British Citizenship

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Thursday 3rd October 2019 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I am sure my right honourable friend the Home Secretary will consider that in due course.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, refugee families often have to make repeated applications for leave to remain, before becoming eligible for British citizenship, paying thousands of pounds at each stage, potentially costing tens of thousands of pounds overall—way above the actual cost to the Home Office of processing their applications. Does the Minister accept that the government policy of overcharging positively discourages those seeking sanctuary in the UK? All these people want is to contribute to and integrate with British society.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

The Home Office does not make a profit from application fees. The income that it derives is used to fund other vital areas of the borders, immigration and citizenship service. We have always provided refugees with exceptions to the need to pay application fees for leave to remain, in specific circumstances. That might be for refugees or those living in local authority care.

Facial Recognition Technology

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Wednesday 2nd October 2019 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

The noble Lord makes a good point. As I said to the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, the use of this technology is being looked at by the ICO. It has launched an investigation following concerns about the use of LFR by managers of shopping malls in and around King’s Cross. I have explained the oversight process to the noble Lord but, as I said to other noble Lords, it is very important that the technology is used proportionately and within the law, and of course the court judgment last month confirmed that that was the case.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, is the Minister not concerned that using custody image databases that include pictures of unconvicted people in conjunction with facial recognition technology is potentially a breach of innocent people’s human rights? Is this not another reason why the Government need to take action?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

It might be helpful to the noble Lord if I outlined the types of people who could be on a watch list. They are persons wanted on warrants, individuals who are unlawfully at large, persons suspected of having committed crimes, persons who might be in need of protection, individuals whose presence at an event causes particular concern, and of course vulnerable persons—we must not lose sight of the fact that the technology can be incredibly useful in detecting vulnerable people.

Terrorism Act 2000 (Proscribed Organisations) (Amendment) (No. 2) Order 2019

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Tuesday 1st October 2019 Lords Chamber

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)]

My Lords, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group—LIFG—was established in the early 1990s and aimed to replace the Gaddafi regime with a hard-line Islamist theocracy. The group mounted a terrorist campaign inside Libya in the mid-1990s, including a 1996 attempt to assassinate Muammur Gaddafi, before becoming part of the wider global Islamist extremist movement in the 2000s.

In 2008, the group formally merged with al-Qaeda. The LIFG has been proscribed as a terrorist organisation in the UK since October 2005. That decision was taken after extensive consideration and in light of a full assessment of available information, and was approved by Parliament. It is clear that the LIFG was concerned in terrorism at that time.

However, the group announced that it was disbanding in 2010. Some of its former members continued to be involved in terrorism, aligned to other groups, or have been involved in fighting since the 2011 Libyan revolution. Some are now involved in more moderate pursuits, such as mainstream Libyan politics or everyday occupations. The LIFG is now assessed to be defunct and no longer exists.

Under Section 3 of the Terrorism Act 2000 the Home Secretary has the power to remove an organisation from the list of proscribed organisations if she believes it no longer meets the statutory test for proscription. Having reviewed the information available about the current activities of the LIFG, after careful consideration the Home Secretary has concluded that there is now not sufficient evidence to support a reasonable belief that the LIFG is currently concerned in terrorism, as defined by Section 3(5) of the Terrorism Act 2000.

Accordingly, the Home Secretary has brought this order before the House and, if approved, this means that being a member of, or providing support to, this organisation will cease to be a criminal offence on the day that the order comes into force. The decision to deproscribe the LIFG was taken after extensive consideration and in light of a full assessment of available information.

As noble Lords will appreciate, it would not be appropriate for us to discuss any specific intelligence that informed the decision-making process. The Government do not condone any terrorist activity. Deproscription of a proscribed group should not be interpreted as condoning any previous activities of this group.

The British Government have always been clear that the LIFG was a brutal terrorist organisation when it existed. Groups that do not meet the threshold for proscription are not free to spread hatred, fund terrorist activity and incite violence as they please. The police have comprehensive powers to take action against individuals under criminal law. We are determined to detect and disrupt all terrorist threats, whether homegrown or international. Proscription is but one tool in the considerable armoury at the disposal of the Government, the police and the Security Service to disrupt terrorist activity.

