Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Paddick
Main Page: Lord Paddick (Non-affiliated - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Paddick's debates with the Home Office
(2 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, changing the subject, the Data Protection Act 2018, reflecting the GDPR, in Section 14 provides that “decisions based solely”— solely—“on automated processing” are “subject to safeguards.” Such a decision
“produces legal effects concerning the data subject, or … similarly significantly affects the data subject.”
The decisions are subject to safeguards under the Act, notification of the data subject and the right of the data subject to request reconsideration or, importantly, a new decision not based on automated processing. Noble Lords will appreciate the potential importance of decisions affecting liberty and that the use of artificial intelligence may well involve profiling, which does not have an unblemished record.
This amendment would alter the term “solely,” because “solely” could mean one click on a programme. The term “significantly”, proposed in the amendment, is not the best, but I think it will serve the purpose for this evening. I do not claim that this is the best way to achieve my objective, but I did not want to let the moment pass. The Justice and Home Affairs Committee —I am not speaking as its chair—has had this issue raised a number of times. The Information Commissioner is one who has raised the issue. Elizabeth Denham, before she left the office, said it should not just be a matter of box-ticking. The guidance of the Information Commissioner’s Office provides that there should be the following three considerations:
“Human reviewers must be involved in checking the system’s recommendation and should not just apply the automated recommendation to an individual in a routine fashion; reviewers’ involvement must be active and not just a token gesture. They should have actual ‘meaningful’ influence on the decision, including the ‘authority and competence’ to go against the recommendation; and reviewers must ‘weigh-up’ and ‘interpret’ the recommendation, consider all available input data, and also take into account other additional factors.”
The Minister will, I am sure, refer to the current government consultation on data, Data: A New Direction, published in September. We dealt with this issue by putting the amendment down before then but, even so, the consultation questions the operation and efficacy of the Article 22 of the GDPR, which, as I said, is the basis for Section 14. I appreciate that the consultation will have to run its course but, looking at it, the Government seem very focused on the economic benefits of the use of data and supportive of innovation.
Of course, I do not take issue with either of those things, but it is important not to lose sight of how the use of data may disadvantage or damage an individual. Its use in policing and criminal justice can affect an individual who may well not understand how it is being used, or even that it has been used. I was going to say that whether those who use it understand it is another matter but, actually, it is fundamental. Training is a big issue in this, as is, in the case of the police, the seniority and experience of the officer who needs to be able to interpret and challenge what comes out of an algorithm. There is a human tendency to think that a machine must be right. It may be, but meaningful decisions require human thought more than an automatic, routine confirmation of what a machine tells us.
The government consultation makes it clear that the Government are seeking evidence on the potential need for legislative reform. I think that reform of Section 14 is needed. AI is so often black-box and impenetrable; even if it can be interrogated on how a decision has been arrived at, the practicalities and costs of that are substantial. For instance, it should be straightforward for someone accused of something to understand how the accusation came to be made. It is a matter of both the individual’s rights and trust and confidence in policing and criminal justice on the part of the public. The amendment would extend the information to be provided to the data subject to include
“information … regarding the operation of the automated processing and the basis of the decision”.
It also states that this should not be “limited by commercial confidentiality”; I think noble Lords will be familiar with how openness can run up against this.
Recently, the Home Secretary told the Justice and Home Affairs Committee twice that
“decisions about people will always be made by people.”
The legislation should reflect and require the spirit of that. A click of a button on a screen may technically mean that the decision has a human element, but it is not what most people would understand or expect. I beg to move.
My Lords, with the leave of the Committee, I will speak briefly. In my comments on the previous group on which I spoke—the one beginning with Amendment 278—I did not mean to suggest that the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, was filibustering. I tried to inject a little humour into proceedings, bearing in mind the wide range of issues that we discussed in the debate on that group and the length of that debate. I joked that it was beginning to look like a filibuster. I have apologised to the noble Lord but I wanted to include that apology in the official record.
We support this important amendment. As my noble friend Lady Hamwee said, Section 14 of the Data Protection Act 2018 provides some safeguards against important decisions being taken by automated processing. It allows a human review on appeal with the subject having been told, but only if the decision was “solely” taken automatically, rather than “significantly”, as my noble friend’s amendment suggests. Experience in the American criminal justice system of using algorithms shows that bias in historical decisions is replicated, even enhanced, by algorithms. We therefore support this amendment.
