, as the public would have it. Despite that, I felt the Government were at least responding to a particular form of protest about which there has been some public agitation and concern. Therefore, that chiding was listened to.

But now, here we are with government amendments on protest that bear absolutely no relation to the Home Office’s motivation on new forms of protest. I do not think the Government have a democratic mandate for these amendments. Fundamental and foundational democratic rights, such as the right to assemble or protest or the right to free speech, should be protected by an iron curtain. If there is any attempt to undermine them, the presumption must rest with the Government to justify in absolutely clear terms, with a sense of the absolutely exceptional reasons for the proposed changes, any more draconian measures being brought in.

It just does not add up. As I have noticed before, even these new types of protest that apparently upset the public are often silent, so the noise trigger does not apply to them in any way whatever. The authorities should consider proposing accruing further power when limiting the right to assembly, and ultimately the right to free speech, only ever in exceptional circumstances. In this instance, those exceptional circumstances are just not there.

Even more galling is the smoke and mirrors of posing these proposals as protecting the public from the consequences of protest. The public are described as “non-protesters”; as I think the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, pointed out, this turns the public into two different groups of people, but actually the public are the people who go on protests. They might not go on all of them all the time, but it is their right as the public that we are talking about. There is an Alice in Wonderland approach here that gets the issues upside-down and implies that the Government are far removed from the reality that free protests have been crucial for the public over centuries. The denial of that right, whether in Putin’s Russia or China’s Hong Kong, should be a visceral reminder to us here of why protest —warts and all—matters.

Of course not all protests are popular. Many of the modern protests I have mentioned, such as those by Extinction Rebellion, I do not support and they irritate me but, as with all fundamental democratic rights—free speech, free association and so on—it does not matter whether they are annoying, unpleasant or objectionable, or even if those demonstrations are directed in a hostile way against what you believe to be true.

We cannot pick and choose which speech or which protest we agree with and then endorse only the ones that we like. We have to make sure that we do not let those kinds of political prejudices get in the way. We are bound to feel uncomfortable at times when people protest for things that we disagree with, but that is freedom for you. It has never been claimed that living in a free society is safe and cosy. It is designed to make you, on occasion, feel uncomfortable. But there are principles here. As the Court of Appeal notes:

“The right to protest becomes effectively worthless if the protesters’ choice of ‘when and where’ to protest is not respected as far as possible”,


and I stand by that.

Nationality and Borders Bill

Debate between Lord Paddick and Baroness Fox of Buckley

Report stage
Tuesday 8th March 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I will speak in support of Amendment 80 and, partially, Amendment 81. On Amendment 80, it is common sense—and would be helpful to all sides of the debates on this Bill that arose in Committee and on Report—that we should know more. As the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, has said, whatever our analysis or principles, we would all be helped if we had reliable data in the public square on asylum and immigration because we could then perhaps do some myth-busting.

When you talk to people outside of this House, there are a range of responses to this issue and, indeed, to our discussions here on the Bill. There is some perception that borders are open, and that there are too many people flooding into the UK for society to cope. Some people will even go so far as to say that we are full. I do not think that we are full but, as far as some are concerned, it looks as though we are being overwhelmed. They use the evidence of their own eyes, watching people crossing the English Channel weekly, sometimes daily, with a perception that nothing is being done. I know that this Bill is trying to do something about precisely that, but the perception is that all these people are coming in and nothing is being done.

I have said before that I do not believe that the people making those observations in public are motivated by xenophobia. I have a number of observations. The UK may not be full—it is not full—but if you live in one of the many towns where there is a chronic housing shortage, you are near the top of the housing list and then you get bumped, you may have a perception that it is to do with immigration because some refugees have been given housing. British citizens from all ethnicities can become frustrated and can feel as though there are indeed too many people coming to the UK. We need to have the figures to be able to refute that, or to do something about it. Also, as it happens, you need the figures to plan how we can get more housing and deal with the lack of services—because, actually, the problem is not too many people but not enough services. We need to know, and that is why the data would be helpful.