The Government continue to exercise the proscription power in a proportionate manner in accordance with the law. We recognise that proscription potentially interferes with an individual’s rights—in particular, the rights protected by Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights on freedom of expression and freedom of association—and so should be exercised only where absolutely necessary. A decision to deproscribe is taken only after great care and consideration of the case, and it is appropriate that it must be approved by both Houses. If agreed, the order will come into force the day after the debate in the other place. I beg to move.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for explaining the order, but I am a little confused. The Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the order states that in January 2019 an application was made to the Secretary of State for the deproscription of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group—the LIFG. It also says:

“The Proscription Review Group (PRG), a cross-Government group … makes recommendations and provides advice … on the implementation of the proscription regime including the case for proscription and consideration of deproscription applications … The PRG”,


as the Minister has just said,

“has assessed that the group is now defunct and no longer exists”.

What is not clear to me, even after what the Minister has said, is who made the application for the deproscription.

We discussed the proscription of terrorist organisations at length during the passage of the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill in December last year. We learned that very few organisations have applied to be deproscribed, not least because it is very expensive. In one case that was referred to during that debate, apparently it cost £300,000 to secure deproscription. Presumably in this case the application was not made by the LIFG, a defunct organisation that no longer exists.

During the debate on the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill, the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, attempted to reinstate and put on a statutory basis an annual review of the activities of proscribed organisations—something that apparently had happened routinely until four or five years ago—and the deproscription of those lacking a statutory basis for continued listing. Have the Government adopted the recommendation of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, at least to the extent that they are now reviewing proscribed organisations to establish whether they meet the statutory requirement for proscription? If so, during that debate the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, also said that at least 14 of the 74 organisations proscribed under the Terrorism Act 2000, not including 14 Northern Ireland groups, are not concerned in terrorism and therefore do not meet the minimum statutory condition for proscription. If there has been a government review resulting in the proposed deproscription of this organisation, when will the other organisations to which the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, referred be deproscribed? I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[Lord Kennedy of Southwark (Lab Co-op)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, has largely raised all the points that I was going to refer to, so I will not detain the House for long. However, I was surprised about the application and just want to ask about a couple of further points.

First, what happens if this group, which we are told is defunct and no longer exists, reappears? Secondly, are any frozen assets held in the UK at present and, if so, will it be possible for them to be unfrozen and for people to get their hands on them? I would be very interested in hearing the answers to those two points and those raised by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. With that, I will not detain the House further.

Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Monday 9th September 2019 Grand Committee

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I, too, thank the noble Marquess, Lord Lothian, for the way he introduced this debate. He was ably supported by the noble Lord, Lord Janvrin, on the work of the Intelligence and Security Committee. This has been an enormously well-informed debate, to the extent that I feel completely underqualified to make any meaningful contribution, but in preparing for our debates on the Investigatory Powers Bill, now the Investigatory Powers Act, I was privileged to visit MI6, to be briefed by MI5 and MI6 and to visit GCHQ. I associate myself with the remarks of other noble Lords. They were summed up by the noble Lord, Lord Ricketts, who described our security and intelligence services as one of our greatest assets. I am in awe. I was lucky enough to be told of some of the work that they were undertaking. What they do and what they can achieve is quite mindboggling.

The noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, talked about the rigorous internal measures within the security services to ensure that everything functions properly, but said that they were no substitute for scrutiny and independent, hard-hitting assessments, as he put it.

The noble Marquess, Lord Lothian, talked about the fact that these debates used to be far more regular than they are now, and the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, said that the last debate on this subject in the House of Lords was in 2010. The theme running through the contributions was about a weakening of parliamentary oversight of these important issues. The noble Marquess, Lord Lothian, talked about how the committee is cleared to see highly classified information, yet in its report on the use of lethal drone strikes, for example, it said:

“Oversight and scrutiny depend on primary evidence: without sight of the actual documents provided to Ministers we cannot ourselves be sure—nor offer an assurance to Parliament or the public—that we have indeed been given the full facts surrounding the authorisation process for the lethal strike”.


If people cleared to the highest levels to see classified information are still denied the evidence they need in order to provide effective oversight, something is clearly amiss—something the Government need to address.

The noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, comprehensively set out the benefits and necessity of external scrutiny. While I was hoping to get through a debate without mentioning Brexit, he quite rightly pointed out that, should we leave the EU, we would have to get an adequacy certificate from the European Union to continue to share data with it, and effective scrutiny and oversight is part of what the European Union will consider in deciding what to provide. The Government should be indebted to the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, for his comprehensive range of recommendations, which the Government would be well advised to take note of.

The noble Lord, Lord Janvrin, talked about the lack of diversity in the intelligence community. We are talking here not about political correctness but about ensuring that the very best people are employed in our security and intelligence services. If there is any way in which any community or group is finding it more difficult to access positions within those services—perhaps because of an overlengthy and bureaucratic vetting process—that is to the detriment of the ability of the security services rather than anything to do with political correctness or reflecting the community more generally. The noble Lord, Lord Janvrin, talked about what the committee will look at in future: the involvement of Chinese companies in the development of the UK’s 5G network. That shows how important and relevant the work of the committee is.

The noble Lord, Lord Ricketts, was able to provide an independent assessment of the independent assessment provided by the ISC. He described its report on the 2017 attacks as “exemplary”. He made the important distinction between the impact of leaving the European Union on law enforcement and judicial co-operation and the impact on intelligence co-operation, which tends to be on a bilateral rather than an EU-wide basis.

Not least because I am not qualified to comment, I do not intend to comment on the work of the committee, but I will comment on this apparent erosion of parliamentary oversight by the committee and the apparent contempt in which the Government appear to be holding the committee. The Government’s response to the 2016-17 annual report was received only on 23 July 2018, but I understand that under the memorandum of understanding it should have been published on 19 February 2018 because the Government’s response should come within 60 days of the publication of the committee’s report. The report states that further questions arose over government action in response to the committee’s other inquiries. The report also talks about the committee’s work being interrupted by a general election and the exceptionally long time after it for the committee to be reconstituted. Parliament was dissolved on 3 May 2017 but because of government delays in appointing new committee members it was not until 23 November 2017 that the committee met again, so nearly six months passed with no parliamentary oversight of the intelligence and security communities.

As I have mentioned, the report states that,

“effective and robust oversight of the intelligence community, entrusted to—

the Intelligence and Security Committee—

“is too important to have been left in a vacuum for so many months”.

We now have another period, albeit a shorter one of five weeks, where there will be no oversight by Parliament because it is being prorogued for an unprecedented and unacceptable length of time. With another general election likely after Parliament returns, there is likely to be another extended period with no effective oversight of the intelligence and security communities provided by Parliament. It is not just a matter of Parliament not sitting during a period of prorogation; it is all its committees being unable to sit to call for evidence and to interview witnesses.

All this points to a Government who are showing contempt for Parliament and its oversight of the Executive, not least in this extremely sensitive area. The important work of this committee and the importance of not having extended periods of prorogation where the committee ceases to function was highlighted in June this year when the Investigatory Powers Commissioner stated that MI5 had handled large amounts of personal data in an “undoubtedly unlawful” way. According to Liberty, MI5 has been holding on to ordinary people’s data illegally for many years. In a High Court action brought by Liberty, lawyers for MI5 stated that they could not explain the exact nature of the breaches in open court because of “serious national security concerns”. The former Home Secretary stated that MI5 had taken “immediate and substantial steps” to comply with the law but, again, national security concerns meant that he could not give any details.

This is exactly the kind of issue that the Intelligence and Security Committee can and must be dealing with because its members are security cleared and can be told the exact nature of the security breaches and what steps have been taken to comply with the law—although, from the sound of things, this Government under this Prime Minister seem to think that complying with the law is optional. As Parliament is to be prorogued for five weeks, there will be no effective parliamentary oversight, as the committee will not be allowed to call for evidence or examine witnesses.

The work of the committee is becoming increasingly important as the powers of state are increased, as they have been substantially and against our objections, by the Investigatory Powers Act. For example, as we argued at the time, tech specialists, security chiefs and former Security Service personnel have argued that measures such as storing internet connection records will create cybersecurity and privacy risks.

We are in danger of increasing the powers of the state to spy on us while weakening Parliament’s oversight of the intelligence and security communities. I look forward to the Minister’s counter to our concerns.

