Police Reform

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Tuesday 18th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

That is an important point, because in areas such as the right reverend Prelate’s there are always going to be tensions between rural councils and the urban council. There are going to be tensions in any authority between high crime levels and lower crime levels. Again, I hope that the policing board model—which I think will be the minority, because of the numbers of mayors that are either in place or coming on stream before the election in 2028—will be one of serious grown-ups having to set a rate for police funding, set a plan for police funding and then hold the chief constable to account for delivering it. Those are their three essential roles. With due respect to the police and crime commissioners, those three roles can be managed in addition to what council leaders are doing. It is no different from council leaders contributing to a wider district plan on environment, transport or housing issues, which happens in every other field of local government responsibility now.

[Lord Paddick (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I declare my interest as a paid but fiercely independent adviser to the Metropolitan Police. The Statement says that the PCC model has drawn policing more into politics and

“had perverse impacts on the recruitment of chief constables”.

Are these problems not the result of concentrating the power to hire and fire chief constables in the hands of one party-politically aligned individual? How does moving to elected mayors address this problem?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The power to appoint the chief constable will reside with the appointed person who has responsibility for policing. That could well be the mayor, the person appointed by the mayor as the deputy mayor, or the lead councillor in a policing and crime board. The dilemma that the noble Lord mentioned will still be there, but it is important, given their wider responsibilities, for the chief constable to be appointed by the person to whom they will ultimately be accountable. That is the same as for any chief executive. Political interference on the day-to-day business of the chief constable is an absolute red line that we want to strengthen.