My second point is about lack of trust, a sense that those in authority are not prepared to tackle this issue; that it is too difficult. Often, that takes the form of people believing that lies are being told about the figures and the real numbers are being hidden. It is in all our interests in restoring trust that we are not hiding any figures. Also, confusion remains over different categories of people wanting to come to the UK. Even in this House, throughout this debate there has been slippage in talking about migrants, immigration, asylum seeking, refugees and so on; they are all too often conflated.

This is further confused by reality. For example, in my view, there are not enough opportunities for unskilled economic migrants to make their life here. I have to persuade my fellow citizens of that; they do not necessarily agree. Regardless, many undoubtedly present themselves as asylum seekers here because of the confusion. I know that it is not a clear picture; none the less, it would surely help to detoxify the issue if politicians were open and honest. That would mean our having much more granular information about the numbers of all types of people living in the UK and their status here.

Finally, I have reservations about Amendment 81 asking for weekly figures of the numbers entering the UK across the English Channel. My reservations are based on the image of some ghastly nightly announcement like those Covid death announcements, which were so often demoralising and not necessarily very reliable. I do worry about scaremongering, or that stats might be used as a substitute for analysis or context, but, on balance, I believe that sunlight is the best disinfectant and the more information in the public realm, the better. This is not because I am particularly enthusiastic about data or into number-crunching, like some other noble Lords. No nation state can claim to have meaningful sovereignty if it does not know or check, or has no control over, the number of people living within its borders. It comes over as indifference to the worries of people who are already citizens here if it looks like we are being evasive about those numbers, or not openly telling them the truth.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

I hope that I do not disappoint noble Lords, but I generally agree with all the speakers before me, particularly the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley. We agree with Amendment 80 in principle, in that there is a definite need for accurate immigration data. In particular, the public need to know what net immigration to the UK is—that is, the number coming into the UK set against those emigrating. In particular, they need to know how many of those are seeking refuge from war and persecution, such as those trying to come to the UK from Ukraine, and how many are effectively economic migrants, whether workers or students, who make a contribution to the economy as either workers or consumers. The former—genuine refugees—arguably have a stronger case for coming to the UK than those who want to further themselves or their careers. As I have said numerous times, in recent years only six in every 100 immigrants have been refugees.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Paddick and Baroness Fox of Buckley

Lords Hansard - Part 2 & Committee stage
Monday 15th November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

Can I just clarify one thing? Many trans people do not agree with some of the orthodoxies that have become associated with trans activism. The inference was that some people possibly have a particular view because they have not met any trans people. That is not true. Whole swathes of trans people do not go along with a particular political opinion, for example in relation to prisons, as in this instance. I am concerned that it is not seen that those people who argue a gender-critical view are doing it because they are ignorant and have not got out enough.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

I hear and understand what the noble Baroness says. However, on this amendment, I am clear. We oppose Amendment 214 from the Front Bench. We do not support the noble Lord’s amendment, but we understand completely the concerns that he and other noble Lords have. However, we feel that the risks that the noble Lord seeks to minimise are already minimal, and that other risks that need to be managed are not covered by this amendment.

The amendment seeks to amend the Gender Recognition Act to reduce the risk that transgender prisoners present to others. This is neither necessary nor desirable for the following reasons. First, there are very few transgender prisoners. In a data collection exercise between March and May 2018, only 44 of 124 public and private prisons said that they had any transgender prisoners at all. The fact that there are so few transgender people in prison is also an indication of the level of offending by transgender people, the seriousness of that offending and the extent of the threat that they pose.

Secondly, the risk of mental health problems, self-harm and suicide is far greater among the transgender community than it is among those who are not transgender. Clearly, in a prison setting, the risk of mental health problems, self-harm and suicide is likely to be higher for all inmates; for transgender prisoners, it is likely to be very high indeed. In November 2015, an inmate who said that she would kill herself if she was sent to a male jail was found dead. Vicky Thompson, aged 21, died a week ago at the all-male HMP Leeds. Friends said that Thompson, who was born male but had identified as a woman since she was a teenager, had asked to be sent to a female jail in Wakefield. This is the sort of impact that having an unbalanced amendment, such as the one proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, can have on transgender people.