Immigration Staff: Recruitment

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Thursday 18th July 2019 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, the noble Lord asked a number of questions, one of which was about border staff. He will know that we have recruited almost all the 900 staff that we undertook to recruit in preparation for Brexit. I will write to him with a longer answer on the inspectorate because I do not have the details at my fingertips today.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, is the real problem at the Home Office not the culture, which is still being driven by trying to achieve the target of reducing net immigration to the tens of thousands? This House has recently passed legislation that effectively continues free movement of EU citizens in the event of a no-deal Brexit. So, the only way that this ridiculous target can be achieved is by the ruthless pursuit of anyone who can be deported, even for the most minor of reasons. Does the Minister not agree that the hostile environment may have changed its name, but it persists?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

As I have said before, the hostile environment started under Alan Johnson and ended under my right honourable friend the Home Secretary. The noble Lord has made the point about culture before, and he is right that the culture of an organisation is key to the way its policies operate. There are no targets of the kind that the noble Lord described. We have a general ambition of reducing net migration but targets—particularly in the hostile environment, as the noble Lord referred to it—no longer operate.

Immigration Detention: Victims of Modern Slavery

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Thursday 18th July 2019 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I thank the noble Lord for his questions. He asked why victims of modern slavery were not detected prior to detention. Quite often, Home Office staff pick up the fact that people are victims of modern slavery. It is not the case that the 507 individuals were detained after getting positive reasonable grounds. As stated clearly in the FoI response, the figure relates to people who had positive reasonable grounds when entering detention or while in it. Further analysis of the figures shows that, of the 507 people in question, 479 received the positive reasonable grounds decision during a detention period. Of those, 328—68%—were released within two days of that decision. In total, 422—88%—were released within a week of the positive reasonable grounds decision. Of the 57 who were detained for eight days or more following the positive reasonable grounds decision, 46—81%—are foreign national offenders.

On the data and the differences in the figures, my right honourable friend the Immigration Minister was absolutely correct to say that there is no central record of those who received a positive conclusive grounds decision and are detained under immigration powers. While the information might be available from the live Home Office case information database, known as CID, it would be for internal management only. For example, some data may be incomplete, and every FOI response is caveated as such.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, it is not just the victims of modern slavery but survivors of rape and other serious sexual assaults whose details are being passed to immigration officials by the police, with a view to deporting those who are undocumented migrants. Perpetrators of modern slavery and rapists will be telling these victims, with good reason, that they cannot go to the police because they will be deported. Vulnerable people are being raped and then deported because they reported the rape to the police. Does the Minister not accept that this kind of data sharing between the police and immigration officials is preventing modern slavery and rape being tackled effectively, and that it has to stop?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I say to the noble Lord, as I think I said the other day, that someone who is a victim of modern slavery, which may well include those who have been raped—these people are exploited to an insufferable degree—should be treated first and foremost as a victim. The abuse and trauma they have suffered should be dealt with first and foremost. However, it is also true that other issues may be involved, such as immigration control. Quite often, in a number of cases, that immigration control will in and of itself protect the victim, because the whole picture will come out. But I reassure the noble Lord that, if someone comes forward who is a victim of modern slavery, they will be protected and treated as a victim first and foremost, and will get all the support they need.

Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 (Amendment) Order 2019

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Monday 15th July 2019 Grand Committee

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)]

My Lords, this draft order differs from recent amendments to the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 in that it is based on changes to scientific and technical detail in existing legislation and does not introduce further controls on compounds under the 1971 Act. I thank the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs—the ACMD—for its expert advice on this technical matter, which has informed the draft order before the Committee.

The order was first laid before Parliament on 4 June. Its purpose is to amend Schedule 2 to the Misuse of Drugs Act by reducing the scope of the generic definition of the third generation of synthetic cannabinoids. I assure noble Lords that this amendment does not repeal the generic definition of synthetic cannabinoids under the Act, and compounds commonly known as Spice and Mamba will continue to be subject to controls under that legislation. The measure is brought forward as a result of the recommendation from the ACMD published on 22 December 2017.