As has been said, Article 22 of the general data protection regulation provides that a person has
“the right not to be subject to a decision based solely on automated processing, including profiling, which produces legal effects concerning him or her or similarly significantly affects him or her.”
It also provides that there is an exemption to this if the automated decision-making is explicitly provided in law. Section 14 of the Data Protection Act 2018 provides, as has been said, some safeguards based on Article 22 for cases where the law allows automated decision-making on things that may have a significant effect on a person. It provides that where a significant decision is made by automated means, the subject may request that the decision is retaken with human oversight. The section currently provides protections for a decision taken, as has once again been said, “solely” by automated means. The amendment would extend this provision to decisions taken solely “or significantly” by automated means.
The issue of automated decision-making will become, and indeed is becoming, increasingly prevalent in our lives—a point made by all sides during the passage of the 2018 Act, when we tried to add far stronger safeguards to the then Bill to prevent decisions that engaged an individual’s human rights being decided by automated means. On that basis, I am certainly interested in the points raised to extend the right of appeal to decisions that are based “significantly” on automated processing.
Finally, it is potentially concerning that the Government are currently consulting on removing Article 22 of the GDPR and the associated protections from UK law altogether. I believe that consultation closed last week. Can the Government give an indication of when we can expect their response?
My Lords, that was one of the most powerful statements I have heard in this House, coming from someone who knows what it is like to suffer. It is a horrible tragedy that the Amess family have suffered. I echo the noble Baroness who introduced the amendment in saying that our thoughts and prayers are with them tonight, and for the repose of Sir David’s soul.
I was not sure that I could add much to this debate, but I gave it some thought and would like to share some personal observations. Thinking about the amendment, I recalled the singing of the hymn, “Abide With Me”. I have heard it sung twice recently: first, when I tuned into a vigil mass celebrated by Canon Pat Browne, the Roman Catholic priest in Parliament, on the eve of Armistice Day, and, again, when I watched the Festival of Remembrance at the Albert Hall on television. What kept coming into my mind was a line in that hymn:
“Hold Thou Thy cross before my closing eyes.”
Those words express what I believe many people of the Christian faith hope for at the end of life. They emphasise how important it is to receive spiritual comfort.
For Catholics like me, the last rites are an important and spiritual passage, a sacrament, an opportunity for reflection on past failings and for seeking forgiveness and reconciliation. I bear witness from within my own family of the peace experienced by loved ones when they were supported in their faith by a priest administering the last rites.
People of faith, whether Jews, Muslims, Christians or indeed of any other faith belief, desire the spiritual support that their faith can give them at the end of life. More widely, I think that many of my friends who have no faith would always wish to be surrounded by family and friends at the end of that life. Let us ask ourselves: who among us would not hope to leave this life comforted by family and friends or, as in the case promoted in this amendment, by a priest?
I strongly agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Stowell, who made it clear that this is a probing amendment and the matter does not require legislation. Rather, it requires a little bit of common sense, perhaps education, training and research, so that the blue-light services, especially the police, recognise this matter and treat a request such as the one that has prompted the tabling of this amendment in a way that will allow a minister of religion to be with a dying person at the end.
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Stowell of Beeston, for bringing this amendment to the Committee, particularly in such a selfless way in that she said that she was neither a Catholic nor particularly religious. Seeing the arrival of Sir David Amess’s body at the House this evening was very moving, and our thoughts are with his family. I thank the noble Baroness for saying that she was not second-guessing the police officers at the scene of that terrible tragedy, but, as she said, there was a local priest who was not allowed to give the last rites.
The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Leeds gave a very moving and sensitive speech, and I agree with much of what he said. I should declare an interest both as a Christian but not a Roman Catholic and as a police officer who served for more than 30 years. Religious faith is important to people, but so is bringing offenders to justice, particularly those responsible for offences where fatal injuries or injuries expected to be fatal are inflicted. The contribution of the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, was extremely powerful in giving first-hand experience of that tension between the need to preserve evidence in order to convict those responsible and wanting to address the needs of the dying person and their family.
