Science and Technology Committee: Nuclear Research and Development

Lord Oxburgh Excerpts

Tuesday 19th June 2012 Grand Committee

[Lord Oxburgh]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to take part in this debate. The committee’s chairman has given us an excellent introduction. I, too, commend his chairmanship of the committee and his presentation of our findings today.

The report is primarily about keeping open this country’s options for nuclear energy, which depends on having the technical competence to understand, procure, run and regulate future generations of nuclear reactors. This calls for a wide range of scientific and technological expertise and a steady inflow of capable young people into nuclear science and engineering. The rationale for the inquiry was concern that we might be losing that competence. In spite of a worrying degree of complacency displayed by some government officials, our concerns were echoed by industry and other experts.

Our review of nuclear engineering and science in the UK showed that a substantial amount of R and D work was being carried out. However, there were two problems. The work was being carried out by more than a dozen different organisations, each with its own remit, priorities and agenda. Furthermore, there were no formal means by which these bodies could tailor their programmes to complement each other or to form a coherent national civil nuclear programme. These organisations are listed in the report, and I will mention only two. Our National Nuclear Laboratory, to which the Government assign lofty aims and responsibilities, is run at arm’s length by DECC, receives virtually no direct government funding and its main programme comprises such short-term, applied projects as it can fund through external commercial contracts. Some of its important and strategic facilities remain unused because no customer needs to use them and universities cannot afford them. It is as if the Government do not mind very much what the NNL does, provided that there is no charge to public funds. This situation is viewed with astonishment by colleagues in other countries, as is the minimal level of public funding for nuclear research over the last 20 years. The striking details are displayed in our report.

The second example is our research councils, which decide what science to support on the basis of competitive bids from universities. If the quality of science proposed in a nuclear bid, although high, is judged to be less good than that in another competitive bid, the work is not funded, regardless of any national importance that it may have. Again, this is not a criticism of research councils, which have to operate this way, but it does mean that special arrangements would have to be made for them to fit into any kind of national programme.

Each of the other UK bodies in nuclear R and D has similarly diverse aims and approaches. Unco-ordinated as they are they are, this eclectic mix of activities does have one characteristic in common: nearly all the money comes directly or indirectly from the Government. It would make sense therefore for the Government to exercise some coherent degree of oversight. But who is to do it? The problem is not eased by what appeared to us to be an unsatisfactory interface between the two departments primarily concerned, BIS and DECC. There is no person or body within government that has either the competence or responsibility to take an overall view of our civil nuclear capabilities. It is hardly surprising that we are not viewed internationally as a serious player, an impression that is reinforced when the Government decides on cost grounds that we should not participate in important, collaborative programmes international programmes that other countries see as a means of reducing costs.

It is for that reason that our report urges the Government to both develop a nuclear R and D strategy and establish an independent nuclear R and D board to ensure that the strategy is implemented. These two elements of our report are closely linked and depend on each other. The board should have members drawn from industry, from research laboratories and, indeed, from academia.

The Government’s reply to our report, as our chairman has said, is encouraging. The reply accepts the idea of a national strategy and a road map, and that is welcome. It has also established a nuclear R and D board, chaired by the government Chief Scientific Adviser to advise on next steps. This is fine as far as it goes. Whereas an advisory body chaired by the government Chief Scientific Adviser may be an appropriate interim step, it would be a serious error to regard it as a long-term solution. The government Chief Scientific Adviser has many responsibilities, and whereas his weight would be useful in dealing with the various independent and disparate bodies I have described, it would be unrealistic to expect of him the ongoing commitment of time and effort that will be needed.

Precisely how our nuclear R and D board is implemented or named does not matter. What we need is a high-level expert and influential body with a chairman who can commit several days a month to the job, supported by a small staff and a modest budget. The board must be able to co-ordinate, promote collaboration and commission work in areas where it recognises strategic gaps, whether in research, development or training. Our inquiry did not anticipate that the cost of funding such work would be high, and one witness suggested that an expenditure of around £20 million a year would be sufficient. This funding would enable the board to complement the work of the research councils, the technology strategy board and others, most likely with contracts placed with the National Nuclear Laboratory or perhaps with universities.

Such a commitment to R and D, along with a coherent road map, would also send a very clear, positive message to the nuclear industry. Much of that industry is international and can choose the most attractive location for its manufacturing facilities. This would be seen as a clear invitation to invest here. The recently announced intention to support the Rolls-Royce naval nuclear propulsion facility is to be welcomed and will certainly attract international interest. It would be strongly reinforced by a clear civil nuclear road map and a credible means of implementing it. The key point is that there must be a clearly identified focus of responsibility for ensuring the health and effectiveness of an agreed civil nuclear R and D programme: the road map. The additional cost would be very small. The job is primarily one of co-ordination and ensuring that the country gets value for the money that it is already spending. The opportunity is not only to secure an essential leg of government energy policy but to open up opportunities for industry at home and abroad.