It may be helpful if I explain to the Committee the history of the control of synthetic cannabinoids under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, as it helps to frame the context of this amendment. The ACMD, the independent experts who provide advice to the Government on the misuse and harms of drugs, first published guidance in 2014 on the third generation of synthetic cannabinoids. This is a group of compounds that mimic the effects of cannabis and are commonly referred to by brand names such as Spice and Mamba. The ACMD recommended that synthetic cannabinoids should be captured under a generic definition— as class B drugs under the Misuse of Drugs Act—due to their associated harms and widespread availability, and it followed the control of the first generation of synthetic cannabinoids in 2009 and the second generation in 2013.

The ACMD advice also recommended that these compounds be placed under Schedule 1 to the Misuse of Drugs Regulations 2001, as it could not determine any known medicinal or therapeutic benefits from these drugs. Any drugs listed under Schedule 1 are deemed to have little or no known medicinal or therapeutic benefits and can be legally accessed only with a Home Office licence, which is generally issued for research or industrial purposes.

Shortly after these changes came into effect on 14 December 2016, representatives from the research community contacted the Home Office and the ACMD, informing them that a large number of research compounds not suspected as being synthetic cannabinoids were inadvertently captured under the generic definition. As a result of the controls placed on these compounds, institutions had to obtain Schedule 1 licences to conduct certain aspects of their research. The licensing process ensures that there is a minimised risk of misuse and diversion of, and harm from, controlled drugs. However, the Government have no desire to unnecessarily impose licensing requirements where compounds do not pose risks of harm. Accordingly, it is important that we amend the generic definition to remove a regulatory burden on the research industry relating to compounds that were never intended to be controlled. On that basis, the ACMD recommended in December 2017 that the scope of the generic definition be reduced.

The order amends the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 to reduce the breadth of compounds controlled as third-generation synthetic cannabinoids. The ACMD’s amended definition will ensure that compounds which have been found to cause harm will continue to be caught by the generic definition. I assure the Committee that the Government are acutely aware of the continued harms posed by the third generation of synthetic cannabinoids, and I want to make it clear that the order does not revoke the generic definition. Harmful synthetic cannabinoids such as Spice and Mamba will continue to be controlled through the generic definition.

The order, if accepted and made, will come into force on 15 November. To complement it, a further statutory instrument will be introduced to make parallel amendments to the generic definition under Schedule 1 to the Misuse of Drugs Regulations 2001 and in the Misuse of Drugs (Designation) (England, Wales and Scotland) Order 2015. As a result, the compounds currently captured unintentionally will no longer require a Home Office licence for the conduct of research as they will no longer be controlled.

I hope that I have made the case to amend the generic definition of the third generation of synthetic cannabinoids to remove the compounds that were unintentionally controlled from the generic definition. I commend the order to the Committee.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for explaining the draft statutory instrument.

It is regrettable that, in 2016, the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs advised the Government to include such a wide definition of third generation synthetic cannabinoids. Between 40,000 and 90,000 compounds captured by this wide definition were not synthetic cannabinoids and therefore were not intended to be controlled under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971. In addition, it inhibited research by requiring researchers to obtain a Schedule 1 licence.

That highlights a series of issues with the Government’s approach to drug misuse. First, the ill-thought-through Psychoactive Substances Act, while making previously so-called legal highs illegal, did not make the possession of such substances an offence—only their manufacture, sale and supply, even though some of the substances are more dangerous than the substances controlled under the Misuse of Drugs Act that they were designed to replace.

Secondly, as a result, the ACMD still has to play catch-up with synthetic alternatives to controlled drugs, such as synthetic cannabinoids, which need to be controlled under the Misuse of Drugs Act because they are so dangerous. To get ahead of the game, on the basis of what the Minister said and what is contained in the material published by the Home Office on the SI, the ACMD appears to have gone to the other extreme and banned swathes of innocuous substances.

Thirdly, these synthetic alternatives to controlled drugs were created only because the controlled drugs that they were designed to replace were illegal. For example, I know a doctor who has had to deal with a number of patients with serious psychiatric problems caused by these synthetic alternatives; they took the synthetic alternatives because they were legal at the time, but they would not have had psychiatric problems if they had stuck to the controlled drugs that the synthetic alternatives were designed to replace. My understanding is that the synthetic cannabinoid Spice, which the Minister mentioned, induces far more psychosis and is far more addictive than even the strongest form of cannabis, for example. Can the Minister confirm that?