Thirdly, if the Prison Service thinks that the risk presented by a transgender prisoner is such that they should be housed in a prison contrary to their legal gender, it can allocate them to a part of the estate that does not match their legally recognised gender. The decision must be taken after consultation with experts and at a high level, but it is possible.

A number of noble Lords have referred to the High Court judgment in July 2021, where lawyers for a female inmate in the female prison estate brought a judicial review against the MoJ. The MoJ argued that the policy pursues a legitimate aim, including

“facilitating the rights of transgender people to live in and as their acquired gender (and) protecting transgender people’s mental and physical health.”

It is interesting that I am actually quoting from the same case as other noble Lords have quoted from. Lord Justice Holroyde said:

“It is not possible to argue that the defendant should have excluded from women’s prisons all transgender women”—


as this amendment proposes. He continued:

“To do so would be to ignore, impermissibly, the rights of transgender women to live in their chosen gender.”


The case was not actually about excluding all transgender women; it was about challenging how policies applied to those who had been convicted of serious or violent offences against women—as the noble Lord’s amendment does.

The Lord Justice went on to say that trans women’s offending history was a factor that the existing policies were required to consider. He said:

“the need to assess and manage all risks is repeatedly emphasised”

throughout existing MoJ policies. He continued:

“In an exceptional case, a high risk transgender woman, even with a GRC, can be transferred to the male estate because of the higher level of security which is there available.”


Therefore, there is a mechanism to do exactly what the amendment is seeking to do, but on a risk-assessed basis.

The court also heard that expert panels are also involved in the process when allocating transgender prisoners and are “expressly required” to consider the trans woman’s offending history, her anatomy and her sexual behaviours and relationships. The Lord Justice said:

“They can in my view be expected to be astute to detect any case of a male prisoner who, for sinister reasons, is merely pretending to wish to live in the female gender.”


He concluded:

“the policies require a careful, case-by-case assessment of the risks and of the ways in which the risks should be managed. Properly applied, that assessment has the result that non-transgender prisoners only have contact with transgender prisoners when it is safe for them to do so.”

This is the same case that noble Lords have been quoting from.

Yes, the Lord Justice said:

“I readily accept that a substantial proportion of women prisoners have been the victims of sexual assaults and/or domestic violence.”


He added that some women prisoners,

“may suffer fear and acute anxiety if required to share prison accommodation and facilities with a transgender woman who has male genitalia, and that their fear and anxiety may be increased if that transgender woman has been convicted of sexual or violent offences against women.”

This amendment says nothing about whether the person has had sex-reassignment surgery, and there are trans women with gender recognition certificates who have not undergone gender reassignment surgery. The amendment, therefore, is not fit for purpose.

There are two sorts of risk that need to be managed here. There are the risks to the transgender prisoner, either from themselves, in terms of mental health, self-harm and suicide, or the risk from other prisoners, such as the risk of a transphobic attack or an attack based on their acquired gender if they present as a woman in a prison housing men, for example. There may be risks that the transgender person poses, perhaps because of a previous history of violence or sexual offences, but those falling into this category are few and far between and can be dealt with under the law as it stands. Any attempt to stereotype all transgender women as a threat to women flies in the face of the facts and needs to be robustly challenged.

The implication that transgender women are a threat to children reminds me of the sort of abuse that was directed towards me as a gay man a few decades ago.

Domestic Abuse Bill

Debate between Lord Paddick and Baroness Fox of Buckley

Report stage
Wednesday 17th March 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, outside this place the amendment is causing quite a lot of excitement and anticipation—certainly a lot of interest —on social media, in the press and among the NGO world and women’s groups, as we have heard. It has been directly linked to the tragic and brutal murder of Sarah Everard. The Fawcett Society, which, along with other groups such as HOPE not hate, the White Ribbon Association, Tell MAMA and others that we have heard about have focused their lobbying on the need to act now against violence against women. We are told that now is the time to change. That was echoed by the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of Cradley, when she introduced the amendment.