Securing forensic evidence is often vital to the identification and prosecution of offenders, as in the case of Sir David Amess. I agree that there needs to be a meeting of police and religious leaders—not just Roman Catholics—to ensure that both sides understand the needs of the other. Police officers should have a real understanding of the religious needs of people and the religious leaders should understand the needs of the police in these circumstances. As I said this afternoon in Oral Questions, surely there must be a role for government in bringing these two sides together, in facilitating this understanding and in ensuring that, after this understanding has been reached, operational police officers share it and know how to respond in these very difficult situations.
Interestingly, in groups of amendments that are to come, I refer to the valuable lessons from Northern Ireland to which I do not think we are paying enough attention. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, for her remarks.
My Lords, what a moving and powerful debate we have had this evening. I know that the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, and her noble friend will have been moved by it as well. The real challenge that has been presented to the Minister and the Government is how to capture what has been said in this Chamber tonight in relation to the practice that takes place in very difficult and challenging circumstances.
I am not going to rush this, and I am pleased that noble Lords have not rushed this either, as this is too important a debate to be rushed. In speaking to their amendment, the noble Baronesses, Lady Stowell and Lady Masham, spoke in such a way that gave respect to the awfulness of what happened with David Amess. I pay tribute to the noble Baronesses. Out of the horror of that situation, they are trying to make something positive happen in future. We have all been moved by that. The challenge for the Government is how to do something about it.
I say gently to the Minister that the system will respond in a bureaucratic, almost insensitive way, by saying, “It’s really difficult, Minister. It’s very tough to do something about this.” This is one of those situations that requires the system to respond. Human needs to speak to system and make it work, and that is not easy—it really is not.
The noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, brought her perspective from Northern Ireland. She did incredible work there in trying to ensure that, among the terrorist atrocities, somehow or other there was comfort for the dying and bereaved, as well as the pursuit of justice. That was a beacon in that situation, and they made it happen there. The noble Lord, Lord Touhig, talked about the situation in his own family. The noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, made a very moving, personal statement about the horror of what happened to her and the tension between trying to comfort the dying while ensuring that the police were allowed to do their work.
The noble Lord, Lord Moylan, made a brilliant speech. I am not a lawyer so, when I spoke just now, I spoke as a politician who demands that the system works. There are brilliant lawyers on both sides of this Chamber who can dissect the law; that is not me. I say to those with legal expertise, like the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, that I may not have that legal expertise, but I know what the public would expect the system and the law to do. I know how they would expect the legal system, the courts and the police to respond, and how they would expect the system to work.
The phrase that the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, used was, “Who owns the death?” Who owns it? I will talk about myself because that is easier to do. Maybe I have got this wrong, but my sense is that, if I were attacked in the street and stabbed—God forbid that this happens to any of us, but if it happened to me and I was dying—I would not want a police officer ensuring that the crime scene was not compromised. If my wife, or my children, or my grandparents were nearby, that is who I would want to come. I would not care if the crime scene was compromised; I would not.
I know that that is difficult for the police because the police will want—as, of course, in generality, we would all want—the perpetrator to be caught, put before the courts and dealt with. I am just saying what Vernon Coaker, a human being, would want: I would want my family or my friend, if they were nearby, to be allowed to come and see me and talk to me, in the way that no doubt the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Leeds has had to do on many occasions. I would want them to give me comfort, and to give me a sense that I could say goodbye properly to my loved ones.
I do not know what that means for the law, to be honest, or what it means for the guidance, but I do not believe that it is impossible to learn, as the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, laid out, from other countries or jurisdictions, or from what is done elsewhere, to find a means of balancing those two priorities in a more sensitive way than perhaps we see at the moment. That is all that this Chamber is asking for—and that is what the Minister needs to demand from the system. The system will say, “It’s tough, it’s difficult. We need to do that, but we have also got to preserve the crime scene.” The Chamber is saying, “Yes, preserve the crime scene; yes, let’s catch the perpetrators, but not at the expense of everything else.” Let it not be at the expense of human beings knowing what is best for themselves—of individuals at the point of death being able to choose who they want to see.