Fourthly, this sort of mistake further undermines the credibility of the system of controlled drugs under the Misuse of Drugs Act. Drugs are being classified primarily on the basis of politics rather than scientific evidence. For example, the previous Labour Government downgraded cannabis from class B to class C on the basis of scientific evidence only for the same Labour Government, under a new Prime Minister, to reclassify it back to class B for political reasons. Some drugs, such as GHB or GBL, that cause a large number of deaths—particularly among gay men, including a former partner of mine—are in class C while MDMA or ecstasy, which cause far fewer deaths, are in class A. We do not oppose the correction of this mistake by means of this SI but we clearly state it again: drug misuse should be treated as a health issue, not a criminal justice issue; all the efforts of government and law enforcement should be focused on harm reduction, not criminalisation; and the Government need to expand their review of drug misuse to include law changes, including potentially legalising and regulating controlled drugs.

The Liberal Democrats are not the only ones saying this. Last week, a survey showed that twice as many people were in favour of the legalisation of cannabis than against it. Research published last week showed that fewer teenagers used cannabis when it was legalised in the United States. The debate on drug misuse is changing. We believe that it is time that the Government paid attention to that.

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

My Lords, I too thank the Minister for her explanation of the content and purpose of the draft order, which we do not oppose. It amends the Misuse of Drugs Act by narrowing the previous definition of synthetic cannabinoids, as the previous definition has had the effect of requiring compounds that are not of concern to be licensed as class B drugs.

Following the control of the first generation of synthetic cannabinoids in 2009 and of the second generation in 2013, the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs first published advice in 2014 on the third generation of synthetic cannabinoids—a group of compounds commonly referred to, as the Minister said, as Spice and Mamba, which mimic the effects of cannabis. The ACMD recommended that these compounds be captured by way of a generic definition as class B drugs under the Misuse of Drugs Act. It also recommended that the compounds be placed in Schedule 1 to the Misuse of Drugs Regulations 2001, meaning that they can be legally accessed only with a Home Office licence, which is generally issued for research or industrial purposes.

Following the ACMD’s recommendations, the changes came into effect on 14 December 2016 but, as has already been said, shortly after their implementation the ACMD and the Home Office were told by research bodies that the breadth of the definition meant that it captured a large number of research compounds, many of which were not synthetic cannabinoids. The effect of this was that research institutions had to obtain Schedule 1 licences when they should not have needed to do so.

The ACMD recognised that its advice that led to the 2016 changes had unintended consequences. As a result, it made a further recommendation in December 2017 to the effect that the scope of the generic definition be reduced. Accordingly, this order amends the generic definition of third-generation synthetic cannabinoids by replacing the term “univalent” with a defined number of substituents. This will apparently reduce the number of compounds unintentionally captured by the generic definition, estimated by industry at more than 40,000 substances, while retaining those that have not been found to cause harm. As the Minister said, the revised definition does not alter the position for class A drugs or the licensed medicines previously excluded.

When this order was discussed in the Commons, the Minister said,

“so that while those compounds that have been found to cause harm are captured by it, fewer compounds are unintentionally captured”.—[Official Report, Commons, 3/7/19; col. 1263.]

In view of the Commons Minister’s words, how many compounds will still be unintentionally captured by the amended order that we are discussing now, and what level of inconvenience or difficulty will that continue to cause the research community in the pharmaceutical and healthcare sector in respect of having to continue, where necessary, to apply for Schedule 1 licences? How cumbersome, time-consuming and time-delaying is the process of applying for Schedule 1 licences, the need for which this order is designed to reduce but apparently not eliminate, in respect of compounds “unintentionally captured” by the 2016 changes? Bearing in mind that the ACMD made its recommendation, which led to the Government making this draft order some 18 months ago, why has it taken as long as it has to reach this stage?

The ACMD’s 2014 recommendations did not come into effect until mid-December 2016. Again, what was the reason for the apparent delay of at least two years? If consultation took place during that lengthy period, did any individuals or organisations raise the problem about the breadth of the definition that the research community raised shortly after mid-December 2016? If not, why did the ACMD—or anyone else—not realise the problem that this order seeks to address before its recommendations were implemented? Did the changes that were brought into effect in mid-December 2016 properly reflect the ACMD’s recommendations of two years or more previously? If not, is that one reason why the problem of the breadth of the definition came to light only after the mid-December 2016 changes came into effect?