We have been asked to vote for the amendment because it will make misogyny a hate crime and will require all police forces to record where crimes are motivated by hatred of women. However, there is a lot of smoke and mirrors here. We need to be careful about allowing an emotive tragedy to be exploited in a way which will not help women and not enhance the Bill. I understand that when something as brutal as Sarah’s murder captures the public imagination, there is a desire to do something. For any of us who have been unfortunate victims on the receiving end of a violent sexual attack, let me tell noble Lords that I empathise with those expressing sorrow, anger and a feeling that they need to act, whether by attending a vigil, going on a protest—legal or otherwise—lighting a candle or even demanding more laws.

Here in this House, we need dispassionate, cool heads and to scrutinise exactly what amending the law in this way will achieve. It is hard to be objective when discussing the murder or abuse of women, of course. There may be a temptation to rush to appropriate blame beyond the perpetrator or to ascribe social and cultural explanations beyond the immediate crime. However, what are asserted as facts are often, at the very least, contentious or contested political concepts. Misogyny is one of those. It is popularly understood as hatred of women but in the past week, and even today, as has been hinted at, the police have been described as institutionally misogynist. Is it true that the police hate women? Should we repeat the mantra that society is suffering an epidemic of misogynist violence? I do not recognise that nightmarish catastrophising vision.

In the Nottinghamshire pilot on measuring misogynist hate crime that has been mentioned, misogyny can include cat-calling, following and unwelcome approaches, which can be conflated with flashing, groping and then more serious assaults. That is all thrown into the misogynist hate-crime category. Meanwhile, as we have heard from another noble Lord, HOPE not hate’s lobbying email for the amendment told us that ideological misogyny is increasingly at the core of far-right thinking, including the threat of far-right terrorism. So, we have gone from wolf-whistling to terrorism. We cannot therefore assume that there is any shared meaning of misogyny and it is therefore unhelpful to tack it on to a Bill on domestic violence or abuse.

I do not think that misogyny is widespread in society and I certainly do not believe that domestic abuse is driven by ingrained hatred of women. That flies in the face of all the nuance, complexity and evidence that we have heard in the many hours of our discussion on the Bill, whether it is our understanding of the impact of alcohol or mental health, the recognition that there are male victims or the debate that we have just had on pornography.

I understand that perhaps opinions are not enough. I acknowledge that the amendment is an attempt at collecting data to assess how much domestic abuse is driven by prejudice, anti-women prejudice. However, if we want accurate data, we should not look to hate- crime solutions because hate is almost impossible to objectively define. The amendment states that the person who defines this hate is the complainant. The police will be asked to collate data based on what

“the victim or any other person perceived the alleged offender, at the time of, or in a recent period before or after, the offence, to demonstrate hostility or prejudice”.

What would be recorded is when an accuser

“perceived the crime to be motivated (wholly or partly) by hostility or prejudice”.

That is not a reliable way in which to collect accurate data and will not help us understand perpetrators’ behaviour as it is based on perceptions, dangerously subjective and untestable legally. There are also some wholly undesirable potential outcomes. It can only encourage individuals to attribute motives to others. Even if they are completely wrong about those motives or intentions, the police will record them as hate-driven. This floats dangerously close to legislating thought crime and could well lead to finger-pointing, malicious allegations, the stigmatising of all manner of behaviour and the labelling of all manner of speech as hateful prejudice.

We already know that the fear of being accused of prejudice or hate is one key factor in chilling free speech. Being officially counted by the police as a bigot would inevitably affect free expression and close down debate. No doubt, some noble Lords will say that I should stop privileging free speech over the amendment because it will mandate the police, to quote the charities, to gather crucial

“evidence about the extent, nature and prevalence of hostility towards women and girls”

and how it relates to domestic abuse. But let us be clear. This is an illusion, too, even a deception because to present the amendment as having anything to do with women or girls is not true. Women are not mentioned in the wording and they are not the focus at all of the amendment. In fact, the language used is particular and purposeful. An amendment championed in the public realm as anti-misogyny and assumed to be about women talks of hostility towards persons who are of a particular sex or gender. That can only muddy the waters and make any data collection unreliable and opaque. Citing the Law Commission as an explanation for the wording does not work because the Law Commission has not yet reported.