I suggest that the majority of us would want our family with us, even if it meant some compromise to the crime scene. That is what I think and what I believe this Chamber is saying and demanding. The debate has been incredibly moving; people have laid out their souls. They have done it with a sense of purpose, to say to the law and the system: it needs to change; this cannot happen again. If this had happened to somebody else, I believe, as somebody else said, that David Amess would be saying the same as the rest of us. Maybe that is a fitting tribute to him as well.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord McColl of Dulwich, for raising the important issue of cuckooing. This is when criminals, mainly drug dealers, take over the homes of vulnerable people. It is a very serious and not uncommon problem, as the figures cited by the noble Lord gave witness to. I look forward to the Minister explaining why this amendment is not necessary or what alternative the Government propose.
I note the work that the noble Lord, Lord McColl, has done on modern slavery over many years, and thank him for it. It is right for us to acknowledge that in speaking to this amendment.
I want to draw particular attention to the section of the noble Lord’s amendment that covers something that is often not recognised to the degree it should be when it comes to county lines gangs’ operations and the way cuckooing works. Proposed new sub-paragraph (ii) talks about when a person
“is unable to give free and informed consent”.
That is the crucial bit. Too often, people are asked, “Why have you allowed this to happen? Why have you let them take over your property?” It is almost as though they have given their consent. But they are sometimes so frightened that they give their consent because, if they do not, the consequences will be such that they live in fear. Somehow, the law does not seem to recognise that.
Proposed new paragraph (c)(ii) refers to someone being unable to give “free and informed consent”. This is absolutely crucial to stopping the offence of cuckooing. People sometimes appear almost as though they have left a property of their own free will, saying, “Here you are. Come into my property. Use it for drugs and county lines operations.” Then, sometimes—not always, but sometimes—the police say, “Well, what did you do about it? Why didn’t you stop it?” That does not reflect the real world. People are terrified; they are frightened. They are told, “If you don’t let us use your property and get out of it, or if you tell anyone about it, we are going to do X, Y or Z to you or to your family.” That is sometimes not recognised, but it is the crucial part of what the noble Lord’s amendment gets at. If we want to stop cuckooing, we must understand that people are coerced into giving their consent; often, the law seems to treat them as though they have given their consent willingly. If we are to stop cuckooing, we must understand the context in which it occurs. I hope that the noble Baroness will be able to reflect on that.
My Lords, I will speak briefly. I thank all noble Lords who spoke to this. It is a controversial amendment, but I think it has been spoken to quite sensitively, all things considered; maybe it is the lateness of the hour—maybe that was a good move.
I agree with the previous speaker that difficulties in the drafting of an amendment cannot just be dismissed as modalities because when we put forward draft amendments to legislation and say “must” we need to examine what that means. If, as the amendment suggests:
“Police forces in England and Wales must keep a record of the sex registered at birth of each person”,
how is that going to be executed and what will the consequences be? One has to imagine that one is a younger version of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, in the police station back in the day. People turn up to record whatever it is—a theft, shoplifting, burglary, or a violent offence. How is this recording of the birth sex as well as the subsequently declared gender going to happen and what is the sanction for the “must”? That is not a modality, it is what law requires; there have to be consequences to a “must” being breached. Whatever is really going on, I know there are really sensitive issues in our society at the moment of sex and gender which we will not, I suspect, resolve tonight—we might, but maybe not.
I agreed with my noble friend about the value of data. Whether in the health service or criminal justice system, data is great, but there is another side too, which I think my noble friend acknowledged: that data will put some people off. There are other jurisdictions not far from here where people are really nervous even about declaring their race because of obvious historic reasons for being sensitive about declaring your race at the police station—let alone declaring your birth sex.
We need to see the yin and yang of this particular debate. On the one hand is the brilliant research and analysis of crime we could do if we had more and more data. But on the other hand—and this is not completely different from the previous debate—what we want is victims to come forward and criminal justice to be done. We do not want to do anything that discourages victims from coming forward and reporting crime. That includes people who feel anxious about certain sensitive pieces of information about themselves. We would never want them to put off going to the police station for fear that they say too much. For instance, a person who has been burgled thinking “Was I burgled just because I was burgled, or because I am a trans person? Do I really want to draw more attention to myself because I am an anxious victim of crime?” We need to think about that, let alone the poor old practicalities for a younger version of the very youthful-looking noble Lord, Lord Paddick.