This draft order does not seek to address the issue of the use, or rather misuse, of drugs. The UK now has, I believe, the highest recorded level of mortality from drug misuse since records began. I hope that we will soon hear from the Government the different approaches, based on what would most effectively reduce harm, that they intend to consider and adopt in response to a drug situation that appears to be getting worse.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I thank both noble Lords for their points. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, made the point that this is regrettable—I agree. It is never a good place to be in, having to amend legislation for this reason. He is right that research was taking far longer because of the application process. That is why we have the order today. He also made the point that psychiatric problems would not be as problematic as they are with synthetic versions. However, I have thought back to several examples that I am aware of, for example, skunk weed, which has caused psychiatric problems. He asked whether I could confirm that Spice is more addictive than non-synthetic cannabis. It is indeed stronger than some other drugs. That is why it is controlled under the Misuse of Drugs Act, in line with the expert advice. The SI does not change the control of Spice.

He also made the point that drugs policy should be aimed at reduction. Of course, reduction of the use of drugs is at the heart of what we are trying to achieve, particularly—

[Lord Paddick]

I said the aim of policy should be harm reduction, not reduction in use.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

The two probably go hand in hand—the harm of drugs and the use of them are quite parallel to each other—but I take the noble Lord’s point. He made a slightly different point and maybe I just took licence because I could respond in the way that I did. He also talked about the legalisation of cannabis. He knows that the Government do not intend at this point to legalise cannabis. In fact, the statutory instrument is not about the legalisation or otherwise of cannabis but, again, he took the opportunity to bring the issue up.

The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked why it has taken so long to get here, given that the recommendation was made back in December 2017. The initial recommendation from the ACMD in December 2017 acted as interim advice, covering a range of proposed solutions for the Home Office to consider. Officials then liaised with the ACMD on the feasibility of the proposals and the ACMD made short-term recommendations amending the generic definition and longer-term recommendations. Following those recommendations, from spring 2018 the Home Office engaged in a targeted consultation with the research community on the proposals, which confirmed at the end of 2018 that it supported the short-term solution of amending the generic definition. Steps were then taken to make this legislative amendment. The unintentional capture did not come to light until after the introduction of the legislative changes in 2016. After receiving representations from the research community, the Home Office and the ACMD then acted.

The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked how many compounds will still be unintentionally caught by the MDA. The nature of a generic definition is such that it is not possible to specify an exact number of compounds. I will write to him with further detail once I have confirmed that point. We are continuing to work with the ACMD on longer-term solutions. With that—

Public Spaces Protection Orders

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Thursday 11th July 2019 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I do not think residents affected by anti-social behaviour would agree with the noble Earl. It is important that these powers are kept in force, as residents should be able to live their lives without the effects of anti-social behaviour—literally on their doorsteps in some cases.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I have been in your Lordships’ House only for almost six years, but I have lost count of the number of times that we have explained to the Home Office how its legislation as drafted could be misused. The Government then say that they do not intend the legislation to be used in that way. Trusting local authorities or the police to use legislation only in the way intended is no longer good enough. When will the Government incorporate measures into legislation to ensure that it cannot be misused?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

The noble Lord may be referring to the rough sleeping strategy and how the Home Office uses it. The Home Office is not looking to trick rough sleepers into providing their data to be used for enforcement purposes—a criticism that has been made against us. However, we have been working with local authorities and charities to design an information-sharing protocol that protects the rights of vulnerable individuals but also allows for the effective operation of the RSS.

Children: Criminal Exploitation

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Tuesday 9th July 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, the criminal justice system acknowledges that women subject to coercive control who attack their abusive partners may be the victims of crime rather than perpetrators. What are the Government doing to encourage all the agencies in the criminal justice system to acknowledge that vulnerable young people who commit criminal acts under the coercive control of criminal gangs may also be victims rather than perpetrators?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

The noble Lord and I have discussed this at length, and I do not disagree that someone who is caught up in county lines activity or similar types of activity is both a victim and perhaps a perpetrator through the coercion of a third party. He will know that the knife crime prevention orders—I know he disagreed with them—were introduced in an attempt not to criminalise children but to divert them out of the activity in which they had become involved or into which they had been coerced.