Gender is not defined in UK law and is a cultural identity—malleable, subjective and one of choice. Sex is, however, a material objective reality. The Office for Statistics Regulation recently emphasised the need for clarity about definitions and stressed that sex and gender should not be used interchangeably in official statistics, and gave the example of criminal justice statistics. Highlighting that variation in the way in which data about sex is captured across the system means that it is not possible to know which definition of sex is being captured. This, in turn, places limitations on how some criminal justice statistics can be interpreted and used. I should say, in referencing the new resource Sex Matters, that by adding the word gender into this confusing mix the amendment undermines any possibility of accurate information being accrued, let alone of addressing the prior problem that that information is based on subjective perception. If our intention is for the police to track whether domestic abuse crimes against women are based on prejudice and hatred, that should be simple enough to do if the police have a clear definition and a reliable data field for the sex of victims and perpetrators. The amendment will not help and will confuse the situation.

If there is one example of misogyny in plain sight, it is surely here. If I thought that erasing the word “woman” from the maternity Bill was bad, not naming women in an amendment on misogyny seems to be even worse. More grotesquely, it could mean that women will be labelled by the police as misogynistic perpetrators if they are perceived as hostile to a person’s gender in a domestic setting. Is the mother who misgenders their child the perpetrator, the hate criminal? Should the position on sex-based rights and service provision of female staff at a women’s refuge be perceived as motivated by prejudice? The highly charged and febrile atmosphere of the past week, of which I am sensitive, in focusing on violence against women, must not pressurise us into passing an amendment that will allow the Bill to be the midwife of criminalising women with gender-critical views. It will not, anyway, help us to understand or help any victim of domestic abuse.

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, for those who are wondering why I am at this position in the list, it is because I wanted to speak personally on this issue, rather than as the Liberal Democrat Front-Bench spokesperson on the Bill. Having just listened to the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, that turns out to have been a wise decision. I remind the House of my experience of 30 years as a police officer in the Metropolitan Police service and as a survivor of same-sex domestic violence. Those are the positions from which I make this speech, rather than as the Liberal Democrat Front-Bench spokesman on the amendment.

I want to start by saying that, obviously, I cannot talk about the substance of this amendment without addressing the context of last week’s events. I echo the comments of former Chief Constable Sue Fish, quoted by the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool. I did not hear Sue Fish on “Woman’s Hour”, but I want to echo what she said.

Domestic Abuse Bill

Debate between Lord Paddick and Baroness Fox of Buckley

Report stage
Wednesday 10th March 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

First, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for such clarity in raising some of my concerns. My enthusiasm for the Domestic Abuse Bill is somewhat muted by the worrying trend from the Government more broadly to use civil protection notices and orders to expand the coercive powers of the state, criminalising a greater range of behaviours without the bother of reaching the burden of proof of criminal law.

To be honest, I was surprised that those who usually speak up on civil liberties in this place seemed rather quiet on this, which is why I was glad to see this amendment. I know that the issue of domestic abuse is emotive and sensitive, and that we all want to do what we can to oppose it, but due process is important too, so I warmly welcome this amendment and thank the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for raising it.

It is a crucial amendment, because it aims to ensure that a criminal standard of proof is applied to a breach of a domestic abuse order. That is just not clear as the legislation is written. It seems an important protection for justice and the rule of law. The danger of any hybridisation of civil and criminal instruments is that criminal penalties can be given out without satisfying the criminal burden of proof, which means that someone can effectively be found guilty of a crime and labelled as a proven abuser without a legal test or representation. That feels far too subjective in the Bill, as it stands.

Of course, I understand that breaches of orders must have consequences. They are not just a piece of paper; they are not just there for show. The amendment seeks to clarify how the judgment of a “reasonable excuse” for a breach in the legislation, or that it was “beyond reasonable doubt”, is arrived at. It must be the role of the courts, but it is just not clear.