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, for introducing my speech. This amendment is designed to compel police forces to
“keep a record of the sex registered at birth”
of anyone who is a crime victim or who is arrested by the police for a crime. It also forces the police to
“keep a record of the acquired gender of each person with a gender recognition certificate”
who is a crime victim of crime or is arrested for a crime.
It also says that providing this data to the Secretary of State will not be an offence under the Gender Recognition Act. Again, I want to try to focus on the amendment and not get drawn into the wider debate, as far as I can. As the noble Baroness pointed out, I was a police officer for over 30 years, so I want to look at this from the perspective of the police.
How will a police officer know what the sex registered at birth is—thumbscrews, or a chromosome test—even without the consent of the victim? Maybe they could force victims to give their fingerprints, in the hope that they may have had their fingerprints taken before they transitioned and that will prove it—except they may have had them taken after they transitioned, and that will then show their acquired gender, so that will not work. Will victims have to produce their birth certificates before they are even allowed to report a crime? Of course, if someone has acquired a gender recognition certificate and used it to have their birth certificate changed, as they are legally allowed to do, the birth certificate will show their acquired gender, so that will not work either. How exactly will police forces keep a record of something they do not know and have no reasonable way of finding out unless the victim or perpetrator volunteers the information?
If the victim or the perpetrator is a trans person, they are legally protected from having to disclose that information. “Well, it’s obvious,” some people will say, “you can tell, can’t you?” I have met trans men who you would never believe were assigned female sex at birth and trans women who you would never believe were assigned male sex at birth. I have also, embarrassingly, been with a lesbian friend of mine, assigned female sex at birth and who has always identified as a woman, who was stopped going into a women’s toilet in a top London restaurant because they wrongly thought that she was a man.
The supporters of this amendment may say that if they do find out, maybe the police can record it—that maybe the victim is reporting a transphobic hate crime or for some other reason volunteers that information.
The second part of the amendment is totally unnecessary. Section 22(4) of the Gender Recognition Act 2004 already states:
“But it is not an offence under this section to disclose protected information relating to a person if … (b) that person has agreed to the disclosure of the information”—
for example, if they are the victim of a trans hate crime—or, as stated later in the same section, at paragraph (f),
“the disclosure is for the purpose of preventing or investigating crime”.
So the police can use that information already, without fear of being prosecuted. The amendment is not necessary if the victim or perpetrator volunteers the information.
My noble friend Lady Brinton asked if she would have to declare every time she becomes a victim of crime, even if it is a burglary, that she has a disability? What about me? Will the next step be that I have to tell the police that I am gay before I can report that my flat has been broken into? For what purpose should victims have to out themselves? What if I get caught stealing a bottle of Marks & Spencer Prosecco?
It is very good, actually; I had some on Saturday. I have not tried to do that but if I did, will I have to admit being gay, as well as being a shoplifter?
In 2018, the Government tentatively estimated that there were between 200,000 and 500,000 trans people in the UK. Noble Lords have said they like data; I am going to give them lots of data. Between the Gender Recognition Act coming into force and 2018, 4,910 trans people have been issued with a gender recognition certificate. If we take the top of the range of the estimate, I make that 0.75% of the population identifying as trans and 0.0076% of the overall population having a gender recognition certificate, or less than one in 10,000 people.
Even if a victim went through the whole criminal justice process without disclosing, and without the police establishing the sex assigned to them at birth, if they were a trans woman, it would increase the number of woman victims, and if they were a trans man, it would diminish the number of woman victims, and taken together, and taking account of the total number of trans people, it would even out. Taking into account that only a fraction of them will become victims of crime who report it to the police, any difference to the crime statistics will be statistically insignificant.
The police arrest, on average, 12 in 1,000 people each year—three in 1,000 women. I do not know how many of the estimated 7.5 in 1,000 trans people are trans women and how many are trans men. Of course, if trans women are counted in the female offender figures, they will also be counted in the female population figures, boosting both the numerator and the denominator. I was never any good at mathematics—I left that to my twin brother—but it is quite clear to me that trans people are not going to make any statistically significant difference to the crime figures unless we assume, and there is no factual or statistical basis to think otherwise, that trans people are more likely to commit crime or to commit particular types of crime.