Migrant Children: Welfare

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Tuesday 9th July 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham for this debate and for the contributions of other noble Lords this evening—and to Project 17 for highlighting the implications for children of the Government’s immigration policy.

I appreciate that this is a difficult situation for the Home Office and for local authorities. I have to take issue with Project 17’s report, which refers to:

“The government’s commitment to creating a ‘hostile environment’ for migrants”.


It was supposed to be about creating a hostile environment for illegal migrants, not all migrants. However, the reality is that the Government have created a hostile environment for all undocumented migrants.

I do not know whether the Minister will repeat what she has said on previous occasions. To be honest, I am not concerned about whether the hostile environment began under a Labour, coalition or Conservative Government, nor whether the new term “compliant environment” is simply a new label for the same culture or a genuine attempt to change the culture at the Home Office. As anyone who has studied business management will tell you, culture is the most difficult aspect of any organisation to change, and the evidence suggests that the culture at the Home Office continues to be one of deporting given the slightest discrepancy in an undocumented migrant’s application, and of imposing no recourse to public funds where the Home Office is unable to deport them. As my noble friend Lord Roberts of Llandudno said, one piece of evidence that the culture still exists is the fact that more than 50% of appeals against Home Office immigration decisions are successful.

I fully accept that the Government cannot allow unfettered access to the UK to all who want to come here, and that there must be rules on immigration and thorough investigations into whether an undocumented migrant meets those rules. But surely any civilised society should provide whatever means are necessary to establish the truth of an application, and should provide a reasonable standard of living while that truth is determined.

This is not about relaxing the Immigration Rules to allow anyone into the country. This is about providing a fair system that allows equality of arms to the applicant and the Home Office and does not lean on the applicant, the applicant’s family and, most of all, the children in the hope that they will give up and leave.

As the report clearly shows, the in many cases devastating consequences for the children caught up in these cases are a result of the Government’s approach and the Home Office’s culture of, “If in doubt, deport—or, if you can’t deport yet, make it so difficult that they’ll want to leave”. This report is about the symptoms of immigration policy. We need to address the causes.

These children are the innocent bystanders in the battle between their parents and the Home Office, and the safety net of Section 17 of the Children Act 1989 is giving way because of the financial strain that is being put on local authorities by cuts in the central government grant. In the same way that the Home Office is under pressure to reduce net migration—from the likes of the Brexit Party, UKIP or whatever the latest incarnation of xenophobic, right-wing populism is—local authorities are under pressure to reduce expenditure in every department because of a lack of funding.

Of course, it is grossly unfair that children should be treated in this way—but by the same token we do not want to differentiate between those seeking permanent leave to remain who have no children and those who have. If in every case applicants were treated fairly and supported for however long the Home Office took to decide on permanent leave to remain, the issues in this report would not arise.

Perhaps I am being cynical. In the equation of, “How many votes will this policy win us and how many will it lose us?”, the cost-benefit analysis of supporting and being decent to undocumented migrants may well come out as a negative. And, of course, none of those involved—applicants and children—has a vote. It is therefore not just the children who are not seen and not heard but the undocumented migrants as well who have no voice.

That may be one reason why the Liberal Democrats are not the most popular party. We believe in the dignity and well-being of individuals, no matter who they are or where they come from. That is why we believe that asylum seekers should be able to work if the Home Office has been unable to resolve their case within six months, so that they can support themselves and their family without having to rely on the state, as the noble Lord, Lord Watson of Invergowrie, and my noble friend Lord Roberts said. But during that six months, or for however long the Government decide to deprive them of their ability to support themselves, they and their children must, at the very least, be given a home, enough to eat and enough to live a decent life. As the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham said, at the moment the system is trapping many in destitution.

Noble Lords will be familiar with the saying attributed to Benjamin Franklin:

“That it is better 100 guilty Persons should escape than that one innocent Person should suffer”.


Surely it is better that 100 applicants should exploit the system than that one innocent child should suffer.