Dispensing with the criminal burden of proof can have some unintended consequences that are not in the interests of the victim either. Some campaigners fear that the police may choose to use breaches of an order as an easier alternative to proving charges for more serious criminal offences, such as assault or criminal damage. A lower threshold may imply that something has been done by the authorities—as it were, ticking a box—but perhaps more should be done. If the police go about choosing an easier tick-box solution, without the nuisance of gathering evidence that can be tested, that is a bad outcome, so we must ensure that order breaches are not used as an alternative to pursing criminal charges where appropriate.

It is also nerve-racking that some breaches of an order may be relatively minor and very far from criminally threatening to anyone, least of all the person the order is protecting. Some fear that alleged victims may be deterred from reporting breaches if that automatically criminalises their partner or their ex-partner, who might perhaps be the parent of their children.

The worry is that those who the Bill seeks to protect are being sidelined in the process and potentially disempowered. Their agency is potentially undermined by decisions taken by the police or third parties who can use breaches of an order to criminalise alleged perpetrators, regardless of what the victim wants or of however minor the breach. If that were to happen, the main loser would ultimately be due process. I therefore support this amendment wholeheartedly and look forward to the Minister clarifying this or reassuring us that this is not a way of avoiding a criminal burden of proof.

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I want to go one step back and start with domestic abuse prevention notices. These can be given by a relatively junior police officer, despite what the legislation describes as a “senior police officer”—I was a police inspector at the age of 23—on the basis that he has reasonable grounds to believe that P has been abusive towards another person aged 16 or over to whom P is personally connected and reasonably believes that the notice is necessary to protect the person from abuse by P. If P breaches the notice, P can be arrested and must be held in custody before they can be brought before the court. That is a lot of power invested in a relatively junior and potentially inexperienced police officer, with serious consequences for P. A practical alternative might be to seek the authority of a magistrate, in a similar way that the police might seek a search warrant, which can be done at short notice, on a 24/7 basis. Did the Government consider such an alternative?

As my noble friend Lady Hamwee said, domestic abuse prevention orders can be made by a court on application, and must be applied for if P is already subject to a domestic abuse protection notice. The orders are made on the basis that the court is satisfied on the balance of probabilities, the civil standard of proof, that P has been abusive towards a person aged 16 or over to whom P is personally connected and the order is necessary and proportionate to protect that person from domestic abuse, or the risk of domestic abuse, carried out by P.

The order can be made in the absence of P, and it can impose a range of prohibitions and requirements. If P fails, without reasonable excuse, to comply with the order, he commits a criminal offence and can be imprisoned for up to five years. Normally an accused person is convicted of a criminal offence only if the offence is proved beyond reasonable doubt, and while I accept that a breach of the order might be so proved, the basis upon which the order is given is on the balance of probabilities.

When this House debated knife crime prevention orders, we discussed whether the breach of what is effectively a civil order, granted on the balance of probabilities, should result in a criminal offence, rather than a fine or a term of imprisonment for contempt of court without a criminal conviction being recorded against the perpetrator. In that case, the Government claimed that it was the police who said that a criminal sanction was necessary, rather than a civil penalty, in order for perpetrators to take them seriously. What is the Government’s reason this time?

As we discussed then, Parliament changed a similar regime introduced under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 and the Anti-social Behaviour Act 2003, whereby breach of the civil order resulted in the criminalisation of many young people with no previous convictions for breach of an anti-social behaviour order or ASBO. Parliament replaced ASBOs with anti-social behaviour injunctions and community protection notices—a purely civil process—by means of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014.

On the basis of hearsay, potentially a malicious allegation, someone could be given a domestic abuse protection order, breach of which may result in a criminal conviction and a term of imprisonment. Can the Minister please explain why it is necessary for a criminal record to be created when there is a breach of the civil domestic abuse prevention order when it is not necessary in relation to anti-social behaviour injunctions and community protection notices?